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The Year of Morocco:  
An Introduction 
Dan Paracka 
Marking the 35th anniversary of Kennesaw State University’s award-winning 
Annual Country Study Program, the 2018-19 academic year focused on Morocco 
and consisted of 22 distinct educational events, with over 1,700 people in 
attendance. It also featured an interdisciplinary team-taught Year of Morocco 
(YoM) course that included a study abroad experience to Morocco (March 28-April 
7, 2019), an academic conference on “Gender, Identity, and Youth Empowerment 
in Morocco” (March 15-16, 2019), and this dedicated special issue of the Journal 
of Global Initiatives. Most events were organized through six different College 
Spotlights titled: The Taste of Morocco; Experiencing Moroccan Visual Arts; 
Multiple Literacies in Morocco; Conflict Management, Peacebuilding, and 
Development Challenges in Morocco, Moroccan Cultural Festival; and Moroccan 
Solar Tree. There were also five YoM Learning Modules developed for use in 12 
different classes across three colleges, and directly involving 375 students. As in 
the past, a semester-long senior-level graphic design class developed the Year of 
Morocco logo. 
The breadth and depth of these programs provided a strong basis for 
understanding Morocco in its historical and contemporary contexts. Participating 
faculty integrated these programs within existing coursework thus allowing for 
further investigation and analysis. For example, one faculty member worked with 
KSU students to offer curricular modules focused on Morocco at local area schools. 
A graduate art student assisted in creating an interactive Arts of Morocco timeline 
game which was delivered at Renaissance Elementary in Fulton County. In 
addition, undergraduate art students learned traditional Moroccan designs and zellij 
clay-making processes which they taught to 30 middle school students at Pine 
Mountain Middle School in Cobb County.  
The Morocco Solar Tree project involved students enrolled (Fall 2018) in the 
courses Solar Power (EE4405), and Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Senior 
Project (EE4800, ME4201, ME4202) courses. These students formed 
multidisciplinary teams and competed to design a Year of Morocco Solar Tree. 
Students from the winning team built and installed the tree on the Marietta campus 
(Spring 2019). The solar tree is a permanent mechanical structure mimicking a real 
tree with small solar modules attached to its branches to harvest solar energy. 
Electrical energy produced by the tree now illuminates a KSU logo at night, 
showcasing KSU’s commitment to sustainability and highlighting Morocco’s major 
efforts at developing alternative energy sources. Indeed, Morocco’s Noor-
Ouarzazate Solar Power Complex will be the world’s largest solar plant (580MW) 
when completed in 2020. 
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Students in these classes and many others developed a nuanced appreciation of 
Morocco and its diversity, strengths, and challenges. This appreciation was 
demonstrated in course projects, research papers, conference presentations, and 
Model Arab League and Model African Union simulations. For example, two 
presentations on literacy in Morocco were delivered by KSU students at the Year 
of Morocco Conference in March 2019, with one team also presenting their research 
at the National Conference on Undergraduate Research conference in April 2019. 
As a faculty advisor commented, “these students’ future career goals and 
trajectories of scholarship have been significantly impacted through their 
involvement.” The Multiple Literacies project provided the Bagwell College of 
Education Literacy Center with new acquisitions of children’s books and scholarly 
books related to Morocco, Islam, and literacy in the MENA region. Through the 
Morocco Library Project lecture, KSU faculty, staff, and students along with the 
Fulton County Public Library at Ocee were inspired to donate more than 12 boxes 
of English language children’s books to the Children’s Medina Library in Fez, 
Morocco. In addition to the donated books from the Ocee Library, advanced French 
students wrote and illustrated their own children’s books about Moroccan culture 
which also were donated to the Children’s Medina Library in Fez.  
As one of the major culminating events, the YoM Conference brought in a 
leading expert on women and youth in Morocco who delivered what one attendee 
described as an “incredibly powerful” keynote address. There were just over 90 
KSU faculty and students at the conference as well as 30 off-campus guests. The 
conference was also attended by seven visiting scholars from Hassan II University 
Casablanca (H2UC), and featured an ecstatically well-received concert by Innov 
Gnawa, a Grammy-nominated music group originally from Morocco and currently 
based in New York City. The concert was co-sponsored with the Center for African 
and African Diaspora Studies and was attended by over 230 people, many from the 
local Moroccan-American community. Gnawan ritual trance music has its roots 
with enslaved soldiers brought to Morocco from sub-Saharan West Africa, their 
trauma of displacement, worship of ancestral spirits, tradition of praise songs, and 
sufi mysticism (el Hamel, 2008, pp. 247-256). A highly regarded five-star Atlanta 
restaurant, Imperial Fez, catered the conference and helped promote the concert. 
Formal and informal evaluation feedback from the YoM conference showed that 
the conference was a resounding success, especially for junior scholars from outside 
KSU for the networking that occurred. Collaborative partners that helped promote 
the conference and attract the participation of scholars by posting announcements 
in their newsletters, websites, and listservs included the Friends of Morocco, 
Fulbright, and the American Institute for Maghreb Studies. 
As in previous years, the YoM resulted in new courses and curriculum, research 
projects, education abroad programs, grant writing, publications, and global 
partnerships. These initiatives directly contributed to student learning, academic 
scholarship, and community engagement. As one of the faculty members in the 
YoM learning community reflected, “to grasp the full complexity of the Year of 
Morocco one must appreciate that in actuality it takes at least three years to propose, 
develop, manage, and execute, to say nothing of the follow up, the consequences, 
and the efforts put toward sustainability and future growth.” The “Year of” program 
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is a strategic investment made by the university and its faculty that provides long-
lasting and diverse learning experience for our students. It involves broad outreach 
and engaged collaborations with important community partners. In this regard, the 
program benefitted through its established international partnership with H2UC.  
KSU’s partnership with H2UC began in January 2005, when KSU President 
Dr. Betty Siegel (1981-2006) visited Morocco to meet H2UC President Dr. Rahma 
Bourquia. The partnership was codified with the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding by both institutions in 2007. More than 100 KSU faculty, students, 
administrators, and staff have visited Morocco and about 30 faculty, students, and 
administrators from Hassan II have been hosted by KSU. Past KSU collaborative 
projects in Morocco have included the following: 
• The creation of a master’s degree program in American studies at 
Hassan II University and involvement in the establishment of the 
Morocco American Studies Association.  
• A compilation of oral histories, production of a documentary video, 
and creation of the Ben M’sik Community Museum (BMCM) in 
Casablanca.  
• A 2011 grant awarded by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of 
Education and Cultural Affairs and the American Association of 
Museums to fund the creation of an online exhibit titled “Identities: 
Understanding Islam in a Cross Cultural Context” 
(www.marb.kennesaw.edu/identities). This intercultural exchange 
and collaborative partnership continues, currently developing 
additional exhibits on “Morocco in World War II” and “Morocco, the 
United States and the Slave Trade.” 
• Participation in Morocco’s Annual International University Theater 
Festival in Casablanca (FITUC) including an award-winning 
production of an adaptation of Herman Melville’s Moby Dick 
performed by KSU’s students both at KSU and H2UC.  
• Work with low-income Artisan groups in Morocco who are designing 
new art products that preserve indigenous arts and crafts traditions. In 
Marrakesh, this project included work with Anarouz, a social 
enterprise cooperative engaging more than 2,000 local artisans and 
their families and communities. 
• Funding of a KSU Strategic Internationalization Grant to interview 
and conduct research on women leaders in Morocco.  
These projects provided a strong basis for the designation of the 2018-2019 
academic year as the “Year of Morocco” at KSU and led to H2UC being named the 
2019 KSU Distinguished International Community Partner.  
In addition to the seven H2UC faculty who visited KSU for the YoM 
conference, 23 KSU students and seven faculty visited the Ben M’sik campus in 
Casablanca as part of the team-taught spring-break study abroad experience. The 
study abroad program visited four cities: Marrakech, Casablanca, Fez, and Tangier. 
This itinerary helped participants experience Morocco’s cultural diversity. 
Highlights of the experience included planting trees with the High Atlas 
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Foundation, visiting the Amal Women’s cooperative, donating books to the Medina 
Children’s Library, visiting the Tangier American Legation Museum (TALIM), and 
interacting with Hassan II faculty and students. While abroad, our students and 
faculty were interviewed by and appeared on Morocco National Television.  
These projects all helped to advance campus internationalization and a more 
nuanced and scholarly understanding of Morocco—especially as it relates to 
important issues that impact both Morocco and the United States. As Clifford 
Geertz, who has written extensively about Morocco, argues in The Interpretation of 
Cultures understanding cultures necessarily involves the craft of interpretation, a 
constantly changing, relational process. The following introductory essay on 
Morocco was developed to help undergraduate students appreciate Morocco’s rich 
cultural heritage and complex place in a global society. 
 
Introductory Essay on Morocco 
Amazigh, Arab, Sub-Saharan African, and European identities are among the 
many influences on Moroccan identity. A geographic and cultural crossroads, it is 
a country continuously negotiating its place in today’s changing world. It is both a 
constitutional monarchy and an Islamic state that protects the rights of other 
religious communities to exist and to practice. Its history is one of extensive 
diplomatic relations with the enduring influence of the monarchy being one of its 
most salient characteristics.  
A sustained history of intercultural and commercial interactions in what is now 
Morocco has taken place among diverse civilizations such as Amazigh, Phoenician, 
Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Andalusian, Egyptian, and Ottoman. Morocco has 
also had long-lasting and substantial trade with sub-Saharan African empires such 
as the Ghana, Mali, Songhai, and Sosso. From 1912 to 1956, it was a colony of 
France and Spain, with Tangier as an International Zone administered by several 
European powers. 
The Amazigh (meaning freeborn in Tamazight) or Berbers (connoting 
uncivilized non-speakers of Greek/Latin), are the indigenous early inhabitants of 
Morocco.1 At present, approximately 40-45% of Moroccans speak one of three 
Amazigh languages: Tamazight, Tashlheit, or Tarifit (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 
1). According to Phillip Naylor (2009), the Amazigh have “evinced an ability to 
adapt to and to absorb other cultures. Their transcultural receptivity has 
distinguished their culture” (p. 4). On the other hand, they have been a major force 
of resistance against foreign invaders, and the Romans, Arabs, French, and Spanish 
all lauded the Amazigh’s desire for freedom and independence (Maddy-Weitzman, 
2011, pp. 177-178). Retaining their culture and language amidst relentless pressure 
to change has been a constant struggle.  
 
 
 
 
1 I will use Amazigh rather than Berber throughout this essay except when quoting other 
works. 
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The Spread of Arabic and Islam across the Maghreb 
Islamic states have generally controlled Moroccan territory since the Arab 
invasions of the 7th century. Arab influence has been significant, with Arabic and 
Islam permeating North African societies. Arabic became the language of learning, 
diplomacy, and trade throughout the region, which came to be known as al-Maghrib 
or “west.” The relationship between trade and Islam was especially close (Brett, 
1999, p. 62). Notably, as Dunn (1986) observed, “one of the strengths of an 
expanding Islam was its successful adaptability to local patterns of culture” (p. xix). 
Its focus on ensuring successful business relationships contributed to its emphasis 
on cultural adaptability. 
It was the Umayyad caliphate (661-750), which was based in Damascus, that 
initially conquered North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula (al-Andalus). The 
Umayyads did not force Jews and Christians (dhimmi, or “peoples of the book”) to 
convert but required them to pay a tax (jizya) that Muslims did not have to pay. In 
the Maghreb, as Bennison (2014) highlights, 
 
[t]he Islamic conquest itself was a long drawn-out process that involved 
ongoing interactions between two tribal peoples, the Arab invaders and the 
indigenous Maghribis, the latter of whom came to be lumped together in 
Arabic writing as the Berbers although they did not see themselves as a 
single ethnos. Indigenous tribes fought the newcomers, allied with them 
and rebelled against them. Such high levels of conflict slowed the pace of 
conquest but also generated intimacy through recruitment and the capture 
of Berber prisoners, male and female, who entered Arab Muslim ranks in 
a way that sedentary peasant populations, many of whom were Christian 
and thus inscribed in the new order as tax-paying ahl al-dhimmi, did not. 
(p. 139) 
 
Across the Maghreb, the Amazigh’s desire to preserve their autonomy and select 
their own leaders contributed to ever-changing alliances, for example, between 
Sunni Umayyads, Khariji, Ibadi, Sufi, Sunni Abbasids, Fatimids, and Umayyad 
Andalusian Islamic groups. As Bennison (2016) notes, the Khariji message “that 
the caliph should be selected for his qualities as a Muslim and a leader rather than 
because of ancestry was appealing to Berber troops who resented their inferior 
status to the Arabs” (p. 12). It was the Umayyad rulers’ excessive demands for 
extraordinary taxes and slave tributes from Amazigh Muslim converts that was the 
primary reason for the “Great Berber Revolt” or “Kharijite Revolt” of 739-743, the 
first successful secession from the Umayyad caliphate. Having broken away, the 
more moderate forms of Sufri Kharijites and Ibadi Kharijites in their Amazigh 
interior strongholds of the Atlas Mountains did not continue to pursue warfare 
against Muslims of other sects and maintained a tolerant attitude toward both 
Christian and Jewish communities (Bennison, 2016, p. 232).  
Writes Brett (1999), “The overthrow of the Umayyads by the Abbasids in 750, 
however, was not a victory for the doctrine of Kharijism . . . but a triumph of the 
call for a member of Muhammad’s family” (p. 59). After the overthrow of the 
Umayyads by the Abbasids (750-1258), who were based in Baghdad, North Africa 
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became a decentralized network of largely independent Islamic states. The 
Abbasids emphasized their religious authority but did not exercise as much direct 
political authority over these states. One such state, the Idrisids (789-920) of 
Morocco promoted widespread commercial and cultural exchange, especially with 
Umayyad al-Andalus, a region which had long been an important trading center. 
The establishment of the Moroccan monarchy (one of the oldest in the world) dates 
to Idriss, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (Sater, 2010, p. 3).  
Idriss I and Abd al-Rahman I had fled Abbasid rule to Morocco and al-Andalus 
respectively, claiming sharifian status (descent from the Prophet) and establishing 
new states. Abd al-Rahman I was the son of an Amazigh mother as was Idris’s son 
Idriss II. Being the proclaimed royal offspring of Arab rulers and conquered peoples 
aided in establishing local legitimacy. As Menocal (2002) points out, “Umayyad 
princes descended from the caliphs of Arabia and Syria were also visibly their 
mothers’ sons” (p. 67). The practice of intermarriage with conquered peoples was 
also evidenced during the reign of Ali ibn Yusuf, an Amazigh ruler of Almoravid 
Andalusia descent whose mother was a Christian (Rosser-Owen, 2014, p. 169). 
Generally, racial and ethnic distinctions were less emphasized under Arab 
patrilineal ideas as compared to those of Europe (Bennison, 2016, p. 180). 
Genealogy and kinship have been critical concerns for establishing the authority of 
Muslim leaders in the Arab world. As Rosser-Owen (2014) notes, “Berber regimes 
. . . deliberately constructed Arab genealogies to legitimize their rule in the Islamic 
West” (p. 155).  
After being overthrown, the Umayyads fled their capital of Damascus to settle 
in al-Andalus. They brought with them invaluable knowledge and attracted a retinue 
of experts that helped the region connect with a wide array of trading centers and 
led to a period of great economic prosperity where Muslims, Christians, and Jews 
lived together in relative peace known in Spanish as the convivencia.  
Describing how the Great Mosque of Cordoba was modeled after the Great 
Mosque of Damascus, Menocal (2002) considers its orientation south instead of 
east to face Mecca, as though it was located in Damascus, as “a conscious 
continuation of what had been destroyed in Syria,” and a symbolic expression of 
“the Umayyad’s care not to destroy a multiethnic and religiously pluralistic state” 
(pp. 58-59). Ironically, there had first been a Roman temple on the Cordoba site; 
the temple was converted into a church by invading Visigoths in 572, and the church 
was demolished and completely rebuilt into the Great Mosque in 784, and then 
converted into a Catholic church in 1236 leading up to the Reconquista.  
The spiritual ideas of Islam were appealing to North Africans but were also 
used for political purposes as throughout the empire. North African Amazigh 
groups proved themselves adept at making scholarly arguments of jurisprudence 
based on Islamic law to assert their rights, a practice that resulted in a rich Islamic 
competition of ideas as well as a struggle for supremacy. 
 
The Amazigh Imperial Age: The Almoravids and Almohads 
Throughout the 10th century, Umayyad Andalusian ideas and practices 
diffused across the Maghreb, especially in Morocco (Naylor, 2009, p. 76). The 
success of Umayyad Andalusia gave rise to the Amazigh Almoravids (1053-1147) 
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and Almohads (1147-1269), “two of the most powerful states in the history of 
Western civilization’s Middle Ages” (Naylor, 2009, p. 7). These two Amazigh 
Muslim empires united North Africa with al-Andalus, Tamazight becoming the 
language of the palace in the Almohad period and being used for explaining the 
Qur’an and hadiths (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 168). As Bennison (2016) stresses, 
while frequently “lumped together under the rubric ‘Berber,’ the Almoravids and 
Almohads drew their support from opposed and linguistically distinct groups of 
tribes in North Africa”; and at the same time, both dynasties represented “the 
maturing of an Islamic society in the Maghrib” (pp. 4-5).  
The Almoravids and Almohads left an impressive array of architecture across 
their empires. This included creating symbols of power through monumental 
architecture and relocating, rebuilding, and repurposing as a means for legitimizing 
their authority (Rosser-Owen, 2014, p. 152). Contrary to historiography that has 
tended to vilify Amazigh African tribes for destroying a more “civilized” Europe or 
simply mimicking their art and architecture, the extensive and intensive cultural 
exchange between al-Andalus and North Africa went in both directions (Carillo, 
2014, p. 68).  
The Almoravids, a confederation of Sanhaja Amazigh tribes, first consolidated 
their power and wealth by controlling the Saharan trade and in military excursions 
against the Soninke kingdom of Ghana (Naylor, 2009, pp. 89-90). The Almoravid 
rulers recognized the Abbasids as the spiritual leaders of Islam, but they looked to 
Umayyad civilization and the Maliki school of jurisprudence for political and 
cultural exemplars. They made Marrakech their capital in 1070, developed the water 
supply, and created a unique layout where the ruler’s residence was not placed 
adjacent to the great Mosque as had been the Umayyad tradition in Damascus and 
Cordoba, an indication that their empire represented something new and perhaps 
more egalitarian. The still-standing Qubbat al-Ba‘diyyin is an exceptional example 
of the ingenious and original style of the Almoravid period (Bennison, 2016, p. 
294). 
In asserting their power and expanding their rule, the rival Almoravids and 
Almohads each claimed to be more religiously faithful than the other, but each also 
went to great effort to deliberately evoke symbols of their predecessor’s 
accomplishments (Bennison, 2014, p. 143). For example, the Almoravids 
remodeled the miḥrāb of the Qarawiyyn mosque in Fez after the one in Cordoba, 
and both the Almoravids and the Almohads transported numerous columns over 
800 kilometers from the famous Madinat al-Zahra ruins in Cordoba to Marrakesh 
(Rosser-Owen, 2014, p. 157, 174). The Almohads were extremely ambitious 
builders, expanding cities, installing new hydraulic water systems, irrigating 
orchard plantations, establishing hospitals, and building imperial fortresses, 
gateways, and mosques with distinctively large square minarets. They destroyed 
and rebuilt many Almoravid mosques claiming that they were incorrectly oriented 
towards Mecca, further asserting their righteousness and power (Rosser-Owen, 
2014, p. 182). Still, many of their designs also evoked Cordoba’s influences. For 
Amira Bennison (2016), the Almohad period demonstrated a true artistic cultural 
synthesis, as Andalusi and Maghrebi craftsmen worked together on projects on both 
sides of the straits, setting a tone for the art and architecture of both regions for 
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centuries to come (pp. 320, 328). The imperial cities of the Almoravid and Almohad 
dynasties were impressive, and many of the Almohad structures are still in use 
today. 
Both empires used religion as a mechanism for extending their control and 
asserting the ruler’s religious authority, a process that elicited a strong grassroots 
response in the form of Sufism. Sufi practice emphasized ritual retreat, fasting, and 
meditation to commune with God. It was “Maliki juridical cliques whose receipt of 
state patronage and exercise of religious power . . . often seemed self-serving rather 
than righteous” that led to the increased appeal of Sufi mysticism and asceticism, 
including the Sufi notion of the divinely inspired guide or charismatic holy man 
(Bennison, 2016, pp. 238-39). The Almohads were fervent critics of the Almoravids 
and are noteworthy for their ideological zealotry for instance in recognizing their 
messianic leader Ibn Tumart as the mahdī, or the one sent to restore true Islam. 
Bennison (2014) writes, “The Almohads viewed their message not simply as 
revived and restored Islam, but as pure Abrahamic monotheism (tawhid) which all 
Muslims, Christians and Jews should accept” (p. 148). Thus, in violation of the 
dhimma, they prohibited Jews and Christians from practicing their religion 
(Gottreich & Schroeter, 2011, p. 13). Ironically, the rising power and attraction of 
Sufi charismatic leaders may have contributed to Ibn Tumart’s assertion of 
infallibility as mahdī, as well as to the Almohad emphasis on a source-based 
approach to law rather than the commentary-based Maliki approach (Bennison, 
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2016, pp. 253, 257-58, 274). This Islamic competition of ideas encompassed 
different notions of religious practice, legal schools, and leadership styles. 
One of the leading philosophical protagonists within these debates was Ibn 
Rushd al-Hafid (1126-1198), also known as Averroes, who served as a judge and 
court physician. The “quintessential Almohad intellectual,” he wrote extensively 
about many subjects including philosophy, theology, medicine, astronomy, physics, 
law, and linguistics. His philosophical works include commentaries on Aristotle 
that were very influential among Jewish and Christian scholars including his 
contemporary, Moses ben Maimon, also known as Musa ibn Maymum or 
Maimonides (1138-1204), who lived and worked in Morocco before migrating to 
Egypt (Bennison, 2016, pp. 261-62).  
The Amazigh were not simple rebel nomads, but intellectual rulers of a vast 
empire. As Bennison (2014) describes the change, “by the end of the Almohad rule, 
the idea of normative urban-based Islamic rule had become generalized throughout 
the Maghreb and the sectarian tribal landscape of preceding centuries had changed 
dramatically and permanently” (p. 154). Conflict increased as urban-based centers 
attempted to expand their power and control. Unfortunately, increased military 
conflict between Castilian Christians and the Almoravid and Almohad Islamic 
empires in Iberia/Andalusia saw the rise of a crusade-based and jihad-based 
political paradigm (Bennison, 2016, p. 19). More and more, “politicized Islam and 
Christianity narrowed perspectives and produced ‘misreceptions’ and 
misperceptions of others” (Naylor, 2009, p. 106). Thus, religious intolerance 
increasingly became a weapon for empire building among competing Christian and 
Islamic states. 
After the Almohads were defeated and pushed out of al-Andalus, they faced 
rising competition in the Maghreb, and were eventually defeated and succeeded by 
the Marinids (1269-1465). Unlike their predecessors, the Marinids were not a 
sharifian dynasty that claimed ancestry from the Prophet (Naylor, 2009, p. 98). 
They were, however, actively involved in the gold trade with Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and provided support to the last remaining Islamic kingdom in Andalusia, the 
Nasrids of Granada. Granada did not surrender until 1492, ending nearly 800 years 
of Islamic rule in al-Andalus. The Marinids re-established the Maliki school in their 
capital of Fez and were known for building large madrasas, including one that 
featured an extraordinary mechanical water-clock (Blair & Bloom, 1994, p. 122). 
Thus, carrying on Fez’s tradition as a seat of learning—the oldest existing and 
continually operating educational institution in the world being the University of al-
Qarawiyyin, founded in 859 AD by a Muslim woman, Fatima al-Fihri.  
 
A Cosmopolitan Era 
It was during the period of Marinid rule that two very influential North African 
luminaries left their mark: Ibn Battuta and Ibn Khaldun. Born into a family of legal 
scholars in Tangier during the Marinid dynasty, Ibn Battuta (1304-1368) is the 
greatest traveler of premodern times. Far exceeding Marco Polo, he traveled 
approximately 73,000 miles and visited more than 40 different lands, including 
Spain, China, Kazakhstan, Tanzania, and Mali. His narrative story of this grand 
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tour, or rihla, reports on a wide variety of political events, human geography, and 
social and economic conditions in great detail (Dunn, 1986, pp. 1-5).  
Ibn Battuta studied in the Maliki school of jurisprudence and was also 
influenced and interested in Sufism, which recognizes the possibility of achieving 
a direct personal communion with God. Sufi saints, known as marabouts in the 
Maghreb, attracted many followers. Today, their tombs dot the rural and urban 
landscape of the Maghreb and are major pilgrimage sites (Zillinger, 2014, p. 41). In 
many ways, his traveling career represented a grand world tour of the lodges and 
tombs of famous Sufi mystics and saints (Dunn, 1986, pp. 22-24). 
The scholarly class of the Islamic world was an extraordinarily mobile group, 
connecting Islamic centers of study and worship with its distant outposts (Dunn, 
1986, p. 24). Ibn Battuta, who spent eight years in India serving as a judge in the 
Sultanate of Delhi, exemplified this practice. According to Ross Dunn (1986), 
 
[m]embers of this cultural elite who were living and traveling in the further 
regions consistently maintained close ties with the great cities of the 
central Islamic lands, thereby creating not merely a scattering of literate 
and skilled Muslims across the hemisphere, but an integrated, growing, 
self-replenishing network of cultural communication . . . Islam tended to 
encourage a higher degree of social mobility and freer movement of 
individuals from one city and region to another than was the case in the 
other civilizations of that time. Islamic culture put great stress on 
egalitarian behavior in social relations based on the ideal of a community 
of believers (the umma) having a common allegiance to one God and his 
Sacred Law. To be sure, a great gulf separated the rich and powerful from 
the poor and weak, as was the case in all civilized societies until very 
recent times. But Islam mightily resisted the institutionalizing of ascribed 
statuses, ethnic exclusivities, or purely territorial loyalties. (p. 10) 
 
Originally from the area of Tunisia, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), author of the Kitab 
al-‘Ibar, a history of Amazigh North Africa under Islamic rule, put forth in the 
Muqaddima (introduction) an influential theory of political world history. 
According to Bennison (2016), Ibn Khaldun argued in this work that “government 
preserved humankind from savagery,” but civilization “fostered an effete, decadent 
and morally questionable lifestyle in comparison with the simple, virtuous and 
hardy ways of the tribes” (pp. 6-7). In some ways, this theory asserted the necessity 
for ruling groups to be replenished by incorporating new or previously 
disenfranchised groups into society. Ibn Khaldun, considering the specific case of 
the Almoravids and Almohads, believed that tribal differences were surmounted 
“by a charismatic leader with a particular religious message,” as was certainly the 
case of Ibn Tumart (Bennison, 2016, p. 7). 
 
European Imperialism and Colonial Rule 
As Islamic rule ended in the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal and Spain embarked 
on an Age of Discovery that entailed establishing control of the high seas. 
Sanctioned by Papal Bulls (decrees) such as the Dum diversas of 1452, the Catholic 
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Church encouraged an aggressive approach that would “vanquish and subdue all 
Saracens (Muslims) and pagans and other enemies of Christ, to reduce their persons 
to perpetual slavery, and to convert to Christianity” (Ghazanfar, 2016, p. 43). As 
Lambert (2005) explains, “When Spain expelled Muslims from Iberia, that 
Christian power confiscated their property, denied the Barbary powers favorable 
trading terms, raided their territory, and enslaved their people” (p. 109). The 1494 
Treaty of Tordesillas fixed a boundary between the competing Portuguese and 
Spanish empires that, in part, allowed Spain and Portugal to fight together against 
the Ottomans and Arabs in the Mediterranean and Arabian Seas in order to 
monopolize the Atlantic and Indian Ocean trade routes to Asia and Africa. Figuring 
prominently in this effort, the Strait of Gibraltar was always a disorderly and highly 
contested space (Pennell, 2001, p. 55). 
The Portuguese exploited the intense rivalry between Morocco’s closely 
related Zanata Marinids and Zanata Wattasids (1465-1554) to seize control of 
Ceuta, the entrance to the Mediterranean, in 1415. In 1437, an expedition 
commanded by Prince Henry of Portugal was surrounded by Moroccan forces at 
Tangier and allowed to return to their ships only upon the promise to surrender 
Ceuta. Prince Henry’s younger brother Dom Ferdinand was held hostage and died 
in prison in Fez, since the promise to surrender Ceuta was never fulfilled (Boxer, 
1975, p. 26). The Portuguese later took al-Qasr al-Saghir, Tangier, and Arzila but 
were expelled from Agadir in 1541 by Morocco’s Sa‘adi (1549-1654) sharifian 
dynasty. The Sa‘adi forced the Portuguese to abandon the cities of Safi and 
Azenmour, thereby reopening the Atlantic coasts to Moroccan commerce (Naylor, 
2009, p. 124). The Wattasids, allied with the Ottomans, briefly occupied Fez, but 
were also defeated by the Sa‘adi. Ottoman incursions in Morocco led the Sa‘adi to 
pursue a strategic alliance with Spain. At the same time, the Sa‘adi extended their 
control over the Saharan trade routes. They also continued the emphasis of 
incorporating water features within their urban architecture, adding many public 
fountains (Blair & Bloom, 1994a, p. 260).  
The Battle of the Three Kings (1578) resulted in the death of the childless King 
Sebastian of Portugal, his ally the deposed Moroccan sultan, al-Mutawakkil, and 
the Sa‘adi Sultan Abd al-Malik. The Sa‘adi victory resulted in Abd al-Malik’s 
brother Ahmad al-Mansur becoming the next ruler of Morocco. The rule of Sultan 
al-Mansur “protected Morocco from the predations and ambitions of Spain and the 
Ottoman Empire” (Naylor, 2009, p. 26). He created the makhzan, a term connoting 
the central organization of government administration. Contrary to the colonial and 
post-colonial discourse of decline often used to characterize non-Western responses 
to the onslaught of European imperialism, Moroccan responses demonstrated a 
resiliency distinguished by cautious strategic thinking and selective appropriation 
of new ideas and technologies, with the Sultans often taking the lead in initiating 
modernizing reforms (Miller, 2013, p. 29). At the same time, European alliances 
grew in the face of such ambitions. For example, in 1662, the cities of Tangier and 
Mumbai became dowry gifts from Katherine of Braganza in her marriage to Charles 
II providing a critical link between the Portuguese and British empires. 
The Sa‘adi and Alawi (1654-present) sharifian dynasties implemented 
numerous reforms and generally managed to protect Morocco from incursions by 
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the Ottomans, Portuguese, and Spanish. One of the most famous Alawi Sultans, 
Mawlay Isma‘il, whose mother was from sub-Saharan Africa, raised a large 
professional army known as the “Black Guard” with an elite cavalry unit, 
constructed a corsair fleet to assert Moroccan power in the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean, moved the capital to Meknes, and made an offer of marriage to 
Louis XIV’s daughter (Bennison, 2002, pp. 27-28; Blair & Bloom, 1994a, p. 260). 
During his reign, the Alawi pushed back Portuguese and Spanish positions on the 
African continent (El Jadida, Sebta, Melilla, Peñón de Alhucemas) (Sater, 2010, p. 
4).  
 
Moroccan Dynasties 
Idrisid 789-920 
Fatimid Rule 922-974 
Umayyad Andalus Rule  974-1040 
Almoravid 1040-1147 
Almohad 1124-1269 
Marinid  1248-1465 
Idrisid interlude  1465-1471 
Wattasid 1471-1554 
Saadi  1549-1659 
Dila'i interlude 1659-1663 
Alawi 1666-present 
 
The death of Sultan Isma‘il was followed by prolonged civil war (his son was 
deposed five times during his 30-year reign) which led to other endemic problems 
that greatly weakened the state and resulted in the navy being disbanded. Isma‘il’s 
grandson, Muhammed III (reigned 1757-1790), however, was a great reformer who 
sent numerous emissaries to learn from the Ottoman court in Istanbul. Believing 
that peaceful commerce with Europe was wiser than continuous warfare, he 
implemented new duties on overseas trade and rebuilt the port of Essaouira on the 
Atlantic coast to promote trade (Miller, 2013, pp. 8-10). 
Muhammed III was the first head of state to recognize the United States as an 
independent nation. Morocco was also the first nation in the world to recognize the 
new U.S. Constitution of 1787 and to address George Washington as the first 
elected president. It can therefore be said that Morocco has the oldest, unbroken, 
perpetual treaty of friendship and peace with the United States (Tise, 2005). This 
relationship was brought about, in part, due to the activities of the Barbary corsairs 
(Lambert, 2005, pp. 50-59).  
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In the Mediterranean, Barbary corsairs, the majority of whom were European 
exiles from the Iberian Peninsula, operated primarily out of Algiers, Tunis, and 
Tripoli as regencies of the Ottoman Empire. Historically, European corsairs were 
also active throughout the Mediterranean and attacked North African shipping 
interests. Both groups engaged in seizing cargo and enslaving and ransoming 
captives. In Morocco, the port of Salé (Rabat) also had active groups of corsairs. In 
the early 17th century, 70 to 80 European ships were being captured annually 
(Weiss, 2011, pp. 7-11). As shipping raids increased, European powers began 
paying tribute to North African rulers, negotiating individual treaties with the Sultan 
of Morocco and Ottoman regencies, in order to ensure safe passage. Similarly, what 
came to be known as privateers, not unlike corsairs, became an institutionalized 
form of piracy licensed by governments to disrupt as well as carry out military and 
commercial activities. European states recognized the corsairs as privateers and 
even financed some Barbary corsair expeditions. The American colonies relied 
heavily on privateers during the War of Independence, with 2,500 mercenary ships 
deployed against British shipping (Silverstein, 2005, pp. 184-187). Military 
competition over trade routes at sea was at its height in the period. 
Ratified by the U.S. Congress in 1787, the Treaty with Morocco established 
free trade without tribute between the two nations. It was hoped that this treaty 
would be a model that the United States could take to the other Barbary powers 
(Lambert, 2005, p. 59). But this was not to be. Between 1785 and 1796, Algerian 
corsairs captured thirteen American ships and held more than 100 Americans 
ransom. The United States eventually agreed to pay $600,000 in ransom for the 
captives and in tribute, to buy peace. The new nation soon negotiated other treaties, 
bringing the total cost to $1.25 million or 20% of the U.S. federal government’s 
annual budget (Lambert, 2005, p. 93). This eventually led to the Tripolitan War 
(1801-1805), as the United States decided to fight rather than continue paying 
tribute (Silverstein, 2005, p. 181). Significantly, it also contributed to deeper 
questioning of slavery in America, for in 1800 there were 750,000 Africans and 
people of African descent enslaved in America, compared to a few hundred 
Americans enslaved in North Africa (Lambert, 2005, pp. 120-121). 
Muhammed III’s extensive reforms challenged the status and privileges of the 
elite religious classes, who eventually enlisted the Sultan’s son, Yazid, to lead their 
opposition. Following Yazid’s short rule, Muhammed III’s second son, Sulayman, 
continued reversing his father’s policies, attempting to close the doors on trade and 
interaction with Europe (Miller, 2013, p. 11). A distinguishing characteristic of 
hereditary monarchies is generational with a distinct and unpredictable rhythm of 
change. How and which issues each ruler addresses is based on their unique 
experiences, skills, and interests. They do not always follow their predecessor’s 
footsteps, but they often learn lessons from their missteps.  
Sulayman’s successor, his nephew Abd al-Rahman (reigned 1822-1859), 
suffered significant military defeats and was forced to recognize that Morocco had 
fallen far behind Europe in terms of its military capability as well as in industrial 
technology and manufacturing. Abd al-Rahman’s son, Muhammad IV (reigned 
1859 to 1873), who commanded the Moroccan army defeated by the French at the 
Battle of Isly in August 1844, launched a series of military reforms establishing the 
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first European-styled regiment, building a munitions factory and setting up a 
military training school in Fez; however, tribal resistance to foreign intrusions 
remained the most effective line of defense (Sater, 2010, p. 13). Unfortunately, 
following raids by Anjera tribesmen on a Spanish garrison at Ceuta, Spain, declared 
war. The Spanish-Moroccan War (1859-1860) included naval bombardment of 
Tangier, Asilah, and Tetouan and resulted in widespread devastation. The British, 
concerned about Spanish occupation, brokered a treaty that imposed a crippling 
indemnity payment on Morocco and that was paid from custom tariffs collected by 
Spanish authorities stationed in the ports (Miller, 2013, pp. 24-25).  
From the time of the French conquest of Algeria in 1830 until the establishment 
of the protectorate in 1912, Morocco was constantly under threat by European 
powers looking to establish a greater colonial presence. The severe and conclusive 
military defeats to France in Algeria in 1830 and 1844 and to the Spanish in 
Morocco in 1860 made clear the immense disparity in the military might of the 
Maghreb and its European neighbors pressuring the Alawi monarchy to accept 
preferential commercial treaties and eventually colonial rule. The first such treaty 
was with Britain in 1856, which the Sultan knew was keen to press any advantage 
in its rivalry with the French. One of the most problematic terms of the treaty 
provided the extension of legal protection to any foreigner involved in a dispute 
who could choose to have the case heard in a consular rather than a Moroccan court. 
The status of protégé, or protected person, grew quickly to include Moroccan 
citizens employed by foreign enterprises (Miller, 2013, p. 23). Most of the 
Moroccan protégés were successful merchants and entrepreneurs who operated 
within legal frameworks, but others operated illegally in exploitive and banned 
activities. Miller (2013) reports that notably, “while Jews figured disproportionately 
among the protégés, they were no means the majority. Most Jews who benefitted 
from the practice were bankers and wealthy merchants, while the mass of Jews—
poor artisans, shopkeepers and laborers—were not affected at all” (pp. 43-44).  
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 shortened the distance from Europe to 
India via the Mediterranean, further heightening tensions and rivalries throughout 
the region. The British went to war with Egyptian nationalists in 1882 to establish 
outright control of the canal and surrounding territory (Anderson, 2013, p. 55). The 
intense competition for world power led to the 1884 Berlin Conference and the 
“Scramble for Africa” during which the continent was divided into spheres of 
influence among the European powers. Miller (2013) further elucidates: “when 
British-French rivalry ceased due to Germany’s increased colonial ambitions under 
Wilhelm II (1888-1918), Morocco’s independence was far less secure, opening the 
way for French colonial ambitions in North-West Africa” (p. 15). The Entente 
Cordiale of 1904 between Britain and France gave Britain a free hand in Egypt, and 
France the right to “preserve order” and “provide assistance” in Morocco (Miller, 
2013, p. 72). 
Hassan I (reigned 1873-1894) continued Muhammed IV’s emphasis on 
military and administrative reforms, further organizing and modernizing a 
professional corps of ministerial and managerial roles. This included sending 
students abroad for training and building a cadre of professionals who could deal 
effectively with Europeans. Most famously, he organized regular annual tours of 
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the countryside to project his authority, during which he was accompanied by as 
many as 15,000 soldiers, court officials, traders, and staff. The impressive show of 
force and commercial benefits of these local diplomatic expeditions were aimed at 
reducing conflict within the empire (Miller, 2013, pp. 34-37). However, growing 
inequalities due to expanded contact with Europe and the inflationary pressure of 
foreign capital exacerbated rising tensions and competition within the empire 
(Miller, 2013, p. 53). As Miller (2013) highlights, “Morocco was [gradually] 
transformed into another subaltern state feeding European expansion by offering 
raw materials, cheap labor, and unprotected markets” (p. 27). Moreover, Europe’s 
“civilizing mission” sanctioned intervention on behalf of subjugated peoples 
everywhere and drove increased militancy in Morocco as elsewhere (Miller, 2013, 
p. 55). Morocco’s annual trade deficit reached 14 million francs annually by 1902, 
and a French loan of 62.5 million francs in 1904 was a clear sign of the Moroccan 
state’s financial crisis (Miller, 2013, pp. 61-63).  
The Acts of Algeciras of 1906, brought on by European imperial ambitions and 
brokered unsuccessfully by Theodore Roosevelt, was signed by Sultan Moulay Abd 
al-Aziz (reigned 1894-1908) (Naylor, 2009, p. 162). It stipulated greater foreign 
economic presence and administrative authority in Morocco, especially in the port 
cities, and led to the overthrow of the sultan in 1908. In an unprecedented move, 
the bay‘a (oath of allegiance) issued by the ulama (religious scholars) imposed 
terms on the new sultan, Moulay Abd al-Hafid, requiring him to abrogate the 
Algeciras Act, restore Morocco’s territorial integrity, and expel French troops from 
Casablanca and Ouja (Miller, 2013, p. 77; Naylor, 2009, p. 16). This proved an 
impossible task and only served to increase French pressure. On March 30, 1912, 
Abd al-Hafid signed the Treaty of Fez, making Morocco a French protectorate. The 
Fez Riots took place in the capital two weeks later. The Jewish quarter was leveled 
before order was restored, when French artillery shelled the centers of resistance in 
the city and forced insurrectionaries to surrender. In the end, 66 Europeans, 42 Jews, 
and some 600 Moroccans were killed, and Sultan Abd al-Hafid abdicated his throne 
(Gershovich, 2000, p. 57). French colonial rule in Morocco would last for the next 
44 years.  
Generally, French colonial practice in Morocco, especially under Resident-
General Hubert Lyautey’s administration, aimed “to work with, not against, native 
socio-political elites and respect pre-colonial customs and traditions. . . . [Preserving 
the Sultanate] put the traditional sources of power and its administration at the 
disposal of the French. This [however] had the potential to seriously delegitimize 
the monarchy in the eyes of the [burgeoning] nationalist movement” (Sater, 2010, 
p. 5). The Resident-General signed all royal edicts in the name of the sharifian 
government (Laskier & Bashan, 2003, p. 473). In reality, there existed two systems: 
the sultan managing a simplified and stripped down, mainly religious, cultural 
affairs division; and the French governing a large technocratic state bureaucracy 
(Miller, 2013, p. 91). As exemplified in the 1930 “Berber Dahir (decree),” the 
French also pursued a divide-and-rule strategy that aimed at splitting traditional ties 
between Arab and Amazigh communities (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 166). In 
general, colonialism emphasized the physical segregation of ethnic, social, and 
cultural groups (King, 1976, p. 7). Special schools for Amazigh taught entirely in 
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French were established, and all legal matters occurring in Amazigh territory were 
placed under French jurisdiction rather than in shari’a courts (Naylor, 2009, pp. 19-
20). Relatedly, language policy in schools has been a crucial on-going issue in the 
formation of national identity ever since this time. 
The Spanish also acquired colonial rule over portions of northern Morocco in 
1912, and it was here that some of the strongest resistance occurred with the 
establishment of the independent Rifian Republic in 1921. The Rif region had been 
a site of resistance for centuries, as highlighted by a 1799 treaty between Morocco 
and Spain that acknowledged the inability of the sultan to prevent local people from 
attacking the Spanish and therefore excluded the region from the treaty (Pennell, 
2001, p. 58). Fighting lasted until 1926, when French forces entered the conflict. It 
took more than 150,000 colonial soldiers to defeat the 40,000 Rifian troops. 
Moreover, “the French unleashed a barrage of modern weaponry perfected during 
World War I with terrifying effect – aerial bombardment, poison gas and armored 
tanks and cars” (Miller, 2013, pp. 104-110). Ironically, during the Spanish Civil 
War (1936-1939), Francisco Franco used northern Morocco as a staging area and 
hired nearly 80,000 Moroccan mercenaries (Miller, 2013, p. 137). The Rif has been 
the site of uprisings and protests ever since. In 1959, Crown Prince Hassan 
commanded the newly formed Forces Armées Royales to try to crush a Rifian revolt 
that had begun in 1957.  
Large numbers of French settlers began arriving in Morocco following World 
War I. They worked not only in construction but also in managerial and professional 
roles. Some became large landowners. They built the new port of Casablanca, a 
railroad system, major dams, a massive electric grid, and developed mining 
concessions (Miller, 2013, pp. 111-113). By the 1940s, the population of European 
settlers in Morocco reached 400,000 (Laskier & Bashan, 2003, p. 474). Ironically, 
colonial rule, imposed from outside, necessitated increased consultation and power 
sharing within Morocco. It opened up spaces for previous non-state actors to voice 
concerns and called for a deep questioning of Moroccan society and values.  
 
The Jewish Experience in Morocco 
The Jewish community in Morocco is one of the oldest in the world dating as 
far back as the destruction of the first temple in 586 BCE, or perhaps even the time 
of Phoenician traders (7th century BCE) or the time of King Solomon (10th Century 
BCE). By the time of the Roman Empire, they were a well-established community, 
later known as the toshavim, or “original residents.” In addition to these ancient 
Jewish communities, large numbers of Sephardic Jews, known as megorashim, the 
expelled, arrived in Morocco from the Iberian Peninsula along with Muslim exiles 
escaping persecution during the 15th century. These two groups did not always get 
along well together (Kenbib, 2011, p. 27).  
These Moroccan Jewish communities spoke Judeo-Arabic and Amazigh 
languages depending on which region of the country they lived. As dhimmi, they 
had a protected status that provided them with some rights (freedom of worship, 
property ownership) and a degree of administrative autonomy. Most lived in 
segregated walled city quarters with locked gates called mellahs and all were 
required to wear black clothing and a hairstyle different from Muslims. Their main 
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sources of livelihood were food production and farming (including making wine, 
forbidden by Islam), spice trading, butchering, tailoring, leatherwork, jewelry 
makers, blacksmithing, and woodworking. Most were poor or low income. The 
largest communities lived in Fez, Marrakesh, and Essaouira (Laskier & Bashan, 
2003, pp. 476-480). Muslim-Jewish relations varied considerably by place and time 
depending on local circumstances and exigencies (Kenbib, 2011, p. 26). 
The Jewish trading community had extensive ties throughout the 
Mediterranean and Islamic world extending all the way to India (Bennison, 2016, 
pp. 203-204). They thrived as partners with Arab traders (Nabhan, 2014, pp. 130-
132). Because of these important commercial relations, many were incorporated 
into the makhzan as key advisors and occasionally sent on diplomatic missions to 
Europe. In the 19th century, affluent Moroccan Jewish traders became influential 
royal merchants who leased government monopolies and port customs on key 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors (Wrytzen, 2015, pp. 180-182). Enmity 
against Jews increased during the 19th century and throughout the colonial period 
as they were increasingly seen as a privileged and protected class (Laskier & 
Bashan, 2003, p. 486).  
In 1860, French colonial administrators in Algeria allowed French language 
and culture schools for Jews operated by the Alliance Israelite Universelle (AIU). 
As Wyrtzen (2015) relates, “the AIU encouraged the ‘moral progress’ and 
‘emancipation’ of Jews living in the Islamic world” (p. 183). The first such school 
in Morocco opened in 1862 in Tetouan and expanded to most other cities over the 
next two decades. These schools were open to girls and provided vocational 
training. In 1863, in part in response to British aristocrat Sir Moses Haim 
Montefiore’s visit, Sultan Muhammed IV issued a royal dahir (decree) ensuring 
equal justice under the law for all Jews. In 1870, the entire Jewish population of 
Algeria was given legal status as citizens of France (Miller, 2013, pp. 45-46). 
According to Laskier and Bashan (2003), “the Jewish press chronicled the 
deterioration of Jewish-Muslim relations since the 1860s that was partly the result 
of the growing French and British interest in Moroccan domestic affairs – and the 
increasing intervention of European Jews on behalf of Moroccan Jewish 
communities” (p. 485). This included philanthropic assistance to impoverished 
Jewish communities in overcrowded mellahs (Kenbib, 2011, p. 27). 
Rising nationalism and anti-Semitism in Europe prompted the Zionist 
movement of the late 1890s. Its idea spread to the colonies in the Middle East and 
North Africa gaining momentum after the 1917 Balfour Declaration (that promised 
to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine) and the divisions created by further 
partitioning of the region following World War I (see Fromkin, 1989). With the rise 
of Nazi-Germany, more than 300,000 Jews emigrated from Europe to Palestine 
between 1922 and 1936. During World War II, Mohammed V refused to sign the 
pro-Nazi Vichy regime’s plans to collect and deport Morocco’s quarter million Jews 
to the killing factories of Europe (Miller, 2013, p. 142). He is also purported to have 
responded to a Nazi commander demanding a list of Moroccan Jews that “We have 
no Jews in Morocco! Only Moroccan citizens” (Raoul Wallenberg Foundation, 
2009). 
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The question of Jewish statehood remained unresolved until after World War 
II when Israel declared independence in 1948, launching a regional war and the 
defeat of Arab forces (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp. 239-271). The rise and 
formation of the Jewish state coincided with the imposition and maintenance of 
colonial rule throughout the region. The impact for Morocco with its large Jewish 
community was highly disruptive. By 1948, the Jewish population in Morocco had 
risen to approximately 275,000 with the largest presence in Casablanca. Wrytzen 
(2015) reports, “while formally preserving the status of Moroccan Jews as subjects 
of the sultan, French administrators increasingly took direct control over them” (p. 
179).  
Amidst the complex circumstances of Zionism and looming Moroccan 
independence following World War II, a massive emigration ensued and deeply 
rooted Jewish communities vanished from the country (Kenbib, 2011, pp. 28-29). 
Laskier and Bashan (2003) estimate that between 1949-1956 90,000 Jews emigrated 
from Morocco to Israel under a semi-legal apparatus called Cadima, about 18,000 
thousand Jews were smuggled out illegally following Moroccan independence 
between 1956-1961, and about 80,000 left legally between 1961-1964 by chartered 
planes and ships under Operation Yakhin (pp. 499-502). By 1970, 230,000 
Moroccan Jews had settled in Israel (Laskier & Bashan, 2003, p. 502).  
André Levy (2015), sums up the developments that led to the migration of Jews 
from Morocco thusly: 
 
Modern historical processes, whose roots were in Europe, arrived in 
Morocco and created an irreversible disruption (in the daily life of the 
community) . . . first and foremost, from the Jews’ point of view, was the 
changes in the dhimmi status, even though it wasn’t abolished de jure, it 
ceased to be relevant de facto. This change was accompanied by a 
demographic process in which initially Jews moved around within 
Morocco; they left their villages and moved to the larger cities, situated 
mainly on the coast, with the intention to join the colonial project 
manifesting itself as inclusive and cosmopolitan. The Muslim majority 
saw this desire to join the colonial project as a betrayal of Moroccan 
nationalism . . . [as] Moroccan nationalism began shaping its collective 
identity as Arab and Muslim. Most of the Jews saw this move as an act of 
rejection. Zionist activity also contributed to the Jew’s disengagement 
from Morocco and to an even greater undermining of their sense of 
belonging, as Zionist activists encouraged Jews to emigrate. Israel’s 
chronic involvement in bloody conflicts with the Arab world also had its 
share of the effect on this outcome. (p. 178) 
  
Today, there are under 3,000 Jews living in Morocco, mostly in Casablanca 
(Eickelman, 2018).  
 
Independence Movement and the Monarchy 
Following World War II, the call for Moroccan independence (in concert with 
calls for decolonization around the world) increased significantly. In 1944, the 
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Istiqlal (independence) Party, led by Allal al-Fasi, called for an independent 
Morocco under the sultan and that the sultan should negotiate independence on 
Morocco’s behalf. Sultan Mohammed V gave an important speech in Tangier in 
1947 affirming the inalienable rights of the Moroccan people to self-rule and in 
1952 wrote a letter to the French president calling for the end of the protectorate 
that was decisively rejected. Meanwhile, widespread strikes and demonstrations 
resulted in violence and many deaths. Writes Wyrtzen (2015), “Between 1953-
1956, the Resistance [various urban guerrilla organizations] engaged in 4,250 
violent attacks in Morocco’s cities, primarily Casablanca, targeting infrastructure” 
(p. 277). France, desiring to maintain control over Morocco and faced with a 
national movement inextricably linked to the monarch, orchestrated with the help 
of the Grand Caid of Marrakech, Thami al-Glaoui, a petition that called for the 
deposition of the sultan. Demonstrating the effectiveness of the divide and rule 
strategy, the petition was signed by many other Amazigh leaders, who either feared 
urban nationalists or like Abd al-Hayy Kettani opposed Alawi rule (Sater, 2010, pp. 
21-23). Sultan Mohammed V was deposed and exiled first to Corsica and then to 
Madagascar in 1953. Exile served to heighten Mohammed V’s standing and 
strengthen the nationalist cause. France faced with other colonial conflicts in 
Tunisia and Algeria and increased riots and violence in Morocco, allowed his return 
to Morocco in 1955. Morocco gained its independence in 1956 and established a 
constitutional monarchy. The challenges facing the country at independence were 
significant. For example, 90% of the population was illiterate and only 15% of 
school-aged children were in school at the time of independence (Miller, 2013, pp. 
153-154). 
King Mohammed V adeptly managed a complex array of factions vying for 
influence in Morocco, both internally and externally. With keen attention to specific 
interests, he translated traditional symbolic legitimacy and his stature as 
Commander of the Faithful (Amir al-Mu’minin) and defender of Moroccan 
nationalism into modern political alliances and popular support amidst often 
competing regional, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences. He worked with 
Amazigh leaders to create a post-independence alliance, suppressed Amazigh 
insurgents, integrated the Royal Armed Forces, reformed Sufi orders, controlled the 
most important ministries, and encouraged a multi-party system (Maddy-
Weitzman, 2011, p. 166; Naylor, 2009, p. 229). He died unexpectedly in 1961 with 
his son Hassan II succeeding him. 
Hassan II also navigated a complex and contested political landscape, including 
the rise of political Islam and an increasingly urbanized population. Most 
immediate, he had to build institutional capacity, and hence engaged in a process of 
decolonization that involved the nationalization of French-owned agricultural 
lands, Moroccanization of industry, and Arabization of education (Sater, 2010, pp. 
39-40).  
Over the course of five constitutions (1962, 1970, 1972, 1992, and 1996), 
Hassan II gradually succeeded by associating politics with the traditional Islamic 
idea of shura consultation (Sater, 2010, p. 30). However, his early years were 
extremely difficult, as he provoked the inconclusive War of the Sands with Algeria 
(1963-64), dissolved parliament in 1965, instituted a state of emergency that lasted 
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five years, saw the kidnapping and murder of opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka 
in Paris, and survived two assassination attempts on his own life in 1971 and 1972 
(Naylor, 2009, p. 229). The first attempt occurred on Hassan II’s 42nd birthday 
party at his beachside palace and resulted in the death of 100 guests and 125 
wounded as well as 150 rebels killed and 900 held in custody. The second attempt 
involved an attack on a Royal Air Maroc flight by Moroccan fighter jets. The king’s 
bullet-riddled passenger jet miraculously landed safely. Both attempts were 
orchestrated by members of the Moroccan military (Miller, 2013, pp. 176-77).  
His survival, perceived by some as baraka (divine blessing or fortune), coupled 
with the politically savvy Green March of 1975, when 350,000 Moroccans armed 
only with the Koran entered the Western Sahara, secured popular nationalist support 
for the King (Sater, 2010, pp. 125-126). In the Tripartite Agreement of 1975, Spain 
gave Morocco and Mauritania administrative control over Western Sahara. In 1976, 
the indigenous Saharawi people, led by the Polisario Front, declared itself the 
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Mauritania withdrew from the 
agreement in 1979. Morocco withdrew from the Organization of African Unity 
when the OAU recognized the SADR in 1984. The 16-year insurgency ended with 
a UN-brokered truce in 1991 and the promise of a referendum on independence 
which has yet to take place (BBC, 2018).  
Numerous strikes and bread riots occurred in the 1980s throughout Morocco, 
in part due to International Monetary Fund and World Bank imposed austerities, 
removal of subsidies, and debt restructuring. Structural adjustment programs 
mandated the privatization of government--controlled monopolies that were bought 
by wealthy Moroccan elites with foreign partners. This neoliberal approach aimed 
to improve efficiencies, curtail corruption, and reduce mismanagement issues, but 
it also led to a shrinking of the public sector and increased unemployment (Miller, 
2013, pp. 185-186, 208-209).  
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Politics of Reform:  
Human Rights, Amazigh Rights, and Women’s Rights 
Human rights, Amazigh rights, and Women’s rights have been at the center of 
reforms since the 1990s. Organizational campaigns for change began as early as 
1984, when Christine Daure, wife of imprisoned dissident Abraham Serfaty, 
founded the Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Morocco. In 1988, this 
was followed by the founding of two additional organizations, the Moroccan 
Organization of Human Rights and the Moroccan Association of Human Rights 
(Miller, 2013, p. 201). In 1990, Gilles Perrault published an exposé titled Our 
Friend the King about corruption and human rights abuses in Morocco. These 
efforts forced a reevaluation by the King that led to significant reforms.  
Naylor (2009) states that, “after the ‘leaden years’ of the 1980s, which featured 
severe repression and infamous detention, King Hassan permitted a deliberate 
‘liberalization’ through reforms and amnesties during the 1990s” (p. 233). This 
included closure of the infamous Tazmamart prison and government creation of the 
Advisory Council for Human Rights in 1990 and the Ministry of Human Rights in 
1994. In May of 1994, seven members of the Telelli (Freedom) Cultural Association 
were arrested for unfurling banners promoting Amazigh language rights. Their 
harsh treatment provoked an avalanche of protest. In response, King Hassan II 
during his 1994 Throne Day speech broadcast on television recognized Amazigh 
language and culture as an authentic component of Moroccan identity. In 1995, he 
issued a royal decree calling for the teaching of Tamazight in public schools (Miller, 
2013, p. 196). However, it took nine more years before Tamazight was actually 
taught, in fall 2003, to first grade pupils in 300 schools (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, 
p. 171).  
The new constitution of 1992 explicitly confirmed adherence to “human rights 
as they are universally recognized” and led to parliamentary elections the following 
year that were touted as the freest since independence (Sater, 2010, p. 61). The 1996 
constitution created a bicameral parliament with the lower house directly elected, 
and where, during the following year, an Islamist party was allowed to put forth 
candidates for the first time. As Miller () stresses, “more important, however, was 
the unwritten understanding that the King would name a prime minister from the 
party having an electoral majority” (p. 205).  
Following Hassan II’s death in 1999 (he ruled for 38 years), his son, 
Mohammed VI, ascended to the throne and almost immediately accelerated political 
reforms with an emphasis on social welfare (Sater, 2010, p. 74). Within months, 
Mohammed VI fired the notorious Minister of the Interior Driss Basri and made a 
high-profile symbolic visit to the northern Rif Region where Amazigh protests and 
rebellions had been regular historical occurrences.  
The issuance in 2000 of a Berber Manifesto, the 2001 royal dahir establishing 
the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture, and Mohamed Chafik’s appointment as its 
leader were groundbreaking developments in Moroccan history and demonstrated 
the King’s commitment to ending Amazigh marginalization (Maddy-Weitzman, 
2011, p. 166). These steps were backed up by generous budgetary allocations for 
the institute. 
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As the “Berber Manifesto” made evidently clear, there was a long history of 
neglect and abuse to address. The hard work of educational and cultural change laid 
ahead. One of the unmet major demands of the Manifesto, was the recognition of 
Tamazight as an official language in the Moroccan constitution. No doubt, 
addressing the issue of Amazigh rights was part of a larger movement advocating 
for human rights and broader participation in public life. In this regard, the 
government sponsored 2004-2005 Equity and Reconciliation Commission which 
collected testimonies from people who survived torture while imprisoned during 
Hassan II’s reign. While those responsible were immune from prosecution, it was 
an unprecedented acknowledgement of wrong-doing. Said Miller (2013), “Overall, 
nearly ten thousand victims of the ‘years of lead’ received indemnities totaling more 
than $200 million” (p. 223). The process also showed that the majority of victims 
were Amazigh (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 155). In this effort and others, the 
Moroccan press also played a vibrant role providing an informative platform for 
public debate (Miller, 2013, p. 219). 
 
Women’s Movement and the February 20th Movement 
Women’s lives in Morocco are shaped by numerous factors including social 
class, geography, ethnicity, religion, and education. For example, women’s 
experience varies greatly depending on whether they live in cosmopolitan urban 
centers like Casablanca, Rabat, and Tangiers or whether they live in traditional rural 
settings. Still, in general, “compared to men, women in Morocco are less 
represented in decision-making processes and in areas such as education, health, 
and employment” (Gender Profile Morocco, n.d., p. 3). The 2015 World Economic 
Forum Global Gender Gap Index (2015) ranked Morocco 139 out of 145 countries 
in overall gender equity, with ranks of 140 and 123 in economic opportunity and 
educational attainment. The illiteracy rate for women in 2012 was 47.6% and much 
higher in rural areas (Gender Profile Morocco, n.d., p. 6).  
In the face of such changes, however, “the women’s movement not only 
advanced the cause of women; [but] it also had the electric effect of opening . . . 
new forms of debate associated with a more inclusive political culture” (Miller, 
2013, p. 194). As Salime (2012) underscores, “for two decades the movement had 
launched a sustained mobilization to challenge women’s secondary status in family 
law” (p. 103). In 1992, a campaign collecting one million signatures called for 
reform of the 1957 mudawwana, or family law. This led to a 1993 reform of the law 
that permitted women to sign an employment contract and obtain a passport on their 
own without male consent (Sater, 2010, p. 68-71). In 2004, the mudawwana was 
renamed the Family Code and additional changes stipulated that women have the 
right to marry without consent of a male guardian as well as the right to divorce 
(Gender Profile Morocco, n.d., p. 4). Recognized for its relatively progressive 
position on women’s rights within the Islamic world, the Family Code reforms have 
provided women with greater rights; however, awareness and implementation of 
the reforms have been limited by the lack of training of judges as well as social and 
religious conservatism, particularly in rural areas of the country (Eisenberg, 2011, 
p. 693). The law has been an insufficient mechanism when it comes to changing 
people’s attitudes and behaviors as local customs often conflict with the law. In 
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addition, ambiguities within the law can be interpreted as reinforcing patriarchal 
perspectives and gendered division of labor. Most significantly, despite the 2011 
constitutional reaffirmation of Morocco’s commitment to human rights as they are 
universally recognized, the sharia-based Family Code remains above international 
law (Elliott, 2014, pp. 16-25). 
Secular women’s movements in Morocco have tended to focus on working 
within the system for political and legal changes to expand and improve women’s 
rights and representation, whereas Islamist movements have tended to focus on 
social change at the grassroots level although at times opposing more feminist 
positions (Salime, 2012, pp. 107-109). No doubt, while legal codes that recognize 
women’s rights are important guideposts, absent widespread social attitudes that 
support and affirm women’s full participation in public life, systematic 
discrimination, and pervading attitudes prevent the implementation of greater 
equality. Therefore, Skalli (2011, p. 340) has emphasized that efforts to promote 
women’s rights should not be siloed in ways that look only at women or that are 
sponsored solely by women’s organizations, rather they must engage with an 
intersectionality of movements and issues. Nonetheless, it was women’s 
organizations that took the lead disseminating the code in darija (spoken Moroccan 
Arabic) and Amazigh dialects (Miller, 2013, p. 228). Since the February 20th 
movement (Morocco’s version of the Arab Spring), Salime (2012) asserts that 
“feminism has not only penetrated the social imaginary of a new generation of 
activists, but has also informed their practices” (p. 101). She sees “women and men 
working together as partners in the struggle for social and economic justice” 
(Salime, 2012, p. 105). Such joint efforts are especially prevalent in emerging forms 
of civic engagement through social media-based activism but are also increasingly 
prevalent in face-to-face interactions.   
The February 20th movement represented broad societal concerns that seek 
greater political representation, economic reform, and government accountability. 
As Zerhouni (2017) described, “the movement asked for a democratic constitution, 
the independence of the judiciary and the media as well as the separation of wealth 
and power” (p. 6). Growing unemployment, poverty, and inequity fueled 
dissatisfaction. Despite successive parliamentary elections since 1993, there is 
significant discontent with political parties and elected officials (Sater, 2010, p. 85). 
Furthermore, these officials were largely regarded as ineffective in a system that 
invested so much power with the king. Young people were especially active in the 
movement as they are keen to see substantive change; however, they do not tend to 
participate in elections at very high percentages. In 2002, the voting age was 
lowered from 20 to 18 years old. One of the few political parties with an active 
youth section, the Justice and Development Party (Islamist Party) won a majority 
of seats in the 2011 parliamentary elections obliging the King to select a prime 
minister from the party (Zerhouni, 2017, pp. 9-10). The king was also applauded 
for his quick response to the movement by putting forth a new constitution 
(approved on July 1, 2011 by 98.5% of voters, with nearly 10 million votes cast, 
representing close to 75% of the eligible electorate). The new constitution included 
changes that enhanced legislative powers, increased the judiciary’s independence, 
and limited the King’s ability to intervene in day-to-day politics (Miller, 2013, p. 
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235). Since 2011, within the lower house of the Moroccan parliament, a minimum 
of 60 seats out of 395 are reserved for women.  
 
Society and the Economy 
With a population of 35 million people, Morocco is rich with natural resources 
such as fish, phosphates, and fertile agricultural lands, but it struggles with rural 
poverty, urban unemployment, and illiteracy (Sater, 2010, p. 87-88). Primarily an 
agricultural economy, it also benefits from tourism and remittances. It has invested 
heavily in renewable energy. As entrepreneurship has grown and Morocco works 
to diversify its economy, there has also been increased attention given to fighting 
corruption (Sater, 2010, p. 104). Its annual gross domestic product is approximately 
$110 billion with a 4% growth rate and $8,600 per capita annual income. 
Unemployment is at 10%, the inflation rate is 1.6%, and 53% of the population is 
under 30 years of age. 
While Morocco has a trade deficit with Europe, it has benefitted by securing 
European Union (EU) capital and through market integration with Europe (70% of 
all its exports go to the EU). The EU has also linked foreign aid to human rights 
and democracy promotion, and Morocco is the primary recipient of EU aid in North 
Africa (Sater, 2010, p. 133). Mohammed VI’s doctoral thesis focused on the 
European Economic Commission and the Maghreb. 
EU relations are also important in regard to issues of migration. Nearly 3 
million Moroccans live in Europe (Miller, 2013, p. 232). Illegal Moroccan 
immigration results in tens of thousands of annual expulsions. In October 2005, 
thousands of Sub-Saharan migrants attempted to breach barbed wire fences at 
Melilla resulting in 13 deaths and hundreds wounded (Naylor, 2009, p. 236). For 
those interested in learning more about the personal circumstances of these 
migrants, Laila Lalami’s 2005 novel Hope and Other Dangerous Pursuits is 
insightful and engaging. 
King Mohammed VI has been a force for social change in Morocco supporting 
the efforts to improve and expand human rights, Amazigh rights, and women’s 
rights. Perhaps most important has been the king’s efforts at alleviating poverty and 
extending social welfare as was evident in the National Initiative for Human 
Development which received a $3.3 billion budget in 2007 and inaugurated 7,000 
projects (Sater, 2010, p. 83). Still, as the February 20th movement demonstrated, 
people are concerned about the economic effects of globalization, the concentration 
of wealth in the hands of a few elites, and the increased securitization of the state in 
the wake of high-profile terrorist attacks.  
 
U.S. Relations and the War on Terror 
Morocco’s cooperative and close relationship with the United States dates back 
to Mohammed III’s acknowledgement of the U.S. Declaration of Independence in 
1777 and the 1787 trade agreement. It found continued relevance when Theodore 
Roosevelt participated in the Algeciras Conference of 1906 (Potter, 1922, pp. 577-
583). Its importance was underscored again in the 1943 Casablanca Conference 
held in the Anfa hotel where Allied commanders met to coordinate the on-going 
war effort and discuss peace plans, including discussions related to decolonization 
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and Morocco’s independence (Miller, 2013, p. 144). Morocco also firmly allied 
with the United States during the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. had 
several air bases, radar and communications installations, and a naval station in 
Morocco (Wyrtzen, 2015, p. 292).  
None of these examples are as straight forward as they appear. They all 
involved complex strategic calculations. More recently, as Miller (2013) has 
highlighted, “the U.S. steadily supplied arms to Morocco for its [Western] Saharan 
war, and in return, Morocco became a consistent supporter of U.S.-Middle East 
policies” (p. 209). Morocco also remained a staunch U.S. ally following invasions 
of Iraq and Afghanistan. Mohammed VI has cooperated with America’s “war on 
terror” and often faced criticism at home (Miller, 2013, pp. 224-225). However, 
high-profile terrorist attacks at or near home have informed this decision. Such 
attacks include a 1994 attack in Marrakesh that led to the closing of the Algerian 
border, a 2003 attack in Casablanca in which 45 people were killed (33 victims and 
12 suicide bombers), and the lethal Madrid bombings in 2004 that killed 191 people 
and injured 1,800 followed by the conviction of Moroccan and Tunisian nationals 
for carrying out the attack. Moroccans have been unequivocal in their rejection of 
such extremism. This may be best characterized by the Marrakesh Declaration of 
2016 that defends the rights and liberties of religious minorities in predominantly 
Muslim communities and rejects “the use of violence and armed struggle as a means 
for settling conflict and imposing one’s point of view.” 
 
This Volume 
Tracing Morocco’s diverse influences, powerful empires, cosmopolitan 
achievements, colonial resistance, and modern nation building efforts, the above 
essay provides a basis for further examination and understanding of these topics. 
Morocco is an active participant in today’s global society, facing challenges that are 
confronting every country and community, and that demand thoughtful and 
innovative responses. The essays in this volume provide a more in-depth analysis 
of Morocco, its history, cultural diversity, and changing contexts. 
This issue, then, begins with an article titled “Between the Line and the Circle: 
Ibn Khaldun’s View of History and Change” by Allen Fromherz that contextualizes 
the 14th century scholar’s views on historiography in ways that remain relevant 
today. It is followed by “The Ebbs and Flows of U.S.-Moroccan Relations in the 
Context of the Anfa Conference” by Karim Bejjit that meticulously reviews the 
conversations held between President Roosevelt and Sultan Mohamed V during 
WWII that helped set the stage for Moroccan Independence. The next two articles 
turn to the world of art. In “Moroccan Artistic Presence at the Centre Pompidou 
Collections,” Tunisian scholar, Sirine Abdelhedi shares a fascinating analysis on 
the “decolonization of the gaze” and how best to represent Morocco on the world 
stage. This piece is complemented by Samir El Azhar’s composition focused on 
“The Changing Roles of Female Visual Artists in Morocco” with its particular 
attention on how these artists have overcome prejudices, corrected misconceptions, 
and transgressed taboos. Next, two very different and powerful articles further 
question issues of changing identities in Morocco. The first, titled “’Your 
Opportunity to Hear Your Voice’: Akaliyat Magazine and the Creation of Queer 
26   Journal of Global Initiatives 
Community in Morocco" by Benjamin Ale-Ebrahim, looks specifically at an online 
journal’s attempt to build a greater sense of community as well as emerging 
coalitions across communities. The second article, “A Study of the Vernacular 
Literacy Practices of a Newly Literate Moroccan Woman: An Ethnographic 
Perspective” by Reddad Erguig examines the central role of the family in literacy 
acquisition. Continuing with the theme of language acquisition, Taoufik Jaafari 
considers the contentious landscape of language education policy in Morocco and 
its implications for the future. Delving deeper into educational and cultural policy, 
Brahim El Guabli describes “Moroccan Society’s Educational and Cultural Losses 
during The Years of Lead.” While difficult to quantify, an analysis of influential 
journals such as Lamalif as well as official reports such as those issued by the Equity 
and Reconciliation Commission shed light on this important topic. Maintaining a 
focus on national politics in “Moroccan Islamists Debate the Causes of Violent 
Extremism,” author Jack Kalpakian outlines the theological challenges posed by 
certain Wahhabi and Salafist views that reject mainstream Moroccan Islam and the 
implications for the government as it works to combat terrorism. Further examining 
the inner workings of Moroccan government, Zakaria Fatih, uses the prism of 
inclusive and extractive institutions to consider the makhzen’s effectiveness in 
terms of national development. While in “Empowering Rural Participation and 
Partnerships in Morocco’s Sustainable Development,” Yossef Ben-Meir analyzes 
the implementation of specific government policies. His assessment is based on a 
long career of working closely with rural communities. The final article in this 
volume by Touria Khannous considers Morocco through the influence of film and 
the transnational, with special attention to the complex role of women in society. 
Given the breadth and depth of subjects addressed in this volume, readers will no 
doubt come away with a strong understanding of Moroccan society and its 
important place in the world today. 
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Between the Circle and the Line:  
Ibn Khaldun’s View of History and Change 
Allen James Fromherz 
 
Historians from many different eras and contexts have viewed history and 
historical change as either linear or circular in nature. Giambattista Vico (d. 1744 
CE), the Italian philosopher and historian, organized history in a cyclical way as 
different nations and peoples rise and fall. At the same time, according to Vico 
(2000), humanity was destined towards equity. Sima Qian of China (d. 86 BCE) 
viewed the past as a series of circular attempts to restore the Mandate of Heaven 
and consolidate central power, attempts that were then followed by breakdowns into 
feudal states (Qian, 1995). For Qian, history seemed to favor evildoers as much as 
followers of Confucian principles; historians therefore had a moral duty to bring 
justice to the past. Leopold von Ranke (d. 1886) was the originator of modern, 
primary source-based historical science in Europe. He promoted a largely linear, 
narrative view of the past. Change occurred at a granular level. Events and peoples 
of the past should be described for their own sake, not as a tool for understanding 
or reifying a larger philosophical, moralistic, or deistic destiny (von Ranke, 2010). 
More recently, the French historian Fernand Braudel (d. 1985) combined both linear 
and the broader cyclical approaches. For Braudel, history occurred on different 
levels. There was the past of the long term, which tended towards patterns 
determined by geography, and the short term, which was more linear and event 
dependent (Braudel, 1996). Today, historians are sharply divided between 
progressivists and Marxists who see humanity on a line towards some destiny that 
will embrace a global vision, and relativists and determinists who view the modern 
and the postmodern system as a particular cultural artefact of the West, doomed to 
collapse and be replaced, in the optimistic view, by a cosmopolitan vision. For 
pessimists, however, the replacement of the West will be far more traumatic 
(Appiah 2019; Fukuyama, 2006, 2018; Pinker, 2019).1  
The circle and the line have never been farther apart, it would seem, than they 
are today. Historians attempt, in vain, to tackle the challenges of reconciling rapid 
 
1 For the progressivists see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New 
York: Free Press, 2006 and Stephen Pinker, Enlightenment Now: the Case for Reason, 
Science, Humanism and Progress, New York: Penguin, 2019. For a cosmopolitan vision 
see Kwame Appiah, The Lies that Bind, Rethinking Identity, New York: Liveright, 2018, 
and the counter argument by Fukuyama, Identity: the Demand for Dignity and the Politics 
of Resentment, New York: FSG, 2018, who seems to abandon his linear vision of the end of 
history.  
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global change with the puzzling rise of identity-centered politics. It seems as if 
feelings of loyalty to the “tribe,” which were supposed to have disappeared with the 
rise of global institutions and mores, have not died, but only increased in an age of 
rapid global “progress.” This paradox, in fact, is not new. At its heart, it is a result 
of two ways of looking at human history, the circular and the linear.  
Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406 CE), the great North African historian and philosopher, 
seemed to be a partisan of the circle. Within the Muqaddimah, or his “Introduction” 
to history, written to describe the “meaning of events,” there seemed to be ample 
evidence that Ibn Khaldun saw the past in ways that would resonate with Qian, 
Vico, and some elements of Braudel. Ibn Khaldun engaged in more theory, more 
interpretation of history than any other known, pre-modern work of history written 
in Arabic. This has made him a modern hero of Arab nationalism, recognized in 
school names and street signs from Qatar to Casablanca. Much of Ibn Khaldun’s 
thought appears, at first, to fit a circular pattern based on a moralistic view of 
inevitable human failing. Looking more deeply at Ibn Khaldun’s writing, however, 
the picture becomes much more complex. There appear to be many exceptions to 
the circular rule. Ibn Khaldun’s understanding of history and change is, in fact, 
much more complex than a simple circular pattern of humanity doomed to a cycle 
of rise and fall. Ibn Khaldun also saw a line of history through religious prophecy 
and the importance of granular, exceptional events that could stand up to the rigors 
of von Ranke. Rather than seeing the linear and the circular patterns of the past in 
conflict or as cancelling one another out, Ibn Khaldun described a combined system, 
a spiral.  
 
The Circle 
According to Ibn Khaldun’s circular vision of the past, dynasties and states 
have a maximum life span of about 100 years, or five generations, roughly the same 
as individual human bodies (Ibn Khaldun, 2002). They start vigorous and young, 
founded on tribal solidarity, or asabiyya, of the first generation, which originates in 
the mountains or deserts, far from the enervating, and for Ibn Khaldun’s day, 
sickening and plague-ridden influences of the city. Each subsequent generation of 
rulers, however, becomes more and more dependent on urban structures of power, 
raising taxes, becoming more and more distant and detached from the original vigor 
of the founders and the people at large who flock to some new dynasty and new, 
vigorous ruler who can call upon the protection and loyalty of a different, rural tribal 
group. This seems to trap history into a perpetual cycle of doomed states. As Ibn 
Khaldun stated, although government is necessary for civilization, it is also the root 
of its own destruction. He cited multiple examples of dynasties that fit this pattern 
and that fill the chronicles of his much larger history, the Kitab al-Ibar. Indeed, both 
North African history and Islamic history, and even world history more generally, 
up until the 14th century, could fit this pattern, one that can be attributed to many 
large, agrarian-based economies and societies before the rise of modernity 
(Hodgson, 1974). Just in the far west of North Africa, known today as Morocco, for 
instance, there were the Idrisids, who ruled independently for around a century. 
They were initially supported by the Berber tribes around Fez. They fell to the 
Fatimids who rose in the region of Algeria with the support of the Kutama Berbers. 
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The Fatimids even took over Egypt. Next were the Almoravids who emerged among 
the Lamtuna, the Berber tribes of the Sahara. They created a great empire stretching 
across trans-Saharan trade routes, sending their valuable currency throughout the 
Mediterranean basin (Bennison, 2016). After the desert came the mountains as the 
Masmuda Berbers of the majestic, High Atlas valleys streamed into Marrakech in 
1147, purifying the mosque of the Almoravids and declaring the beginning of a new 
era. Their movement began with the preaching of the Mahdi Ibn Tumart and was 
made a great success with the military genius of ‘Abd al-Mu’min who was the first 
ruler in history to conquer and control North Africa, including the Atlas Mountains, 
which served as a fortress for the empire. Over time, however, the solidarity of the 
original mountain Berbers, like that of the Saharan Berbers before them, began to 
diminish. Military defeats such as at Navas de Tolosa or Al-‘Iqab in 1212 and 
Christian incursions, including the adoption of a Castilian mercenary guard by the 
Caliph in Marrakech, seemed to confirm the end was near. After about a century of 
effective rule the Almohads also met their fate. Their empire broke apart, replaced 
in Morocco by a new, vigorous dynasty, the Marinids, founded by Zanata Berbers 
who came from the plains around the oasis of Figuig. It was the Marinid ruler Abu 
‘Inan who employed Ibn Khaldun. In Granada, the Nasrids, famous for building the 
Alhambra, arose. Muhammad V, one of the more powerful Nasrid princes, also used 
the services of Ibn Khaldun. A remnant of the Almohads remained, in much 
changed form, as the Hafsid dynasty in Tunis; Ibn Khaldun worked there as well. 
Each of these broken and fragmented sections of the once great and unified 
Almohad Empire fell into war and rivalry with one another. While they tried to 
reassert the unity of the past, their divisions provided opportunities for Castilian 
and, later, Portuguese incursions. Nonetheless, Ibn Khaldun held out the hope for a 
restoration of the glories of the past, for a retaking of the lands lost in Muslim Spain, 
al-Andalus, which was the homeland of his ancestors, the Banu Khaldun.  
As I argue in Ibn Khaldun, Life and Times, he had many reasons for his 
pessimistic view of the past and for his strange mixture of revulsion and attraction 
towards urban life (Fromherz, 2016). In the light of the dizzying, damning, and 
distressing rise and fall of dynasties and the failure of a unified response to Christian 
incursions, Ibn Khaldun was one of the first Muslim chroniclers to note the rise of 
the Renaissance and Christian power in the Mediterranean. This pushed Ibn 
Khaldun against the idea of divine providence driving the events of his times. 
Rather, it seemed, humanity must be at fault. Human structures and especially large-
scale urban life and government, with all of their luxuries and cosmopolitan 
compromises of identity, while the source of civilization, were also the source of 
plague. Ibn Khaldun (2002) wrote, “City air causes sickness as it is mixed with 
putrid vapors and a great quantity of odors” (p. 810). Air is that which gives vivacity 
to the spirit, and the air of civilization, of cities, ultimately weakens the body and 
the body politic. Thus, even as humanity builds culture, arts, and cities, it also builds 
the foundation of its destruction in the form of corruption, luxury, and sickness. The 
seeds of decline are planted with the founding ambition of every urban civilization. 
This plague had a profound impact on Ibn Khaldun and helped inspire him to think 
differently. As he stated, “it is as if the entire creation had changed and the whole 
world been altered … a world brought into existence anew. Therefore, there is a 
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need at this time that someone should systematically set down the situation of the 
world” (Ibn Khaldun, 2015, p. 30). He tells us the plague, which wiped out what 
was before and cycled humanity back to a new beginning, was the reason why he 
decided to write the Muqaddimah. The cycle of history was not simply a theory for 
Ibn Khaldun, it was personal.  
Ibn Khaldun lost his parents and most of his family to the pestilence. He was 
left alone at an early age, under the tutelage of his brother. The death of his father, 
a profound influence on the young Ibn Khaldun, especially due to his spiritual and 
Sufi tendencies, seemed to haunt him the rest of his life. Ibn Khaldun seemed unable 
to give up the ghost of his father. He described as an addiction his exercising power 
and politics in his various roles as minister, judge, and high functionary in Fes, 
Granada, Tunis and, finally, Cairo. He even met the great conqueror Tamerlane and 
explained to him the reasons for his success.  
 
Here is the explanation [for your rise]. Power does not exist without tribal 
solidarity (‘asabiyya). Power is at its greatest extent among mainly tribal 
peoples, those whose lives are mostly governed by tribal solidarity. Men 
of science are agreed on the fact that the two nations most tribal on earth 
are the Turks and the Arabs. You know of the great power of the Arabs 
after they were united by the religion of their prophet [Muhammad]. As 
far as the Turks, their [successful] rivalry against the Kings of Persia is 
sufficient witness to their power...No King on earth, neither Chosroes, nor 
Caesar, nor Alexander nor Nebuchadnezzar had at their disposal a sense 
of tribal solidarity such as theirs.... (Ibn Khaldun, 1951, pp. 366-367) 
 
His constant travelling and his diminishing hope of restoring the North Africa and 
Islamic governance to its former glories weighed on him. At various points in his 
life, he yearned for the purity of the countryside and the simplicity of the ascetic, 
Sufi tariqa.2 He retreated to the remote fortress of Ibn Salama in Algeria to write 
his Muqaddimah and attempted to give up on political ambitions and become a 
simple Sufi, but to no avail. The city, which he blamed for so much of what went 
wrong in history, always drew him back.  
 
The Line 
There was both the line and the circle in the writings of Ibn Khaldun. Although 
his life was full of disappointments and his search for the meaning of history often 
only led to more paradoxes than answers, Ibn Khaldun was not simply a pessimist. 
He saw the possibility of a linear past. In particular he cited instances for the 
intervention of God in human affairs. Prophecy and prophets, in Ibn Khaldun’s 
view, created a way out of the circular inevitabilities. When a dynasty is founded 
by a prophet, according to Ibn Khaldun, it can last far longer. Also, there were some 
states, such as the Hafsids, that seemed to last, even without the invigoration of new 
tribal solidarity or prophecy. In this case, a type of dynastic inertia took over. 
 
2 A tariqa is a Sufi “path” or “order” usually with a Sufi Sheikh in charge who has 
authority over his pupils.  
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Generally, however, these dynasties, as was the case with the Hafsids, were limited 
to constrained geographic boundaries and did not expand outside a defined sphere 
of influence for long periods of time. Also, while he denounced the purely 
chronological approach to the past employed by some of his predecessors, the linear 
progression of one event after another, the traditional narrative history that was the 
mainstay of history both before and after him, still characterized the vast majority 
of his writing. The Muqaddimah, although a large work, stands out as the exception, 
the Introduction to a far larger ambition which was to write a Universal History of 
the world as he knew it. In this respect, Ibn Khaldun could be compared to another 
universal, world historian who wrote on the other end of the Islamic world in 
Ilkhanate Iran, Rashid al-Din Hamadani (d. 1318 CE). While he occasionally 
mentioned his historical theories within the body of his history, Ibn Khaldun, like 
Rashid al-Din before him, seemed as much caught up in his devotion to the line of 
events as the “meaning” or lessons he sought behind them.  
 
Spiral Towards the Future 
Although he noted the importance of the new technology of gunpowder, and 
he realized the rising power of Italian city-states, and he even sailed on a ship with 
a representative of Ottoman sultan Bayezid, little did Ibn Khaldun realize a new era 
was about to dawn soon after his death in 1406 CE. The Ottomans took 
Constantinople in 1453 and launched a great, diffuse, and cosmopolitan empire that 
would last for centuries, successfully fusing diverse geographic zones and putting 
down the revolts of tribal solidarity that would have been the seeds of new dynasties 
and rulers in the past. In Morocco, the cyclical history of Ibn Khaldun came to an 
abrupt end with the rise and fall of the Saadians who were eventually replaced by 
the Alaouite Dynasty. The Alaouites used gunpowder technology and elite military 
corps of soldiers, often from south of the Sahara, to break the ruler’s previous 
dependency on tribal solidarity. Founded in 1631, the Alaouites are still reigning 
today as one the longest living dynastic monarchies on earth. Throughout the rest 
of North Africa and the Middle East, the Ottomans would create a much larger 
“gunpowder empire” that lasted far longer than Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical theories 
would have predicted. This did not stop later Ottoman officials from studying Ibn 
Khaldun’s work in their search for ways to revitalize the empire (Lewis, 1962).  
Was Ibn Khaldun disproven by these dramatic future events? Was he wrong to 
think that dynasties would inevitably fall based on their lack of solidarity? Perhaps, 
in some ways, he was. At the same time, and as discussed above, Ibn Khaldun did 
not view history in a purely linear or circular fashion. He left ample space for change 
and for the intervention of unknown forces. Also, the gunpowder empires did last, 
many of them well into the 20th century. They were replaced by global, capitalist 
cosmopolitanism, which negates the tribal solidarity of the past. However, identity 
politics has once again emerged onto the scene. Ibn Khaldun is today, in some ways 
suddenly, as valid and relevant as ever. Perhaps what seemed like a line or a circle 
was actually a spiral. A spiral allows for change in a way that a circle, as a closed 
system does not. It is also not a simple line with completely different and unrelated 
events happening one after the other. As the world becomes more interconnected 
and as technology advances, inherent risks are emerging, often in the shape of 
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peoples trying to assert their identities. It is increasingly possible that there will be 
a singular new event, something that changes the world entirely, that seems to wipe 
the slate clean, as the Great Plague did for Ibn Khaldun in the 14th century. At that 
moment, Ibn Khaldun’s understanding of history and the destiny of humanity will 
be more relevant than it has ever been.  
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Abstract 
This essay seeks to shed new light on the intricate course of U.S.-
Moroccan relations following the landing of American troops on the 
Atlantic coasts of Morocco. The Anfa Conference and Sultan Mohamed 
V’s dinner meeting with President Roosevelt marked an important stage in 
the process of Moroccan struggle for independence. Roosevelt’s personal 
interest in the Moroccan situation may have accentuated the 
inconsistencies in U.S. foreign policy in the 1940s regarding the French 
colonial empire and confronted its fundamental idealism with the 
exigencies of pragmatic politics. The vicissitudes of the war and America’s 
deep commitment to its French ally as well as its efforts to contain the 
spreading influence of communism across North Africa compelled the 
American administration to generally adopt an ambivalent position vis-à-
vis Moroccan nationalist movement in its fierce pursuit for independence.  
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Introduction 
Accounts of Moroccan-American relations have often emphasized the 
fortuitous origins of these relations especially in an era marked by limited 
diplomatic contact with the burgeoning United States and even by acts of hostility 
toward it from the so-called Barbary States (Roberts & Roberts, 2008). What is 
more intriguing is the remarkable longevity of these relations despite the lack of 
extensive commercial and political interests between the two nations that could 
justify such enduring mutual esteem. Historical annals bear witness to a steady and 
peaceful course of relations devoid of any dramatic incidents. For over a century, 
and aside from the peace treaties of 1786 and 1836, U.S. consuls established in 
Tangier had little to report to their home authorities. The Perdicaris affair of 1904 
was a peculiar diplomatic oddity that gained momentary attention in the American 
press mostly as a campaign slogan (Davis, 1941, p. 517; Hall, 1971, p. 341). 
Nevertheless, the enduring value of U.S.-Moroccan relations today is largely 
the fruit of this benign legacy. It has become an established custom for government 
officials of both countries to indulge in a graceful narrative of how Morocco was 
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the first country to recognize the independence of the nascent republic and how 
Sultan Mawlay Suleiman made a generous gift of a house in the old medina of 
Tangier to Consul John Mullowny in 1822. Although it has ceased to have an 
official character, the house is the seat of the American Legation and is still 
cherished as the oldest American public property outside the U.S. In recent decades, 
Morocco has been viewed in U.S. media and in the official circles as a strategic ally 
in the MENA region and a reliable partner in the global war on terrorism. Besides 
close security cooperation, Morocco has concluded important military and trade 
agreements with the United States and benefited from various aid programs.  
Within the Moroccan context, historians have expounded on the decisive 
intervention of the United States during World War II and its consequent impact on 
the colonial regimes in North Africa. The landing of American troops on the 
Moroccan coasts as part of Operation Torch in November 1942 inaugurated a new 
phase in modern Moroccan history and helped raise political consciousness among 
the Moroccan elite (Baida, 2014). U.S.-Moroccan relations, in particular, gained 
momentum following the historic meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(FDR) and Sultan Mohamed Ben Youssef during the Anfa Conference held in 
January 1943. No record has provided more vivid a description of the long and 
friendly conversation between the two leaders than the account offered by FDR’s 
own son, Elliot in his memoir titled As He Saw it (1946). Elliot Roosevelt (1946), 
who served as the president’s military attaché, noted that the dinner meeting was 
attended by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill who, seated on the left side 
of the president, “grew more and more disgruntled” as the conversation between 
FDR and the sultan dwelt on the “wealth of natural resources” in the country (p. 
110). The Sultan made no secret of his wish to engage American support in 
promoting “modern educational and health standards” (Roosevelt, 1946, p. 110) in 
Morocco and shaping the future development plans of the country. On the political 
plane, the sultan, it is stated, was particularly elated by FDR’s remark that “the 
postwar scene and the pre-war scene would, of course, differ sharply, especially as 
they related to the colonial question” (Roosevelt, 1946, p. 111). 
Elliot’s account makes frequent reference to Churchill’s sense of malaise as he 
listened to the cordial exchange between the sultan and the president. Evidently, 
Roosevelt’s critical views of European colonial empires were both vexing and 
alarming. In the following years, the substance of Roosevelt’s conversation with the 
sultan became the object of ongoing speculation (Sangmuah 1992; Stenner, 2014). 
In their correspondence, U.S. officials often denied the claim that FDR promised to 
support Moroccan ambitions for independence. This essay looks at the broader 
context of U.S.-Moroccan relations in the years that followed the Anfa Conference 
and focuses on the impact of that single dinner meeting on the political evolution of 
Morocco toward independence. While they did not amount to a formal declaration, 
the progressive views voiced by FDR over the meeting emboldened the sultan and 
nationalist leaders to embrace a militant agenda and oppose French colonial 
policies. For the Moroccan nationalists who took to heart the liberal principles 
professed in the Atlantic charter and the four freedoms announced in FDR’s speech 
in 1941, the old status quo guaranteed by the Protectorate Treaty of 1912 was 
inadmissible. France, after all, was in no measure to honor the terms of the treaty. 
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Politically divided, it depended on the Allies for help to liberate its own occupied 
territories. A year after the Anfa meeting, Moroccan nationalist leaders would 
present a manifesto calling for independence under the sultan. This triggered a new 
phase of conflict with the French colonial authorities and plunged the country into 
a vicious cycle of violence and repression.  
 
Roosevelt and the Sultan 
The specific nature of FDR’s pledges to the sultan has stirred a continuing 
controversy among historians. Given that no official record of the dinner meeting 
exists other than the personal accounts of some of those who were present notably 
FDR’s son, Elliot, and the Crown Prince Hassan, the exchange between the sultan 
and the president became a subject of interpretation and contestation. The gist of 
this controversy centered on the political significance of the meeting and its 
powerful impact on the nationalist agenda in Morocco in the following years. 
Several historians have emphasized the relentless efforts of the sultan and 
nationalist leaders to enlist American official support for independence and to 
engage the figure of FDR in their propaganda war against the French (Rivlin, 1982). 
A recent historian has even argued that Moroccan nationalists invented a 
“Roosevelt’s myth” “to legitimize their claims in the eyes of Western diplomats and 
politicians” (Stenner, 2014, p. 526). The problem with this American-centered 
narrative is that it constructs a rigid and quite reductive view of Moroccan anti-
colonial struggle, which was a multi-faceted and a dynamic process. More 
importantly, it makes light of Roosevelt’s political convictions vis-a-vis French 
colonial regime in North Africa. FDR’s attitude not only was the outcome of 
personal sympathy with an ambitious young sultan, but also rested on a firm belief 
in the right of subject peoples to govern themselves and take advantage of their own 
natural resources.  
There is a substantial amount of archival information that is now available 
involving FDR’s subsequent correspondence with the sultan testifying to his keen 
interest in the future status of Morocco. What transpires from these letters is that 
FDR’s sympathetic views were not fully shared by the members of his own 
government for whom the ongoing war-time conditions and the necessity of 
safeguarding the interests of such a strategic ally as France formed a more urgent 
priority. However, it is important to keep in mind that for the sultan and the 
nationalists, FDR and the United States represented a positive force of change that 
opened a new frontier for political action against a protecting nation, which seemed 
to have betrayed its promises and lost its credibility.  
FDR’s letters to the sultan and his exchanged memos with Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull and other officials relating to the Moroccan situation are now 
accessible online from the State Department.1 There are numerous records available 
at the National Archives website on the Anfa Conference. The Morocco file consists 
 
1 “Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration (1933–1945).” Retrieved from 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/roosevelt-fd 
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of 44 pages of digitized official correspondence organized in a chronological order.2 
The American Legation library in Tangier also holds a file that contains several 
records relating to FDR’s visit to Morocco including a four-page typed report on 
the events of January 22, 1943, drawn from the notes of Harry Hopkins, FDR’s 
close advisor. There is also an excerpt from a log kept during the president’s trip to 
Casablanca providing significant details on the visit. 
It can be gleaned from these documents that contact between FDR and the 
sultan began in November 1942 after the landing of U.S. troops on the Atlantic 
coast of Morocco. The purport of this early correspondence bears upon the 
immediate war affairs and the long tradition of friendship and respect that united 
Morocco and U.S.3 Other documents offer substantial information on the dinner 
meeting on January 22. The sultan, it is stated, arrived at the villa Dar Essaada at 
7:40 p.m. accompanied by the Crown Prince, the Grand Vizier, and Chief of 
Protocol. They “were magnificently attired in white silk robes and came bearing 
several presents – a gold-mounted dagger for the President in a beautiful inlaid 
teakwood case, and two golden bracelets and a high golden tiara for Mrs. 
Roosevelt” (Hopkins, 1943, p. 531). The presents were duly acknowledged by Mrs. 
Roosevelt in a subsequent letter to the sultan. The documents say very little about 
the exchange between the sultan and FDR save that the sultan and his delegation 
departed at 10:10 p.m. and were followed by Prime Minister Churchill, General 
Nogues, the Resident General, and General Patton. De Gaulle was not invited to the 
dinner but was received by FDR alone shortly afterwards. 
The following day, still motivated by the encouraging words of the president, 
the sultan dispatched his Grand Vizier and Chief of Protocol to meet Hopkins. The 
minutes of the secret meeting recorded by Brigadier General Wilbur reveal that the 
sultan was curious to know American plans for the future of Morocco and 
particularly Roosevelt’s position regarding a tentative proposal of an eventual U.S. 
takeover of the French and Spanish protectorate mandates. Hopkins’s response was 
diplomatic and evasive.4 His reserved reaction would set a pattern of U.S. political 
conduct in subsequent years. A number of American historians (Sangmuah, 1992, 
p. 132; Stenner, 2014, p. 526) have characterized the persistent attempts of the 
Sultan and the nationalists to elicit from U.S. consuls clear statements as well as 
concrete action in support of the Moroccan cause as acts of nuisance and 
manipulation resulting in a great deal of embarrassment for the U.S. administration. 
In contrast, the sultan’s overtures show the great confidence he placed in 
 
2 “Morocco: Diplomatic Correspondence, 1933-1945, FDR-FDRPSF.” Retrieved from 
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/16618683 
3 The sultan’s letter in Arabic (dated 12 Dhul-Qa`dah 1361/ November 21, 1942) is a 
response to both a letter and telegram sent by FDR. The French and English translations of 
the Arabic version carry an earlier date, which is obviously a mistake. There is also copy of 
FDR’s letter to the sultan carrying no date or signature. The heading at the top indicates 
that the version was intended for the press and bears a later date (1942, November 23). 
Judging from its contents, the letter may be the original one sent to the sultan 
acknowledged in his response.  
4 Wilbur Notes. (1943). Retrieved from 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941-43/d382 
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Roosevelt’s power to redefine the rules of the game and to enforce a new process 
of political change. Above all, they reflect his loss of faith in the ability of the 
Franco-Spanish protectorate systems to serve the interests of the Moroccans.  
Not discouraged by Hopkins’ circumspect attitude, and wishing to take 
advantage of the opportune political conjuncture, the sultan instructed Thami El 
Glaoui, then still a close and trusted advisor, to open channels of communication 
with the British and American Consuls with the aim of probing their views 
regarding the proposition, of establishing a “joint protection” with France over 
Morocco. To get around French control of the foreign policy decision-making 
imposed by the terms of the treaty, the sultan also solicited the “appointment of 
diplomatic representatives who would have direct access to him” (Hull, 1943, p. 
738). The instructions of the Department of State to the U.S. consul in Casablanca 
echoed the same views expressed by their British counterparts namely that “it would 
be both impracticable and impolitic to support any such policies or ambitions as 
ascribed to the Sultan” (Hull, 1943, p. 739).  
Secretary of State Cordell Hull was the principal architect of the policy of non-
interference in French domestic affairs in Morocco. When he reported on his 
meeting with the sultan in Oujda on June 24, 1943, Robert D. Murphy, Roosevelt’s 
special representative in North Africa, was aware of the policy line adopted by the 
State Department. He observed, “I have been careful to avoid several suggestions 
emanating from Rabat for a ‘confidential’ discussion with the Sultan, as I feel that 
this is a matter in which the Department would desire the greatest prudence 
exercised” (Murphy, 1943, p. 743). On the other hand, Hull was concerned about 
the repressive measures taken by the French colonial authorities against North 
African populations. He accordingly directed U.S. consuls to report on the conduct 
of French administration and signify to French officials that Americans “have a 
natural interest in the native situation in French North Africa, [...] and that this 
interest may be expected to increase in the future” (Stettinius, 1943, p. 746). 
The reserved response of U.S. diplomatic agents did not dissuade the sultan or 
the nationalists from continuing their campaign. On the morning of January 11, 
1944, two nationalist leaders, Mohamed Lyazidi and Idriss Mhamedi (who later 
became Minister of Interior in the first cabinet of independent Morocco), paid a 
visit to the American consulate in Rabat and were received by the vice consul, 
Donald A. Dumont. The purpose of their visit was to submit a copy of the 
Independence Manifesto and, interestingly enough, a letter intended for President 
Roosevelt. The vice consul, who had no clear instructions as how to deal with such 
a situation, could only point out “the impropriety of transmitting communications 
from political groups in a foreign country to the President of the United States” 
(Dumont, 1944, para 4). 
The letter, of which a copy is preserved at the Tangier American Legation 
library, reveals the nationalists’ high hopes in the American administration and 
especially the president. Addressing President Roosevelt, the signatories stated that,  
Knowing your high sense of justice and your great love of liberty, we are 
convinced that our movement will find benevolent sympathy not only near 
Your Excellency, but also with your government and the great American 
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democracy ... You did us the signal honor of coming to our country and 
you encouraged U.S. thereby to continue the struggle by the side of the 
Allies, for our freedom, the Liberation of France and the Triumph of the 
humanitarian principles for which the Allies are making so many sacrifices. 
(Abdeljalil, Belafrej, Zeghari, Bahim & Chami, 1944, para 2). 
 
Of particular interest here is the report of U.S. Consul General Frederick Mayer to 
the State Department dated January 12, 1944. Mayer expressed strong disinclination 
to encourage the nationalists’ activities and even pressed for a firm statement from 
his government to this effect:  
 
If Department wants to nip in bud this movement before it could reach 
serious proportions, I respectfully suggest desirability of official 
pronouncement to the effect that American Government cannot look with 
favor upon political movements in areas associated in war effort which 
might hamper progress of war. (Mayer, 1944, p. 532) 
 
U.S. records show that this particular letter with its edgy tone caught Roosevelt’s 
attention, and he desired to see the State Department’s response before it was 
dispatched. Despite the escalation of events and the arrest of nationalist members 
by French authorities reported by Mayer in the following weeks, the State 
Department’s letter, dated January 31 and approved by FDR, expressed mild 
concern. It called for restraint and advised, “the Sultan and the nationalist groups to 
avoid challenging the authority of the French and thereby undermining the security 
of the zone at this time” (Hull, 1944, p. 537). Mayer’s pleas for a clear U.S. policy 
regarding the surging political activities of the nationalists warranted a discreet hint 
that the State Department took into account “what appears to be a sympathetic 
interest in the native problem of Morocco in the highest quarters” (Murray, 1944, 
p. 537). 
FDR gave further evidence of his political sentiment when he decided to send 
his autographed photograph to Pasha Glaoui later in January. Secretary Hull 
signified that given the explosive political situation in Morocco, “it might be 
advisable to defer this presentation until such time as the agitation has calmed 
down” (Hull, 1944, P.36). FDR replied in a later memo that he did not see how his 
photograph could “change the future of history,” and prophesied that “in regard to 
Morocco something new is bound to happen in the next ten years, I do not think 
that a population, which is ninety per cent Moors, should be run permanently by 
France” (Roosevelt, 1944, p. 35). 
 
Post-War American Policies vis-a-vis the Moroccan Question 
What was the sultan’s role in this whole process? How much support was he 
willing to give to the nationalist movement in particular in the light of the many 
constraints imposed on him by the terms of the Protectorate treaty and the repressive 
policies of the General Residency? Until then, the margin of maneuver available to 
him was limited and discrete action seemed an advisable strategy to avert open 
French reprisal. The nationalists’ move in January 1944, however, could not have 
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been undertaken without the tacit approval of the Sultan. The published memoirs of 
some of these nationalists underline the fact that nationalist activities were planned 
in concert with the sultan and his close circle (Al-Wazzānī, 1986, pp. 97-102; 
Qādirī, 1997; pp. 174-175). Al-Wazzānī notes in his memoir that on January 13, 
1944 following the presentation of the Independence manifesto, the sultan 
summoned the Pashas and requested their opinions on the nationalists’ demands. 
All but the Pasha of Fes supported the call for independence (Al-Wazzānī, 1982, p. 
97). 
The death of FDR in April 1945 and the victory of the Allies in the war gave a 
real boost to the French colonial authorities to crack down on the burgeoning 
independence movement and its representative entity—the Istiqlal Party. While the 
Truman administration did not display any interest in supporting Moroccan 
nationalists and undermining French interests, U.S. consuls were not blind to the 
fast deteriorating situation in North Africa and the rising wave of nationalism across 
the region. In the broad geo-political context of the post-war and the settling of the 
Cold War era, Morocco’s strategic importance diminished significantly. The 
Department of State records related to Morocco in the post-war years focus on U.S. 
efforts to restore the international status of Tangier and end Spanish control over 
the city. Thus, in August 1945, delegations from France, Britain, the Soviet Union, 
and the United States held several meetings in Paris and agreed to a new and 
provisional regime for Tangier that guaranteed the international character of the city 
and the rights of powers signatories of the 1923 statute. Given American political 
ascendancy at the international scene, France and Britain invited the United States 
to take part in the administration of the city. In his response to the French 
ambassador in Washington, the acting secretary of state stipulated that American 
participation in the administration of Tangier shall not cause any modification or 
prejudice to the rights and privileges acquired by the United States and enjoyed by 
its nationals and ressortissants prior to the introduction of Tangier Statute in 1923.5 
Over the next years, the refusal of the U.S. administration to recognize the specific 
terms of the French Protectorate treaty relating to U.S. extra-territorial privileges 
ensured by the old treaties of 1786 and 1836 with Morocco proved to be a point of 
contention (Azzou, 2005, pp. 110-111). It triggered a long legal dispute with France 
that reached the International Court of Justice in 1950. The case was eventually 
ruled in favor of the French government in August 1952.6  
The sultan, on his part, saw in the restitution of the international status of 
Tangier an opportunity to assert his sovereignty and bring international attention to 
the political crisis in Morocco. In an era marked by anti-colonial struggle and the 
 
5 Acheson D. (1945, September 22). The Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador 
(Bonnet). Retrieved from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v08/d6446 
Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of The United States of America in Morocco (France 
V. United States of America) (1952, August 27). Retrieved from https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/11/011-19520827-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf 
6 Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of The United States of America in Morocco (France 
V. United States of America) (1952, August 27). Retrieved from https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/11/011-19520827-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf 
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surge of nationalist movements, political groups and organizations across North 
Africa succeeded in establishing contact and securing support from the newly 
created Arab League in Cairo and from its first Secretary General Abderahman 
Azzam Basha. The declared attachment of Morocco’s political elite to their Arab 
and Islamic roots undermined France’s influence and the policies it endeavored to 
pursue in Morocco. The sultan’s visit to Tangier in April 1947 was inscribed within 
this new post-war dynamic. Though long envisaged, it came at a propitious time 
and added new momentum to the active agenda of the nationalists. 
The details of this visit were recorded by the historian Abdellah Al-Jirārī, who 
served in several capacities in the Royal Court in the 1940s, and the nationalist 
leader Allal Al- Fāsī. In his memoir of Sultan Mohamed V, Al-Jirārī notes that the 
Tangier journey, which lasted from Wednesday, April 9 to Sunday April, 13, was a 
historic event that further demonstrated the unanimous support and loyalty enjoyed 
by the sultan in the Spanish and international zone of his kingdom. Arriving in 
Tangier by train from Rabat after a ceremonious stopover in Asila, the sultan was 
driven to the palace of the Mendoub amid large crowds of cheering bystanders 
raising colorful banners. In the evening, the municipality organized a show of 
fireworks in celebration of the event. The following day, Thursday April 10, he 
received in his Palace at Mendoubiya, representatives of foreign powers, as well as 
dignitaries from the Muslim and Jewish communities. The first of these diplomatic 
officials was the American Consul General in Tangier, Paul H. Alling who had just 
been nominated U.S. ambassador to Syria. The Sultan then received the 
representatives of Great Britain, Spain, and France, successively, and made the 
following statement: 
 
In this informal meeting, and in the presence of representatives of the 
friendly countries, we are pleased to extend our sincere thanks to you for 
the affection you have shown us and to the Moroccan people on this 
historic occasion, this is not surprising, since the bonds of affection we 
have had since ancient times were built by our noble ancestors. …You are 
well acquainted that Morocco participated in the last war and contributed 
its sons and all its means until the final victory was achieved, and since 
nations are now demanding rights that suit the present time, it is only right 
for the Moroccan people to obtain their legitimate rights and to achieve 
what we hope for and what the Moroccan people yearns to like all other 
nations. (Al-Jirārī & Jawharī, 2006, p. 131). 
 
After this reception, the sultan delivered a long and powerful speech to the public 
that went down in the annals of history as the speech that launched the sultan’s 
formal public engagement to reverse the status quo. The speech laid emphasis on 
the Islamic identity of the Moroccan nation and its strong ties with the Arab 
countries through their newly established entity the Arab League. It also called 
attention to the strong bonds that had united the royal family with the Moroccan 
people and made repeated references to the necessity for the Moroccan people to 
attain their legitimate rights. More significantly, the speech made no ceremonious 
reference to the work of the French colonial authorities, and the omission was 
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interpreted as the sultan’s new disposition to resist the imposed policies of the 
residency. George Joffé argues that the Tangier speech not only revealed the 
sultan’s endorsement of the nationalist agenda, but also paved the way for the 
urban-based Istiqlal party to spread its influence in the rural parts of the country 
where it lacked grassroots base (Joffé, 1985, pp. 289-290).  
The escalating events that followed in the ensuing years and the French 
hardline policy to curb the sultan’s ascendant influence and popularity among the 
Moroccan population and its political elite only served to radicalize his position vis-
a-vis the French colonial establishment. Beside infusing local domestic public 
enthusiasm and confirming his sovereignty over the northern region of the country, 
which had been under Spanish control since 1912, the sultan’s visit to Tangier 
enabled him to reach out to the international community through its diplomatic 
agents represented in Tangier and to receive extensive media coverage both in local 
and foreign newspapers. If during the Anfa conference the sultan emerged as a head 
of State struggling to secure American recognition and support for his country’s 
cause, the Tangier visit acclaimed him as a popular and legitimate sovereign who 
inspired hope and confidence among his people in the future. On Friday, the sultan 
headed to the great mosque of Tangier and delivered the Khutba (sermon) to the 
excited worshippers. While his sermon did not contain any clear political messages 
apart from exhortations to hold to the teachings of Islam, it endorsed his image as a 
devout and religious leader.  
The outcome of this extraordinary royal visit to Tangier for the colonial 
authorities in Rabat and the Parisian official circles was extremely disappointing. 
By appointing Resident General Eric Labonne in early 1946, French government 
had aimed to appease the tense political situation in Morocco and introduce new 
reforms commensurate with rising demands of nationalist movements across North 
Africa. However, Labonne’s agricultural and educational reform policies as well as 
political reconciliation failed to contain the demands of the nationalists for a 
political process culminating in Moroccan independence. The apparently lenient 
policy and bill of reforms of Labonne did not appeal to the French colonists either. 
The tragic incident of the ben M’sik massacre of April 7, 1947 on the eve of the 
sultan’s visit to Tangier, reported in international newspapers including the New 
York Times, had raised tensions further. Labonne was succeeded by General 
Alphonse Juin, a military figure of a less tractable nature whose term would see the 
further deterioration of relations with the sultan and the nationalists.  
How did the American authorities react to these changes in Morocco? 
Contemporary U.S. diplomatic correspondence reveals that the situation in the 
country was being watched carefully. The situation of North Africa was far from 
reassuring and the policies adopted in Paris and implemented by the colonial 
authorities in Tunis, Algiers, and Rabat did not seem to meet the rising demands of 
North African peoples whose agitations for better political and social conditions 
were now strongly supported by the Arab League. A new agency, the Bureau du 
Moghreb Arabe, was established in Cairo, which brought together the major 
political parties in the three countries. In July 1947 by instructions from the 
nationalist movement and the approval of the sultan, Mahdi Bennouna travelled to 
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New York and established an office to lobby for the Moroccan cause among the 
members of United Nations (Perkins, 1976, p. 66). The fruit of his efforts and of his 
office will begin to show only in the early 1950s when the Moroccan case was 
debated in the UN General Assembly sessions. 
Meanwhile in light of the activities of French communists in France and 
Morocco American officials in Morocco began to sound the alarm, and frequently 
advised the Department of State in Washington that although the nationalists had 
expressed allegiance to the United States, they may in desperate measures resort to 
Soviet political support in the United Nations or even clandestinely to bring the 
desired change in their country. What used to be an exclusively French colonial 
affair had now become a delicate issue for American government. The currents of 
Cold War politics, it seems, had swept over this part of the world too. The American 
government was unwilling to allow Soviet influence to penetrate this strategic area. 
On June 10, 1947, only two months after the sultan’s visit to Tangier, Secretary 
of State George Marshall wrote to the U.S. embassy in Paris outlining his view of 
the North African situation. He noted that to avert the risk of the Indo-China 
scenario, the solution lies in “leading North Africans [being] approached with some 
plan guaranteeing evolution toward self-government while concurrently 
safeguarding economic development of country and legitimate French interests in 
area by integration into French Union” (Marshall, 1948, p. 686). He urged the 
ambassador to summon U.S. agents in North Africa to confer on the situation there 
and propose a course of action. The conference indeed took place a week later in 
the American embassy in Paris and was attended by representatives of U.S. 
missions in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and France. The report of their 
findings presented by Ambassador Jefferson Caffery was detailed and contained a 
road map to resolve the crisis that was fast developing in North Africa. After 
outlining U.S. principles and orientations in taking this initiative, the participants 
including Paul H. Alling the Consul-General of Tangier who chaired the meeting, 
proposed that the French government be approached and urged to introduce “long-
range plans to guide both North African Protectorates (Morocco and Tunisia) 
toward dominion status” (Caffery, 1947, p. 693). Such a plan, they pointed out, 
should have a definite time-frame and should involve concrete actions to establish 
“without delay a solid basis of mutual trust” (Caffery, 1947, p. 693). These actions 
include “freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, rapid amplification of the 
school program, administrative reforms, initiation to democratic ways through 
municipal elections, etc.” (Caffery, 1947, p. 693). 
In retrospect, these proposed reforms received little heeding from the French 
authorities who preferred to pursue a stick policy in their North African colonies. 
The American government on its part continued to ignore the nationalists’ appeals 
for support, and often used its political influence to offset the criticism and 
condemnation of France in the United Nations. The raging Indochina war and 
French grim prospects there compelled the U.S. government to support French 
economically, militarily, and politically. The establishment of U.S. air bases in 
Morocco in 1951 without prior consultation or consent of the sultan were part of 
the broad framework of their collaboration. However, starting from 1953 after the 
French had deposed Sultan Mohamed Ben Youssef, the U.S. government was itself 
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under pressure from Arab and Asian countries to take a firm position against France 
in the United Nations general Assembly. In the end, France had to reverse its 
colonial policy and acquiesce to the demands of the nationalist movement by 
reinstating the sultan and bringing to end the long protectorate phase. 
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Abstract 
This article highlights the cultural, economic, historical, and political 
criteria that influence the current international policy of the Pompidou 
Center, particularly a new interest in non-Western art in Arabic-speaking 
countries. It focuses on works produced by Moroccan artists that are part 
of the collections of the National Museum of Modern Art - Centre 
Pompidou in Paris. It includes a brief introduction to some key milestones 
in Moroccan art history that help contextualize the research project.  
 
 
The Context of the Project: Milestones in Moroccan Art History 
At the dawn of the 20th century, the destiny of Morocco, like most African 
countries, could not escape Western colonization. The signature of the Treaty of 
Fez on March 30, 1912 allowed the establishment of a Franco-Spanish protectorate. 
The Spanish dominated the Rif region in the north of Morocco, while the French 
exerted their power in the central/southern parts of the country. Two institutions 
dedicated to artistic education were created under the colonization system and 
which belong today to Moroccan authorities. The Ecole des Beaux-Arts of 
Casablanca opened in 1950 and the Ecole des Beaux-Arts of Tetouan created in 
1945. 
However, as art historian Toni Maraini (2014) has noted, there is a popular 
pictorial tradition that did not come to Morocco "in the trunks of colonialism." 
Morocco has long been and continues to be at the crossroads of different 
civilizations and cultures. Miniatures, illuminations, arabesques, Amazigh signs, 
Roman antiquities, and Islamic architecture have inspired generations of 
autodidactic artists who employ techniques that belong to these aesthetic registers. 
I mention a few: Mohamed Ben Ali Rbati (1861-1939), Mohamed Ben Allal (1924-
1995), Ahmed Ben Driss El Yacoubi (1928-1985), Hassan El Glaoui (1923-2018), 
Chaïbia Talal (1929-2004), and Fatima Hassan Farrouj (1945-2011). Their 
productions were wrongly so-called “naïve” during the protectorate. But “naïve” 
according to whom and in what context? They all started exhibiting from the 1950s 
in Morocco and abroad. 
The years immediately before and following independence (1956) were 
decisive for the future of contemporary art in Morocco. A new generation of artists 
benefitted from scholarships to continue their artistic training abroad while others 
chose to stay in Morocco. When talking about the birth of abstraction in painting in 
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Morocco, the names of Ahmed Cherkaoui (1934-1967) and Jilali Gharbaoui (1930-
1971) are always among the first directly mentioned. Cherkaoui draws on his 
heritage to create contemporary work. He uses visual elements (usually inspired 
from the Amazigh alphabet or tattoos) and enlarges then so that the shape occupies 
the entire space of the canvas. As for Gharbaoui, he chose to express himself 
through the pictorial gesture. The imbalance in his private life has influenced him 
as his work is characterized by violent and rapid gestures.  
In 1962, upon his return to Morocco, Farid Belkahia (1934-2014) took over the 
direction of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts of Casablanca. Joined by artists-teachers 
Mohamed Melehi (1936-) and Mohamed Chebaa (1935-2013) and historians Toni 
Maraini (1941-) and Bert Flint (1931-), they established an artistic education that 
takes into account the different aspects of Moroccan culture for the creation of 
contemporary works. Like many other artists, they have thought about the future of 
Moroccan art by refuting the ideas that reduced it to naïve art during colonial and 
post-colonial periods. Their collaboration is at the origin of the artistic movement 
known as the “School of Casablanca.” Maraini says (2014), “More than a style, 
‘modernity,’ thus understood, was a spirit and an attitude. Far from being 
established like an academy of styles, modern art became the space of questioning 
and unveiling” (p. 73). They encouraged their students to create outside the 
academic space and go to meet the public. To challenge the folklorization of 
Moroccan art defended in neo-colonial salons, they created an open-air exhibition 
in Jamaa el Fna square (1969) which undoubtedly represents an historical moment 
in Moroccan history of art.  
During that period, quality art and culture journals were born. Maghreb Art 
(1965-1969) was published by the School of Casablanca, Souffles (1966-1973) 
initiated by poets Abdellatif Lâabi and Mustapha Nissaboury, and then Integral 
(1971-1977). In 1971, Pauline de Mazières founded l’Atelier, the first contemporary 
art gallery in Morocco. She was joined by Sylvia Benhassan and for 20 years (until 
1991), the gallery was considered as a reference point not only nationally but for 
the broader Arab world. In the late 1970s, Mohamed Melehi and Mohamed 
Benaissa, both originating from Asilah and elected to the city council, initiated the 
Cultural Moussem of Asilah. This festival of art and culture is organized every year 
between July and August. Through its programming, the organizers aim to ensure 
the social and economic development of the city through culture and arts.  
Many companies and patrons supported the artists not only by collecting but 
also by supporting and creating places to spread the visual arts. This is the case of 
The Office Chérifien des Phosphates, the Foundation Omnium nord-africain (ONA) 
and its two art villas based in Casablanca and Rabat: the Attijari Wafabank and its 
art space Actua; and the real-estate group Alliances owned by Mohamed Alami 
Lazrak and its eponymous foundation which manages the Museum of 
Contemporary African Art Al Maaden just to name a few.  
In 1993, the artist-teacher Faouzi Laatiris (1958-) set up the “Volume and 
Installation” workshop at National Institute of Fine Arts of Tetouan. He contributed 
to the training of the most remarkable artists of a generation – the “Tetouan 
generation” which included Batoul S'Himi (1974-), Younes Rahmoun (1975-), 
Safaa Erruas (1976-), Mohssin Harraki (1981-), Mustapha Akrim (1981-), etc. 
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A lot of artists and curators have also created venues for the dissemination of 
contemporary art and culture. This is the case of Yto Barrada (1971-), who took 
over the Cinémathèque de Tanger and saved it from collapse; Hassan Darsi (1961-
) founded the research center The Source of the Lion (1995) in Casablanca; 
Mohamed Mourabiti (1968-) initiated Al Maqam, an artist's residence located in the 
Amazigh village Tahannaout not far from Marrakech; Abdallah Karroum founded 
in 2002 L'appartement 22, an artist's residence in Rabat; Younes Rahmoun 
cofounded in 2013 with Berénice Saliou Trankat, a space of residence and creation 
in the medina of Tetouan. 
In 2002, Hicham Daoudi founded the Compagnie Marocaine des Œuvres et 
Objets d’Art, an auction house based in Casablanca and renamed in 2008 as the Art 
Holding Morocco. Its area of specialization extends to cultural management. Thus, 
Daoudi created in 2009 Diptyk, an art magazine published in Casablanca and 
directed by Myriam Sebti and in 2016 the Comptoir des Mines, a contemporary art 
gallery in the heart of Marrakech. In 2004, Vanessa Branson initiated the cultural 
event Art Marrakech, which was named The Marrakech Biennale in 2012. Due to 
lack of funding, its sixth and last event took place in 2016. 
At the initiative of His Majesty Mohamed VI, the National Foundation of 
Museums was created in 2011, and chaired by the artist Mehdi Qotbi (1951-) to 
manage the 14 national museums of the kingdom including the Museum of Modern 
and Contemporary Art Mohamed VI, which was inaugurated in 2014 in Rabat. In 
February 2018, 1:54, the contemporary African art fair founded in 2013 by Touria 
El Glaoui, took place for the first time in Marrakech at the Mamounia. These are a 
few of the important milestones that set the stage for a discussion of Moroccan 
artwork as represented through the Centre Pompidou collections that is the focus of 
this article. A non-exhaustive list of Moroccan artists can be found in the appendix 
to this article. 
 
The Research Project 
Aware of the Euro-American focus of the collections that they manage, the 
curators in modern and contemporary art museums have been interested in non-
Western artists since the late 1980s. The French National Museum of Modern Art 
(Musée National d’Art Moderne), created in 1947 in Paris, was born from the 
merger of the collections of the Museum of Living Artists (Musée des Artistes 
Vivants) and the Museum of Contemporary Foreign Schools of the Jeu de Paume 
(Musée des Écoles Étrangères Contemporaines du Jeu de Paume). It is, since 1977, 
established at the Centre Pompidou and considered as the first institution dedicated 
to promoting contemporary art in France (Quemin, 2007, p. 527). 
The Centre Pompidou is a multidisciplinary cultural institution initiated by the 
French President Georges Pompidou and opened on January 31, 1977. The building 
was designed by Renzo Piano and Richard Rogers. The Center houses different 
cultural structures including the National Museum of Modern Art, which gathered 
together the third most important collection of modern and contemporary art in the 
world. More than 120,000 works of art are classified within seven departments: 
photography, graphic art, fine arts, architecture, design, cinema, and new media. 
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The first director of the museum, Pontus Hulten, made the international exhibition 
a contribution to the art world (Dufrêne, 2007, p. 509). Early exhibitions marked 
the beginnings of the museum within the Pompidou Center by tracing the links 
between Paris and the art capitals of the avant-gardes: Paris-New York (1977), 
Paris-Berlin (1978), and Paris-Moscow (1979). With shows like Magiciens de la 
terre (1989), “What About China? (2003), or Africa Remix (2005), the institution 
attests to an interest in the art worlds of the former colonies, as seen through the 
prism of multiculturalism and diplomatic agreements. 
In this regard Catherine Grenier, the former deputy director of the museum, 
initiated in 2009 the scientific program titled “research and globalization.” The first 
result of this program consisted of a new display of the permanent collection entitled 
Plural Modernities: 1905-1970 (Modernités Plurielles: 1905-1970). She announced, 
 
This manifest exhibition, the fruit of research conducted by a large team 
of curators and young university researchers, is a first proposal for the 
renewal of the conventional discourse on modern art. It breaks with long 
years of consensus around a unified narrative, linear and progressive, 
proposed with slight national variants by all Western museums. This 
consensus, now in crisis, needs to be updated and re-established on a new 
basis. (Grenier, 2013, p. 15) 
 
This semi-permanent exhibition—which aims to decolonize art history—is the 
guiding thread of my study. 
In addition to the linearity of the discourse, which is focused on Western and 
North American art scenes, different observations brought me to think about the 
topic and to focus on Moroccan artists who are represented in the collection of the 
museum. First, an increased interest in non-Western artists is accompanied by 
participation in group exhibitions and acquisitions of their works. Second, the 
Friends of the Centre Pompidou is a nonprofit organization that aims to enrich the 
collection of the museum by supporting new acquisitions. An International Circle 
of patrons was created in 2013 and is organized according to geopolitical areas. It 
includes a Middle Eastern group (2013) and an African section (2019). Third, on 
the other side of the Mediterranean, particularly in Morocco, we notice a vibrant, 
emerging art world as well as the establishment of new institutions that aim to 
spread contemporary art, such as the Marrakech Biennale (2004-2016), the National 
Foundation of Museums (2011), the Museum of Contemporary African Art Al 
Maaden (2016), and 1:54 Contemporary African Art Fair (2018), etc. And finally, 
a partnership agreement recently signed between the Centre Pompidou and the 
Moroccan National Foundation of Museums. 
 
Methodology 
The main subject of this research project is to determine if the Moroccan artistic 
presence in the collections of the Centre Pompidou signifies a decolonization of the 
gaze and of the conventional discourse of art history. As a first step, I identified the 
role that Morocco plays in the museum’s collection through an inventory derived 
from the online catalog of the collection. In addition to asking, what were the criteria 
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set up by the museum staff to complete the collection, especially in a difficult 
economic context affected by budgetary restrictions, I also studied the 
dissemination vectors set up by the institution to share its collections with the 
audience. I then situated the corpus on a timeline and correlated it with historical 
events and with the development of the art market over the last two decades. This 
work allows me to analyze how the interest in Moroccan artists is generated and 
changes. The below inventory compiled in 2018 as part of this study includes the 
identification of the artists and their works, the acquisition methods, and whether it 
is a purchase, a donation, or a deposit.  
 
Artists Title Created Technique Acquired Acquisition 
Method 
Mehdi 
Qotbi 
Small 
symphony 
1980 Lithography  1980 Purchase 
Majida 
Khattari 
Fashion 
show/perfor
mance 
1998 Video 1999 Purchase 
Dreams of 
young girls 
2001 Video 
installation 
2001 Purchase 
Yto 
Barrada 
The 
magician 
2003 Video 2005 Purchase 
Untitled 
(From the 
series The 
Strait, notes 
on a useless 
country) 
1998 Chromogeni
c print stuck 
on 
aluminum 
2006 Donation from 
the Caisse des 
dépôts 
et consignations 
Untitled 
(From the 
series The 
Strait, notes 
on a useless 
country) 
1998 Chromogeni
c print stuck 
on 
aluminum 
Donation from 
the Caisse des 
dépôts 
et consignations 
Untitled 
(From the 
series The 
Strait, notes 
on a useless 
country) 
1998 Chromogeni
c print stuck 
on 
aluminum 
Donation from 
the Caisse des 
dépôts 
et consignations 
Untitled 
(From the 
series The 
Strait, notes 
on a useless 
country) 
1998 Chromogeni
c print stuck 
on 
aluminum 
Donation from 
the Caisse des 
dépôts 
et consignations 
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Untitled 
(From the 
series The 
Strait, notes 
on a useless 
country) 
1998 Chromogeni
c print stuck 
on 
aluminum 
Donation from 
the Caisse des 
dépôts 
et consignations 
Hill of the 
Charf - 
Tangier 
(Tomb of 
Ante) 
From the 
series Gran 
Royal 
Turismo 
2001 Chromogeni
c print  
Donation from 
the Caisse des 
dépôts 
et consignations 
Municipal 
Stadium - 
Tangier 
From the 
series Gran 
Royal 
Turismo 
2002 Chromogeni
c print  
Donation from 
the Caisse des 
dépôts 
et consignations 
Ba-Youssef 
and the 
yellow 
tomatoes 
2011 Chromogeni
c print  
2012 Donation from 
the Friends of 
the Centre 
Pompidou 
Project for 
contemporary art 
2011 
School 
table of the 
greenhouse, 
educational 
farm, 
Tangier 
2011 Chromogeni
c print  
Donation from 
the Friends of 
the Centre 
Pompidou 
Project for 
contemporary art 
2011 
Untitled, 
Subtitle: 
painted 
educational 
boards 
found in 
Natural 
History 
Museum, 
2013 - 
2015 
Chromogeni
c print 
2018 Donation from 
the Friends of 
the Centre 
Pompidou 
International 
Circle - Middle 
East Group 
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never 
opened, 
Assilah, 
Morocco 
Najia 
Mehadji 
Pomegrana
te flower 
2003 Sanguine on 
paper 
2005 Purchase 
Pomegrana
te flower 
2003 Sanguine on 
paper 
Purchase 
Pomegrana
te flower 
2002 Sanguine on 
paper 
2005 Donation from 
the artist 
Pomegrana
te flower 
2002 Sanguine on 
paper 
Donation from 
the artist 
Icarus 1985 Painting, 
paper pasted 
on canvas 
2010 Donation from 
the association 
Camille 
Volute n°2 2008 Gouache on 
paper 
2012 Donation from 
the artist 
Mohamme
d Melehi 
Pulsation 1964 Acrylic on 
canvas 
2011 Donation from 
Loft Art Gallery 
Hassan 
Darsi 
The model 
project 
2002 - 
2003 
A model 
and several 
documentar
y elements 
2012 Donation from 
Art Holding 
Morocco 
Ahmed 
Cherkaoui 
The 
coronation 
1964 Oil and 
pigments on 
canvas 
2013 Deposit from the 
Centre National 
des Arts 
Plastiques 
Purchased in 
1964 
Farid 
Belkahia 
Tribute to 
Gaston 
Bachelard 
1984 Dye on skin 2013 Purchase 
Hicham 
Berrada 
Report of 
universal 
laws #3 
2013 Video 2014 Donation from 
the Friends of 
the Centre 
Pompidou 
perspective for 
contemporary art 
2013  
Presage 11-
10-2013-
7h36 
2013 Video Donation from 
the Friends of 
the Centre 
Pompidou 
Perspective for 
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contemporary art 
2013 
Achraf 
Touloub 
Protocolar 
garden 
2014 Installation 2016 Donation from 
the Friends of 
the Centre 
Pompidou 
International 
Circle - Middle 
East Group 
Seated 
thoughts 
2014 Ink and 
gouache on 
paper 
2016 Donation from 
Plan B Gallery 
Younes 
Rahmoun 
Manzil 
Jana 
(Paradise 
House) 
2015 Installation 2016 Donation from 
the Friends of 
the Centre 
Pompidou 
International 
Circle - Middle 
East Group 
Manzil-
Markib-
Mawja 
(House-
Boat-Wave) 
2015 Mixed 
installation 
structure 
and video 
projection 
on the 
ground 
2018 Donation from 
the Friends of 
the Centre 
PompidouIntern
ational Circle - 
Middle East 
Group 
Mohssin 
Harraki 
Anwar al-
nujūm 
(Stars 
Light) 
2015 Multimedia 
installation 
4 projectors, 
4 
multimedia 
players, 4 
digital video 
2018 Donation from 
the Friends of 
the Centre 
Pompidou 
International 
Circle - Middle 
East Group 
Purchase / Deposit 
Donation from the Friends of the Centre Pompidou 
 
Donation from individuals / corporate 
 
Figure 1. Table of the works produced by Moroccan artists and belonging to the 
National Museum of Modern Art – Pompidou Center Collections. 
 
Data collection was followed by an interview survey with the involved 
stakeholders: artists, curators, gallerists, etc. I thus identified three groups of works 
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based on the museum’s criteria1: “Abstraction as an artistic language” (Farid 
Belkahia, Mohamed Melehi, Hicham Berrada, Achraf Touloub, Mehdi Qotbi, Najia 
Mehadji, and Ahmed Cherkaoui); “Islam as a source of inspiration” (Majida 
Khattari, Mohssin Harraki, and Younes Rahmoun); and “Rethinking the 
environment” (Yto Barrada and Hassan Darsi). In the following pages, I explore the 
paths of three artists, one from each category, Farid Belkahia, Younes Rahmoun, 
and Yto Barrada.  
 
The Abstraction as an Artistic Language:  
Select Works of Farid Belkahia 
Born in 1934 in Marrakech, Farid Belkahia has produced a contemporary work 
closely linked to Moroccan heritage and local craft. At the dawn of the 
independence of Morocco, he travelled, like many artists of his generation, to study 
abroad at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris (France), at the National Theater in 
Prague (Hungary), and at the Brera Academy of Fine Arts in Milan (Italy). In 1962, 
he returned to Morocco to take charge of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts of Casablanca. 
He held this position until 1974. Belkahia and the artist-teachers, including 
Mohamed Melehi and Mohamed Chebaa, abandoned the established conventions 
and teaching methods spread during the French protectorate in favor of research and 
practices that take into account the different facets of Moroccan culture. Their 
collaboration was at the origin of the artistic movement known as the “School of 
Casablanca.”  
From the 1960s, Belkahia's personal approach is a continuation of the reflection 
initiated with the Casablanca group. He explored local heritage to identify different 
elements such as forms, signs, symbols, and substances that will be the raw material 
of his visual language. The painter abandoned canvas, easel, and chemical paints in 
favor of local materials such as animal skin, copper, henna, saffron, etc. The skin 
became his favorite material for nearly 40 years. Each work is a sensory 
composition imagined like a puzzle. In order to create a dialogue between the form 
and purpose of the artwork, Belkahia has visually translated several themes such as 
the Melhoun (Amazigh poetry), Lalla Mira (an Amazigh queen celebrated by the 
Gnawa music), the Trance, Jerusalem, the Hand, and also paid tribute to intellectual 
personalities such as Ibn Battoûta, Antoni Tapiés, René Char, and Gaston 
Bachelard, among others.  
 
 
 
 
 
1 In the online catalog of the collection, each work of art has its own descriptive form. I 
identified the museum's selection criteria through the comparison of the keywords associated 
to each work mentioned in its descriptive form on the one hand and the study of the artists' 
body of works on the other. The comparison and analysis of these information allows me to 
identify the three main groups mentioned above. The online collection is available through 
this link: https://collection.centrepompidou.fr/#/artworks  
56   Journal of Global Initiatives 
 
 
Figure 2: Farid Belkahia, Tribute to Gaston Bachelard, (1986), 320 x 296 x 4 cm, 
Dye on skin. © Hassan Nadim and Fouad Maazouz, Courtesy Fondation Farid 
Belkahia, Marrakech* 
 
The work, Tribute to Gaston Bachelard (1984), was purchased by the National 
Museum of Modern Art in 2013. As part of this study I met with the curator Michel 
Gauthier, to learn more about the acquisition process. He recalled, “I knew his work 
a bit and when we started working on the hanging of the permanent collection Plural 
Modernities, I wanted to meet him. It seemed to me that, apart from Plural 
Modernities, it was a pity that there is no works created by Belkahia in the 
collection” (M. Gauthier, personal communication, June 2016). The idea of 
acquiring his work was set up in 2011 when Gauthier went to Marrakech to meet 
the artist and see the available pieces. He reflected: 
 
Finally, we focused on this work, because Belkahia, moreover, thought it 
was a tribute to Gaston Bachelard so there was a kind of logic that this 
work that evokes a French thinker belongs to France. (...) And it seemed 
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to me extremely interesting by its colors, the fact that it is composed by 
several elements and that there are signs and arrows on the clouds. The 
piece is truly representative of the artistic work of Belkahia. ” (M. 
Gauthier, personal communication, June 2016)  
 
Farid Belkahia passed away in Marrakech in 2014. His reflection on the 
collective memory and his non-traditional analysis of tradition allowed him to 
bequeath to humanity a work of universal significance confirmed by the words of 
Toni Maraini (2014), “In fact, the work of Farid Belkahia—who is one of the 
leading artists of contemporary Moroccan painting—is there to remind us that 
creation rises outside or beyond the limits of time, that modernity is multiple and 
that art is imbued with immemorial symbols” (p. 148). 
 
Islam as a Source of Inspiration: Select Works of Younes Rahmoun 
Graduated in 1998 from the National Institute of Fine Arts of Tetouan in 
Morocco, Younes Rahmoun, born in 1975 in Tetouan where he lives and works, 
combines artistic practice with a spiritual one. According to Roxana Azimi, “Raised 
within the Muslim religion, which he rarely sees as a weight or a hindrance, this 
true believer searches through all the key spiritualties in order to understand the 
world” (Azimi & Saliou, 2012, p. 2). His work is shown in France from 1999 
following his participation in the exhibition: The disoriented object, organized at 
the Museum of Decorative Arts in Paris (France) under the direction of Jean-Louis 
Froment and Regards Nomades, which took place in Museum of Fine Arts in Dole 
(France).  
About Rahmoun’s approach, Frédéric Bouglé (1999) says,  
 
Sawdust, paper, rope, stone, sand, jute fabric, studs, gravel, the materials 
used by Younes Rahmoun in his installations decline and are repeated like 
the strident rhaïtas of a jajouka melody. Poor materials but rich in meaning 
and memory. They secretly reveal magical rituals under the obvious 
evidence of everyday life. They show the life of the souk, of the medina 
and of the lonely villages of his native country. (p. 25) 
 
A multidisciplinary artist, Rahmoun explores various media: installation, video, 
animation, photography, performance, and drawing. His minimalistic work invites 
a meditation and reflection on the unfolding of life. He translates his everyday 
experience through simple elements. In his language, universality is perceived 
through simple geometric shapes, flowers, and natural elements such as small 
stones. In his work there is a strong presence of architecture and a spiritual reading 
of spaces of habitation from an individual and collective perspective. Hence, he 
creates a connection between the external world and the introspective experience in 
order to communicate a universal message.  
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Figure 3. Younes Rahmoun, Manzil-Janna (Paradise-House), (2015), 30x30x225 
cm (x7), resin. © Younès Rahmoun, Courtesy of the artist and Galerie Imane Farès, 
Paris* 
 
The installation Manzil Janna (2015), whose title is translated from Arabic to 
English by Manzil as “house and Janna = paradise,” entered in 2016 the Centre 
Pompidou’s collections thanks to a donation from the International Circle—Middle 
East group of the Friends of the Centre Pompidou. Composed of seven small white 
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houses, whose shape is inspired by birdhouses, each is more than two meters high 
on thin stilts and represents a minimalist intimate space and a high refuge of the 
soul. The choice to repeat the structure seven times is not trivial. The number seven 
carries an important significance in Islam on the one hand and the repetition 
accentuates the meditative action on the other hand. The white color is used to 
enhance purity. Each house is painted inside in multicolored uniqueness. According 
to the artist, the spectrum of colors represents the infinity of possibilities, 
interpretations, etc. Perhaps, the installation invites his audience to an elevation of 
the soul beyond the seventh heaven, to paradise. 
 
Rethinking the Environment: Select Works of Yto Barrada 
The Franco-Moroccan artist Yto Barrada was born in Paris in 1971 and 
graduated from the Sorbonne in History and Political Science and the International 
Center of Photography in New York. Since the beginning of the 2000s, she has been 
conducting a reflection on post-colonial history and the challenges of globalization 
through a critical look at the Moroccan context. She was working between Tangier 
and New York before settling in the American city. In 2003, she co-founded the 
Cinémathèque de Tanger, to which she gave her studio which will serve as artistic 
residency. Primarily a photographer, Barrada also produces films, installations and 
sculptures. 
In 2006, a set of seven photographic images were donated to the Centre 
Pompidou museum from the Caisse des dépôts et consignations, consisting of five 
photographic clichés from the series The strait, notes on a useless country and two 
from the Gran Royal Turismo series. Through a photographic survey, Barrada 
paints a portrait of Tangier. The city is located on the Strait of Gibraltar and it 
represents a strategic point between Africa and Europe. Barrada confronts different 
elements that reflect the demographic transformation of Tangier. She documents 
the local environment and reveals a fragile ecosystem threatened by the increasing 
urbanization. The emptiness, the abandoned nature or the human presence brings 
fiction to her visual narratives.  
Photography allows Barrada to represent the tragic reality of the world from an 
artistic point of view and to invite the viewer not only to contemplation but also to 
reflection (B. Utudjian, personal communication, May 2018). Through her 
iconographic exploration, she emphasizes the colonization effects in the 
postcolonial era. In an interview with Sina Najafi, the artist declares: “Morocco is 
a place where history has been confiscated and replaced by propaganda and 
repression. The ‘sharing of Africa’ is still a reality; sixty years after independence, 
we still cannot impose our ideas” (Najafi, 2013, p. 147). 
By her documentary approach, Barrada draws up an inventory of the city and 
tries as much to alert the observer to the fragility of the inhabitants in Tangier and 
to their environment as she does to raise broader awareness, in the absence of a 
political strategy that faces the dangers of globalization, of the effects on 
environmental and cultural ecosystems designed to meet the needs of the dominant 
West. 
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Results of the Study 
The inventory of the collection shows that the Arab artistic representation 
within the collection of the National Museum of Modern Art – Centre Pompidou 
does not exceed 0.5%.2 The selected artists are mostly from the Moroccan diaspora. 
For most, they have studied in Western art schools, they are represented by Western 
galleries, and they are exhibiting abroad. 
Once the works produced by Moroccan artists are identified, we notice that the 
Centre Pompidou curators are focusing more on the new generation, as if the art 
history in the kingdom of Morocco is being written right now. The majority of the 
works do not reflect the traditional art of the country.  
The thirty-one pieces acquired are as follows: twenty-three donations, seven 
purchases, and one deposit of the National Center of Contemporary Art. These data 
show the important role patrons are playing in the contemporary art ecosystem in 
France, a country traditionally focused on public funding which is increasingly 
reduced. In addition to the quality of the artists' work, it seems that the networks 
and the actors behind many artists play an important role for their recognition and 
the establishment of their professional careers.  
The study of the dissemination vectors set up by the museum to enlarge public 
knowledge about the richness of the art history shows that: artists from Morocco 
and the Arab region are not well represented through the temporary exhibitions, the 
permanent hanging of the collection, the Massive Open Online Course, the mobile 
app, and the catalogs edited by the institution. It also reveals a confusion in the use 
of concepts; for example, the historiographies of art combine sometimes Moroccan 
creation with that of the Middle East and with that of Africa. It should be noted that 
Morocco is a country of the Arab world but not of the Middle East geographical 
space. In this regard, there is a lot more work that should be done to clarify the use 
of different political concepts that impact cultural context.  
Regarding the partnership between the National Foundation of Museums and 
the Centre Pompidou, it involves exchanging expertise “hopefully in both 
directions.” A turnkey exhibition of works from the Pompidou Collection was 
organized at the Mohamed VI museum in Rabat during the summer of 2018. Its 
curator Christian Briend said, 
 
At the end of the proposed itinerary, the visitor may regret not finding 
artists from other geographical areas than those represented here, starting 
with the Maghreb countries. (...) It is enough to say how the exhibition 
 
2 This result is obtained following the inventory study I conducted in May 2018. The number 
of works available in the online catalog at the time of the study was 106,947. At first, I tried 
to identify the artists (79) who represent the Arab scene and their works (365), and then to 
focus on those who represent the Moroccan artistic scene. The figures obtained indicate that 
the works produced by artists belonging to the countries of the Arab world represent only 
0.3% of the totality of the collection. However, I estimate 0.5% because the entire collection 
is not available online. The number will evolve according to the site's feed with further 
digitization of new acquisitions. The scanning process is long and is subject to certain 
restrictions. 
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“The Mediterranean and Modern Art” remains dependent on a heritage, 
that of a collection conveying a European vision of the history of art, that 
the institution is working today to question by a policy of exhibitions ever 
more attentive to "plural modernities." (Briend, 2018, p. 21) 
 
It seems that the economic crisis has modified power relations and accelerated the 
transition to another world relatively not affected by the economic catastrophe. The 
emergence of new cities as center of the world (Hong Kong, Singapore, Dubai, etc.), 
the evolution of the art market Christie’s (2006) and Bonhams (2007) in Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates, Sotheby’s (2007) in Doha, Qatar, local art fairs like Art 
Dubai (2007), the newly rich art collectors, and the establishment of new cultural 
institutions all serve to improve the visibility and presence of non-Western artists 
within the global art scene. That’s why the reduction of the public budget in France 
(and elsewhere) encourages art institutions to diversify their economic sources and 
to look for diverse private support. In this way, the interest seems to be not only 
intellectual but especially economic. 
On the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, the civil society and the Moroccan 
government are involved in the promotion and the development of the artistic scene. 
However, many actions, frameworks, and responsibilities still need to be defined. 
Moroccans who are engaged in the artistic domain need to establish a long term 
efficient work strategy that reviews art education at all levels, establishes art 
disciplines as a research field in higher education, organizes art institutions, works 
hand in hand with local partners, refrains from buying turnkey exhibitions from 
abroad which are very expensive, and instead encourages local Moroccan curators 
and artists to create more local exhibits, and to think about new teaching methods 
and dissemination tools adapted to the local context in order to reach a wider 
audience. Such changes are needed if Moroccan artists are to reach their full 
potential and deserved recognition. Unfortunately, according to artist Younes 
Rahmoun, it is largely still the case that “By exhibiting abroad, we are better 
recognized and more valued at home. It's sad but it's like that” (Gabsi, 2015, p. 545). 
 
Call to Action 
Recent progress of museum research based on issues such as acquisition, 
dissemination, and display are the result of bilateral actions among artistic networks 
and collaborators on the one hand and the evolution of cultural policies in Morocco 
as well as in the majority of Arab countries on the other. However, the options taken 
in Morocco must no longer consider art based solely on Western references, rather 
it must develop local sponsorship and greater institutional support. In the absence 
of a cultural management strategy accompanied by a structured education, the 
Western model and its actors seem to remain, today, the dominant world reference 
in the art field. While Morocco’s recent efforts to define and develop its modern art 
practices are a step in the right direction, there is greater need for institutional 
direction from within Morocco (as well as the Middle East and North Africa region) 
to determine how best to represent itself on the world stage. 
 
62   Journal of Global Initiatives 
 
References 
Azimi, R., & Saliou, B. (2012). Darra. Paris, France: Galerie Imane Fares.  
Barrada, Y. (2013). Yto Barrada. Zurich, Switzerland: Jrp. 
Bouglé, F. (1999). Regards nomades: Mohamed Abdel Benyaich, Hassan Darsi, 
Mounir Fatmi, Younes Rahmoun, Batoul S'Himi. Dole: Fonds régional d'art 
contemporain de Franche-Comté ; Musée des beaux-arts.  
Briend, C. (2018). La Méditerranée et l’art moderne. Paris, France: Skira.  
Centre Pompidou. La collection du Musée National d’art moderne. Available on: 
“https://collection.centrepompidou.fr/#/” 
Dufrêne, B. (2007). Centre Pompidou - trente ans d’histoire. Paris, France: Centre 
Pompidou.  
Gabsi, W. (2015). L’art contemporain du sud de la Méditerranée: à la recherche 
d’une identité, d’une place et d’une reconnaissance à l’heure de la 
mondialisation. Department of Fine Arts, Paris 1 – Pantheon Sorbonne 
University, Paris, France.  
Grenier, C. (2013). Modernités Plurielles: 1905–1970. Paris, France: Centre 
Pompidou. 
Maraini, T. (2014). Écrits sur l’art. Casablanca, Morocco: Le Fennec.  
Najafi. S., (2013). Une grammaire de Tanger. In Barrada, Y. Yto Barrada. Zurich, 
Switzerland: Jrp. p. 145 – 154.  
Quemin, A., (2007). Montrer une collection internationale d’art contemporain : la 
place des différents pays sur les cimaises du Centre Pompidou. In Dufrêne, B. 
Centre Pompidou- trente ans d’histoire. Paris, France: Centre Pompidou. p. 527 
– 535.  
Touzani, A. (2016). La politique culturelle au Maroc. Casablanca, Morocco: La 
croisée des chemins.  
 
 
 
* The author is sincerely grateful to the Foundation Farid Belkahia 
(Marrakech) for permission to use Figure 2, to Younes Rahmoun and 
Galerie Imane Farès (Paris) for permission to use Figure 3. 
 
 
  
Sirine Abdelhedi   63 
 
 
APPENDIX: A non-exhaustive list of Moroccan artists 
 
ABOUZID SOUALI, 
Mariam 
AFIFI, Saïd 
AGUEZNAY, Amina 
AGUEZNAY, Malika 
AKRIM, Mustapha 
ALAOUI, Leila 
ALAOUI, Rita 
ALAOUI ,Yasmina 
ANDALIBE, Zainab 
AREJDAL, Mohamed 
ATBANE, Younes 
AZEROUAL, Mustapha 
BAALA, Mo 
BABA-ALI, Younes 
BAKHTI, Mohamed  
BALBZIOUI, Yassine 
BARRADA, Yto 
BATTAL, Rim 
BELKAHIA, Farid 
BELLAMINE, Fouad 
BELMAACHI, Ghany 
BEN ALLAL, Mohamed 
BENBOUCHTA, Amina 
BEN CHEFFAJ, Saad 
BENITAH, Carolle 
BEN LAHCEN, Morran 
BENOHOUD, Hicham 
BENZAQUEN, Deborah 
BERHISS, Abdelmalek 
BERRADA, Hicham 
BINEBINE, Mahi 
BOUHCHICHI, M’barek 
BOURKIA, Hassan 
CHAIR, Mohamed Said 
CHARRAT, Mounat 
CHEBAA, Mohamed 
CHERKAOUI, Ahmed 
CHERKAOUI, Larbi 
DAIFALLAH, 
Noureddine 
DARSI, Hassan 
DOUKKANE, 
Abderrahmane 
DRISSI, Mohamed 
DRISSI, Moulay Ahmed 
ECHAKHCH, Latifa 
ECHAIR, Hassan 
EL BAZ, Mohamed 
EL GHRIB, Khalil 
EL GLAOUI, Hassan 
EL GOTAIBI, Amine  
EL MAKHLOUFI, Nabil 
ENNADARE, Touhami 
ERRUAS, Saffa 
ESSAYDI, Lalla 
FAKHIR, Ymane 
FARIJI, Mohamed 
FATIMI, Mounir  
FETTAKA, 
Simohammed 
GHARBAOUI, Jilali 
HAJJAJ, Hassan 
HAMIDI, Mohamed 
HARRAKI, Mohssin 
HASSAN FARROUJ, 
Fatima 
HASSANI, Saad  
HATIMI, Yasmine 
HRIECH, Chourouk 
JOUAL, Soukaina 
KABBAJ, Houda 
KABBAJ, Ikram 
KACIMI, Mohamed 
KHALILI, Bouchra 
KHATTARI, Majida 
KOURKOUNI, Adil 
LAATIRIS, Faouzi 
LABIED, Miloud 
LAHLOU, Mehdi-
Georges 
LAKHDAR, Boujemaa 
LEKLETI, Mohamed 
MAAZOUZ, Fouad 
MAIMOUN, Ali 
MARFOUK, Walid 
MAZIRH, Safaa 
MAZMOUZ, Fatima 
MEHADJI, Najia 
MELEHI, Mohamed 
MEGARA, Meki 
MEZIAN, Meriem 
MILOUDI, Houssein 
MOURABITI, Mohamed 
NABILI, Mohamed 
NAJI, Lamia 
NEJMI, Malik 
NEMMAOUI, Khalil 
OUAZZANI, Abdelkrim 
OUCHRA, Youssef 
OUHADDOU, Sara 
QOTBI, Mehdi 
RABI’, Abdelkebir 
RACHDI, Mohamed 
RAHMOUN, Younes 
RAHOULE, 
Abderrahmane 
RBATI, Mohamed Ben 
Ali 
SAHLI, Ghizlane 
SALADI, Abbes 
SHIMI, Batoul  
SLAOUI, Hassan 
TABAL, Mohamed 
TALLAL, Chaibia 
TALLAL, Hossein 
TIBARI, Kantour 
TILSAGHANI, Nour 
Eddine 
WAKRIM, Zakaria 
YACOUBI, Ahmed 
YAMOU YORIYAS 
ZEMMOURI, Fatiha 
ZIYAT, Yasmina 
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Abstract 
Female artists are actively participating in the development and 
growth of visual arts in Morocco. This article seeks to highlight 
their important contribution in the Moroccan visual arts. It deals 
with the access of women to the field of visual art, delineates 
successive categories for understanding the types of work female 
artists have engaged in since the independence of the country in 
1956, and the challenges that these artists have been facing. It 
focuses on the artistic experiences of specific artists, believed to 
be, representative of some historical era or artistic trend. 
Moreover, it tries to put these artists into a cultural and historical 
framework to contextualize their artistic production. 
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Today, the number of female artists in the Moroccan art scene is increasing. 
They are actively participating in the development and growth of visual arts in 
Morocco. From different cultural backgrounds, intellectual levels, and social strata, 
they have campaigned through pictorial expression for environmental causes and 
for the emancipation of women overcoming a long repressed and ignored freedom 
of speech. This article seeks to highlight the important contribution of female artists 
in Moroccan visual arts. In this respect, it deals with the access of women to the 
visual art, the successive groups of female artists since the independence of the 
country in 1956, and the challenges that these artists have been facing. However, 
this article neither claims to provide a comprehensive anthological study of female 
artists in Morocco nor does it aim at outlining an aesthetic or art history. Rather, it 
discusses the artistic experiences of some artists, whom I believe to be 
representatives of some historical era or artistic trend. Moreover, it tries to put these 
artists into a cultural and historical framework to contextualize their artistic 
production. 
 
Creative Yearning in the Harem 
In the Arab Muslim worlds, women were historically associated with the 
privacy of the harem.1 More for cultural than religious considerations, women were 
 
1 The separate part of a Muslim household reserved for wives, daughters, sisters and female 
servants, etc. 
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compelled to spend their lives secluded within the protective walls of the harem. 
Regardless of their family positions (wives, daughters, mothers, or servants), they 
had to perform household duties that often seemed like drudgery. However, despite 
their Sisyphean housework, they managed to transcend their restricted lives by 
indulging in more refined artistic productions. They took refuge in some artistic 
activities that allowed them (figuratively) to go beyond the walls of the harem and 
enjoy freedom. Habiba, in Fatima Mernissi’s autobiographical book Women’s 
Dreams, expresses this yearning for freedom in 1940s: 
 
Aunt Habiba was certain that each of us had in herself a kind of magic, 
hidden in her most intimate dreams. "When you're imprisoned, without 
defense, behind the walls, stuck in a harem, she said, you dream of 
escape." … Liberation begins when the images are a dance in your head 
and you start to translate them into words. The words don't cost 
anything!" She kept telling us that we all had this inner power. (Mernissi, 
1997, pp. 147-148) 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Samir El Azhar's photograph of Lalla Essaydi: “Harem #14,” used by 
permission from the Museum Mohamed VI of Modern and Contemporary Art. 
 
When they finished their tedious work, they indulged in some activities that were 
believed to be far more positive in nature and often more agreeable to do because 
they were - according to those women who have written about these experiences - 
a source of revelation and creation. In a mystical way, they focused their creation 
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on embroidery patterns, henna2 shapes, silk decorations on caftans3 and sherbils,4 
and carpet (rug) designs. These creative works enabled them to escape the rigid 
social code that imprisoned them within confined walls. They created their own 
symbols and motifs that transcended their limited space. In Women’s Dreams, 
Fatima Mernissi (1997) highlights this point:  
 
That day Aunt Habiba was trying to embroider a green bird with wings of 
gold. This kind of bird, aggressively spreading its wings, was not part of 
classical designs. … Of course, birds existed in traditional embroidery 
designs, but they were tiny, and often completely paralyzed, stuck between 
giant plants and large bushy flowers. Because of Lalla Mani, Aunt Habiba 
always embroidered classical patterns when she was in the yard, and kept 
for herself her bird with wings deployed, in the privacy of her chamber. 
(pp. 193-194) 
 
In the first half of the 20th century Morocco witnessed important social changes 
that shaped its future. One major leap towards the future was allowing girls to 
pursue secondary and university education. Young girls were formerly allowed to 
go to primary school but had to leave school as soon as they got their elementary 
certificate. In the 1930s, leaders of the Nationalist Movement,5 who were religious 
scholars in the University of Al Quaraouiyine,6 allowed their daughters to leave the 
harem for high school. This brought about dress changes that allowed young girls 
to walk easily in the street. About this change, Fatima Mernissi (1997) wrote, 
 
My mother also wanted to replace the traditional haik of women 
by the djellaba, the male mantle, which many women of 
nationalists had adopted. The haik was made of seven meters of 
heavy white cotton in which her body was enveloped. … When 
the nationalists started to send their daughters to school, they also 
 
2 Henna is a plant that has been used since antiquity to dye skin, hair, and fingernails, as 
well as fabrics including silk, wool, and leather.  
3 Caftan is a loose female garment that can be made of wool, cashmere, silk, or cotton, and 
may be worn with a sash. The word is ultimately from old Turkish "kap ton," meaning 
"covering garment." 
4 Sherbils are female shoes of Andalusian origin that are embroidered with silk and gold 
threads to fit the rest of women garments. 
5 The Istiqlal (Independence) Party, which provided most of the leadership for the 
nationalist movement, released in 1944 a manifesto demanding full independence, national 
reunification, and a democratic constitution. King Muhammad V (1927–1961) had 
approved the manifesto before its submission to the French authorities, who answered that 
no basic change in the protectorate status was being considered. The Nationalist Movement 
continued its political and military struggle until Morocco gained its independence in 1956. 
6 University Al Quaraouiyine is the oldest university in the world. It was founded by 
Fatima Al-Fihria in 859. It became one of the leading spiritual and educational centers of 
the historic Muslim world. It was incorporated into Morocco's modern state university 
system in 1963. 
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allowed them to wear a djellaba, much lighter and convenient 
than the haik in order to do four times a day the journey from 
home to school. The girls therefore wore djellabas of men and, 
soon, their mothers imitated them. (pp. 153-154) 
 
Another step of equal importance was late King Mohamed V’s decision to allow 
girls to study at Al Quaraouiyine University in 1948. This opened the doors of 
modernity to Moroccan women and paved the way for an era that called for gender 
equality. King Mohamed V made another symbolic act to show Moroccans his firm 
support of the education of women. He sent his daughter Lalla Aicha, wearing 
modern Western clothes, to deliver an important political speech in Tangier in 1947. 
In Shahrazad is not Moroccan, Fatima Mernissi, the Moroccan sociologist, argues 
that the decades of the 30s, 40s, and 50s in the 20th century brought about enormous 
achievements that changed completely the ideological and economic structure of 
society, particularly regarding outer places, especially important places: the school 
(as a place of knowledge) and the labor market (as an economic location) (Mernissi, 
2010, pp. 72-73). 
These first steps towards modernization initiated a process of struggling for 
equality in social, economic, judicial, and political domains. Women played a 
crucial role in building a modern society based on the ideal of equality of 
opportunities between the genders. According to scholar Moulim El Aroussi, 
Moroccan women made major contributions in building a free and modern Morocco 
(El Aroussi, 2017, p. 185). Thus, women have become active members of modern 
Moroccan society. Their presence in both the public and private sectors is striking. 
They do widely varied jobs: teachers; university professors; deans and presidents 
of universities; doctors; engineers; CEOs of companies; bus, taxi, and tram drivers; 
policewomen; judges and lawyers; and members of parliament and government, to 
name only a few. It is not surprising then to see the strong presence of women in 
the artistic world as a logical outcome of their struggle to win their place in the 
public sphere which was, until the mid-1900s, the domain of men. 
 
From Utilitarian Production to Artistic Culture 
Throughout Morocco’s history, Moroccan women have preserved a rich, 
tangible cultural heritage. They have woven carpets (rugs), embroidered silk and 
cotton fabric, decorated pottery and leather products, manufactured jewelry, 
embellished the skin with tattoos and henna designs, and designed and embellished 
clothes. For women who had mastered these skills and techniques, the transition 
from the creation of utilitarian material culture to producing artwork was relatively 
easy and smooth. Instead of working on objects for everyday use, they created 
works for artistic contemplation. From mere women performing ephemeral 
utilitarian activities, they became artists who produced inspirational works of art.  
Some Moroccan women artists have turned traditional symbols, colors, and 
forms into aesthetic productions that reveal the depth of human experiences. In this 
respect, Rita El Khayat (2011) argues that “[a]n artist learns and masters an art and, 
for this, he or she is creative. He or she is close to the craftsman because he or she 
makes material objects, but unlike the latter, most of his or her work is to create 
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works that constitute new sources of emotion and reflection” (p. 17). In this sense, 
women, as artists, started to produce art (in the fullest sense of the word) when they 
created artworks intended for aesthetic enjoyment in and of themselves. According 
to Moulim El Aroussi, the transition of painting from a traditional craft industry to 
modern artistic production has relied on objects produced by both women and men. 
Woodwork, plaster, mosaics, and metal were traditionally made by men while quite 
a number of products and handicrafts were produced by women. For example, in 
fabric, leather, embroidery, and sewing, women played a significant role that in 
many cases exceeded that of men (El Aroussi, 2017, p. 184). 
Out of this social, political, and cultural context the first women artists 
emerged. In the 1960s, women rarely engaged in artistic pursuits. Not well 
acquainted with art culture, only a handful of women used visual art to express 
themselves professionally. According to Farid Zahi (2007), a Moroccan art critic, 
these pioneers were either wives of painters (Fatima Hassan), mothers of painters 
(Chabia, the mother of the painter Talal or Radia, the mother of the painter Miloud), 
or daughters of painters (Fatima El Ouardiri). Other pioneers were in one way or 
another in contact with European culture and were encouraged by Europeans to use 
the brush, paint, and the table easel, which was a quite new experience for women 
used to producing utilitarian crafts in the domestic sphere.7 A prominent figure of 
this period is Meriem Meziane.  
Meriem Meziane was born in 1930 in Mellilia, a city in the north of Morocco 
that is still colonized by Spain.8 She attended the elementary school in Larache, a 
small Atlantic town in the north of Morocco. With her father, an officer in the 
Spanish army, she migrated to Spain. She held her first exhibition in 1953 in 
Malaga. She then entered the school of fine arts of San Fernando in Madrid. In 1959, 
she received a degree that allowed her to teach visual art. She organized numerous 
exhibitions in Morocco, Tunisia, Spain, France, the United States, and Canada. She 
passed away in Casablanca on March 29, 2009. 
Although Meriem Meziane spent a long period of her life in Spain, she never 
forgot her native country, which was omnipresent in her paintings. She borrowed 
her subjects, colors, and forms from her home in the Rif Mountains. She was 
inspired by the beauty of the landscape, and the generosity of the people and their 
ancestral traditions. She painted Moroccans, especially Moroccan women, 
performing social, ritual, and festive activities. Mohamed Adib Slaoui believes that 
her realistic paintings were concerned with Amazigh (Berber), Saharan, Fassi, and 
Tetouani women with their costumes, jewelry, and social traditions, which granted 
her works a special ethnographic and cultural vision (Adib Slaoui, 2012, p. 54). 
 
7 For more information, please, see, Samir El Azhar, Visual Arts in the Kingdom of 
Morocco, a book-review: 
http://www.thirdtext.org/domains/thirdtext.com/local/media/images/medium/Azhar___Visu
al_Art_in_Morocco.pdf  
8 Morocco was colonized by two colonial powers: Spain in the north and south of the 
country and France in central Morocco. In 1956, Morocco gained independence from 
France and Spain but two cities in the north, Ceuta and Mellilia, are still under Spanish 
rule. 
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Figure 2. Samir El Azhar's photograph of Meriem Meziane: without a title, 1950, 
by permission from the Museum Mohamed VI of Modern and Contemporary Art.  
  
Another pioneer is Chems Eddoha Ataa Allah who was the first Moroccan 
female artist to graduate from a Moroccan School “des Beaux Arts” in Tetouan in 
1960. In the same year, she organized her first exhibition. Following the Agadir 
earthquake in February 1960, which destroyed the whole city killing 15,000 and 
injuring more than 25,000, she generously offered to donate the profits from sales 
of her paintings to the victims of this earthquake. Since then, she has devoted her 
art to helping some associations such as those of cancer and brain surgery who need 
financial support (Ezzakari, 2016). 
Chems Eddoha paints Moroccan faces and portraits with a special interest in 
Moroccan women, Moroccan weddings, women working in the countryside and 
their hard everyday life, etc. She has organized exhibitions in Morocco and abroad. 
About her artistic beginnings, she stated,  
 
… at the beginning of independence women were not allowed to practice 
any artistic activity. Art was believed to be dishonorable and disrespectful 
to traditions. … Many believed that women had to stay at home and raise 
children. But I joined the field of art, thanks to my mother, Malika El 
Merini, an open-minded woman who believed in change and had 
revolutionary ideas … After Morocco got its independence in 1956… 
there were many education opportunities for Moroccan women to fill in 
the gap left by the colonial administration. I was among the students who 
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benefited from this situation as I did a training of six months to get a job 
in education. Afterwards, I joined the Tetouan school of “des Beaux Arts” 
as the first Moroccan woman, in 1957. (Ezzakari, 2016) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Samir El Azhar's photograph of a poster advertising Chems Eddoha Ataa 
Allah’s exhibition in Rabat; June 4-30, 2015.  
 
Both Meriem Meziane and Chems Eddoha Ataa Allah belonged to the group of 
female artistic pioneers that included Fatima Hassan, Chaibia Talal, Malika 
Agueznay, and Latifa Tijani. Chronologically, the second generation of Moroccan 
female painters includes the following artists: Khadija Tanana, Noufissa 
Benjalloun, Benhila Regraguia, Fouzia Guessouss, Nadia Boulaich, and Najat Al 
Khatib, to name only a few. The third generation is comprised of the following 
names: Ikram Al Kabaj, Reem Al Laabi, Nawal Sakkat, Mahacine Al Ahrach, 
Maryam Al Alj, Asmae Alamy, Kenza Benjalloun, Mounat Charrat, and many 
others.  
To discuss the artistic experiences of these female artists, I have thought it 
convenient to classify these generations into four distinct groups: naïve painters, 
secondary career artists, those who have received an academic artistic education, 
and those who have rebelled against formal scholastic artistic conventions.  
Naïve art, a controversial term due to its negative connotations, has been 
described as simple, unaffected, and unsophisticated art made by artists who have 
had no formal training in an art school or academy. In addition to this, naïve works, 
according to Encyclopaedia Britanica, “are often extremely detailed, and there is a 
tendency toward the use of brilliant, saturated colours rather than more subtle 
mixtures and tones. There is also a characteristic absence of perspective, which 
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creates the illusion that figures are anchored in the space, with the result that figures 
in naïve paintings are often ‘floating’” (Rimsa, 2008, p. 1). Among the naïve artists 
are Chaibia Talal, Fatima Hassan, Benhila Regraguia, Fatima Najm, Fatima Al 
Bakouri, and Kenza Al Mukdassni. To deal with the major characteristics of this 
trend, I have chosen Chaibia Talal as a representative of this group because, I 
believe, any discussion of naïve art in Morocco without a reference to Chaibia Talal 
would be shallow and superficial. 
Chaibia Talal was unquestionably the most famous Moroccan painter of the 
20th century. She is the only Moroccan painter whose works are listed on the stock 
exchange. Her paintings can sell for more than $100,000. Born in 1929 in a village 
near El Jadida, a coastal town on the Atlantic, Chaibia’s childhood was cut short by 
an early marriage when she was 13 years old. At the age of 15, the young woman 
was already a widow and mother of a child. To make a living, she worked as a 
housemaid in several French households. She experienced harsh living conditions 
to raise her child. When Fatima Mernissi interviewed her in 1985 and asked her 
how she earned her living before she discovered painting, Chaibia answered, “What 
do you want me to do? What can an illiterate woman like myself do? I cleaned, 
washed and swept houses. I did what I had to do earnestly. But I had a feeling that 
I had to go somewhere and put an end to all that” (Mernissi, 2010, p. 113). Her son, 
Al Houssine Talal, left Morocco for France where he studied visual art. He returned 
to Morocco and became a painter.  
Two important events changed Chaibia’s life. According to her, in 1963, when 
she was 25 years old, she had a dream: someone offered her some paint, papers, and 
brushes and asked her to paint. Another event that was a turning point in her life 
was her encounter with Pierre Gaudibert, the French art curator and critic. Her son, 
Al Houssine Talal, invited Pierre Gaudibert, to have lunch at home to show him 
some of his paintings. Chaibia told the French critic that she also painted. When he 
saw her drawings and paintings, he was more interested in her works than in those 
of her son (Al Muntassir, 2016, pp. 58-59). 
From 1966 until her death, Chaibia exhibited in Paris, Copenhagen, Ibiza, 
Rotterdam, New York, Tokyo, and many other capitals. In 2003, she was awarded 
a Gold Medal from the French Academic Society for Education and 
Encouragement. She died in Casablanca in 2004 at the age of 75 years.  
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Figure 4. Samir El Azhar's photograph of Chaibia Talal: “Fishermen,” 1979, used 
by permission from the Museum Mohamed VI of Modern and Contemporary Art.  
 
Chaibia Talal was inspired by her childhood and her rural environment, 
creating daring, innocent, and childlike paintings. Her work is characterized by the 
use of colors in their original state. Her sincerity, boldness, and spontaneity earned 
her the appreciation and respect of the leader of the Cobra movement,9 Pierre 
Alechinsky, international critics, and even heads of states. To quote Lahsen 
Bougdal, 
 
Chaibia Talal, this “paysante des arts” as nicknamed by the sociologist 
Fatima Mernissi, is probably the one that managed to give her letters of 
nobility to this raw art. Her spontaneity combined with her simplicity 
gratified us with compositions where the power of graphism and the 
harmony of the fresh colours forced the admiration of many specialists 
around the world. Brilliant and recognized, the painting of these three 
pioneers [Radia Bent Al Hussein, Fatima Hassan Al Farouj and Chaibia], 
established itself in a male environment where it was hard to exist. 
(Bougdal, 2016, p. 15) 
 
The second group is that of secondary career artists. Unlike the first group 
whose members have not received any schooling, secondary career artists are 
 
9 The Cobra movement was a European avant-garde movement that believed in spontaneity 
and drew their inspiration in particular from children’s drawings and from primitive art 
forms. 
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cultivated women who have worked either as doctors, architects, civil servants, etc., 
but have left their jobs and become artists. This group comprises Aicha Ahardan, 
Aziza Jamal, Laila Cherkawi, Rajaa Al Atlassi, Noufissa Benjalloun, Nadia 
Khayali, Jamila Al Araychi, Asmae Alamy, Fatiha Tahiri, etc. These painters did 
not have any formal art education. Of different ages and horizons, they started 
painting and improved themselves throughout their careers by attending art training, 
workshops, and Biennales. According to Moulim El Aroussi, most female painters 
in the early post-colonial period did not attend any art schools. With the exception 
of Meriem Meziane and Malika Agueznay, there were no female painters with 
academic art education (El Aroussi, 2017, p. 186). As an example of this set, I have 
selected the experience of Rajae Al Atlassi. 
Rajae Al Atlassi was born in 1965 in Casablanca. After university studies in 
French literature, she had created theatrical sets before she moved to painting. She 
was spotted at an exhibition titled "Screens of Contemporary Artists” organized by 
the collector and gallery owner Daniel Couturier, at Forney Library in Paris. She 
exhibited in Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Netherlands and France.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Rajae Al Atlassi: “Lumières d’automne,” 2012. [digital image] 
Retrieved from https://darzampa.wordpress.com/2012/10/28/lumieres-dautomne-
lexposition-de-la-rentree-au-musee-de-la-palmeraie/  
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The path undertaken by Rajae Al Atlassi in Moroccan visual art is remarkable. 
With literary education, she embarked on an artistic career. In her paintings, women 
are a recurring and iconic theme, in the guise of enigmatic and closed faces. The 
huge chunks of bright colors and the discontinuous and unpredictable movements 
alongside the traditional caftans overlays are reinterpreted with mastery; mystery of 
life, in this colorful bubbling of swirls, strips, circles, and stars (Benqassem, 2010, 
p. 38). She also uses Arabic calligraphy in her paintings. 
The third group includes an array of artists that had a formal academic artistic 
education either in Morocco or abroad. This group includes Mahacine Al Ahrash, 
Ahlam Lemssefer, Laila Sherkaoui, Jamila Al Arayshi, Maryam Al Alj, Amina 
Benboushta, Malika Agueznay, Maryam Asharaibi, Asmae Alamy, Nawal Assakat, 
Nadia Khayali, Halima Hadoush, Aziza Jamal, Saadia Pirou, Maryam Belmkadem, 
Fouzia Guessouss, Fatima Al Alaoui, and many others. These artists paint according 
to the scientific rules and academic techniques they acquired at art schools. Malika 
Agueznay highlights the experiences of artists who have received academic artistic 
schooling. 
 
  
 
Figure 6. Samir El Azhar's photograph of Malika Agueznay: “Regard,” 2013, 
used by permission from the Museum Mohamed VI of Modern and Contemporary 
Art.  
 
Malika Agueznay was born in Marrakech. She had studied sociology before 
she entered the “Ecole des Beaux Arts” of Casablanca from which she graduated in 
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1970. In 1978, she was invited to the International Festival of Assilah, where she 
learned the art of engraving, encountering printmakers and professors such as 
Mohamed Omar Khalil and Robert Blackburn. From there, she traveled to New 
York to study engraving in the workshop of Mohamed Omar Khalil and Robert 
Blackburn. She also attended the "Counterpoint" workshop in Paris conducted by 
the artists Hector Saunier and Juan Valladores (Chaouat, 2017, p. 2). 
Malika Agueznay was a member of the “Casablanca Movement” (Chaouat, 
2017, p. 3).10 She uses blue color in her paintings to evoke the blue of the sky, the 
blue of the sea, and the blue of the eyes of women. For her, colors are full of life 
and meaning. They take different forms and shapes and thus acquire different 
significance. Her paintings feature intricate interweaving and overlapping organic 
forms which she calls “algae,” meaning seaweed. “Her work is often abstract, 
sometimes representational, but always full of movement” (The Culture Mobile, 
2010, p. 1). Throughout her career, she has developed an original aesthetic by 
exploring new techniques in painting as well as in engraving. By using two media, 
she seeks to express different facets of her sensitiveness. When asked about what 
kind of mission a female artist has, she answered, 
 
Being a female artist is not a simple thing. … art requires a deep 
investment of oneself, a large concentration. The mission is to convey, 
bequeath and share with others one’s knowledge, one’s experience. To this 
end, one has to be truthful, believing in what one does and leaves traces. 
(Chaouat, 2017, p. 3) 
 
Female artists who rebel against artistic academic techniques define the fourth 
group. This group includes Ikram Al Kabbaj, Kenza Benjelloun, Reem Alaabi, 
Mounat Acharrat, Fatiha Tahiri, and many others. In the 1990s, another era began: 
a new king (Mohamed VI), a new family code (Al Mudawana), a new concept of 
power (more freedom of expression), new technologies (computer and internet), 
and new means of communication (social media). Like in other sectors of life, artists 
in general and female artists in particular responded to these changes and adopted 
new ways to express themselves. Hence, a new trend named “contemporary art” 
emerged.  
 
10 About her artistic experience, she states: “I attended the school of des Beaux Arts in 
Casablanca during the years 1966-70. It was the "Moroccan Bauhaus", where the birth of 
the "movement of Casablanca" took place: contemporary orientation of art directed towards 
observation, research and innovation. … The training of students was not only academic 
but oriented to the exploration, research, creativity, and the inspiration from our cultural 
heritage of a great diversity and wealth. This strengthened our action and our legitimacy in 
abstraction, geometric shapes, the notion of the essence of this contemporary art (very rich 
heritage such as arabesque forms, calligraphy, colour, material, carpets, embroidery, 
ceilings of the South painted with plant colours, brass, skin, tattoos etc...). All this is a great 
source of inspiration and continuity in the search for our identity in universal art.” 
Interview with Malika Agueznay in Visages du Maroc, 
http://visagedumaroc.org/visage/malika-agueznay/. (Accessed October 24, 2017). 
Translation the author.  
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Diverse and eclectic, contemporary art is a rebellion against the academic 
techniques of the third group. It is an art that requires “a dynamic combination of 
materials, methods, concepts, and subjects that challenge traditional boundaries and 
defy easy definition” (Silka, 2016, p. 6). It is much more socially conscious than 
any previous era in art has been and is increasingly global and diverse in its themes. 
“In its most basic sense, the term contemporary art refers to art—namely, painting, 
sculpture, photography, installation, performance, and video art—
produced today. Though seemingly simple, the details surrounding this definition 
are often a bit fuzzy, as different individuals' interpretations of ‘today’ may widely 
and wildly vary” (Kelly Richman-Abdou, 2019, p. 2). When asked to define 
contemporary art, Professor Terry Smith, author of What Is Contemporary 
Art? (2009), answered: “it is a bit like trying to describe time: we all know what it 
is, and that we are in it, but we find it hard to say what it is” (Jackson, 2019, p.7). 
Visitors to contemporary art institutions, he added,  
 
would notice that there are fewer paintings and sculptures than in the 
“modern” rooms. Instead, there are many texts, videos, photo series, 
installations, performances, and objects that don’t look like art at all. Yet 
these are only the tip of the iceberg. Most contemporary art is being made 
outside of museums, in public spaces, for temporary exhibitions such as 
biennials, or is being shown online. (Jackson, 2019, p. 7) 
 
Contemporary art marks a break with modern art. It is a rebellion against the spatial 
frontiers. While modern art is related to indoor spaces, contemporary art is related 
to outdoor spaces. In essence, modern artists create their works in their work-places 
and display them in galleries and museums. Many contemporary artists, however, 
create their artistic works in factories, streets and markets and exhibit them in open 
public spaces (El Aroussi, 2017, p. 207). 
In Morocco, a new group of contemporary male and female artists emerged 
between 1990 and 2013. They were brought together by their sharp criticism of 
political and social institutions. For instance, Hassan Eddarssi devoted his energy 
to drawing people and the authorities’ attentions to taking care of one of the 
Kingdom’s ancient zoos. Fouzi Laatiriss was interested in the social and intellectual 
environment from an anthropological standpoint. With the rise of conservatism and 
the risk of suppressing individual freedoms, Kenza Benjelloun devoted all her 
works to advocating for greater freedoms (El Azhar, 2016, p. 5). 
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Figure 7. Samir El Azhar's photograph of Kenza Benjelloun: "La liberte guidant la 
femme," 2015, used by permission from the Museum Mohamed VI of Modern and 
Contemporary Art.  
 
Kenza Benjelloun is indeed a good example to illustrate this contemporary 
tendency that abolishes spatial as well as artistic frontiers. Born in 1966 in 
Casablanca, Kenza Benjelloun graduated from the Ecole des Beaux Arts of 
Casablanca in 1992 and from the Ecole des Beaux Arts of Aix-en-Provence, France, 
in 1995. She organized her first exhibition in 2000, the year she was awarded the 
second prize of Pensar con las manos organized by the Cervantes Institute of 
Casablanca. Since then, she has organized several exhibitions in Morocco, France, 
Spain, Italy, and the United States. 
After the Arab Spring, the growth of fundamentalism and the expansion of 
radicalism, Kenza Benjelloun has devoted her art to advocating human rights in 
general and particularly to freedom of expression and women’s rights which seemed 
to be threatened with the rise to power of conservative movements and parties. She 
therefore criticizes polygamy, sexual harassment, sexual abuse, teenage marriage, 
and any forms of social injustice to which women are still subjected. 
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Figure 8. Samir El Azhar's photograph of Kenza Benjelloun: "Le Cadi de la 
Moudouana," 2015, used by permission from the Museum Mohamed VI of 
Modern and Contemporary Art.  
 
In her last exhibition, Le Cadi de la Moudouana, Kenza Benjelloun tackled 
these social issues in a satirical way. The title of this exhibition was highly 
symbolic. She has used the Arabic word “Cadi” as a pun. The word “Caddy” in 
French means a trolley of a supermarket and in Arabic the word “cadi” means a 
judge. Because the issue motivating the work is teenage marriage, she criticizes the 
new family code (Al Mudawana) that gives the judge the right to accept such a 
marriage. He is considered the only authority empowered to permit or deny this 
marriage. When he consents to such a marriage, the “cadi,” judge, according to her, 
becomes a “caddy,” a trolley that delivers fresh meat as it is seen in her artistic 
work. 
Le Cadi de la Moudouana is a multidimensional and innovative event that 
includes digital creations, installations, performances, and videos. This exhibition 
reveals an artist who, faithful to her artistic conviction, deliberately opts for an art 
of protest. Her social criticism of the status of women in Moroccan society focuses 
on the female body. She represents how this female body is seen by men and also 
by laws, traditions, and social representations. She satirizes and ridicules the 
attitudes and social representations of this patriarchal society. 
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Challenges 
The status of women has evolved since the beginning of the 20th century. 
Social, legal, economic, and cultural changes have occurred, allowing women to 
play active roles in society. The 2011 Constitution explicitly calls for gender 
equality: “The man and the woman enjoy, in equality, the rights and freedoms of 
civil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental character, enounced in 
this Title and in the other provisions of the Constitution. … The State works for the 
realization of parity between men and women” (Morocco’s Constitution of 2011, 
2011, p. 8). The implementation of this gender equality is, however, very slow, 
especially in the artistic world.  
Female artists struggle to become artists, to work as artists, to exhibit their 
work, and to assert themselves in the art scene. They face many challenges that 
hinder their creativity or even compel some to leave art.11 With an experience of 
more than 50 years, Shems Adha Ataa Allah, the first Moroccan woman to graduate 
from a Moroccan School of des Beaux Arts in Tetouan in 1960, believes that she 
did not get the recognition she deserves. She blames the media, art galleries, and art 
critics who devote more attention and space to male than to female artists. She was 
obliged to stop her artistic career for some time because of family responsibilities. 
In this respect, she stated, 
 
I have decided to go back to painting which I had left because of my family 
… [A]fter the death of my husband and the social stability of my three 
sons, I began to spend more time in my studio at home and take care of my 
garden … I don't care about fame as much as I care about satisfying a 
psychological desire to reconcile myself with my talent and my work that 
I learned more than 50 years ago in the School of “des Beaux Arts” in 
Tetouan. (Ezzakaki, 2016, p. 3) 
 
Amina Ben Bouchta, another Moroccan female artist, believes that parity has not 
yet been achieved in the Moroccan art scene. When interviewed about the obstacles 
she faces, she answered,  
 
… If you analyze how much people are ready to invest, you will find that 
they are ready to invest a great deal of money on male artists. Many 
wonderful talented women are completely forgotten from the art scene 
because the world market is really hard. … They face difficult choices of 
family life. To be an artist means a full time job so it is difficult to handle 
a family at the same time. I was personally unable to attend a lot of 
residencies and to get awards because I have a family that I have to take 
care of. … Moroccan female artists need to go out of Morocco in order to 
study, to see museums, and to attend residencies, which is not easy for the 
 
11 In the academic year 2016-2017, I conducted a seminar on “Art Galleries in Morocco” 
and I asked my B.A. students to interview some female artists about challenges. The 
subsequent quotes are part of this assignment. 
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young artists who very often do not have the means for that. (Amina Ben 
Bouchta interviewed by Mouna Bazzi on May 9, 2017) 
 
Reem Battal, another Moroccan artist, shares her colleagues’ point of view and 
refers to other issues such as sexual harassment and daily sexism:  
 
I do not think Moroccan female artists get equal credit as men in the art 
world but it is not something specific to the art world. It is a general thing 
that women suffer from and if you happen to be an artist and a woman, of 
course you are not heard the same way. Women have many barriers to 
overcome such as ordinary sexism and harassment. Moreover, there are 
three main obstacles that Moroccan female artists face in the field: social 
pressure, sexual harassment and daily sexism. (Reem Battal interviewed 
by Mouna Bazzi on May 18, 2017) 
 
Although Amina Charrat shares the same ideas with our two aforementioned 
artists, she believes that she was lucky. Her father was a lawyer and was fond of 
painting. He encouraged her despite his worries about her future on the grounds that 
one cannot make a living from art. She believes, 
 
Like in other fields, we have some challenges. We do not have a law that 
really protects us. Also in terms of prices, the price of a man’s work is 
higher than that of a woman. Same thing is true for exhibitions. Men 
dominate exhibitions more than women. I have also noticed that female 
artists are not free to express their thoughts and ideas because we are 
conservative and we exist in men’s society. …Discrimination exists but it 
is not shown. It is always hidden. People think that art world is men’s 
world that is why they invest their money in male artists more than in 
females. (Amina Charrat interviewed by Mouna Bazzi on May 12, 2017) 
 
On the other hand, Kenza Benjelloun points out that artists, whether women or 
men, face the same challenges. When I asked her about the kinds of difficulties 
Moroccan female artists face and about their relationships with art galleries, she 
answered: 
 
Personally, I have not had any problem in this regard. What bothers me 
sometimes is to display women just for the sake to encourage female 
creation as if creation were a matter of women or men. … I have never had 
any problems with galleries. If there is any problem, it is not because I’m 
a woman but because of my opinions in my current exhibitions 
(installations, video, performance...) that are a little too frontal. "Le Cadi 
de la Moudouana" is an eloquent example. No Gallery has agreed to 
display it with the exception of the Museum of Mohamed VI at the 
exhibition Moroccan Female Artists of Modernity curated by Reem Laabi. 
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Galleries try to sell. They do not care about sex or gender. (Kenza 
Benjelloun interviewed by Samir El Azhar on November 5, 2017) 
 
The Museum Mohamed VI of Modern and Contemporary Art (MMVI) hosted, from 
November 23, 2016 to March 8, 2017, the exhibition Moroccan Female Artists of 
Modernity, 2016-1960. To pay tribute to Moroccan female artists, the MMVI 
displayed more than 100 works of 26 women artists. This event, unprecedented in 
the MMVI, raised issues of integration and the contribution of Moroccan women 
artists in the history of art by offering a space for reflection on this plastic creation. 
To quote Reem Laabi, curator of this exhibition, 
 
It is an exhibition that explores a specific attitude in the history of art, in 
this case, a distinct modernity of Moroccan women artists. In fact, they are 
modern because they have a view of the plural Morocco and the world. It 
is a voluntary choice and finally a way to look, to feel and to act …. (Laabi, 
2016, p. 8) 
  
I have found it necessary to quote at some length these artists to objectively 
report their struggle to overcome prejudices, correct misconceptions, and transgress 
taboos. Thanks to their sacrifice and perseverance, they have succeeded in asserting 
themselves in the art scene and have thus contributed in the richness and diversity 
of visual arts in Morocco. Soumaya Naamane (2016), the Moroccan sociologist and 
writer, believes that Moroccan female artists, 
 
have released the female imagination and freed feminine body, portrayed 
with a chaste sensuality. Wise transgressors, they have overcome taboos, 
celebrating love, romance, sensuality, eroticism, sometimes with poetry, 
tenderness, sweetness and passion, sometimes with anger and severity. All 
the women's work is a giant fresco, which captures the history and 
evolution of our culture. (p. 27) 
 
This article provides a glimpse of the contribution of female artists in Moroccan 
visual arts over the last 60 years. Talented, motivated, and dedicated, they have 
devoted their time and energy to representing, from their perspective, Moroccan 
social and cultural realities through their paintings. To avoid any exclusive 
interpretation, it is important to note that Moroccan artistic production is 
characterized by its diversity in techniques, trends, and contents. The Moroccan art 
scene includes, regardless of their gender, artists of different political convictions, 
plastic genres, and artistic movements, which has made Moroccan artistic 
experience rich and varied. Art is a human experience that transcends the limiting 
considerations of gender and frontiers. 
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“Your Chance to Make Your Voice Heard”:  
Akaliyat Magazine and the Creation of a Queer 
Community in Morocco 
Benjamin Ale-Ebrahim 
Abstract 
Publicly claiming an LGBTQ identity in Morocco can place a young 
person under the threat of violence, both on the part of the state, which 
criminalizes homosexuality under Article 489 of the Penal Code, and from 
actors within Moroccan society who wish to uphold a heteronormative 
conception of Moroccan national identity. The internet, with its potential 
for anonymous communication, serves as a relatively free and safe space 
for young queer Moroccans to explore their sexuality and gender identity. 
Akaliyat Magazine, an internet-based publication founded in 2015, serves 
as one of the only Arabic-language media outlets in Morocco that focuses 
on providing a space for queer youth to “express themselves” and to hear 
each other’s stories. In this paper, I develop a brief history of Akaliyat 
Magazine, drawing on content from the five issues published to date as 
well as a 2018 interview I conducted with the magazine’s editor and 
founder. Drawing on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and Richard Bauman to 
investigate the question of genre and its orientation to specific 
communities and ideologies, I argue that Akaliyat Magazine uses specific 
forms of address and genres of writing that work to create a community of 
queer youth in Morocco. 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, I investigate Akaliyat magazine, an internet-based publication 
founded in 2015 that is one of the only Arabic-language media outlets in Morocco 
that provides a space for queer youth to express themselves and to hear each other’s 
stories. I develop a brief history of Akaliyat magazine, drawing on content from the 
five issues published to date as well as a 2018 interview I conducted with the 
magazine’s editor and founder. I argue that Akaliyat magazine uses specific forms 
of address and genres of writing that work to create a community of queer youth in 
Morocco. I draw on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (1994), Karin Barber (1997), and 
Richard Bauman (2004) to investigate the question of genre and its orientation to 
specific communities and ideologies. I also discuss what types of discourse Akaliyat 
employs to address its audience: are they addressed as Moroccan national subjects? 
As religious or irreligious individuals? As minorities living in a hostile 
environment? As oppressed people in need of liberation? I argue that Akaliyat 
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invites its readers to think of themselves as a community of listeners to each other’s 
stories, a community held together by public intimacy and affective ties of 
belonging (Kunreuther, 2010). By providing a space that affirms queer sexualities 
and gender identities, encourages debate about controversial topics such as politics 
and religion, and - most importantly - invites its readers to listen to each other’s 
stories, Akaliyat serves a critical role in the creation of queer community in 
Morocco. 
 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
In his discussion of the many different types of discourse present in the novel, 
Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin provides a useful analytic for 
understanding how people use language in conversation with others. He presents 
his readers with the concept of “double-voiced discourse,” defined as language that 
is “directed both toward the referential object of the speech, as in ordinary 
discourse, and toward another’s discourse, toward someone else’s speech” 
(Bakhtin, 1994, p. 105, italics in original). Double-voiced discourse exists in 
anticipation of its reception by an audience; it is spoken with the understanding that 
it will be heard by others. This consciousness of the presence of an audience 
determines which words a speaker will choose to use and how they will choose to 
present them, or, to use Bakhtin’s (1994) words, “the individual manner in which a 
person structures his own speech is determined to a significant degree by his 
peculiar awareness of another’s words, and by his means for reacting to them” (p. 
108). Double-voiced discourse speaks to its immediate audience—to the task at 
hand—at the same time as it imagines and anticipates a future response—a moment 
of audience talk-back. Although Bakhtin was primarily concerned with analyzing 
discourse in the analog genre of the novel, I find that this concept is particularly 
well-suited to understanding how communication happens in online platforms that 
support feedback and dialogue, such as the digitally published magazine that I 
discuss below.  
Building off the work of Bakhtin and his concept of double-voiced discourse, 
Richard Bauman (2004) describes a number of different ethnographic examples 
from around the world of “how speakers may align their words to the words of 
others” (p. 128), from Irish poets to Fijian spirit mediums to Akan chiefs. He argues 
that genres come into being when the “mode[s] of regimenting the circulation of 
discourse” become standardized and formalized (Bauman, 2004, p. 158); that is, 
when the speaker first imagines a specific and defined audience and then associates 
a particular way of speaking as the appropriate way to address that audience. One 
must address the appropriate audience using the appropriate linguistic conventions 
in order to be understood as a particular kind of speaker, such as a lyrical poet, a 
novelist, a radio announcer, or, in this case, a member of the queer community in 
Morocco.  
Karin Barber (1997) takes a slightly different analytical emphasis in her 
discussion of audiences in Africa. Rather than focusing on the choices that a speaker 
makes in addressing an imagined and standardized audience, as Bakhtin and 
Bauman do, she focuses on the productive nature of speaking in the creation of 
audiences, arguing that: 
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Performances do not just play to ready-made congregations of spectators 
which are out there awaiting address; they convene those congregations 
and by their mode of address assign them a certain position from which to 
receive the address. Thus performances, in the act of addressing audiences, 
constitute those audiences as a particular form of collectivity. (Barber, 
1997, pp. 353-354)  
 
In other words, collectively listening to others speak teaches us how to think of 
ourselves as an audience. We learn to understand ourselves as a collectivity on the 
basis of our use of shared linguistic conventions and our collective status as the 
intended audience of a genre. Genres and audiences are co-constitutive of each 
other, taking shape in tandem as specific ways of speaking and listening in 
relationships formalize over time.  
Another way to think about this process is through the analytic of voice and 
voicing, as Laura Kunreuther (2010) discusses in her study of youth-focused radio 
programs in neoliberalizing Nepal. She argues that these programs encourage their 
listeners to use a “direct voice” (p. 335) in speaking about their feelings and intimate 
relationships when they call in to these radio shows; that is, they encourage young 
people in Nepal to use a voice which expresses agency over one’s feelings and 
which indexes a modern, urban, neoliberal self (Kunreuther, 2010, pp. 335-336). 
Through continued exposure to the radio programs, and from feedback given by the 
show’s host and from other listeners, young people in Nepal begin to adopt the 
linguistic features of this direct voice, coming to understand themselves and their 
identities in a new way: as neoliberal subjects responsible for the cultivation of 
marketable skills and their own individual economic success (Kunreuther, 2010, p. 
343).  
We can see, then, that the way in which we choose to speak in public affects 
how we think of ourselves as individuals and as communities. Our imagination of 
an audience that we hope to engage with through the use of standardized genres 
does more than orient our speech to an appropriate group of listeners, it actually 
works to bring this audience into being, shaping the members of this audience into 
a collectivity that starts to think of itself as sharing collective feelings, desires, and 
identities. Through continued exposure to certain genres and ways of speaking, we 
learn how to think about ourselves in new ways and begin to develop affective ties 
with others who are the fellow addressees of these genres. It is this complex, co-
constitutive matrix of genre, audience, and voice that I wish to investigate in this 
paper, focusing on how Akaliyat magazine uses specific linguistic and rhetorical 
features to teach its audience, spread throughout the country of Morocco and 
beyond, and how they think of themselves as a cohesive queer community.  
 
Queer Activism in Morocco and in the Broader Arab Context: 
Legal Regimes and the Role of Social Media 
In order to understand how Akaliyat works to create queer community in 
Morocco, we must first understand some of the social and legal background 
surrounding LGBTQ activism in the country. According to Article 489 of the 
88   Journal of Global Initiatives 
Moroccan Penal Code, “‘unlawful or unnatural acts with an individual of the same 
sex’” are criminalized with the potential for punishment of up to “six months to 
three years in prison and a fine of 120 to 1,200 dirhams ($13-130)” (Fanack, 2018). 
In recent years, a number of incidents where individuals have been arrested in 
accordance with Article 489 have prompted public debate in Morocco, including an 
incident in 2004 where over 43 people in the northern city of Tetouan were arrested 
and charged with “‘engaging in homosexual activity’” (Fanack, 2018). This 
incident sparked the creation of Kif-Kif, an organization founded in 2005 by 
Moroccan LGBTQ activists with the goal of advocating on behalf of queer people 
living in Morocco. Kif-Kif was prevented from legally registering itself as a 
nonprofit organization in Morocco and is currently based in nearby Spain (Fanack, 
2018). In April 2010, with funding from the European Union, Kif-Kif launched the 
first LGBTQ-focused magazine in Morocco with the publication of Mithly (Arabic 
for “homosexual” or, literally, “like me”) (IRBC, 2013). Over 200 print copies of 
the magazine were distributed in Morocco in 2010 and an online version was also 
published (Pfeiffer & Abdennebi, 2010). Mithly is currently out of print, however, 
and appears to have been inactive for some years now. According to Kif-Kif’s 
website, the organization has shifted its focus and now works primarily to serve the 
needs of LGBTQ immigrants and asylum seekers in Madrid (Kif-Kif, 2018).  
Although the U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 2012 contends that Article 489 is “‘infrequently enforced’” (IRBC, 
2013), queer people continue to be arrested in Morocco, especially in cases where 
their sexuality is made public on social media. For example, in 2014 a 69-year-old 
British man and his Moroccan partner were arrested by Moroccan police for 
violating Article 489. The police used “images on both the men’s phones as 
evidence” for their arrest (Fanack, 2018). This case attracted attention from the 
British media and Members of Parliament and the British man was allowed to 
“return to the UK pending an appeal” while the Moroccan man involved in this case 
remained in prison (Fanack, 2018). Later, in 2016, after footage of a brutal 
homophobic attack in the city of Beni Mellal went viral on social media in Morocco, 
the victims of this attack were arrested and imprisoned before being released 26 
days later. Two of the four attackers were sentenced to between “four and six 
months in prison” while the other two were released (Fanack, 2018). Also in 2016, 
after being filmed kissing each other on a Marrakech rooftop, two Moroccan 
teenage girls were arrested under Article 489 and were later acquitted following an 
international social media campaign using the hashtag #FreeTheGirls (#تانبل_وقلط in 
Moroccan Arabic) (Lutkin, 2016; Morgan, 2016). According to Kif-Kif, “more than 
5,000 homosexuals, mostly men, have been tried by the courts for violating Article 
489” since Moroccan independence in 1956 while statistics from the Moroccan 
Ministry of Justice indicate that “there were 81 trials involving charges of 
homosexuality in 2011” alone (IRBC, 2013).  
Although social media platforms are used to incite the arrest of LGBTQ people 
in Morocco, they also serve an important role for LGBTQ activists based in the 
country. In addition to Kif-Kif and its now defunct magazine, a number of other 
queer-focused organizations have emerged to argue for the decriminalization of 
homosexuality in Morocco and to speak out on behalf of LGBTQ Moroccans on 
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digital media platforms. For example, the Aswat Collective (2018a) (aswat being 
the Arabic term for “voices”) describes itself as an organization founded in order to 
lead “the fight against discrimination based on sexuality and gender” (“la lutte 
contre la discrimination fondée sur la sexualité et le genre”) . Aswat operates 
Facebook and Twitter accounts as well as publishing its own “queer, libertarian 
magazine” online (Aswat, 2018). MALI (Mouvement Alternatif pour les Libertés 
Individuelles) is another organization based in Morocco that describes itself as a 
“universalist, feminist, secular movement of civil disobedience and in defense of 
sexual and reproductive rights” (“un mouvement de désobéissance civile, 
universaliste, féministe, laïque et de défense des droits sexuels et reproductifs”) that 
advocates on behalf of women and LGBTQ people living in Morocco (MALI, 
2017). In May 2018, on the International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia, 
and Biphobia both of these organizations used their Facebook pages to publish 
information in support of queer Moroccans and against Article 489 (Figures 1, 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Image from Aswat Collective’s (2018) Facebook page depicting two 
young Moroccans holding up handwritten signs saying, “I am not an abomination 
(shaadh) or a faggot (luti) / dyke (sehaaqia), I am a homosexual (mithly).” 
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Figure 2. Image shared on MALI’s Facebook page saying “NO to Article 489 of 
the Moroccan Penal Code. Homophobia is the crime, not homosexuality.” 
 
Of course, Morocco is not the only Arab-majority country where queer activists 
are working to create change. With the exception of Jordan and Iraq, homosexuality 
remains criminalized in most Arab countries, with legal institutions either explicitly 
banning consensual same-sex activity (as in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) or 
using broader morality laws that are consistently interpreted to prohibit same-sex 
sexualities (as in Lebanon, Egypt, and Bahrain) (Ghoshal, 2018). While there are 
queer activist movements in most Arab countries, movements in Jordan, Tunisia, 
and Lebanon have been among the most successful in campaigning for change. For 
example, over 10 years ago in Jordan, Khaled Abdel-Hadi worked to found 
My.Kali, one of the Arab world’s first LGBT-focused magazines that is still in 
publication to this day (Ghoshal, 2018). In addition, in Tunisia, former President 
Beji Caid Essebsi recently tasked a government commission, the Individual 
Freedoms and Equality Committee, with drafting new recommendations on how to 
improve the human rights situation in the country, and among the recommendations 
submitted by the commission was the legalization of homosexuality (Fitzsimons, 
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2018). Tunisian queer organization Mawjoudin has sponsored the region’s first 
queer film festival for the past two years in 2018 and 2019 (Schnall, 2019) while 
Association Shams, another queer activist group based in the Tunisian capital, 
launched the Arab world’s first LGBTQ-focused radio station in 2017 (Ghanemi, 
2017). More recently, Shams’ chairman Mounir Baatour announced a long-shot bid 
for Tunisia’s presidency in the 2019 election, campaigning on a platform of 
legalizing homosexuality and promoting more expansive individual and civil rights 
(Knipp, 2019).  
Despite progress being made in places like Jordan and Tunisia, Lebanon, and 
more specifically the city of Beirut, remains the Arab world’s queer capital, at least 
in terms of its high concentration of queer-friendly social spaces and well-
established activist organizations. Two of the region’s oldest and most well-known 
queer organizations were founded in the Lebanese capital: Helem, founded in 2004, 
is a public-facing NGO that was the region’s first “above-ground” LGBT 
organization, and Meem, founded in 2007, is a smaller, underground group that 
broke away from Helem to focus more on queer women’s issues and the trans 
community (Moussawi, 2015). A number of gay-friendly bars, cafés, and beaches 
exist in Beirut that, according to anthropologist Sofian Merabet (2014), do not 
exactly allow for the formation of a cohesive “gay community”–since many 
Lebanese queer people deny such a thing exists–but rather allow for the existence 
of a “homosexual sphere,” “a realm that consists primarily of gendered as well as 
sexual symbols in relation to which queer space is perpetually produced” (p. 112). 
Helem and Meem, along with Beirut’s gay bars, cafés, and mediated spaces like the 
dating app GayRomeo (Gagné, 2012) make up the “homosexual sphere” in which 
queer Lebanese individuals shape their identities and form social connections with 
each other. Beirut’s comparatively robust queer social infrastructure serves as a 
useful comparative lens through which we can better understand Akaliyat in 
Morocco.  
 
Genre, Audience, and Voice in Akaliyat Magazine 
With this social, political, and regional context in mind, let us turn our attention 
to Akaliyat. Founded in 2015 by a single activist with the goal of “releasing a free 
electronic magazine concerned with the affairs of sexual and religious minorities 
[aqaliyat jinsiya wa diniya] in Morocco, North Africa, and the Middle East,” 
Akaliyat is an LGBTQ-focused organization based in Morocco that began as a 
magazine (majalla), became a “collective” (majmu’a) and now describes itself as 
an “association” (jam’ia) (Akaliyat, 2018).1 Akaliyat maintains a Facebook page 
and a YouTube channel as well its own website (www.akaliyatmag.org) where it 
publishes Akaliyat magazine in free downloadable PDF format.2 It is clear from our 
discussion above that Akaliyat is not alone in advocating for the rights of queer 
 
1 For the rest of this paper, I distinguish between Akaliyat magazine (in italics) and Akaliyat 
the organization (unitalicized).  
2 Due to financial constraints, Akaliyat’s website, where they publish Akaliyat magazine, is 
only intermittently active. At the time of publication, Akaliyat’s website is inactive. 
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Moroccans nor is it unique in using the internet and social media to do so; what 
makes it stand out is its emphasis on inviting its readers to think of themselves as a 
community of people held together by certain narratives, framing both LGBTQ 
people and non-Muslims (here meaning primarily ex-Muslim atheists and converts 
to Christianity) as fellow marginalized “minorities” (aqaliyat in Arabic, the basis 
for the organization’s name) within Moroccan society.  
According to Akaliyat’s founder and editor-in-chief, whom I had the chance to 
interview in Rabat in 2018, the organization envisions its audience as Moroccan 
society as a whole, not just LGBTQ-identified individuals or non-Muslims. The 
magazine is open to submissions from anyone living in Morocco or abroad who can 
write well in Modern Standard Arabic or Moroccan Arabic (darija), with the goal 
of framing itself as a locally-facing organization. Akaliyat prefers not to use French 
or other European languages in its materials in order to remain focused on its local 
Moroccan public. It sees its mission as advocating for freedom of expression and 
individual freedom for all Moroccans, not just queer people, seeking to create a 
space where all of those without a voice or visibility in mainstream Moroccan 
society can speak and share their stories. In other words, it is not just an LGBTQ 
organization but an organization which sees LGBTQ rights as one aspect of the 
broader right to freedom of expression. For example, one of the organization’s first 
activist campaigns was organized in opposition not to Article 489 but to Article 222 
of the Moroccan Penal Code, which criminalizes the public consumption of food 
and drink during the holy month of Ramadan, when Muslims are expected to fast 
during daylight hours. Akaliyat works together with other feminist, secularist, and 
LGBTQ activist organizations based in Morocco, North Africa, and the broader 
Arab world to achieve its goals. Akaliyat aspires to be a public, officially recognized 
NGO, having unsuccessfully attempted to register themselves as an official 
organization with Moroccan authorities in 2016 (Ghoshal, 2018). Akaliyat occupies 
a similar position in relation to the Moroccan state as Helem in Lebanon, existing 
as a public-facing, rights-focused organization that is “ambiguously accepted 
without any official recognition” (Moussawi, 2015 p. 601). 
When I asked Akaliyat’s editor about why the organization publishes content 
exclusively online, he told me that publishing physical copies of the magazine 
would put its readers in danger because the public sphere is not a safe space for 
LGBTQ Moroccans to be open about their identities. Until they can achieve legal 
protection as an officially recognized organization, Akaliyat prefers to restrict the 
bulk of their activity to the digital media sphere, where there is relatively more 
freedom of expression. Digital media platforms like Akaliyat, although they present 
the possibility of being “outed” to undesirable audiences like the state or 
homophobic members of one’s community, are the only viable tool that many queer 
Moroccans can use to talk with each other, to read affirming information about 
queer sexualities and gender identities, and to realize that there are other queer 
Moroccans who are facing many of the same challenges they face in their daily 
lives. Unlike GayRomeo in Beirut (Gagné, 2012), however, Akaliyat magazine is 
not a platform in which users primarily attempt to arrange in-person encounters – 
the focus is much more on attempting to build networks of community across the 
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country of Morocco and its diaspora, developing a sense of queer consciousness 
that is specific to the local social context.  
Akaliyat is an organization that does far more than just publish a magazine. 
Akaliyat’s editor told me that he receives dozens of emails every week from 
LGBTQ Moroccans around the country asking him to help them find safe places to 
stay after being abused or kicked out of their homes because of their sexuality or 
gender expression. He told me that if a queer person experiences violence, 
especially in rural areas of the country, it is not safe for them to go to the police and 
they must rely on friends or activist networks like Akaliyat to receive support. There 
is a severe lack of resources that Akaliyat has at its disposal to help its readers if 
they find themselves in a dire situation, with the editor devoting a significant 
amount of his own personal time, energy, and money at his own risk to help those 
in need who contact him. Although the magazine was originally intended to be 
published monthly, these significant personal and financial constraints have 
resulted in the magazine publishing only five issues in its run time to date: Issue 1 
in January 2015, Issue 2 in February 2015, Issue 3 in April 2015, Issue 4 in August 
2015, and Issue 5 in February 2018.3 The magazine itself is read by people from 
across the country of Morocco and abroad. While the editor could not give me 
statistics on precisely where the magazine’s readers were located, he did tell me that 
the first issue of the magazine was downloaded over 15,000 times, the second issue 
was downloaded over 18,000 times, and the organization’s website receives over 
10,000 visitors per day as of July 2018.  
What types of discourse does Akaliyat magazine use in addressing its readers? 
Within each issue of the magazine, there are a number of different types of articles 
and genres of writing, including: interviews with prominent activists of Moroccan 
descent who serve as “guest of the issue” (daif al-’adad) and who appear on the 
cover, such as a feminist activist affiliated with MALI and an evangelical Moroccan 
Christian pastor based in Europe (Figure 3); conversations (hiwar khas) with 
anonymous queer and trans Moroccans who do not wish to share their name or a 
photo of themselves; news about LGBTQ issues and religious minorities around the 
world, with a focus on Arabic-speaking countries, framed as “our news” 
(akhbarna); articles on subjects like the possibility of same-sex marriage in 
Morocco and how to observe Ramadan as a gay Muslim written by Akaliyat’s editor 
as well as guest contributors; a question-and-answer section devoted to addressing 
common questions from readers and social media followers like “Are gay men 
always feminine?” and “Are lesbians just women who have had bad experiences 
with men and do they hate men?”; poetry and romantic short stories about same-
sex relationships; a section written in Moroccan Arabic (darija), discussing 
different relevant political or social issues; recommendations on quality queer films 
available for free on the internet; a section entitled “what happened?” (matha 
hasala?) where readers describe difficult moments from their past and how they 
overcame them; and an open space called “my life” (hayati) where contributors are 
given space to write a short autobiography. 
 
3 The three year gap in publication is due to the organization’s financial constraints.  
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Figure 3. “Guests of the issue” (duyuf al-’adad) from Akaliyat Issue 1 (left), a 
feminist lawyer and activist affiliated with MALI, and Issue 5 (right), a Moroccan 
Christian pastor based in Europe.  
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In all of these different sub-genres within the magazine, Akaliyat models for its 
readers how to talk about queer identities from a specifically Moroccan perspective. 
For example, in Issue 1, in the interview with the MALI-affiliated feminist activist 
“guest of the issue,” the editor of the magazine asks her the following question: 
 
Q: Whenever we talk about minorities and their rights in Morocco, we 
come up against a great deal of ignorance (jahl kabir) about the subject 
and confusion in understanding. Our “Arab” society specifically singles 
out sexual and religious minorities (aqaliyat jinsiya wa diniya) [for 
persecution]. What is your comment on this proposal, if I am correct in 
saying so? 
 
A: I use the word “minorities” with caution because there are no statistics 
that we can use to determine the majority or the minority, and freedom of 
expression does not exist in Morocco that would allow each person to 
express their religious beliefs or sexual orientation in order for us to have 
access to these numbers. I also use the term “our Arab society” with 
caution because we do not live in an Arab society but rather a mix between 
many different cultures and the use of this term (“Arab”) shows 
persecution that is not the persecution that sexual and religious 
“minorities” suffer from but rather the cultural persecution and 
marginalization that the Amazigh have suffered for example. (Akaliyat, 
2015, my translation) 
 
In other words, she argues that sexual and religious minorities are marginalized 
communities like the Amazigh (Berber) population of Morocco, the indigenous 
people of North Africa to whom most Moroccans can trace some degree of ancestry 
and who were recently given official recognition of their language and cultural 
rights after a long history of persecution and struggle (Fanack, 2017; Hoffman & 
Miller, 2010). Like the Amazigh, she argues, so-called “sexual and religious 
minorities” may in fact make up the majority of the Moroccan population—there 
are simply no statistics out there that prove that LGBTQ people or supporters of 
secularism are not the majority because no Moroccan has the right to freely express 
their religious beliefs or their sexuality in public, Muslim or non-Muslim, straight 
or queer. This is a strategic mode of coalition building, encouraging LGBTQ people 
to think of themselves as allied to other marginalized groups who in fact make up 
the majority of Morocco’s population; although they may feel small and alone, there 
are feminists, secularists, Amazigh activists, and other groups fighting for greater 
freedom of expression who would be natural allies of the Moroccan LGBTQ 
community. Queer people, ex-Muslims, and secularists may be minorities if they 
seem themselves as individual communities, but taken together, they form the 
majority. Speaking with this sort of voice (Kunreuther, 2010), from the perspective 
of a minority community allied to other minorities, allows queer Moroccans to think 
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of themselves not as uniquely marginalized and alone but as integral members of 
their local communities and a diverse national public.  
In another example, from the “conversation” (hiwar khas) section of Issue 3, 
Akaliyat speaks with a gay Moroccan police officer in his thirties who goes by the 
pseudonym “Rachid” (Figure 4). After describing how he realized he was gay 
around the age of 15, his decision to join the police force in order to evade financial 
hardship, and the personal conflicts he faces in being responsible for enforcing a 
legal system that criminalizes his sexuality, he concludes his discussion by saying: 
 
I wish all homosexuals (mithliyin) a happy and normal life, just like anyone 
else, and I also hope that there will come a day when society will change 
its opinion of homosexuality. I think this will happen through the work of 
your magazine and the rest of the free media outlets that are trying to 
improve the situation of homosexuals in our Arab nations (dakhil awtanina 
al-’arabiya). I also hope that your magazine continues to exist because it 
shines a light on an anxious class of people that, if the magazine didn’t 
exist, would face increasing and deepening oppression. (Akaliyat, 2015b, 
my translation) 
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Figure 4. Conversation (hiwar khas) with gay Moroccan police officer “Rachid” 
from Akaliyat Issue 3. 
 
We can see in this conversation an example of how Akaliyat invites its readers 
to understand their sexuality as well as how they should understand their 
relationship to the magazine. One “discovers” that they are a homosexual at a young 
age, as evidenced by the editor’s question to Rachid, “when did you discover that 
you were a homosexual?” at the beginning of the conversation (mata iktashafta 
annaka mithly an-jins?). One’s sexual orientation is understood to be an internal 
state that is an integral aspect of one’s individual identity that begins to manifest 
itself in childhood and adolescence, an idea which is reflective of the magazine’s 
reliance upon understandings of gender and sexuality based in the physiological and 
psychological sciences rather than on traditional Moroccan-Islamic notions of 
gender and sexuality that presume a socially-imbricated heterosexual subject. This 
question is a good example of double-voiced discourse (Bakhtin, 1994), with 
Akaliyat employing terms drawn from medical and psychological traditions in order 
to teach both Rachid and its readers how they should understand their sexuality and 
its implications for their identity.  
Furthermore, it is assumed that telling others about one’s sexuality is something 
that one should do after “accepting” (taqabala) and becoming “convinced” 
(iqtana’a) of one’s “being” (kawn) a homosexual, with the editor asking Rachid, 
“You are convinced of being [a homosexual] and you’ve accepted your sexual 
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orientation - hasn’t that convinced you to tell your family and friends about your 
homosexuality?” (kawnak iqtana’ta wa taqabalta mayulak al-jinsy, alam 
yushaja’ka hatha ‘an i’lan mithliyatak al-jinsiya li-usratak wa asdiqa’ik?). Rachid 
responds to this question by saying that he has only confided in his identity with 
one or two other gay friends because they are the only people he can trust with this 
potentially career-destroying information, with the implication being that he feels 
safe confiding in them because they could also face serious ramifications if their 
sexuality was made public to the wrong audience. Readers of this exchange will 
implicitly understand that knowledge of their homosexuality is deeply powerful and 
it should be revealed only to those whom they can trust completely – probably only 
to other queer Moroccans who also have a lot to lose and therefore understand the 
heavy weight of this information. While voicing one’s homosexuality is an essential 
aspect of coming to terms with one’s identity as a queer person, one must be very 
careful in deciding with whom they share this information. 
Also in this exchange, Rachid (and, through his voice, Akaliyat) invites readers 
to be affectively invested in the success of the magazine as one of the few “free 
media outlets” fighting on behalf of LGBTQ people in the Arab world. Akaliyat 
wants its readers to be aware of the precarious financial and legal status that the 
magazine finds itself in and that it seeks their support. If it can show that it serves 
as a platform dedicated to “shining a light” upon the untold stories of oppressed 
people living in Morocco and the broader Arab-majority region, it can stake out a 
claim for itself and its mission, hopefully encouraging other queer people in its 
audience to share their stories as well, thereby increasing the magazine’s audience 
and prolonging its viability. This stance is also reflected on the magazine’s website, 
where a button on the sidebar announces that Akaliyat provides “your chance to 
make your voice heard by over 10,000 visitors a day … click here to share” 
(forsatak li-isma’ sawtak li-azid min 10000 za’ir yawmian … inqar hona lil-
mosharika) (Figure 5).  
 
Benjamin Ale-Ebrahim   99 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Sidebar on Akaliyat’s website announcing, “your chance to make your 
voice heard” (forsatak li-isma’ sawtak).  
 
In the third substantive textual example that I would like to address in this 
paper, Akaliyat includes a conversation with a young gay Moroccan man from the 
coastal city of Agadir who was blackmailed by one of his neighbors threatening to 
make his homosexuality public. This conversation was published in the section 
entitled “what happened?” (matha hasala?) in Issue 4 (Figure 6). The young man 
describes how photos showing him “in very intimate states with his ex-boyfriend 
‘R’” were sent to a neighbor after he lost his cell phone one day. Three days after 
he lost his phone, a neighbor contacted him and told him that he had “something to 
return to him”: “personal photos” of himself. After agreeing to meet, the neighbor 
then told him “you’re really handsome” and that he would “publish the photos on 
the internet” if the young man did not do what he asked. Scared, the young man 
asked what the neighbor wanted from him and the neighbor responded by saying 
that he wanted him to have sex with him. Despite protesting and suggesting “other 
solutions,” including payment of “a sum of money,” the neighbor refused to delete 
the photos unless the man had sex with him. Feeling as if he had no other choice, 
the young man reluctantly agreed. After this incident, in which he was raped 
violently, he describes feeling scared, hopeless, and unable to speak. A few days 
later, the neighbor contacts him again and demands the same thing. Again, feeling 
trapped, the young man is forced to agree to sex for a second time. After being 
blackmailed and violently raped twice in one week, the young man reports 
attempting suicide three times. Akaliyat’s editor then asks: 
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Q: How were you able to escape from this state of mind? 
 
A: After my suicide attempts, I told my friends about what happened and 
they helped me a lot in getting out of this state of mind. One of my 
friends advised me to move to a different city, and with his help I moved 
to that city where I still live today. (Akaliyat, 2015c, my translation) 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Conversation with young gay man from Agadir who was blackmailed 
by a neighbor. From “What happened?” subsection of Akaliyat Issue 4. 
 
In this exchange, we see Akaliyat teaching its readers how to process incidents 
of violence that could occur to them if their sexuality is made public against their 
wishes. Although one could feel desperate and alone after experiencing something 
as horrible as what this young man went through, Akaliyat tells its readers that is 
important to reach out to friends one can trust and tell them what happened – it is 
critical to voice these experiences, to put them in words. Developing and relying on 
this network of close friends is an important strategy that queer Moroccans must 
use to prevent them from feeling depressed, hopeless, and suicidal. Because the 
state and legal institutions do not support victims of rape or sexual violence in 
Morocco, especially if they are queer, relying on help from friends and activist 
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networks like Akaliyat is vital to one’s survival as well as one’s physical and 
emotional wellbeing. The conversation ends on a distinctly empowering note, with 
the young man speaking directly to “decision makers in Morocco,” asking them, 
“How long will the state keep attacking homosexuals in one form or another?” “We 
just want to live peacefully in this country,” he says, and “we deserve protection 
from the state … I want to say to that neighbor [who raped me] that today I 
discovered that the sickness that must be cured as soon as possible is not me [as a 
homosexual] but you [as a rapist]” (Akaliyat 2015c, p. 23).  
 
Conclusion 
As we can see through these examples, Akaliyat magazine invites its readers to 
imagine themselves as a diverse community of “minorities” held together by shared 
political aspirations as well as affective connections. Addressing both LGBTQ 
people and ex-Muslims living in Morocco, Akaliyat focuses on “shedding light” 
upon some of the most controversial and taboo topics in Moroccan society—
homosexuality and the decision not to practice Islam—that remain criminalized in 
the Moroccan Penal Code. Akaliyat argues that these practices are not abnormal 
social ills, as the Moroccan state and much of the public sees them, but rather they 
should be accepted and legalized in Morocco under the rubric of expanding 
individual freedom and freedom of expression. Although Akaliyat as an 
organization has distinctly secularist political leanings, it takes a neutral stance with 
regards to its individual readers’ relationships to Islam by publishing stories that 
feature the voices of both queer and trans Muslims as well as ex-Muslims of all 
sexual orientations and gender identities. 
The many different types of interview that Akaliyat publishes function as 
“double-voiced discourse” (Bakhtin, 1994), allowing the magazine’s readers to hear 
the stories of individuals who have overcome challenges in their own personal lives 
regarding their sexuality, gender identity, and religious beliefs at the same as giving 
them discursive tools for thinking about how they can address similar challenges 
that they may be facing in their own lives. In the absence of an official state-
sponsored regime of support for “sexual and religious minorities,” these somewhat 
informal and network-based practices, such as building coalitions with secular-
leaning institutions and relying on trusted friends for support in difficult times, 
represent best practices for survival in an oppressive socio-political environment. 
The genre of the interview in its various forms (the “guest of the issue” [daif al-
’adad], “conversation” [hiwar khass], and “what happened?” [matha hasala?]) is 
the most important and powerful “mode of regimenting the circulation of discourse” 
(Bauman, 2004) that Akaliyat employs in helping its readers develop practical 
strategies for dealing with their sexuality, gender identity, and religious affiliation 
in their own lives. 
In addition, by describing its readers as “sexual and religious minorities,” 
Akaliyat works to create a collectivity of queer people in Morocco by “assign[ing] 
them a certain position from which to receive [the magazine’s] address” (Barber, 
1997). This framing allows LGBTQ individuals to think of themselves alongside 
ex-Muslims, secularists, feminists, Amazigh activists, and others who support 
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individual freedoms and freedom of expression as co-minorities who, when taken 
together, actually make up the majority of Morocco’s population. Whether or not 
this is true, this framing allows queer people to imagine themselves in solidarity 
with others and helps them think of themselves not as marginalized and hopeless 
individuals but rather as empowered members of a wide-ranging community. 
Akaliyat attempts to create a cohesive “gay community” out of the more loosely 
organized “homosexual sphere” that exists in Morocco (Merabet, 2014), of which 
Akaliyat forms one part along with groups like Aswat and MALI. Akaliyat 
encourages queer Moroccans to think of themselves as a community of individuals 
who must rely on each other for support, an interdependent network of speakers and 
listeners, and a minority population deserving of political rights and freedom of 
expression within a legal framework.  
Finally, by encouraging its readers to voice their sexuality and gender identity 
in a public space like the magazine (Kunreuther, 2010), or at least with a trusted 
group of close friends, Akaliyat encourages its readers to think about their identities 
from a specifically queer-affirming and localized Moroccan perspective. Using the 
language of sexuality and gender identity borrowed from secular physiological and 
psychological sciences, the magazine tells its readers that sexuality is an internal 
and natural aspect of one’s identity that is “discovered” in one’s youth. Coming out, 
or “telling one’s friends and family about one’s homosexuality,” is considered an 
important part of one’s journey toward “acceptance” of “being” a homosexual, 
mirroring the predominant narrative within Western queer communities 
surrounding “being out” (Duggan, 2002). Akaliyat also highly encourages its 
readers to share their voice by contributing an article or interview to the magazine 
as a way to support one of the only “free media outlets” advocating for the rights of 
LGBTQ people in the Arab world. It frames itself as part of a vanguard of queer 
organizations and media outlets, such as My.Kali in Jordan, Shams and Mawjoudin 
in Tunisia, and Helem and Meem in Lebanon, that are working toward greater 
acceptance of LGBTQ issues in Arab-majority societies across the Middle East and 
North Africa region.  
Akaliyat magazine works to create queer community in Morocco by invoking 
a coalition of minorities framed as interdependent co-listeners to each other’s 
voices. The magazine models a supportive and affirming approach to queer 
identities in the absence of support from the state, Moroccan medical or legal 
institutions, Islamic religious organizations, and many families and communities 
throughout the country and in the Moroccan diaspora. By sharing intimate stories 
about their own journeys to self-acceptance as queer people, about how they 
overcame difficult challenges in their lives, and about how LGBTQ people can 
work together alongside other “minority” communities to achieve a political system 
that respects individual freedoms and freedom of expression, Akaliyat magazine 
and its readers serve a critical role in the emergence of queer community in 
Morocco.  
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The Vernacular Literacy Practices of a  
Newly Literate Moroccan Woman:  
An Ethnographic Study 
Reddad Erguig 
Abstract 
This paper offers a discussion of the literacy practices of a newly literate 
Moroccan woman. I draw on the social practice theory of literacy and I use 
ethnographic methods to explore the participant’s life history and offer an 
account of her family-related literacy practices within the framework of 
gender studies. In-depth interviews, informal discussion, participant 
observation, visual ethnography, and documentary photography were 
employed to collect data over one year. Literacy events were used as the 
basic unit of analysis and patterns were identified through coding and 
theme analysis. The findings indicate that the family is a strong impetus 
for the participant’s literacy acquisition and a major context where she uses 
the literacy skills she has developed in an adult literacy class. Literacy for 
this participant is an empowering tool because she has become able to 
carry out many of the outdoor tasks that were formerly exclusive to men. 
However, literacy has extended rather than reversed Imane’s home-based 
roles within her family. These results corroborate the findings of previous 
research on the embedded nature of literacy practice and illustrate the 
numerous ways in which the vernacular literacy practices of a participant 
from Morocco is embedded in a strong gender-based division of labor. 
 
Keywords: literacy practices, emergent literacy, adult literacy, gender, 
ethnography 
 
 
Introduction 
This article offers insights into the literacy practices of a newly literate 
Moroccan woman. It reports the findings of a year-long ethnographic study of the 
literacy practices of a woman adult literacy student. Strong emphasis is laid on the 
opportunities and challenges she faces in relation to the literacy activities she 
engages in within the family domain. More specifically, the aim is to (i) examine 
this newly literate woman’s beliefs about and attitudes toward literacy, (ii) 
document and analyze her literacy practices as they take place in specific real-life 
contexts, and (iii) investigate how her literacy practices are part of her personal 
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and/or social life as a daughter, mother, and wife (this is the status of a large segment 
of participant in adult literacy programs in Morocco). Emphasis is laid on the degree 
to which the literacy skills she has developed in the adult literacy class either 
empower or disempower her. This study therefore addresses the following 
questions: how does this newly literate woman utilize her newly acquired literacy 
skills in the family context? In what ways is her literacy practices embedded in 
socio-cultural structures and in different contexts, and how is this literacy practices 
shaped by gender relations in her family context? What strategies does she employ 
to deal with the literacy problems she encounters and to learn new literacy skills?  
The present study is informed by the social practice theory of literacy and 
presents a case study from the Moroccan context of the embedded nature of the 
literacy practices of an adult literacy student. As Purcell-Gates (2007) notes, “[i]t is 
now generally recognized that literacy is multiple and woven within the 
sociocultural lives of communities, but what is not yet fully understood is how it is 
multiple – how this multiplicity plays out across and within differing sociocultural 
contexts” (p. 2). Second, previous studies on adult literacy in Morocco (see review 
below) focused on the results of surveys and quantified achievements, but they did 
not fully explore the ways students use literacy in everyday life; conversely, the 
present article aims to cover the gap in this literature through bringing in an 
ethnographic perspective. Indeed, an ethnographic study of the everyday life 
literacy practices of an adult literacy student that stresses her own beliefs, 
perspectives, and voice is likely to yield results that can inform adult literacy policy, 
research, and instruction in Morocco.  
This article is organized along the following lines. In section one, details about 
the context of the study are presented. The second and third sections offer an 
account of the theoretical framework adopted as well as the methods utilized to 
address the objectives of the study. After laying out the findings in section four, a 
discussion ensues aiming to analyze them in the light of the findings of previous 
research. The paper concludes with several implications.  
 
Context 
Since Morocco gained Independence in 1956, literacy has been a fundamental 
component of national policy. Successive governments have adopted different 
policies and various measures to eradicate illiteracy. These ranged from 
generalizing access to schooling among school-age children, including the 
encouragement of the schooling of girls in rural areas, to the organization of large-
scale literacy programs targeting adults who either had never joined school or who 
had dropped out (Agnaou, 2002). The civil society has played a crucial role in these 
“illiteracy-eradication programs.” The International Literacy Year in 1990, 
however, marked a turning point in the national policy in matters related to adult 
literacy dissemination. The focus shifted from simply encouraging enrollment and 
increasing the number of the participants in adult literacy programs across different 
social groups, to place more emphasis on the quality of learning within these 
programs. Consequently, the priority of the department of adult literacy consisted 
in considering adult literacy students’ specificities and using pedagogy suitable for 
adults’ literacy needs (Direction de la Lutte, 2003). The National Charter of 
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Education and Training, which was adopted in 2000 and which outlines the national 
policy in education, made education and adult literacy a national priority. As the 
charter stipulates, education is the social duty of the State and literacy training is a 
prerequisite for socioeconomic development (Charte nationale de l’éducation, 
2001; Direction de la Lutte, 2003; Secrétariat d’Etat chargé, 2006). However, 
statistics relative to the literacy situation in Morocco do not align with the 
government’s claims and goals. In point of fact, in spite of the enormous literacy 
efforts invested since 1956, statistics show that illiteracy and school drop-out rates 
are still high especially among women and girls (see table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Breakdown of literacy, school enrollment and drop-out rates in Morocco in 2006 
by sex 
 Men Women Total Source 
Literacy rates 
(people aged 10 and up) 70.2% 47.3% 58.7% 
(Haut-Commissariat 
au Plan, 2007) 
 
School enrollment rates 
(2006) 90.8% 86.4% 85.4% 
(World Bank Report, 
2009) 
School dropout rates 
(children aged 6 and up) 7.72% 10.33 8.90% 
(Haut-Commissariat 
au Plan, 2007)  
 
 
In addition to being a priority in the national policy of the Kingdom of 
Morocco, literacy has also been the object of research in academia. A seminal 
literacy research project was conducted by Wagner and his colleagues between 
1980 and 1986. The objective of their Moroccan Literacy Project was to study the 
impact of socio-cultural factors such as language, family background, preschool 
experience, and socioeconomic status on literacy acquisition and retention among 
Arabic- and Amazigh-speaking children (Wagner, 1993; Wagner, Messik, & Spratt, 
1986; Ezzaki, Spratt, & Wagner, 1987). In similar terms, Afkir (2001) investigated 
the ways Moroccan children’s socioeconomic background shapes their socialization 
into a literate environment. However, one area that remains to be researched is the 
literacy experience and practices of Moroccan adults.  
The research on adult basic education in Morocco is of two types. The first is 
concerned with the Moroccan government’s efforts to fight illiteracy, the obstacles 
that face literacy provision, and the various strategies to fight illiteracy (Essaknaoui, 
1998; Maddi, 1999; Qabaj, 1998). The second type of research is based in fieldwork 
and is concerned with the adult students’ demographic characteristics, the reasons 
why they did not attend school, their motivations to enroll in literacy programs, and 
the literacy difficulties they face (Secrétariat d’Etat chargé, 2006). Other studies 
within this line of research offer an assessment of the adult students’ literacy 
achievements, the correspondence between the participants’ needs, and the program 
objectives as well as the portrayal of women in adult literacy textbooks (Aganou, 
2002; Agnaou & Boukous, 2001; Ibaaquil, 2001). 
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These studies, however, have methodological limitations: they either rely on 
self-reported data collected through quantitative data collection instruments and 
analyzed through statistical measures (Secrétariat d’Etat chargé, 2006), or they 
measure the participants’ literacy achievements using school-based tests (Agnaou, 
2002; 1Boukous & Agnaou, 2001). Literacy programs in Morocco, however, have 
not been studied ethnographically in terms of the participants’ actual literacy uses. 
The present article, which is part of a larger study, aims to fill this gap in the 
literature and thus contribute to scholarship on the social nature of literacy. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The present ethnographic study of the literacy practices of a newly literate 
Moroccan woman is couched within research tradition commonly known as the 
New Literacy Studies (NLS) and is informed by the social practice theory of 
literacy, which posits that literacy is a social practice embedded in social 
relationships and institutions, historically situated and informally learnt. As 
Baynham (2004) argues, emphasis is placed on, 
 
the social meaning of literacy: that is, the roles these abilities [reading and 
writing] play in social life; the varieties of reading and writing available 
for choice; the contexts of their performance; and the manner in which they 
are interpreted and tested, not by experts, but by ordinary people in 
ordinary activities. (p. 285) 
 
The springboards for the present study include four seminal studies that 
highlight the social nature of literacy (Barton & Hamilton, 1998, p. 160; Heath, 
1983, p. 196; Scribner & Cole, 1981; Street, 1984). These researchers have 
examined the “‘vernacular’ or non-dominant literacy practices . . . that are 
overlooked and ignored by the constructions of literacy elaborated by and within 
dominant institutions” (Barton, Hamilton, & Ivanič, 2000, p. 3). They are concerned 
with the ways “literacies are positioned in relation to the social institutions and 
power relations which sustain them” (Prinsloo & Breire, 1996, p.15). 
Within the NLS scholarship, a significant body of research has been concerned 
with emergent literacy and has focused on exploring the outcomes of adult 
education in different communities. Within this line of research, simplistic claims 
of governments and development agencies that literacy alone leads to 
socioeconomic development and to women’s empowerment are questioned. Papen 
(2005), for example, notes that the Namibian and South African participants in the 
adult literacy programs she researched ignore the everyday life literacy skills they 
are taught in the adult literacy classes and express instead a need for a school-based 
curriculum because they were formerly excluded from formal education. Prinslo 
and Breire (1996), by contrast, argue that South-African paticipants in adult literacy 
programs make limited use of the literacy skills they learn because they are exposed 
to school-based literacy practices which are unrelated to the everyday life literacy 
demands. Again by contrast, Betts’s (2003) concludes that, based on ethnographic 
study in El Salvador, participants’ low-attendance of literacy classes does not 
indicate their lack of motivation to acquire literacy but rather the existence of 
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literacy mediators who offer literacy help to the community and make literacy 
acquisition unnecessary. Even more interestingly, Ahearn’s ethnographic work in 
Nepal reveals that adult literacy acquisition has negative repercussions; that is, 
newly literate women engage in love-letter writing and decide to elope with their 
lovers, but they become powerless and cut off in cases where the marriage fails. 
Finally, Erguig (2017) examines the ideological nature of the national adult literacy 
program in Morocco, and stresses the crucial role of a strong political will in the 
status the mosque-based literacy program currently enjoys as the predominant 
“literacy sponsor.” He argues that the mosque is no longer an “ideology-free” site 
for the delivery of the adult literacy of reading, writing, and math to the 
predominantly women participants, but it has rather become a site where a moderate 
view of Islam is promoted and where “balanced” ideological beliefs and values are 
inculcated as part of a larger state policy that seeks to preserve the “spiritual 
security” of the nation. The present study contributes to this literature by presenting 
an ethnographic case study from the Moroccan context that foregrounds the 
multiple ways in which a newly literate woman’s literacy practices is “located in 
the broader patterning of social activities” (Barton & Hamilton, 1998, p. 160). 
In addition, this study is framed by gender theories, namely scholarship, which 
is concerned with the connection between adult literacy and gender equality 
(Molyneux, 1987; Stromquist, 1987). Molyneux (1987) made a distinction in 
gender interests in terms of whether they are (i) practical and lead to women’s 
access to and use of literacy to serve practical functions or whether they are (ii) 
strategic and enable women to claim their place in the world and to participate in 
the social-cultural, economic, and political activities on an equal footing with their 
male counterparts (p. 260). Robinson-Pant’s (2005) research in Nepal is another 
case study concerned with the processes involved in Nepalese women’s literacy 
acquisition and the literacy practices in which they engage. She views the link 
between women’s literacy, gender, and development as a dynamic process and 
demonstrates that literacy planners often introduce theoretical approaches to the 
design and implementation of literacy programs which take little account of the 
local teaching situations and the local participants’ beliefs about adult education. 
As Robinson-Pant (2000) contends, the “relationship between objectives and 
outcomes of a programme, between teaching methods and learning outcomes, 
should therefore not be seen as a simple equation to be balanced” (p. 159). 
 
Method 
Design and Context 
The present study is ethnographic in nature: a multi-method approach, 
consisting of interviews, informal discussion, participant observation, photographs, 
and artifact collection, was used. These methods were deployed to gain an emic 
perspective and to capture the entirety of the participant’s literacy experience in 
order to ultimately provide a detailed, in-depth description of her everyday life 
literacy practices within the family domain. The approach is holistic and 
interpretive, and it aims to highlight the participant’s lived experience and give 
space for her voice. 
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The participant in this ethnographic study, Imane, a pseudonym, is aged 47 and 
lives in a popular and relatively old neighborhood of a growing urban center, 
Temara, which is about 7.5 miles south of Rabat, the capital city of Morocco. She 
is married to a military serviceman who makes around 2,500 dirhams ($280) a 
month, which means they are a low-income family. She is mother to three 
daughters: Sanaa, Nawal, and Noura aged 11, 8, and 2, respectively. Sanaa is in 5th 
grade and Nawal is in 2nd grade. 
Imane lives in an old apartment in the same neighborhood as that of her 
parents’. Her nuclear family is characterized by a clear gender-based division of 
labor: the husband is the breadwinner and Imane is in charge of domestic chores, 
including the literacy-related ones. She does the housework, attends to the needs of 
the daughters, prepares food, and also does the shopping. Her father runs a small 
local business for making women’s traditional clothing, and her mother is a 
housewife who also works as an occasional cook. Her two brothers, 40 and 35, work 
as teachers of English in state-sponsored schools, and her 16-year-old sister is a 
high school student. She spends part of her day time in her parents’ apartment, 
helping her mother with the housework. To earn some money to cover her personal 
needs, she occasionally helps make cakes for her mother’s clients. 
Along the lines of purposeful sampling (see Patton, 1990, p. 169), I selected 
Imane because she represents an “information-rich case . . . for study in-depth.” 
Although the insights the present case study offers can by no means be generalized 
to all newly literate women, Imane is a woman Moroccan adult literacy student 
who, unlike her brothers, who continued their education until they got jobs as 
teachers, willingly dropped out of a nearby school when she was in 4th grade against 
her father’s will (Imane’s father, personal communication, November 10, 2017). By 
her father’s account, he did not put much pressure on her to return to school (see 
subsection “Ruling Passions” below for a discussion of the reasons why she 
returned to attend an adult literacy class). In this respect, it is important to cite the 
national survey conducted by the Ministry of Education to explore adult basic 
education students’ characteristics and their motivations to enroll in adult literacy 
classes; the results showed that 16.4% of the adult literacy students in Morocco left 
school when they were either 4th or 5th graders (Secrétariat d’Etat chargé, 2006, p. 
22).  
Second, Imane is like thousands of women adult literacy students who attend 
literacy classes in addition to their family responsibilities. Interestingly, she is 
indeed highly motivated to improve her literacy skills as attested by her non-stop 
literacy learning pursuits. She attended an evening state-sponsored literacy class 
offered in a near-by public school in 1994 over a period of two years to learn how 
to read and write in Arabic, but she had to quit upon suspension of the program. 
When she got married in 1996, she moved to a small town where no literacy class 
was available. In 2004, she came back to live in Temara when her eldest daughter 
had reached 11 years old and was able to attend a literacy class for another year. 
However, she had to leave it again for family reasons. She said, “I was often 
disturbed because I used to take my elder daughter with me to the literacy class. 
When I gave birth to my second daughter, I had to leave the literacy program in 
order to attend to her needs” (Imane, personal communication, September 5, 2017).  
Reddad Erguig   111 
 
Third, I have been a long-term friend of Imane’s family and regularly visited 
them for over 20 years; her two brothers have been long-time friends and 
colleagues. Such a background has indeed led to the development of a brother-sister 
type relationship between us. My position as a friend of the family enabled me to 
gain genuine access to her reading and writing practices. This social relationship 
with Imane was also vital in the sense that the researcher as a man could not have 
conducted this ethnographic study with her given the gender components in the 
analysis of study. However, thanks to these social ties and to the close personal 
relationship to her, I managed to have easy access to her day-to-day reading and 
writing practices. In short, despite the existence of a potential researcher bias and 
the fact that much of the evidence comes from the participant’s self-reported 
experiences, both of which should be acknowledged as a possible limitation of the 
study, Imane’s confidence that her collaboration is for research purposes to promote 
the cause of millions of Moroccan women who are eager to learn literacy resulted 
in an anxiety-free atmosphere wherein she willingly shared her stories about her 
literacy acquisition journey. 
 
The Ethnographic Research Process  
This ethnographic study aims to provide a detailed, in-depth description of a 
woman’s everyday life literacy practice based on field work that spans over one 
year. Its guiding principle was an exploration of a Moroccan woman adult literacy 
student’s literacy beliefs, attitudes, and practices in their entirety, with a particular 
emphasis on the intersection of these factors. This research experience was 
characterized by the author’s participant observation of aspects of the life of this 
woman made possible by the relationship he had developed with the participant’s 
family and her husband. The variety of ethnographic research methods discussed 
below was used to represent the participant’s perspectives and to highlight “the 
centrality of literacy in the patterning of contemporary everyday activities and how 
people act within a textually mediated social world” [emphasis in original] (Barton 
& Hamilton, 1998, p. 196; see also Barton, Ivanič, Appleby, Hodge, & Tusting, 
2007). 
In-depth interviews were conducted to collect demographic data about Imane 
and to explore her literacy history and former schooling experience. I also 
continually interviewed her (in Moroccan Arabic) to uncover the ways in which the 
observed and reported literacy events fit into her personal and/or social life (the 
interview transcripts in this article are translations from Moroccan Arabic). The 
interviews centered on her daily literacy practices with a special focus on the 
functions in which she put reading and writing to use, her roles and attitudes in the 
literacy events in which she engaged, and the literacy difficulties she faced. 
Informal conversation with her family members also helped collect additional 
background information about her. 
I also observed Imane in real-life settings (i.e., the contexts where she interacts 
with written text) as she engaged in some literacy events using visual ethnography, 
and photographs were taken while she was involved in literacy events. I additionally 
asked her to report the day-to-day occasions when reading and writing were part of 
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her social interactions. Finally, I used documentary photography, photographing the 
literacy artifacts in her apartment in order to provide a vivid picture of the ecology 
of writing in her home. Throughout this process, I used field notes to record my 
observations and comments. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis Process 
The grounded theory approach, “a qualitative research method that uses a 
systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded theory 
about a phenomenon” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 23), was used to generate themes. 
I continuously interviewed Imane and analyzed data to inform the following process 
of data collection; data were coded and themes were generated and enriched until 
theoretical saturation was achieved. In this process, which took place from August 
2017 through July 2018, the three ethical considerations of the participant’s 
informed consent, right to privacy and protection from harm were observed and 
explicitly shared with the participant in the study. 
The basic units of analysis are “literacy events” which refer to “the occasions 
in which written language is integral to the nature of participants’ interactions and 
their interpretive processes and strategies” (Heath, 1983, p. 196). Emphasis in the 
analysis focused on the following five elements: (i) Imane, the participant, (ii) the 
activities performed by participants (i.e., Imane and the people involved in the 
literacy events in which she engaged), (iii) the settings in which the interaction takes 
place, (iv) the domains within which literacy events take place (i.e., the areas within 
which her reading and writing activities can be categorized), and (v) the resources, 
or the material artifacts and non-material values involved in the interaction. Literacy 
events were the springboard for the study of the literacy practices, which Street 
(2003) describes as “the broader cultural conception of particular ways of thinking 
about and doing reading and writing in cultural contexts” (p. 82).  
I analyzed the ethnographic data to generate categories and identify the 
prominent literacy domains. The themes that emerged from the data were then 
identified, combined, and further analyzed with reference to the research questions 
raised initially. I placed Imane’s literacy practices within a gender framework, and 
I explored the implications of her status as a newly literate woman for her roles 
within a gender-based family structure. 
 
Findings 
In the present article, I examine the participant’s literacy practices within the 
family domain and analyze the ways she uses literacy in connection with the 
following categories: her children’s schoolwork and their health needs, shopping, 
having home appliances repaired, cooking, withdrawing money from the post 
office, checking documents, and reading mail. Before I provide a discussion of 
Imane’s day-to-day literacy practices, a review of her motives to return to an adult 
literacy class after having dropped out of school when she was in primary school is 
in order. 
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“Ruling Passions” 
In my different interviews and informal discussions with Imane, religion, her 
children, and the daily literacy demands were her “ruling passions.” She often 
turned the conversation round to these topics as major reasons behind her decision 
to attend an adult literacy class after having dropped out of school when she was in 
primary school. She said, “To be frank, I attended the literacy class primarily to be 
able to read the Quran and for my daughters’ sake” (Imane, personal 
communication, September 9, 2017). 
Therefore, religion is a major impetus for her decision to attend a literacy class 
and to recall the literacy skills she had lost after she had left school. Although the 
Quran and other religious information are nowadays accessible to the illiterate via 
audiovisual media (CDs, TV channels, and social media), Imane insisted that she 
wanted to be able to read the Quran as a book and to understand the teachings of 
Islam. she said, “I can now read short Sourates easily” (Imane, personal 
communication, August 8, 2017). Nonetheless, her biggest dream is to manage to 
read the Quran in its entirety: “I want to be able to read Al Baqara Sourate, 
especially the Al Kursi verses, which are posted on the wall in my sitting room in 
my flat” (Imane, personal communication, September 1, 2017). The second motive 
behind her enrollment in an adult literacy class consists of her intention to develop 
the literacy skill she needs to be able to help her daughters with their schoolwork. 
Like many parents who may be unsatisfied about the quality of education offered 
in some state-sponsored schools and who may be unable to hire a private tutor, 
Imane is intent on offering her daughters the literacy support they need to achieve 
school success. 
 
Children's Schoolwork 
The participant’s major family-related literacy use consists of helping her 2nd 
and 5th 5 grade children with their schoolwork (see image 1). As a matter of fact, 
22% of the adult literacy students surveyed in 2006 stated they joined a literacy 
program to better educate their children (Secrétariat d’Etat chargé, 2006, p. 17). 
Indeed, in the different interviews I had with her, she consistently affirmed that she 
helps her daughters learn the letters of the alphabet, read the Quran, and memorize 
and recite excerpts from it. In spite of being a newly literate woman equipped with 
only basic literacy skills, she manages to provide useful literacy help to her children 
because they are primary school pupils who do not yet necessitate that she should 
have advanced literacy skills. Thus, literacy was an enabling tool to help meet a 
family need. Such literacy help is part of the domestic chores she performs in a 
family structure characterized by a strong gender-based division of labor: “I help 
my daughters mainly with the Quran and math. I am also the first to read their 
transcripts; my husband doesn’t often read the children’s school grades because 
when he does, he keeps scolding them” (Imane, personal communication, 
September 6, 2017). In this family task, however, she at times receives help from 
her siblings:  
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My sister and brothers occasionally help my children with their 
schoolwork. My husband can read and write, but he doesn’t help the kids 
with their school tasks. He comes back from work and then he lies down . 
. . he watches TV and sport, that’s all . . . He has a busy schedule; he leaves 
home early in the morning and comes back late in the afternoon. (Imane, 
personal communication, May 15, 2018)  
 
Second, Imane helps her daughters with mathematics:  
 
Imane happily related how she was very delighted when she once managed 
to understand and explain to her eldest daughter the difference between the 
mathematical symbols of less than (<) and greater than (>). She managed 
to distinguish one from the other using her prior knowledge of numbers 4 
and 7. She said that for her the symbol (<) looks like a “4” and (>) looks 
like a “7.” (Imane, field-note, February 27, 2009) 
 
This vignette illustrates that, in addition to literacy, Imane’s numeracy practices 
are also embedded in her gender-based roles. Drawing on the skills she has learned 
at school and which she managed to remember in the literacy class, she handles 
the family-related numeracy tasks and helps her daughters with their math 
exercises.  
 
 
 
Image 1. The participant is at home helping her daughter with a school task. 
 
A third kind of literacy event associated with Imane’s use of literacy to help 
her children with their schoolwork is her practice of reading an easy reader which 
she performed at the request of her eldest daughter. She reported, “Yesterday, Sanaa 
[her eldest daughter] asked me ‘Please, mum, read this story! I want you to improve 
your literacy skills and to be like my classmate’s mum, who helps her daughter with 
schoolwork’” (Imane, personal communication, September 6, 2017). In this literacy 
event, Imane is invited by her daughter to read the easy reader in the aim of 
improving her own reading skills, and this in turn will enable her to better help her 
children with their school-based literacy tasks. 
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The literacy help that Imane offers her children is a common literacy practice 
in the Moroccan family in which the wife is literate. There is a remarkably strong 
interest in children’s schooling even among the most low-income families. Some 
families even take bank loans or sell real estate and other property to ensure an 
adequate and modern education for their children. The concern for the children’s 
education is also manifest in the literacy help parents offer their children and/or the 
evening classes’ fees they pay for them. 
In terms of the social theory of literacy, Imane’s literacy uses are consistent 
with previous research which shows that literacy practices are purposeful and that 
they “are already embedded in an ideology and cannot be isolated or treated as 
‘neutral’ or merely technical” (see Barton & Hamilton, 1998; Street, 1984). From a 
gender perspective, these examples align with the findings of previous research on 
the gendering of literacy: they support the view that literacy tasks within the 
household are seen as the woman’s task and that women tend to help their children 
with schoolwork and to respond to the family literacy demands more often than men 
(Rockhill, 1993, p. 160; see also Barton & Hamilton, 1998). The examples also 
show that while literacy enables her to engage in some activities formerly 
customarily carried out by males, it also entails more family responsibilities for her. 
 
Children’s Health Needs 
Imane also engages in literacy practices when attending to her children’s health 
needs. She reported, “My husband doesn’t interfere with anything. It is I who have 
to attend to the needs of my daughters when they are ill” (Imane, personal 
communication, December 23, 2017). Drawing on her knowledge that every 
medical box bears an expiration date, she reads labels on medical boxes to check 
the expiration date of the medicine she wants to give her daughters: 
 
My daughter was sick a couple of days ago; she had fever. I wanted to give 
her fever syrup, and I asked my eldest daughter to re-check the expiration 
date. I learned that the medicine had expired, so I bought her another bottle 
of the syrup at the pharmacy. (Imane, personal communication, August 1, 
2017) 
 
Imane also read directions and signposts when she was taking her sick daughter to 
the doctor’s office:  
 
My mother and I took my daughter to the pediatrician because she was ill. 
We found ourselves in front of a building where there were many doctors’ 
offices. I was glad when I managed to recognize all by myself the name of 
the “pediatrician” I was looking for. (Imane, personal communication, 
September 17, 2008) 
 
These examples illustrate Imane’s gender roles enactment. As a mother 
administering a medicine to her daughter or taking her to the pediatrician, literacy 
and numeracy enabled her to accomplish her tasks and be autonomous. From a 
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gender perspective, also, these instances lend support to the claim that, through her 
literacy skills, Imane managed to fulfill her domestic obligations. From an 
empowerment perspective, however, literacy did not lead to a radical change in 
household gender roles, nor did it entitle her to perform tasks formerly performed 
by males only.  
 
Shopping 
Within the family domain, the participant also writes shopping lists at home 
before going shopping at “lahri,” a nearby non-self-service wholesale shop where 
she buys groceries and dairy:  
 
Interviewer: Who does the shopping at home? 
  It’s me of course. You see, brother [being a long-time 
friend of her brothers’ entitled me to the status of an almost 
family member], I have to attend to all the domestic chores. 
Interviewer: Do you use a shopping list? 
   I don’t use a shopping list for produce and meats. But as I 
buy everything else [grocery and dairy] at “lahri, ” I have to 
use a shopping list. Without a shopping list, I would buy 
some items and forget others. I sometimes ask my daughter 
to check the shopping receipt for me.  
(Imane, personal communication, September 2, 2017) 
 
Getting Home Appliances Repaired 
Imane’s literacy practice as embedded in her gender-based family structure is 
also evident in her completion of another family task: getting the home appliances 
repaired. For example, “when her fridge broke down, she was looking for a person 
to repair it for her. She went to his shop and read a note posted on the door saying 
that he does not work on Sunday so that people would not knock on his house door 
and disturb him” (Imane, field-note, September 17, 2017). This vignette illustrates 
the way Imane uses literacy to perform a family duty related to her current status as 
a newly literate wife. This is an opportunity for her to engage in social activities 
beyond the borders of her home and to practice her literacy skills; however, it also 
shows that literacy is used to serve the traditional gender-based family role and not 
necessarily to challenge the domination of the male in the life of the family. 
Imane views the act of taking the fridge to have it repaired as a family duty 
assigned to her because she because she does not work outside the home. However, 
although she does not now aspire to be a working woman, she believes her husband 
would help with the housework if she had a job. As she reported, “My husband 
doesn’t help me with the domestic chores . . . . If I were a working woman, he would 
help me with the housework and would take the fridge to have it repaired” (Imane, 
personal communication, December 23, 2017). 
At the Post Office: Mail and Documents 
Imane’s literacy activity at the post office further exemplifies the embedded 
nature of literacy. She often goes to the post office to cash a check for her husband 
or withdraw money from his account. Such a family task usually begins as a literacy 
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practice in which she draws on her own literacy skills, but it turns into a mediated 
literacy practice when she turns to a man who assists people with form filling 
usually for a three to 10 dirhams fee ($0.25 to $1.15). She needs his help especially 
with the fields to be completed in French thanks to his knowledge of French; she 
also solicits his expertise in handling the post office paperwork. She said, “If I were 
literate, I would rely on myself and not ask for . . . [this man’s] help” (Imane, 
personal communication, February 30, 2017). Such a literacy event reveals overlap 
of two languages (Arabic and French) and two alphabets (Roman and Arabic), and 
highlights the idea that part of being literate in Morocco is to be able to use both 
languages and writing systems fluidly. More importantly, although it is primarily a 
family duty in which she serves a function traditionally assigned to a woman, the 
post office vignette indicates that Imane unintentionally interacts across gender 
boundaries and language/literacy resources. Because of her status as a newly literate 
woman and because she is not literate in French, she enters a realm formerly a male 
domain and interacts with a man she does not know to obtain information and solicit 
his literacy help. 
In addition, Imane engages in reading the mail she finds in the mail-box in both 
her apartment and her parents’ apartment. She related to me how she had read a 
letter from her sister’s school about the school final examination. She said, 
“Yesterday, I found a letter in my parents’ mail-box and I read the name of the 
person to whom it was destined. I read the address too and I knew it was destined 
to my sister” (Imane, personal communication, September 9, 2017). Imane also 
related having read the cover to a letter mailed to her brother which stated: 
 
I met Imane in her parents’ flat this morning. She happily related how she 
had been so delighted a few days before when she managed to decode the 
letters of the Roman alphabet and to read what was written on the cover of 
a letter (bank statement), which was destined to her younger brother. 
Although this was a rudimentary skill, it was for her a moment of victory 
and self-fulfillment. (Imane, field-note, February 27, 2018) 
 
This literacy practice illustrates how Imane’s literacy practices are centered on her 
nuclear and/or extended family. Reading the cover of the mail and passing it over 
to the right person illustrates how literacy fits into her management of the domestic 
chores as a wife (within her apartment) and as a daughter and sister (within her 
parents’ apartment). 
Finally, Imane occasionally reads documents she comes across while she is 
doing the housework. She related how, out of curiosity, she once read her husband’s 
salary statement, which she came across when she was doing the laundry: 
 
I was about to wash my husband’s pants at home this morning when I came 
across a document in his pocket. It was a salary statement, and the total 
was in Moroccan dirhams. I knew how to read it, but I didn’t know how to 
convert the sum into riial (cents). I asked a neighbor’s help on how to 
convert it. After all, I knew how much my husband earned, but I wanted 
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to know for sure how much he made. (Imane, personal communication, 
February 30, 2018)  
 
This literacy activity features overlap of two monetary systems that exist together 
in Morocco (dirham and riial). As is the case in several other literacy events, Imane 
is autonomous at the beginning and draws on her literacy skills and reads the 
document by herself, but this turns into a mediated literacy practice when she asks 
for her neighbor’s help. This literacy event reflects a gender-based division of labor 
because such a reading act was embedded within the task of her housework duties, 
namely the laundry. This gendered literacy practice also reflects Imane’s exclusion 
from detailed knowledge of her husband’s salary based on gender; because he is the 
breadwinner in the family where a strong labor division is predominant, he is the 
type of husband who does not want his wife to know details about his salary.  
A second type of document Imane read at home is her marriage contract, which 
she came across while doing the housework: 
 
I didn’t know what the document was about at first. It was thrown among 
some papers. But after reading a few lines, I recognized it as my marriage 
contract. I knew it when I read my parents’ and grandparent’s names on it. 
(Imane, personal communication, September 6, 2008) 
 
Unlike many other occasions in which Imane faces literacy difficulties and seeks 
help from her daughter or neighbors, in this literacy event she manages to 
understand the content of the document relying on her own knowledge and literacy 
skills. This vignette further highlights the fact that, through literacy and her reading 
of the marriage contract, Imane manages to reduce her exclusion from the 
documentary circumstances of her marriage. This is an additional example of a 
literacy activity which is embedded within a domestic chore and which is strongly 
related to her gender-based family tasks and to her status as a housewife.  
 
Discussion 
In line with the assumptions of the social theory of literacy, Imane’s literacy 
practices demonstrates the multiple ways in which her literacy practices are 
embedded in gender roles and as such “are patterned by social institutions and 
power relationships” (Barton & Hamilton, 1998, p. 160; see also Hamilton, 1998; 
Barton & Hamilton, 2000). The literacy help she provides to her children with their 
school assignments, and her reading of shopping lists and directions highlight the 
centrality of literacy in her management of the household affairs. They demonstrate 
the ways her literacy practices are gendered and the ways they fit into her world as 
a wife and mother who uses literacy to maintain her traditional roles and carry out 
family responsibilities. These literacy practices are an assertion of her position as a 
person who has acquired enough skills to be autonomous when meeting the daily 
literacy demands and also a translation of her desire to achieve more autonomy 
regarding these literacy tasks. In fact, Imane constantly evaluates her social position 
in terms of self-worth, and she feels a positive change in her social status because 
she successfully meets her family literacy demands. 
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These findings are consistent with the results of previous research within NLS 
on the embedded nature of literacy. They support Rockhill’s (1993) findings that 
Hispanic women in Los Angeles “conducted most of the literacy work of the 
household, and that associated with the purchase of goods, interface with public 
services and their children’s schooling” (p. 139). They equally corroborate the view 
that the literacy tasks within the family are assigned to the mother and that “part of 
being a good mother is to be a literate mother” (Barton & Hamilton, 1998, pp. 172-
3). Smythe (2006) similarly concludes in a study of American women’s domestic 
literacy work that “women’s domestic literacy work had become invisible as ‘real 
work’ in the home” (p. 294). Furthermore, the results obtained align with Kulick 
and Stroud’s (1993) contention that newly literate people “far from being passively 
transformed by literacy, instead actively and creatively apply literate skills to suit 
their own purposes and needs” (p. 31). However, it is noteworthy to know that these 
findings deviate from Rockhill’s (1991) observation regarding the violent conflicts 
women in her study experienced as their husbands opposed the shifting power 
dynamics resulting from the former’s decision to improve their literacy skills. 
Imane’s husband seems to welcome her new status and appreciate her new skills, 
probably because they at least extend the duties she performs for the family. 
A second characteristic of Imane’s literacy practices is that they are historically 
situated and they reflect changes within her family roles. As a newly literate wife 
and mother, she still conducts domestic chores, but these roles have been extended 
to include literacy-based tasks beyond the borders of the family. At the post office, 
for instance, Imane is an example of the traditional Moroccan housewife who, 
besides the domestic chores of doing the housework and cooking food for the 
family, now engages in outdoor literacy-based activities. This supports my central 
claim in the present article that, far from empowering her to claim her place in the 
world and play leading roles in the family life, literacy places new family demands 
on her. 
Multimodality is a third characteristic of Imane’s literacy practice. At the post 
office, Imane engages in a multimodal literacy practice in which two languages 
(Arabic and French) and two orthographic systems (the Roman and Arabic 
alphabets) are used. This event also draws attention to the idea of multiliteracies, 
the recognition that the skills and competencies required to be “literate” in 
contemporary culture are no longer limited to the traditional tasks of reading and 
writing but are extended to knowledge of how to complete forms and handle 
paperwork. Other literacy practices such as the reading and/or writing of shopping 
lists and medical labels also involve overlap of different semiotic systems: literacy 
and numeracy. A fourth characteristic of some of Imane’s literacy practices is that 
they are mediated (for the concept of literacy mediation see Baynham, 1993; 
Wagner, Messik, & Spratt, 1986). At the post office, she initially draws on her own 
literacy skills, but she later seeks a literacy mediator’s help with form filling.  
Finally, to handle the everyday literacy problems and/or learn new literacy 
skills, Imane uses informal strategies. At the post office, she turned to the man who 
fills forms for people for literacy help. This example underscores the situated nature 
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of learning and illustrates the strategic use of “informal responses to dominant 
practices” in cases of difficulties (Barton & Hamilton, 2005, p. 21).  
In short, from a gender perspective and within the broader social and cultural 
context of Morocco, the results of the present study demonstrate that literacy can 
be both enabling and constraining. On the one hand, literacy is enabling for Imane 
since it allows her to position herself as an autonomous person who can handle the 
outdoor everyday life family-related literacy tasks by herself. She can now check 
her own shopping receipt and also help her children with their schoolwork. Her 
gender roles also advance as she now engages in literacy-based family tasks beyond 
the borders of her home, including the management of the family money, which 
were formerly assumed by males. However, literacy does not play a liberating role 
in the life of Imane, who, despite her status as a newly literate woman, does not 
perform tasks which were formerly exclusive to males such as using her literacy to 
engage in income-generating activities. Thus, literacy has indeed extended rather 
than reversed Imane’s home-based roles within her family. 
Indeed, literacy does not enable the participant to challenge the male 
domination of the family life or to perform tasks which are similar to her husband’s. 
Rather, literacy places new demands on the participant. Because she can now meet 
many of the everyday life literacy demands, she is expected to carry out additional 
family duties. Literacy therefore helps her serve her practical rather than strategic 
needs (Molyneux, 1987; Robinson-Pant, 2005). In short, and in line with Scribner 
and Cole’s (1981) argument about the use of the Vai script to serve the Vai people’s 
practical or pragmatic needs, the ways Imane engages with the written word shows 
that literacy serves as a practical response to social changes and family demands 
rather than a revolutionary act against the gender-based division of labor within her 
family. 
The findings of the present study have several implications. In terms of policy, 
the day-to-day family-based literacy practices discussed above should be 
considered when implementing and evaluating adult literacy programs in Morocco. 
Since Imane uses literacy to respond to her children’s school-based literacy 
demands, adult literacy classes designed for middle-aged women should be focused, 
among other things, on their family-based literacy needs. These classes can be 
useful even if they adopt a school-like curriculum, in which case they will provide 
literacy instruction that may not be closely linked to the participants’ daily literacy 
needs but will still help them satisfy their children’s school literacy needs. Further, 
when designing and implementing literacy classes, the needs and constraints of 
participants who have to leave out their literacy classes must be taken into account. 
The results obtained also have implications for adult literacy evaluation and 
research. While the previous studies in Morocco reviewed above (Agnaou, 2002; 
Boukous & Agnaou, 2001) claim that literacy classes have limited outcomes, the 
results of the present study suggest that they may have overstated the case, since the 
participant under study, for instance, manages to handle the everyday life literacy 
demands. Methodologically, these results also show the value of an ethnographic 
approach to the study of everyday life literacy practice. Instead of measuring 
literacy outcomes, such an approach enabled me to provide an account of a newly 
literate woman’s literacy practices which differs from the findings of large-scale 
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quantitative studies which rely on pre-designed tools and take little account of the 
socio-cultural context in which literacy is acquired and practiced. Further 
ethnographic research needs to be conducted on newly literate Moroccan women’s 
literacy practices across domains of literacy use and age groups and from different 
regions and linguistic backgrounds because studies of this nature can deepen our 
theoretical understanding of literacy as social practice, enrich our knowledge of 
their literacy use, and have implications for the design and implementation of 
literacy classes.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has offered an examination of the literacy practices of a newly 
literate Moroccan woman and demonstrated the complex ways in which literacy is 
dynamic, purposeful, and embedded within her gender-based family roles. For 
Imane, literacy is an enabling tool that allows her to perform additional literacy-
related tasks for her family. Her identity as a wife and mother is evident in the 
literacy practices which she engages in, and such practices fit within her traditional 
roles in the family. Her gendered literacy practice thus aligns with findings of a 
body of literature within NSL, which shows how newly literate people appropriate 
literacy and adapt it to meet their own needs, hence the emphasis on human activity 
and agency (Ahearn, 2004; Kulick & Stroud, 1993). However, literacy does not 
empower the participant in the sense that it does not allow her to play roles that 
were previously the exclusive privilege of males such as establishing her own 
business, or engaging in income-generating activities, or shouldering 
responsibilities within the community, nor does it lead to a significant change in her 
family roles or relationships. 
The variety of Imane’s family-related literacy practices reflects how the family 
is both an impetus for her literacy acquisition plans and a major locus for her literacy 
practice. The ways she draws on her recently acquired/recalled literacy skills show 
that her family needs are a strong factor for her decision to enroll in the literacy 
program and a major site and source of support for her literacy practice. The family 
domain is indeed a significant domain in which she continues to practice and 
“scaffold” her literacy skills and also informally learn more literacy skills (Bruner, 
1985). However, her family is at times a handicap for her literacy learning pursuits 
as her domestic obligations are a reason why she had to drop out of the literacy class 
(see Tighe, Barnes, Connor, Steadman, & Steadman, 2013). 
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Abstract 
Language is a critical basis of local identity and a vital tool for global 
communication. In multilingual Morocco, the issue of language instruction 
has been highly politicized, a factor that has contributed to poor 
educational practice. This article aims at providing a brief description of 
Morocco’s linguistic landscape together with the language policies first 
established in Morocco by the French colonizer. It goes on to further assess 
the evolution of language education policy and makes recommendations 
for strengthening Morocco’s multilingualism. 
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Introduction 
Morocco, a strategically located North African country, is situated beside the 
Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean at the geographical intersection between 
Europe and the rest of Africa. This rather unique geographical location has given 
the country its genuine multilingual character and diverse population of European, 
African, Arab, and Imazighen (Singular Amazigh, plural Imazighen, a word which 
means “free people” and is preferred over the term Berber) who have cohabited 
with one another for many centuries. Morocco has always prided itself on the 
stability of its society, where multilingualism, multiculturalism, and multi-ethnicity 
have been instrumental to national and cultural identity. However, this linguistic 
situation which has been characterized by its richness, diversity, and complexity 
hides various ideological and sociopolitical conflicts. In fact, this linguistic 
pluralism has been a source of contention that has contributed to failing educational 
policies implemented ever since the political independence of the country.  
There are six languages which shape the linguistic landscape in Morocco: 
Classical Arabic with its two varieties Modern Standard Arabic and the local Darija 
(Moroccan Arabic); and Imazighen languages with its variants – Tamazight, 
Tashelhit (Tashelhiyt, Tashelhait, Shilha) and Tarifit; and finally French, English, 
and Spanish. 
 
Under French Colonization 
During the French colonization of Morocco (1912-1956), France imposed 
French as the official language of education and administration and tried to 
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marginalize the two already existing languages, (Moroccan) Arabic and Amazigh 
varieties, which were peacefully existing side by side. In fact, among the policies 
that the French colonizer usually relied on to spread their hegemony and to 
disseminate the French language was through building modern schools. Gordon 
(1962) quotes a well-known French saying which claims that “when the Portuguese 
colonized, they built churches; when the British colonized, they built trading 
stations; when the French colonized, they built schools” (p. 7). That is why French 
was enforced in all walks of life (especially the economic and the political domains) 
and it even replaced the Arabic language whose status was relegated to that of a 
secondary language to be used only in the traditional educational system. 
Furthermore, the French colonizer adopted a discriminatory "divide and rule" policy 
through the 1930 Berber Decree to make a clear-cut segregation between the Arabs 
and the Berbers. This enabled them to set up a different type of school called the 
Franco-Berber Schools especially in the middle Atlas Mountains where they started 
teaching French as a first language and Tamazight as a second language to the 
exclusion of Arabic. Among the most famous schools they built in the middle Atlas 
is Tarik Ibnou Zayyad high school in the town of Azrou. El Aissati (2005) wrote: 
 
During the protectorate period, an event of paramount importance in the 
modem history of Morocco, which was to be exploited by the nationalist 
movement of this country, is the elaboration of a decree in 1930. This 
decree, signed by the then king of Morocco, Mohamed V, stipulated that 
the areas with Berber as the dominant language -mostly rural areas- were 
entitled to carry on their tribal law system (droit coutumier), which had 
been die practice among the Berber tribes for centuries. What the French 
did was simply formalize these practices by law. This decree was seen by 
the pan-Arab nationalists as the ultimate attempt by France to separate 
Berbers from Arabs. (p. 61) 
 
Surprisingly, this French policy backfired on the French colonizer because instead 
of the intended segregation and the desired destruction of national unity, the Arabs 
and the Imazighen woke up to this danger and consolidated their unification by 
emphasizing their common faith of “Sunni Islam” (Etheredge, 2010, p. 147) in 
addition to a “unified cultural identity” (Crawford, 2005, p. 172). The French aimed 
at “civilizing” the Imazighen through “civilizing missions” (Zouhir, 2013, p. 274) 
under which the Imazighen found themselves “in the cross-hairs of these recurrent 
European anxieties” (Silverstein, 2010, p. 14). Aitsiselmi and Marley (2008) 
summarize these missions on the ground that “the French belief in the mission 
civilisatrice ‘civilizing mission’ of their language led to a desire to create an elite 
who would think and act like them, whilst keeping the mass of the population 
illiterate” (p. 193). 
In addition to these schools, the French established special schools that were 
devoted to the European community and to certain rich families which sided with 
the colonizer who promised to protect their wealth and their estates and who were 
made to believe that everything European in language, tradition, literature, or even 
people, is superior to the local one viewed as ancient, archaic, and backward. The 
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French did not open schools for the middle- and lower-class Moroccans, thus 
reinforcing and exaggerating class divides within society.  
As a reaction to the newly-imposed colonial presence and introduction of 
French schools, the educated patriotic nationalists took the lead and founded the 
free schools. These schools were private and free from colonial government control 
rather than free of tuition. Their mission was to combat the spread of French and to 
retain Arabic’s cultural, national, and sacred status and identity. These schools, 
many of which are affiliated to the government nowadays, were mainly sponsored 
by militant founding fathers whose main concern was to defend the Arabic language 
and Islam. These schools were also used by the nationalists to inculcate in the youth 
a national spirit and to disseminate the ideological, religious, and cultural values 
integral to “Moroccan identity.” Also, through these schools, the nationalists tried 
to reveal the colonizer's hidden agendas and to awaken Moroccans to the fact that 
their identity and culture were being threatened. Moreover, the nationalists 
managed to raise Francophobia and succeeded in making people aware that the 
French presence and settlement in Morocco was not to achieve Marechal Lyautey's 
"mission civilisatrice" but rather to exploit the natural resources and to strengthen 
their hegemony over North Africa after colonizing Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 
1881. 
 
Arabic 
Classical Arabic is the sacred language which derives its power and authority 
from God. In addition, Classical Arabic is highly esteemed although it is not spoken 
anywhere in all the 23 Arab countries. Classical Arabic together with Hebrew and 
Latin, are referred to by Anderson (1983) as classical truth languages. Classical 
Arabic, empowered by the existence of a great literary heritage, has a special status 
in Morocco and as a high variety in a diglossic situation, according to Ferguson 
(1959), cannot devolve into an everyday vernacular. Its usage is mainly restricted 
to high functions like religious sermons, literature, and academic writings. Modern 
Standard Arabic (MSA) as a simplified variety derived from Classical Arabic was 
designed to serve mostly in administrations and in the media in addition to its being 
the first language that pupils learn in their first year of primary education. Talking 
about this diglossic situation, Ferguson (1959) says, 
 
DIGLOSSIA is a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition 
to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or 
regional standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often 
grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large 
and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in 
another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education 
and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by 
any sector of the community for ordinary conversation. (p. 325) 
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Traditionally, both Classical Arabic and MSA are considered to be the languages 
of prestige in Morocco. However, nowadays, it seems that French and English are 
considered high prestige languages in Morocco.  
 
Mother Tongues and Language Attitudes 
Unlike Classical Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic, Moroccan Arabic or 
Darija is the native language and the mother tongue of the majority of the populace. 
It is the non-standardized spoken form of Arabic. According to the latest census in 
2014 from the High Commission for planning, more than 89.42% of Moroccans 
communicate in Moroccan Arabic. Moroccan Arabic dialect or Darija is gaining 
ground and is being used nowadays in the media and in everyday business 
transactions. Previous research, however, (Boukous, 1995; Bullock, 2014; 
Ferguson, 1959) has shown that Moroccans hold negative attitudes towards their 
mother tongues (Darija and Tamazight) because of the low status that these 
languages have in the linguistic market. In recent research on a subset of the 
Moroccan population, Et-tahiri (2019) investigated the attitudes of Moroccan 
university students towards the various varieties which shape the linguistic market, 
and the 520 respondents who participated in this research also confirmed this claim. 
The study was carried out in Casablanca (Morocco) and the respondents included a 
sample of university students from two faculties (Ben Msik Faculty of Art and Ben 
Msik Faculty of Science); both faculties belong to the Hassan II university. On a 
five-point Likert scale (Not at all important (1)-Very important (5)), the following 
table shows the low share that Tamazight and Darija (6.4% and 19.9%) occupy 
compared to French (33.1%), Standard Arabic (46.1%), and English (74.5%). 
 
Table 1 
Attitudes of Moroccan university students towards languages in Morocco.  
 
Language Not at all 
important 
Not 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important 
Tamazight 20.9%  18.7%  39.3%  14.7% 6.4%  
Arabic 
(Fusha) 
0.6%  0.9%  10.7%  23.6% 64.1%  
French 3.7%  6.4%  22.1%  34.7% 33.1%  
Spanish 14.4%  20.9%  39%  18.1% 7.7%  
Darija 6.7%  14.7%  30.4%  28.2% 19.9%  
English 0.6%  0.3%  6.4%  18.1%  74.5%  
Source: Et-tahiri (2019, p. 70).  
 
Et-tahiri’s (2019) findings support previous research on language stratification 
in Morocco. Chakrani (2010), for example, uses a Language Attitudes 
Questionnaire to research how language attitudes affect linguistic stratification and 
practices among Moroccan youth. The study examined H (High) codes (Standard 
Arabic and French) and an L (Low) code (Moroccan Arabic) using different focus 
group participants. This analysis of covert attitudes shows that these languages are 
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not uniformly distributed along the poles of status and identity but rather are 
competing for both (Chakrani, 2010, p. ii). 
When describing a similar linguistic situation in Egypt, Haeri (2003) noticed 
during her stay in Egypt that the Egyptians speak a language they do not respect 
and respect a language they do not speak referring, of course, to Classical Arabic 
(pp. x-xi). Here, Haeri (2003)’s observation can be cautiously generalized to most 
if not to all the other Arab countries where the modern dialects are regarded as 
“deviant” varieties of Classical or Standard Arabic (Alajmi, 2014; Alghamdi & 
Petraki, 2018), or, as Bentahila and Stevens (1985) put it, “corrupt languages” (p. 
34). 
Tamazight 
Imazighen are the indigenous population of Morocco. According to El Kirat 
(2008) they are “the oldest known inhabitants of Morocco and their language is the 
most ancient language in the Maghreb” (p. 126). Although there are many 
hypotheses about the origin of the Amazigh language, its origin has not been clearly 
traced because of the lack or the absence of a written literature. The Imazighen 
speak three main dialects: Tamazight is spoken in the Middle Atlas Mountains; 
Tarifit in the Rif Mountains; and Tashelhit in the Anti-Atlas Souss Mountains. 
These three dialects are generally mutually incomprehensible and differ noticeably 
especially in their lexicon and their phonetic inventory.  
Scholars, government officials, and associations and NGOs do not agree on the 
exact number of Imazighen in Morocco; for example, Boukous (1995) and Zouhir 
(2008) estimate the number of native Tamazight speakers in Morocco to range from 
40% to 45% of the population. In this respect, Brett and Fentress (1997) in their 
book The Berbers state that it is difficult to estimate the numbers of Imazighen in 
North Africa because they say that it all depends on who is counting and who is 
counted (p. 5). El Kirat (2008) explains that “it is hard to give any exact estimation 
of the number and percentage of the Imazighen in Morocco, especially in the urban 
centers, for no census has ever taken this variable into consideration” (p. 127).  
Ever since the independence of Morocco and after officializing Arabic in the 
constitution, Imazighen felt marginalized and they started a campaign to gain 
recognition of their culture and of their language. In fact, the Amazigh activists 
crowned their nearly five-decade struggle by having their language proclaimed as 
an official language next to Arabic in the 2011 amended constitution. Prior to the 
constitutionalization of their language, they managed through the Royal Institute 
for the Amazigh Culture (generally abbreviated in French as IRCAM, Institut Royal 
de la Culture Amazighe), established in 2001, to introduce the teaching of 
Tamazight in the primary school education. There was a problem as to which script 
to use in standardizing it but it was eventually agreed on using Tifinagh 
(an abjad script used to write the Tamazight languages). In September 2003, 
teaching started in 300 schools in view of gradually generalizing it to all primary 
schools in Morocco by 2010. Currently, Amazigh activists are asking the 
government and the parliament to enact further laws for the implementation of their 
language. 
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French 
Although French has no legal status in Morocco and is considered one among 
many other foreign languages, it remains the most dominant language on the 
Moroccan linguistic landscape as it is used extensively in many vital sectors such 
as the administration, education, business, and the media, even in post-independent 
Morocco. Up to now, most of the administrative paperwork be it in the public or the 
private sector, is still written in French. No doubt, its presence in the public space 
reflects the economic and political power that it used to enjoy during the 
protectorate period. The only government domain where French is not used is the 
judicial system.  
The maintenance of the French status in Morocco was prepared long ago during 
the protectorate when the French colonizer thought of creating Moroccan elites who 
would take over after them. These elites, some of whom were from the poor 
indigenous population, were made to believe that the French culture and language 
are the symbols of modernity and the vehicle of science as opposed to Arabic that 
was portrayed as only serving religious and traditional purposes. Many elites were 
bilingual in both French and Arabic and had high hopes of ushering in post 
independent Morocco. El Kirat (2008) claims that French “plays an important role 
in the socio-economic and educational fields because it is highly valued (generally 
associated with the upper class, i.e. the rich and educated people). Until now, it is 
the most prestigious language, for it represents the language of the opening on the 
modern world” (p. 124). 
 
English 
The first prolonged contact with the English language in Morocco was in the 
Second World War when American military bases settled in Tangiers and Kenitra. 
It was taught simply to facilitate the translation from French into English and from 
English into French. After the independence of Morocco, English was taught 
together with Spanish and German as optional foreign languages in high schools. 
Despite the great dominance of French, the English language has managed to 
impose itself especially with the socio-economic challenges brought by 
globalization in the last two decades.  
According to El Kirat (2008), “unlike French and Spanish, which are a symbol 
of political and cultural dependence, English has no colonial connotations [in 
Morocco]. Negative attitude towards French increases the positive attitude towards 
and popularity of English” (p. 125). In the field of education, currently, English is 
taught starting from the last year of the middle school in public education system 
until graduation from high school. Although students are introduced to English in 
secondary schools, some educators have recommended English be introduced in 
primary schools. It is assumed that the early introduction of English in primary 
schools will help students learn English at an early age and consequently, they are 
likely to be even more competitive when they embark on the labor market. 
 
Spanish 
The Spanish language is spoken by less than 6% of Moroccans, mostly in the 
northern regions and certain regions in the south. The presence of the Spanish 
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language dates back to 16th century when the Moriscos were expelled from Spain. 
Many factors have helped in maintaining the presence of Spanish such as the 
geographic proximity and the Spanish colonization of the north of Morocco. After 
the political independence of Morocco, Spanish was taught as a second language in 
the northern part of the Morocco and as an "optional" foreign language in the rest 
of the country. The language lost its official status as the administrative and 
educational language in the North and has been replaced by French (El Kirat, 2008). 
However, recently, “more and more Moroccans choose to continue their studies in 
Spain because of its proximity to Morocco and also because of the cost of living” 
(p. 124).  
 
The Language Debate and the Educational Language Policies 
Morocco has experienced many language policies starting from the eve of 
independence. To establish a linguistic and cultural unification, and to distance 
itself from the colonial past, Morocco's first national educational project, decided 
to opt for Arabization and to adopt the Arabic language as an official language of 
instruction. Grandguillaume (1983) sates that “. . . [Its] ultimate goal was to advance 
the Arabic language as the official and national language” (p. 153). There were 
many problems with this improvised policy because of the lack of a clear vision. 
For example, there was a significant shortage of teachers and administrative staff 
and the state had to recruit teachers from many Arab countries especially from the 
Middle East to make up for this deficiency. This shortage was mainly due to the 
fact that all the Moroccan administrators and teachers were educated in French only. 
In addition, Morocco as a newly politically independent country was still 
economically, socially and culturally dependent on France. 
In addition, the policy of Arabization has kept gaining ground and by the year 
1980, the Arabization of the primary and the secondary education was complete. 
However, the university level has never been Arabized for three main reasons 
which, according to Ennaji (2005) are as follows: (1) the language of references or 
textbooks in the university is either French or English; (2) the lack of teachers and 
professionals who master the Arabic language; and (3) the inevitable need of French 
in the socio-economic environment (p. 106). There has also been a long-standing 
bias against Arabic as a language of higher learning in the West where many 
Morocco professors were trained. 
The varying levels of prestige, economic value, and language roles within the 
same nation lead to “tension” especially between Arabic speakers and Tamazight 
speakers. This tension reflects the prioritization of the Standard/Classical Arabic as 
a national language over Tamazight and Moroccan Arabic as “low” languages with 
no religious or economic sway. In this context, Ait Dada (2011) argues that 
Moroccan Arabic is seen as a “corrupt and incorrect form of Arabic, which is 
associated with poverty and downgrade and therefore considered to be inferior to 
Classical Arabic for it is neither codified nor standardized” (p. 19).  
According to Ibn El-Farouk (2002), Morocco is experiencing a linguistic 
crisis which is not visible but persists and worsens despite the measures taken by 
the state. The language debates which have been going on for many years in the 
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hope of achieving a balanced linguistic market and a clear language policy have 
reduced the linguistic varieties in question to merely weapons of struggles among 
politicians. In fact, such “politicization and ideologization of languages made it next 
to impossible to craft a coherent policy” (Chahhou, 2014, p. 138). The damages of 
the shifting language policies which have been implemented for the last four 
decades did not yield any benefits for people in general and for the pupils and 
students in particular. Rather, they have resulted in a “chaotic” unhealthy 
educational system (Cheddadi, 2011, pp. 56-57) and may lead to a kind of 
sociolinguistic inter-ethnical conflicts (Ait Dada, 2011, p.19).  
For example, after decreeing Tamazight as an official language in the 
constitution, the linguistic situation has been even more “complicated” as 
“unexpected” issues (pertinent to the educational landscape) have cropped up, 
including the lack of trained teachers and supervisors and the precariousness of the 
teaching conditions, among other things (El Kirat, 2008). The empowered Amazigh 
activists vehemently asked the two chambers of parliament to pass the laws which 
would help in implementing their language(s) in all walks of life. However, as noted 
previously, the main obstacle to this process concerned which of the three Amazigh 
varieties (Tashelhit, Tarifit, or Tmazight) to implement. 
Scholars such as Fihri (2013) and Al-Wadghiri (2000) believe that the 
failure of the educational system is due to the policy choices that have been 
motivated by political considerations rather than the real needs of the majority of 
Moroccans. Nowadays, many voices of political leaders, academicians and 
intellectuals are defending Arabic against the campaigns of colloquialism, 
francophonization and Amazighation (Laroui, 2014). They claim that despite the 
negative stereotypes that have been established against the failure of Arabic, it is 
still the most qualified language in the country to respond to the urgent needs of 
education, identity, modernity and science. Fihri (2013) asserts that among the 
factors that should be considered while upgrading the level of Arabic and opting for 
the Arabization policy is the increasingly growing number of its speakers all across 
the world in addition to its dramatic digital presence on the internet. The number of 
internauts (users of the internet) using Arabic has moved from 2.5 million to more 
than 70 million between the years 2001 and 2011.  
 
Darija and Education 
Another controversial issue which is the subject of heated debate is Darija. 
Activists such as Nourddine Ayyouch, in a televised program in 2014, and scholars 
like Loutfi (2017) and Slaoui (2014) have persuasively advocated the use of the 
Moroccan Arabic or colloquial Arabic as a language of instruction. They argue that 
since more than 89% of Moroccans communicate using Moroccan Arabic and since 
it is the main mother tongue, why shouldn't it be promoted, implemented, and 
included in educational reform plans? They also defended their claim by referring 
to the UNESCO's (2008) recommendations, which suggest that children who begin 
their schooling with their mother tongue continue to perform better than children 
who have to acquire another language when they enter school (Ball, 2010). In 
addition, UNESCO considers the use of mother tongue in teaching to be a human 
right and claims that the teaching in the mother tongue helps in reducing the number 
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of school dropouts (Bender & Dutcher et al., 2005). In September 2018, there was 
a big social outcry when the ministry of education agreed to release some primary 
school Arabic textbooks which included, for the first time in the history of 
schooling, some Moroccan images with some colloquial words. In the following 
photo from one textbook (designed for primary school students of the second level), 
the three Darija words underneath the Moroccan pancakes and cookies exemplify 
this:  
 
 
Figure 1. The inclusion of words from Moroccan Arabic (My Guide to the Arabic 
Language textbook, p. 9). 
 
Many Moroccan parents criticized and condemned the inclusion of colloquial 
words in school textbooks designed for primary schools. They regard colloquial or 
Moroccan Arabic as a corrupted and incorrect variety of Arabic which is loaded 
with many loan words and borrowings from Spanish and French and a lot of 
grammatical and syntactic structures from Tamazight. This is why they could not 
hear of it being used neither as a subject nor as a language of instruction. Instantly, 
the government, through the head of the government and the minister of education, 
strongly reacted to this blunder. They claimed that this issue is closed for good and 
nobody can violate the clauses of the constitution, which decreed and officialized 
MSA not Colloquial Darija. Kasraoui (2018) states that “El Othmani [the Head of 
the government] thanked citizens for their strong stance against the use of Darija in 
education” adding that “their stance supported the position of the government” 
(parag. 4). Conversely, the Ministry of National Education defended the inclusion 
of Darija words as progress towards cultural relevance in the curriculum as cultural 
products specific to the region with no equivalents in MSA. 
Decreeing Tamazight in the constitution and becoming a second official 
language equal to Arabic shifted the linguistic debate in Morocco because shortly 
after the Amazigh activists wanted to have their language incorporated in all 
domains of life such as the court, the administration, road signs, and public spaces 
in general. They asked to have their language leveled up to junior and high schools 
after launching it in primary education in 2003. The Amazigh activists (Assid, 2019; 
Errihani, 2006) even asked to have their language implemented as a language of 
instruction for all school subjects. For many Amazigh activists and intellectuals, the 
officialization of the Amazigh language was not enough as, 
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in many cases, the underlying goal of several language policies is 
simply symbolic: the goal of recognising a minority language or 
instituting it as a national language could be sometimes seen as 
nothing more than a symbolic act often seen as politically 
necessary. (Errihani, 2006, p. 145) 
 
Whether politically motivated or not, the teaching of Tamazight in primary school 
education was hampered with different constraints including: the lack of qualified 
teachers, the difficulty of making the pupils get acquainted with the new script 
Tifinagh, the unavailability of textbooks, the teaching of a standard variety which 
was not comprehensible to speakers of the main varieties of Tamazight, and last but 
not least, the negative attitudes that most non Amazigh pupils and their families 
have towards the teaching of Tamazight.  
An Amazigh is likely be motivated to learn a language which might be useful 
in his personal, social, and professional life; however, it is not surprising to see non-
Amazigh speakers questioning why Tamazight should be imposed on them. In one 
of my seminars, I asked a student who is Amazigh but does not speak Tamazight 
about whether he is looking forward to learning Tamazight. Surprisingly, he said, 
“Why should I learn a language which would only help me one day if ever I traveled 
to see one of my remaining relatives in my parents’ village in the Souss region? I 
would rather learn a foreign useful language instead” (personal interview that took 
place in February, 2018).  
In addition, research (Errihani, 2006; Soulaimani, 2015) has shown that the 
pupils who were subjected to this new experience, learning Tamazight, did not in 
any way learn Tamazight but rather they spent all of the three-hour-a-week sessions 
getting acquainted with a third somehow hard script, Tifinagh, which was added to 
the Arabic and Latin scripts at an early stage in their schooling. Also, the Tamazight 
teachers themselves were not familiar with the Tifinagh script in which they had 
only a three-week period training during 2003.  
 
French and Education 
The main debate which has been around for so many years concerns the strong 
linguistic presence of French in all the educational policies. All the policies have 
reinforced French either as a subject or as a language of instruction in public schools 
depending on the politicians who championed the policy. Currently, Moroccan 
pupils get introduced to French in their second year of public schooling and 
continue learning it until they graduate from high school. This means that students 
learn French as a subject for 11 years before they join the university. The paradox 
here is that after all this period of teaching, a considerable number of students, 
according to the 2009 report released by the Conseil Supérieur de l'Éducation, de 
la Formation et de la Recherche (2009), finish their high school with a very low 
level in French which does not even enable them to communicate let alone to pursue 
their higher studies in sciences, economics, and medicine at public institutions 
where all the teaching is carried out in French (p. 31).  
There are many issues to highlight here concerning this big failure. First, there 
must be a serious problem with the teaching methodologies when after exposing 
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students to a language for 11 school years for a minimum of at least four hours a 
week, students are still unable to communicate even at a basic level. Second, 
Moroccan pupils, students, and people in general have changed their attitudes 
towards French from that strong language of power and prestige to an inferior 
language which is losing ground in most of the ex-colonies and even in France itself 
(See Table 1). Also, the French government, in the person of the French prime 
minister himself acknowledged for the first time ever that English is the language 
of the future. On the 23rd of February, 2018, Edouard Philippe said, “Bien 
maîtriser l’anglais, c’est mieux maîtriser son avenir : chaque étudiant, à la fin 
de son lycée et au plus tard en fin de licence, aura passé un test de type TOEIC, 
Cambridge, IELTS, financé par l’État” (Fjarraud, 2018, parag. 2). This means in 
English that “Mastering English well is better for securing and controlling your 
future. Every student at the end of their high school or at the latest at the end of their 
bachelor’s degree will have reached a high score in one of the English international 
tests like IELTS, TOEFL, or TOEIC, funded by the state.”  
In another address to the students in a press conference in EDHEC Business 
school, Edouard Philippe said, “that English is the lingua Franca. That’s how it is. 
You have to speak English if you want to act and move in globalisation” (cited in 
Kasraoui, 2018). This clearly shows that French is losing ground in France itself 
and is no longer a language of academic research, modernity, and openness to the 
world. Likewise, French is no longer regarded as the language of the future in 
Morocco and even the Moroccan Francophile elites have woken up to this fact and 
started sending their children to English or American schools which are booming 
in Morocco. 
 
English and Education 
The above discussion leads us to another point which has been very 
controversial in language debate recently and which concerns the status of English 
in the Moroccan educational policies. English is considered to be the second foreign 
language in Morocco and as I mentioned earlier, it has been taught as a school 
subject for many years in high schools. The popularity of English at the high school 
level,  
 
leads to a wider spread at the university level: largest number of registered 
students [reside] in the departments of English throughout the country. In 
the early 1970s, there were only two departments of English in Morocco 
(Rabat and Fez). There are more than 17 departments of English 
throughout Morocco. (El Kirat, 2008, p. 125)  
 
In some English departments the enrollments of first-year students outnumber all 
the other departments despite the first shortlisting and subsequent placement 
interviews that are administered. It is worth mentioning here that the students we 
receive at the Ben Msik Faculty of Letters, Casablanca English department are 
exposed to English for a maximum period of four years, but what is striking is that 
during the interviews, we find that these students are more proficient in English 
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than in French, which they had studied for 11 years. Twenty or 30 years ago, this 
was not the case. We used to receive only literary or humanities students; however, 
for the last 15 years the number of science students has grown significantly higher.  
Currently, in the department where I teach (Ben Msik Faculty of Letters, 
Casablanca), 68% of our students are science students. Of course, this has made us 
question this issue and ask about the reasons which push the students to choose to 
learn English instead of pursuing science. The main reasons why most of those 
students prefer not to join the sciences schools are first because of their weak level 
in French, which is the language of instruction and second because they claim to 
have been impressed by the teaching of English in high schools and thus prefer to 
study further at university. According to Buckner (2011), 
 
English is becoming a new means for socio-economic competition in 
Morocco, by appealing to upper and lower class alike. Upper class view 
English as a way to maintain their privilege as Morocco opens itself to the 
global economy. In contrast, many lower-class Moroccans, who are weak 
in French, see English as a means to access public sector teaching 
positions, a traditional channel of mobility, or to sidestep the power of 
French entirely and engage directly with the global economy on their own 
terms as low-paid labour in Morocco’s tourist industry and informal 
economy. (p. 21) 
 
Although English has been developing in Morocco over the last two decades, 
Morocco remains to be an exception to other countries because of its heavy 
multilingualism heritage of its past. Arabic, Amazigh, French, and Spanish have 
been strongly implanted in the country’s way of communicating, thus creating 
major challenges in language policy and instruction. As noted earlier, because 
English does not have a colonial legacy in the country, it is seen, especially among 
younger students, as the language of modernity and future market-led opportunities. 
While Moroccans feel very strongly about their national identity, they do not 
perceive of English as a threat to it at all. Moroccan students who are strongly 
motivated to learn English view it as a popular language, promising opportunities 
and social mobility for all classes. El Kirat (2008) sums up the current status of 
English in Morocco by emphasizing that,  
 
Moroccans, in general, have a positive attitude towards English. The 
Moroccan government policy is extremely influential in encouraging the 
spread of English. Moroccan policy makers realized that international 
communication between Morocco and the rest of the world could not be 
achieved via French alone. English is the key to communication. Its status 
is not connected to political considerations or to ties with Great Britain or 
the USA. It is not viewed as a sign of colonialism or attachment to another 
nation as it is the case with French. (p. 126) 
 
The issues which I have covered throughout this article in relation to the 
language debate(s) confirm that the chronology of the educational policies which 
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have been successively implemented ever since political independence have been 
tremendously unsuccessful (El Kaidi, 2018). Their failure is clearly manifested in 
the low quality of the learning output which lags behind the desired outcomes. This 
failing language policy and instruction has somehow contributed to a real linguistic 
conflict between the two official languages that make up the national identity and 
the first foreign but dominant language French.  
Further evidence of this can be seen in the improved National Charter for 
Education and Training (NCET) which came into being in the year 2000 and 
appeared very promising to many educationalists that saw it as an improvement on 
the past deficiencies of the previous reforms. However, nine years later, all the 
hopes were dashed when many signs of its failure came out, resulting in a 
subsequent emergency education reform plan for which a huge budget was devoted 
but to no avail. In 2015, the NCET was substituted with the 2015-2030 Strategic 
Vision (SV) of reform, a reform which was grounded on the recommendations of 
the Supreme Council for Education and Training.  
For the sake of this paper, I will examine only the clauses that deal with the 
teaching of languages as subjects and the choice of the language(s) of instruction. 
It stipulates that children will be exposed to Arabic and French in the two years of 
preschooling (the third or fourth year) with a particular emphasis on oral 
communication. In the primary school, the two official languages Arabic and 
Tamazight are compulsory throughout the level. French is also taught as a subject 
in all the levels. At the fourth year of the primary school, English will be introduced 
and taught as the second foreign language. Concerning the middle school and the 
high school, the same languages will be maintained with a special focus on both 
French and English (being taught only as foreign languages and not as a language 
of instruction for other subjects). At the high school level, in addition to the 
aforementioned languages in the three previous levels, another third optional 
foreign language will be introduced and this language will be Spanish. In this 
strategic vision, it is clearly mentioned that Arabic is the only language of 
instruction throughout the three cycles of schooling. The SV aims at achieving three 
fundamentals. The first is to achieve equity and to insure equal chances in the 
learning of languages. The second is to standardize the presence of the two national 
and official languages with their constitutional and social status. The third 
fundamental is to establish a progressive and balanced multilingualism.  
Now after nearly three years since this strategic vision has been implemented, 
there are still many constraints which obstruct the incorporation of all its clauses. 
Last month, the language of teaching scientific disciplines came to the surface again 
as some members of the parliament started questioning the fact that Arabic will not 
serve this function appropriately since it is not a scientific language according to 
them. What is surprising is that the traditional political parties belonging to the 
majority do not themselves agree on this. Some political parties suggest either to go 
back to French or to use English instead. What is certain is that the fervent defenders 
of the Francophonie will struggle again to impose French because they are finding 
it harder to take a backseat and watch English become the first foreign language in 
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Morocco and the lingua franca of the world, in addition to seeing Arabic gain more 
ground and strength in Morocco.  
 
Recommendations 
This last section is intended to highlight the implications that can be drawn 
from the various issues the paper has raised. The implications range over 
theoretical, methodological, and socio-political areas.  
The diachronic aspect is crucial for the understanding of the current linguistic 
situation is Morocco. This means that any linguistic description remains incomplete 
in the absence of a deep, coherent, and reliable understanding of the historical issues 
that have given rise to the current linguistic situation in Morocco and its interplay 
with the future of education. This diachronic outlook is likely to help researchers 
gain understanding of the language policy during the French protectorate and its 
impact on the current situation that the French language enjoys in present-day 
Morocco. 
Multidisciplinarity is another prerequisite for examining the current linguist 
situation and the future of education in Morocco. Multidisciplinarity guarantees a 
reliable, fair, and non-discriminatory perspective on the investigated issue. In this 
very context, it seems that the incorporation of sociolinguistics, the sociology of 
education, and the socio-historical awareness seem to be inescapable to the study 
of multilingualism in Morocco.  
For policy makers, crafting a coherent policy should be free from any 
politicization or ideologization of the issue. Ideological attitudes eclipse the right to 
linguistic diversity and legitimizes the suppression of certain languages deemed to 
be corrupted or inaccurate (e.g., Darija). Language policies should provide an even 
playing field for the different national languages in Morocco. Moroccan Arabic or 
Darija and Tamazight are the native languages and the mother tongues of the 
majority of the populace. 
The attitude of policy makers and intellectuals should be directed towards the 
potential that these languages hold for the improvement of the quality of education 
especially at the elementary levels. Research findings clearly show that learners 
benefit from using their native language in education in early grade years. 
Concerning the officialization of Tamazight, as El Kirat (2008) correctly argues 
“the state would be compelled to promote its usage and to accept it as a legitimate 
language for all social activities, including the formal settings” (p. 125). 
Research should be directed towards exploring the systematic properties of 
Moroccan Arabic. These properties can help place Darija on solid academic 
footings compared to well-studied languages such as Classical Arabic and French. 
In addition, mass media should work towards valuing the status and role of 
Moroccan Arabic, especially towards helping Moroccans reconsider the negative 
attitudes held towards their mother tongues.  
Situated within its socio-political and socio-historical context, it seems that the 
officialization of the Amazigh language is far from achieving its desired result as a 
“real” socio-political outlet. Therefore, decreeing Tamazight in the constitution and 
becoming a second official language should be coupled with the political will to 
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provide the necessary support to this long-repressed national language on concrete 
footings (e.g., revising textbooks, training teachers, etc.). 
Finally, the status and role of English in the Moroccan educational policies 
should also be revitalized in light of its current national and international 
socioeconomic role, compared to French. English should be introduced as a medium 
of instruction at least for the teaching of science.  
Recent educational reforms in Morocco (NCET, the Emergency Plan, and SV) 
have embraced the principles of linguistic openness, calling for the establishment 
of a progressive and balanced multilingualism. However, more concrete and 
realistic steps should be taken by the government policy makers towards ensuring 
that national and international languages are enjoying the same socioeconomic 
privileges and support as French.  
 
Conclusion 
El Kirat (2008) argues that “strong sentimental attachments to a language are 
not always accompanied by language use, nor by a desire to actively promote it. But 
only people and communities can keep a language alive” (p. 128). I would like to 
conclude by questioning whether the multilingual situation in Morocco has ever 
been taken as the starting point for educational policy makers. There are many 
pragmatic recommendations and solutions which have been suggested in academic 
symposia, conferences, and research studies in this regard, but unfortunately, these 
proceedings and publications have been mostly ignored, stored, and shelved in 
libraries. Hopefully, this article will find more attentive and receptive audiences 
interested in supporting Morocco’s multilingualism. 
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Moroccan Society’s Educational and Cultural 
Losses during the Years of Lead (1956-1999) 
Brahim El Guabli 
Abstract 
In this article, I argue that political repression during the Moroccan Years 
of Lead (1956-1999) engendered myriad losses in the fields of education 
and culture. However, the scholarly focus on the embodied effects of state 
violence on former prisoners and forcibly disappeared individuals has 
overlooked the intangible damages both education and culture sustained 
during this period. In investigating the imbrication of political 
conservatism, educational reform and censorship, the article opens a more 
critical space for the conceptualization of the broader implications of the 
Years of Lead for education and culture. Drawing on several primary 
sources in Arabic and French, including documents of the Moroccan 
Student Union (UNEM), Lamalif issues, and ERC’s final report, I examine 
how educational and cultural loss was constitutive of the experience of 
Years of Lead. Combining close readings with historical analysis, this 
article is an invitation to broaden the scope of scholarly investigation of 
the multilayered ramifications of statal political violence on socio-
economic and cultural fields in Morocco.  
 
Keywords: Years of Lead, culture, education, loss, potential, 
retraditionalization, authoritarianism, Lamalif, Souffles/Anfas 
 
 
We don’t know yet the extent to which repression impacted the production 
and creativity of academics, music, theater, cinema, visual arts, literature, 
[and] the press, both written and audiovisual (Fakihani, 2005, p.163). 
 
 
The Moroccan “Years of Lead” (1956-1999), also known as sanawāt al-jamr 
wal-raṣāṣaṣ, al-sanawāt al-sawdā’, les années de plomb, les années de la braise, 
and les années noires were decades of multilayered losses due to state violence. 
Describing the decades between Morocco’s independence in 1956 and the passing 
of King Hassan II in 1999, the Years of Lead were half a century of systematic 
violence against dissidents in the midst of the power struggle that pitted the 
monarchy against its opposition (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006a, pp. 51-53). Although much 
work has focused on the embodied violence victims experienced during this period 
(Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006a, pp. 51-117), less tangible losses the state inflicted on 
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Moroccan society during the Years of Lead have yet to be examined in theoretical 
terms. For example, there was loss of socioeconomic and cultural potential due to 
the isolation imposed on the regions that housed former detention centers (Hay’at 
al-inṣāf, 2006b, pp. 37-38). Additionally, not only did the Years of Lead leave their 
scars on their direct victims, but they also exacerbated the fear of institutions and 
undermined the democratic, economic, and artistic prospects of Moroccan society 
(Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, pp. 68-72; Fakihani, 2005, p. 163). Since preventing a 
people from achieving their full potential in any field is a form of loss, this article 
aims to reveal the processes that led to the intangible and difficult-to-quantify losses 
that authoritarianism inflicted on Moroccans through the examination of the impact 
the Years of Lead had on education and culture.  
I argue that education and culture were areas in which the Years of Lead had a 
significant, albeit understudied, damage. In this regard, Rachid Benmokhtar, a 
former minister of education, has declared that “[t]he opposition between the 
monarchy on the one hand and the political parties on the other hand made Morocco 
lose forty years of development.” (Akalay, 2017, para. 10). According to 
Belmokhtar, “[i]nstead of taking care of development, much time was spent on 
power struggles.” (Akalay, 2017, para. 10). The striking absence of academic 
studies that ground their analysis of the present state of Moroccan education and 
culture in the repressive Years of Lead requires that I craft this analysis based on 
written sources. Consequently, I draw on original documents of Union Nationale 
des Etudiants du Maroc (National Union of Moroccan Students, UNEM) collected 
by Claude Palazzoli in his book Le Maroc politique (1974), some issues of the 
monthly journal Lamalif, and the Equity and Reconciliation Commission’s (ERC) 
final report to theorize how political retraditionalization, cultural attrition, and 
educational losses are interconnected during the Moroccan Years of Lead. In 
investigating loss in education and culture as a fundamental aspect of this violent 
period in Moroccan history, this article paves the path toward a broader scholarly 
engagement with the intangible effects of authoritarianism. The article also provides 
a retrospective understanding of the chronic ills that continue to haunt Moroccan 
educational and cultural fields today.  
 
Retraditionalization of Education during the Years of Lead 
Education and culture were ideal candidates for political repression during the 
formative years following Morocco’s post-independence in 1956. Clifford Geertz 
(1973) has defined culture as a “system of inherited conceptions expressed in 
symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their 
knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (p. 89). In Morocco’s post-
independence context in which both the monarchy and the nationalist movement 
were negotiating the configuration of power, both contenders understood that 
monopolizing educational and cultural outlets was key to establish control over 
society and the political system that would define the new nation-state. In fact, even 
before Morocco’s independence, Moroccan nationalist leaders made access to a 
modern education a crucial stepping-stone toward liberation (El Ayadi, 2009, p. 
199; Monjib, 2013, p. 7). In the post-colonial period, however, education and 
culture were one of the terrains in which the conflict between the monarchy and its 
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opposition played out. This very fact turned education into a battlefield in which 
were fought out political disagreements over the future of Morocco. Culture and 
education were corner stones of the monarchy’s strategy to retraditionalize the 
political system by reviving pre-colonial mechanisms of authority despite the 
opposition of the progressives who advocated the establishment of a democratic 
state. However, the victory of retraditionalization by the enthronement of Hassan II 
in 1961 dealt, as an academic would later write, a strong blow to the “modernist 
flow in Moroccan culture,” which “was subjected to a real operation of political 
abortion whose harbingers appeared in the aftermath of March 23 [1965] 
[education-related] events in Casablanca” (al-Naḥḥāl, 2013, para. 5). Noureddine 
Afaya, the philosopher who made this statement, has thus attributed Morocco’s 
failed modernity to repression in the fields of culture and education.  
The strive to quell dissidence in 1960s and 1970s shaped the Moroccan state’s 
attitude vis-à-vis education. In a much-referred-to interview with Jean Daniel, the 
director of the French newspaper Le Nouvel Observateur, King Hassan II was 
reported to have connected education to dissidence. In Hassan II’s opinion, 
educated Moroccan youth either turned to Marxism or joined the ranks of the 
opposition (El Kaidi, 2018, para. 7). This royal skepticism vis-à-vis education was 
translated into an active endeavor “to convince the ruling class that the 
massification of education represented a mortal threat to the socio-economic 
equilibrium and the worldview on which the regime is [sic] founded” (Monjib, 
2013, p. 7). Also, this desire to halt universal education in the 1960s coincided with 
the firing of Abdallah Ibrahim’s government, which undertook fundamental socio-
economic reforms in all fields and strove to preserve the autonomy of the prime 
minister’s office (Daoud, 2019, pp. 159-160; Kably, 2011, pp. 660-661). UNEM, 
which was created to represent all Moroccan students in 1956, blamed the 
recantation of the “generalization, unification, Arabization, and Moroccanization of 
cadres” on the royal decision to sack Ibrahim’s government to prevent 
modernization (Palazzoli, 1974, pp. 422-423). Even the ERC has recorded a 
historian’s assessment of the Years of Lead as “a transitional period during which 
the educational system [witnessed] the assassination of critical thinking and the 
replacement of the younger generations’ learning of love of the homeland and its 
territory […] with a superficial education that relied on an artificial history” (Hay’at 
al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 72). The assumption underlying this statement is that critical 
thinking bred dissidence and “real” history infused people with a spirit of resistance, 
both of which were not encouraged during this period. 
A progressive school was antithetical to the monarchy’s retraditionalizing 
project. Morocco’s independence created a clash of visions of the nascent nation-
state between a traditionalist camp that rallied behind the monarchy and a more 
progressive camp that wanted to establish a democratic polity (Kably, 2011, p. 658, 
661). While the monarchy was surrounded by former French Protectorate 
administrators, caïds, rural notables, and officers, the progressive camp brought 
together different factions on the left of Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl (Independence Party) as 
well as members of the newly formed Armée de libération nationale (National 
Liberation Army). The two principles that cemented this camp together was the 
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establishment of a constitutional monarchy in which the king reigned without ruling 
and continuing the struggle for the complete liberation of all Moroccan territories 
(Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006b, p. 51; Kably, 2011, pp. 655-656). Retraditionalization 
resulted in royal absolutism, which ended 44 years of colonial modernity by 1960. 
Reflecting on retraditionalization, Laroui (2005) underlined the fact that instead of 
the anticipated modernity, the monarchy “erased [the colonial reforms] one after 
the other” (Laroui, 2005, p. 23). Concepts, such as bay‘a (allegiance) were 
reinvented and constitutionalized to further legitimize the royal power (Hammoudi, 
1997, p. 13). Moreover, political retraditionalization was accompanied by a return 
of annual religious festivals to entrench the “dynastic, territorial and cultural” 
continuity of the Alawite monarchy despite the Salafis’ protests (Valensi, 1990, p. 
280). Not only that, conservative values as well as mosque education were 
promoted in the media and state institutions (Kably, 2011, p. 665). In both school 
and politics, the triumph of retraditionalization terminated “an experience in which 
a Moroccan humanism could have been born” (Daoud, 2019, p. 174). Therefore, 
conservative politics deprived Morocco of the myriad possibilities that could have 
emerged from “a synthesis between Moroccan traditional, religious culture and 
modernity” (Daoud, 2019, p. 174).  
The revival of religious education undergirded political and societal 
retraditionalization during the Years of Lead (Kably, 2011, p. 665). Mohammed 
Chafik, a pedagogical inspector and former director of the prestigious College 
Royal, where princes and princesses still receive their education, was recruited in 
the context of May 1968 events in France to prepare “a more technical report on the 
pedagogical value of Quranic education that was dispensed in the mosques” (Aït 
Mous & Ksikes, 2014, p. 46). Chafik recommended dismantling the religious 
education system because, in his very unreserved words, “education in the msids 
[mosques] is one of the main causes of our civilization lag” (Aït Mous & Ksikes, 
2014, p. 46). Against Chafik’s conclusion, the king instructed his minister of 
education to generalize this education; a decision that Chafik would later explain 
by the fact that msid education has historically furnished the Moroccan state with 
its best servants because, always in his controversial phrasing, it teaches a “culture 
of submission” (Aït Mous & Ksikes, 2014, p. 47). Chafik’s highly disputable 
statement about Islamic education shows how deep the cleavage was between the 
conservative monarchy and the modernist current in society. Speaking to the 
consequences of this system, Khadija Merouazi, a human rights activist, declared 
that the state’s education strategy “contributed to the creation of the […] submissive 
Moroccan citizen” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2005, para. 13). Princeton-trained sociologist 
Mohamed Guessous also accused the state of using schools to “create generations 
of hyenas” (Guessous, 2016, n.p.). The distrust of education by the authorities was 
reflected in Guessous’s (2016) assertation that “considered school a threat and 
education a tool for the training of agitators” who become “opponents of the 
dominating economic, social and political regime” (para. 3). Guessous’s analysis of 
the demonization of education was twofold: first, he showed that the dominant 
discourse attempted to delegitimize the importance of the modern school; second, 
in using the ḍabu’ or hyena metaphor to describe the new generations of Moroccan 
students, Guessous referred to the fact that school curricula did not teach critical 
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thinking skills. Paradoxically, as Monjib (2013) has revealed, in the midst of the 
generalization of religious education, the royal palace requested the assistance of 
the French embassy to order French first grade curricula for the crown prince (p. 
10). This means that retraditionalization in education was not designed for all 
Moroccan children.  
 
Colonial Precursors: A Protracted Legacy 
The Moroccan state had a model to follow in its revival of religious education 
in parallel to a modern school. Acting as France’s first resident general in Morocco 
between 1912 and 1925, Lyautey bequeathed Moroccans a dual educational system. 
This system included pre-Protectorate, religious schools as well as the modern 
school system that was established in 1912. While the former was accessible to all 
children through mosques and Sufi orders, the latter was only available to the lucky 
few Moroccans who joined the écoles des fils de notables. This colonial educational 
system was governed by multiple discriminatory and intelligence-based 
considerations, which all aimed to educate some Moroccans just enough to serve 
the state without endangering the indigenous way of life (Knibiehler, 1994, p. 490). 
In accordance with Lyautey’s vision to spare Moroccans colonial modernity, he 
instituted a policy that continued to prevent Moroccan students from attending 
French universities until 1930 (Vermeren, 2011, p. 56). Colonial education was also 
hierarchized and organized according to class (poor/notables), location 
(rural/urban), professions (agricultural and industrial schools), religion 
(Jewish/Muslim), and languages (Berber/Arabic) (Chafiqi & Alagui, 2011, pp. 29-
30). By the end of its 44 years of direct rule in Morocco, France’s most impactful 
achievement was the establishment of an elitist system that served a very small 
number of Moroccans (al-Jābiṛī, 1972, p. 18). This same system has been reinvented 
to be the key to the future and a passport to education in engineering, medical, and 
business schools abroad in contemporary North Africa (Vermeren, 2005, para. 5). 
This Lyauteyan model was there for the Moroccan government to guide the 
reforms it undertook in education in the heated political climate of the 1960s. In 
response to students’ increasing political commitment, education was reformed to 
stave off the revolution of the educated generations. Controlling foreign languages 
became central to the state’s strive to prevent political commitment among students. 
For example, Moroccan students in the 1960s acquired solid linguistic skills, 
allowing them to read Marx, Engles, Gramsci, Lenin, and Mao Zedong, when they 
joined the university. This fact turned French into a revolutionary tool that the ruling 
class attempted to withdraw from ordinary Moroccans. Vermeren (2011) has 
written that Hassan II “limit[ed] students’ access to primary school, then secondary 
school, [then] he start[ed] the Arabization, cancel[led] the teaching of ‘subversive’ 
topics (European history, philosophy, sociology), and then put[s] an end to 
educational cooperation [with France]” (p. 57). In this context, depoliticizing the 
youth was Arabization’s main function in the 1960s and 1970s. Although the king, 
at least in in his public statements, was in favor of bilingualism (El Ayadi, 2009, p. 
201), he did not hesitate to Arabize education when the class interests of his 
opponents converged with his conservative politics (El Ayadi, 2009, p. 196). 
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Therefore, there is reason to think, however, that Arabization, albeit a demand of 
Moroccan nationalists, was used to prevent future generations of Moroccan students 
from accessing revolutionary ideas. 
 
Student Protests and Security-Driven Reforms in Education 
UNEM, the national student union, opposed the conservative monarchy and 
became the incubator of the Moroccan student-led revolutionary thought. Although 
Moroccan students played an active role in the construction of Moroccan 
nationalism during the colonial period, their activism after independence was 
mistrusted by the monarchy. A depoliticized organization when it was established 
in 1956 to represent all Moroccan students, UNEM’s first four years were 
uneventful (Palazzoli, 1974, pp. 400-401). However, the student union took a 
radical turn in the aftermath of the split within the Independence Party in 1959 and 
the sacking of Ibrahim’s government in 1960 (Palazzoli, 1974, pp. 400-401). Its 
1963 Azrou Manifest called for “the abolition of the regime [as] condition sine qua 
non to extricat[ing] the country from the open or latent crisis with which it has not 
ceased to wrestle since independence” (Palazzoli, 1974, p. 419). In the face of the 
all-out political repression of political parties and student activism at the peak of the 
Years of Lead, UNEM stressed that its historical responsibility required that 
Moroccan students work toward “overthrowing the current regime and seiz[ing] of 
power by popular, revolutionary, democratic and legitimate organizations that 
represent the people” (Palazzoli, 1974, p. 421). These radical positions of the body 
representing Moroccan students, high school students included, induced security-
driven reforms that aimed to reduce the number of students admitted into the 
educational system.  
These security-driven, rather than pedagogically-oriented, reforms triggered 
the explosion of post-independence frustrations in Casablanca on March 23, 1965. 
Minister of Education Youssef Belabès had proposed a bill in February 1965 to 
institute an age cap on students’ access to high school (Brouksy, 2005, para. 2). By 
proposing to prevent students who were aged 16 or more from passing final middle 
school exams, the minister intended to decrease the number of students in 
increasingly politicized high schools (Daure-Serfaty, 1993, p. 29). Moreover, these 
proposed measures were disadvantageous to working class families at a moment 
when the lucrative jobs left behind by former French employees as well as 
thousands of qualified Moroccan Jews would be available for educated Moroccans 
(Miskīn, 2019, para. 3). As a result of the announcement of this reform, Morocco 
witnessed the first post-independence urban rebellion on March 23, 1965. Instigated 
by UNEM, which became the de facto “spearhead of the opposition” (Kably, 2011, 
p. 665), thousands of students protested peacefully in Casablanca on March 22. 
These student protests ended in a bloodbath on March 23 (Brouksy, 2005, paras. 7 
& 8). When parents and the unemployed joined the protests, the army intervened, 
turning the peaceful protests into a carnage; leaving 500 to 1,000 dead according to 
social memory (al-Sanūsī, 2009; Laffort, 2009, p. 43). 
Up until the establishment of the ERC, this rebellion was relegated to oblivion. 
However, ERC’s final report unsilenced the history of this educational revolt and 
established some important facts about it. In addition to refuting the official version 
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of the events, which “put the [death] toll at seven dead,” ERC confirmed the death 
of 50 protesters (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006a, p. 91). ERC’s report has also specified that 
“a large number of the 31 victims died of gunshot wounds in the skull and rib cage,” 
including three children under the age of 10 (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006a, p. 75). Not 
only did the ERC officialize the existence of higher numbers of dead, but its 
investigative work brought more journalistic and scholarly attention to this 
foundational urban uprising.  
Security concerns also impacted humanistic disciplines, specifically sociology 
and philosophy during the Years of Lead. For instance, the Institut de sociologie, 
which played a crucial role in the effort to decolonize social sciences, practice 
sociology as an “activist-oriented” discipline, rather than a “sociology on demand,” 
and subsequently train generations of Moroccan sociologists, was closed in 1970 
(El Idrissi, 2017, p. 193). May 1968, the rise of the Moroccan Marxist-Leninist 
Movement (MMLM), and the state’s wariness of contact between researchers and 
populations created an adverse climate to sociological work. Evoking the events of 
this period, Zakya Daoud (2007) has observed that,  
 
The authority suspected the institute of training evil spirits [italics in the 
original]. Morocco has no need (for) these birds of bad omen that 
sociologists are. Once the institute was shut down, sociology was replaced 
by theology, and [the country] plunged into tradition and social archaisms 
were encouraged. (p. 141) 
 
Abdelkébir Khatibi, the then director of the institute, downplayed Daoud’s 
observations. In his response to Daoud’s assertions, Khatibi refuted the institute’s 
political role and foregrounded its academic mission and the diligence of its 
students (Khatibi, 2008, p. 35). While expressing his consternation at the 
government’s decision to shutter the institute, Khatibi attributed it to the prevalence 
of resistance to critical and analytical inquiry among politicians (Khatibi, 2008, p. 
35).  
Philosophy did not fare any better. The Arabization of the discipline put an end 
to 40 years of francophone philosophical practice in Morocco. When philosophy 
was Arabized in 1971, Tahar Ben Jelloun, a then unknown philosophy teacher in 
high school in Casablanca, left Morocco to live in France. Years later, Ben Jelloun 
would say that the “Ministry of Interior decide[d] to Arabize philosophy in order to 
prevent Moroccans from learning how to think, to doubt, and to reflect. So, we 
[would] Arabize and teach Islamic thought [instead]” (Sorel-Sutter, 2015, p. 160). 
Indeed, in tandem with the Arabization of philosophy and the onslaught on 
sociology, Islamic studies were introduced in order to Islamize the Marxist youth 
(El Ayadi, 2004, p. 114). El Ayadi (2004) has argued that by the time Islamic 
Studies became a department during the academic year 1979-1980, philosophy, 
which they replaced, became “the victim of the state’s new religious doctrine” (p. 
118). Consequently, Islamization and Arabization of academic disciplines were 
entrenched even as the Moroccan monarchy consolidated its authoritarian grip on 
the country.  
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Intellectual work was also denigrated in these disadvantageous circumstances 
for education and culture. Intellectuals, especially the ones endowed with 
“advanced theoretical training,” in the humanities were met with disregard and 
suspicion (Monjib, 2013, p. 7). Analyzing Hassan II’s attitudes toward intellectuals, 
including himself, Abdallah Laroui (2005), Morocco’s prominent historian and 
philosopher, has written that “[f]for a long time, Hassan II ignored me as he ignored 
tens of other intellectuals who prefer to write in Arabic” before adding that,  
 
Hassan II did not like those of his subjects who lived abroad for a very 
long time or pretended to have original ideas. […] [Hassan II] was only at 
ease among technicians, who are content with finding solutions to the 
problems that he brought to their attention (engineers, jurists, physicians, 
littérateurs, etc.). He also got along very well with the traditional “ulamā” 
who were also, in their own way, technicians of speech and psychological 
manipulation. (p. ix) 
 
Adil Hajji, a Moroccan intellectual, has explained Hassan II’s attitude toward 
intellectuals by his traditional training (Dalle, 2011, p. 625). Accordingly, Hassan 
II understood the intellectual as a learned person who “knew the texts, the scriptural 
sources, the Quran, history, and language.” (Dalle, 2011, p. 625). Thus, the critical 
intellectual had no place in this traditional understanding of intellectual work 
(Dalle, 2011, p. 625). This royal disregard of highly educated citizens was true 
across the board, even vis-à-vis educated Moroccan Jewish Communists 
(Benbaruk, 1990, p. 51). Hassan II’s preference for technicians and technocrats was 
probably due to the wrong assumption that their work is not premised on the 
existence of freedom compared to their humanistic counterparts. Whereas 
authoritarianism can cohabit with technical modernity, as is the case in places like 
China today, freedom and free thought are more challenging to accommodate. 
Therefore, this disregard for intellectuals was merely a reflection of an official view 
of educated people and education’s place in society.  
However, instead of placing all agency with King Hassan II, it is important to 
underline that Moroccan political parties also facilitated the constraints imposed on 
education. For instance, immediately after March 23, 1965, Mohammed Benhima, 
the new Minister of Education, charted a detailed reform program. This reform plan 
included pursuing the generalization of primary education, introducing a selection 
process in high school to orient students to specialties that better suited their 
abilities, instituting bilingualism as a policy, continuing educational cooperation 
with France, and improving the quality of education (Adam, 1966, pp. 223-224). 
However, the Independence party accused the minister’s plan of “undermin[ing] the 
foundations of [the nation’s] personality as well as the unity of the country by 
destroying the mother tongue; [and] its cultural unity, which is based on the national 
language, the language of the Quran” (Adam, 1966, pp. 224-225). King Hassan II 
snatched the initiative from the Independence party and, according to former 
minister Mahjoubi Aherdan,  
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ordered the institution of the five obligatory prayers in all universities and 
schools, [and] the addition of a course of religious education, which will 
be taken into consideration to sanction a student’s success regardless of 
their grades or language of education. (Aourid, 2019, para. 1)  
 
As El Ayadi rightly has noted, the convergence between “religious reformism of 
the Istiqlāl party” and the “monarchy’s religious fundamentalism” accelerated the 
implementation of the “Arabization-Islamization of education” (El Ayadi, 2004, p. 
117). Therefore, political parties cannot be entirely absolved of their share of 
responsibility for the lost potential of the Moroccan education system.  
Today’s discussions of the pathetic state of Moroccan education lack the 
historical depth. A better contextualization of education and culture within the 
politics of the Years of Lead could explain how repression thwarted the 
establishment of a progressive and egalitarian school system. It is true that 
international bodies’ reports rank Morocco very low in terms of the quality of 
education (for instance, UNESCO), but these reports do not ground these rankings 
in historical contexts to illuminate the political origins of the failure. A systematic 
study of the impact of the establishment of an authoritarian regime on the country’s 
move toward educational modernity could elucidate the various ways in which the 
rupture it instituted in both politics and society forestalled the potential of Moroccan 
education. Moroccan’s rush toward private schools and foreign-language-based 
education today does not emanate from society’s natural evolution but is rather a 
consequence of the country’s failure to reverse the nefarious effects 
authoritarianism-dictated policies had on education. It’s both state and society that 
are paying the price for the sabotage of any progressive educational reform since 
independence. The social and human cost of Morocco’s lagging behind in education 
is now threatening to the state because of “civic disengagement, social delinquency 
and political deviance” (Berrada & El Aoufi, 2007, p. 4). Confirming these 
scholarly conclusions, none other than the official Haut Commissariat au Plan 
(2007) has warned that “it is highly probable that any development strategy is 
doomed to fail” if Moroccan human capital is not rehabilitated (p. 66); a belated 
realization that, for sure, emerged from the exigencies of neoliberalism and 
economic globalization, but which fails to contextualize the attrition in Morocco’s 
educational system in the legacy of the Years of Lead. 
 
Cultural Attrition during the Years of Lead:  
Banned Cultural Journals 
Cultural production, writ large, sustained multiple losses during the Years of 
Lead. Sociologist Abdellatif Ezzine (n.d.) has rightly suggested that it is critical to 
investigate “censorship and the different restrictions that targeted thought and 
culture in their critical dimension” during the multidecade Years of Lead (para. 1). 
Ezzine (n.d.) even suggested that culture lived its own Years of Lead. Following on 
Ezzine’s proposition, I foreground the significance of cultural losses the Moroccan 
cultural scene registered due to state violence. A combination of censorship and 
weakening of the legal guarantees for publishers silenced cultural outlets that 
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challenged the state or provided a critical approach to Moroccan affairs (Hay’at al-
inṣāf, 2006, p. 38). Over the years, many important newspapers, such as al-
Muḥarrir, and cultural journals Lamalif (1966-1988), Aqlām (1964-1982), al-
Thaqāfa al-jadīda (1974-1984), al-Zaman al-maghribī (1980-1984), al-Jusūr 
(1981-1984), and al-Badīl (1981-1984) were banned or pushed to bankruptcy 
through frequent seizures (al-Sāwrī & al-Qasṭālī, 2014, pp. 72-76; Anoual, 1984, p. 
4), thus depriving Moroccan society of their valuable contributions to public 
debates. The mere absence of these publications from the public arena and the 
suppression of the voices for which they served as a platform was a consequential 
loss that scholarship has yet to account for.  
Souffles/Anfas (1966-1973) is the cultural and political journal whose loss has 
been studied the most (Fondation Laâbi, 2016; Harrison & Villa-Ignacio, 2015; 
Sefrioui, 2013,). Souffles/Anfas was MMLM’s cultural outlet and the publication 
that set the tone for the radicalization of the Moroccan youth after March 23, 1965. 
The termination of Souffles/Anfas’s publication in 1972 dealt a huge blow to 
Moroccan leftist thought. Indeed, Souffles/Anfas played a crucial role in creating a 
new language and disseminating a leftist consciousness among both francophone 
and Arabic-speaking readers. However, the tendency of francophone scholars to 
present it as the main driver of intellectual transformation in Morocco is a risky 
project. It has had the reverse effect of overshadowing the foundational work of 
other cultural magazines during the same period. For instance, while Souffles/Anfas 
adopted a rejectionist attitude vis-à-vis political parties, which was in line with 
MMLM’s accusation of legal political parties of reformism (al-Shawi, 2015, p. 
112), other publications, such as Lamalif and Aqlām, treaded more tactically to 
survive. Unlike Souffles/Anfas’s short-lived experience, these journals managed to 
sustain their existence for decades, neither compromising their editorial convictions 
nor betraying their critical positions, thus making a long-term impact on both 
society and politics. Yet the long-term impact Arabic and francophone Moroccan 
journals had on culture and politics still demands a comprehensive study. 
In terms of numbers, Arabic journals suffered the most from the Years of Lead. 
Because of their larger readership, Arabic cultural outlets also played a crucial role 
in creating a critical cultural scene in Morocco. Not only did Arabic journals 
contribute to the emergence of a Moroccan school of thought, but they also put this 
local thought in dialogue with other intellectual traditions from both the East and 
the West. For instance, journal Bayt al-Ḥikma translated articles by Michel 
Foucault, François Ewald, Jacques Derrida, Claude Lévy-Strauss, and Julia 
Kristeva, among others (1985, issue 1, April 1). Al-Jusur’s articles also included 
translations of Aleksei Tikhonov’s work on Soviet planning and Jacques Attali’s 
work Sovietism (1981, issue 2, June 1). Nonetheless, authoritarian Morocco could 
not cohabit with the analyses Moroccan and foreign intellectuals disseminated 
through these cultural platforms. As a result, the journals al-Thaqāfa al-jadīda, al-
Zaman al-Maghribī, al-Jusūr, and al-Badīl were banned at once in 1984 (Anoual, 
1984, p. 4). Commenting on the administrative decision to close these cultural 
journals, Annual (1984), the daily newspaper, interpreted this act as an “abortion of 
innovative activities” in the cultural field (p. 4). Anoual also saw in banning these 
journals an act of silencing that aimed to isolate serious intellectual work from 
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Morocco’s “Arab and global environment” (Anoual, 1984, p. 4). In Anoual’s 
analysis, the ban of the four journals “reflected repression’s sensitivity toward the 
progressive cultural action” and signaled that this decision was bad news for the 
rest of the cultural institutions that they might be targeted as well (Anoual, 1984, p. 
4). The shuttering of several media outlets at the same time was meant to shock and 
terrorize cultural actors that the state had limitless power over their existence.  
The early cultural outlets of Amazigh cultural expressions were also repressed. 
Neither Amazigh activists nor their cultural production were spared the generalized 
experience of loss during the Years of Lead. Upon Morocco’s independence, Arab 
nationalism’s irredentism combined with the Jacobin state model erased Amazigh 
identity from the public sphere. The persistence of the legacy of the so-called Berber 
Dahir, which was supposedly passed by the French Protectorate in 1930 to divide 
Arabs and Berbers in Morocco through French-Berber schools and the application 
of customary law to Berber areas, contributed to the negative attitude toward 
Amazigh cultural expression. Even worse than the Berber Dahir was the fact that 
the leaders of the coups d’états against Hassan II in 1971 and 1972 were Amazigh. 
However, the cultural field was the area in which repression of Amazigh rights was 
most manifested in the 1980s. For example, Ali Sidqi Azayku, an Amazigh activist, 
historian, and littérateur, was accused of posing a threat to the safety of the state 
because of an article he published in the first issue of journal Amazigh: revue 
marocaine d'histoire et de civilisation in 1981. Entitled “Fī sabīl mafhūm ḥaqīqī 
lithqāfatina al-waṭaniyya” [toward a real conceptualization of our national culture], 
the article was a revisionist attempt to question the connections between language, 
Islam, and national culture in Morocco. In driving a wedge between Islam and 
Arabic, Azaykou refuted the argument whereby Arabic as the language of Quran 
was used to eliminate Amazigh. Azaykou showed that the Quran did not invent a 
new Arabic with the advent of Islam in order to demonstrate that claiming Amazigh 
culture and being Muslim were not mutually exclusive (Azaykou, 1981, p. 41). 
Azaykou’s 
  
article constituted a frontal attack against the advocates of Arabization, 
who falsely linked the primacy of Arabic to Islam and preached incessantly 
the need to replace foreign languages with Arabic in order to promote a 
national culture while acting in an entirely contrary manner in their own 
lives. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 99) 
 
However, the price was a year in jail for Azaykou and the prohibition of the journal. 
With the ban of Amazigh: revue marocaine d'histoire et de civilisation, “Amazigh 
cultural movement was deprived of any activity” until the early 1990s (Rollinde, 
1999, para. 11).  
The end of Lamalif’s journey in 1988 was probably the most significant loss of 
a cultural platform during the Years of Lead. Lamalif )لا ( , which means NO in 
Arabic, was one of the most important journalistic experiences in Moroccan 
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history.1 Started by Jacqueline David (Zakya Daoud) and Mohammed Loghlam in 
1966, Lamalif: Revue Mensuelle, Culturelle, Economique et Sociale initiated a 
different kind of journalism in Morocco. Combining coverage of culture, economy, 
society, and in-depth analyses of specific issues in a monthly journal, Lamalif 
targeted readers from across the social and political spectrum (Lamalif, 1966, p. 5). 
The conspicuous NO gracing its third page could not be more explicit in terms of 
the journal’s position vis-à-vis the Moroccan state throughout the period of its 
publication. Established in the tumultuous context of the state of exception (1965-
1970) and the brutal attack on opposition political parties, Lamalif incarnated the 
mission of the “fragmented” Moroccan left without being a political party 
(Rollinde, 2002, p. 149). However, Lamalif’s editors’ success at striking a balance 
between their role as journalists/intellectuals and critics of the socio-political and 
cultural conditions in Morocco granted the journal longevity and allowed it to reach 
200 issues that shed critical light on a host of issues of interest to Moroccan society. 
Lamalif rehabilitated intellectual reflection through a journalistic practice that has 
both the “critical gaze and the necessary autonomy to analyze, comprehend, and 
react to society in which [the journalist] lives.” (Rollinde, 2002, p. 150). By 1988, 
Lamalif was “a reference for a whole democratic current,” thus posing a threat to 
the state (Rollinde, 2002, p. 151). Just as Lamalif reached the pinnacle of its success 
by the publication of its 200th issue, Daoud and Loghlam shut down the magazine 
in a last activist act against authoritarianism. Rather than accepting a humiliating 
compromise with the authorities to publish articles by the powerful Minister of 
Interior and confining Lamalif’s distribution to university campuses (Daoud, 2007, 
p. 323), Daoud and Loghlam terminated the existence of their journal. The 
disappearance of Lamalif from Moroccan newsstands in 1988 was synonymous 
with the end of a most elegant and subversive way of saying NO to power. It also 
meant the loss of the longest existing and one of the most successful cultural 
journals in Moroccan history. 
Even today, it is difficult to compare Lamalif to other journals. The balance 
between political independence, intellectual integrity, and critical engagement with 
societal questions was Lamalif’s mission statement from the start. In its first 
editorial entitled “Ce que nous voulons,” (this is what we want) Lamalif announced 
its identity and explained the three axes that defined its mission. In displaying لا on 
its covers, Lamalif (1966) rejected the prevalent feelings of negativity in Moroccan 
society and presented itself as “an optimistic journal […] driven by hope, 
confidence, and certainty” (p. 5). Representing a project of hope in the morose 
Years of Lead required Lamalif to be a “journal that is resolutely open, open to all, 
to all professions, all intellectual tendencies, from all sides” (Lamalif, 1966, p. 5). 
Lamalif presented itself as part of most Moroccan people’s shared vision to “create 
a new state of mind, lift taboos and walk steadfastly toward the future” (Lamalif, 
1966, p. 5). In delineating its cultural, economic, and social nature, Lamalif used a 
 
1 I had incorporated some ideas from this section into the proposal of the Lamalif anthology 
I am co-editing with Professor Ali Alalou. Although my work on Lamalif predated my 
partnership with Professor Alalou on the anthology, I would like to acknowledge the 
discussions I have had with him about the journal in the last two years.  
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very subversive definition of culture as “contestation, questioning, so renovation, 
because it is the profound expression of a people, its problems, aspirations, and its 
own reality” (Lamalif, 1966, p. 6). Finally, Lamalif’s self-chosen mission to provide 
analyses and studies of socio-economic and cultural questions did not prevent it 
from interest in literature and art, which it served immensely over 22 years of its 
existence.  
The special dossiers, which Lamalif promised to publish on a monthly basis, 
were the location in which its 200 issues made a breakthrough in Moroccan thought 
and social debates. Opening up new breaches in the walls of social and political 
taboos, Lamalif published issues entitled “Yesterday and today’s crazies” (issue 81, 
1976), “The war on cannabis” (issue 4, 1966), “ELECTIONS, TOMORROW?” 
(issue 10, 1967), “Che Guevara” (issue 16, 1967), and “Is there a Jewish question 
in Morocco” (issue 21, 1968), among others. The cover of its penultimate issue was 
dedicated to the “Language debate” in Morocco (issue 199, 1988). From women’s 
rights to religiosity in the French banlieues and Morocco’s multilayered belonging 
to the Maghreb, Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean, Lamalif brought 
significant depth to the journalistic practice in Morocco. The combination of 
information, analysis, and reflection on the deeper implications of the topics 
discussed in its pages made Lamalif a true forum for cutting-edge analyses about 
and theorization of a different Morocco. The premature termination of Lamalif’s 
publication in 1988 has since deprived generations of Moroccans of the benefits of 
these theorizations.  
Lamalif survival under repression should not, however, be interpreted as a sign 
of democracy. In fact, Lamalif survived for 20 because its editors succeeded at 
navigating Morocco’s uncertain political situation. Loghlam and Daoud’s 
knowledge of when their work would be tolerated and when it would invite a 
backlash allowed them to practice their profession carefully. For instance, Lamalif 
did not cover MMLM members’ trials nor those of the soldiers involved in the coups 
d’états in 1970s. Additionally, unlike Souffles/Anfas’ support of independence in 
Western Sahara, Lamalif’s positions vis-à-vis this issue was closer to the 
authorities’. This aptitude to be critical and also careful when criticism is a risky 
endeavor helped Lamalif to stay a critical voice in an authoritarian climate for two 
decades. Nevertheless, a financially successful and intellectually autonomous 
journal could not be tolerated by the authorities. It only took one sentence about the 
Moroccan state officials’ habit of making people wait in its 200th volume for the 
journal to come under fire. This would ultimately lead to the termination of its 
existence. 
In 1994, six years after the publication of Lamalif was stopped, Zakya Daoud 
provided an insightful reflection on the journal’s experience. Daoud remembered 
an independent, successful, and conscientious journal that should not have 
disappeared from the Moroccan cultural landscape. According to Daoud (1994), 
 
all our collaborators in the beginning were part-time workers and 
volunteers. However, they slowly became permanent in their jobs and 
received remuneration. Our commercial means had also been developed. 
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By 1988, Lamalif was 90 pages-long and used full color (quadrichronmie), 
especially in its covers which were reserved for Moroccan paintings, in an 
[an effort that reflected] a nationalist aesthetic will. Also, our 
independence has always been preserved, and Lamalif had never any 
money issue, which was very rare [in the press sector]. It would have 
continued to exist indefinitely by its own means. (p. 162)  
 
However, what Daoud did not say was that this very success was the reason Lamalif 
had to cease existing. Since the journal was not struggling enough financially, the 
authorities must have known that a compromise with the editors was impossible. 
Daoud (2007) would later reveal that the Minister of Interior complained of the 
“enormous” nature Lamalif’s sales, which reached 12,000 copies a month (p. 322). 
This number might sound insignificant in 2019, but it was quite momentous for a 
mostly illiterate society in 1988. Even Souffles/Anfas did not reach such numbers in 
its heyday in 1960s. For the Minister of Interior, these high sales indicated that 
Lamalif was not just read by the francophone elites, but also by ordinary Moroccans. 
To prevent Lamalif’s critical voice from seeping even deeper into society, the 
minister offered the publishers the possibility to sell it on university campuses only 
(Daoud, 2007, p. 322), a solution Loghlam and Daoud rejected, and, instead, closed 
the journal out of their own volition. The pressure to put an end to Lamalif’s 
publication in 1988 cannot but evoke the continuity of the same mistrust of 
education and culture that reigned over Morocco since independence.  
 
The ERC and the Immaterial Losses in Education and Culture  
During the Years of Lead 
Upon the recommendation of the Conseil consultatif des droits de l’Homme, 
King Mohammed VI put in place Morocco’s ERC on January 7, 2004 (Hay’at al-
inṣāf, 2006, p. 16). Its founding decree tasked the ERC with “nonjudicial” 
prerogatives that “include[d] the inquiry, the investigation, the assessment, the 
arbitration, and the recommendation” about the past arbitrary detention and forced 
disappearance (USIP, 2009, Article 6). The same decree limited ERC’s mandate to 
finding the truth about past violations of human rights without determining 
individual responsibility for them (USIP, 2009, Article 6). Specifying ERC’s 
temporal prerogatives, Article 8 of the decree stated that the ERC was created “to 
deal with the violations committed during the period from the independence to the 
date of the royal approval creating the Independent Commission of Arbitration in 
charge of compensation of the victims of forced disappearance and arbitrary 
detention” (USIP, 2009, Article 8). This period roughly covered Morocco’s 
independence in 1956 through the passing of King Hassan II in 1999. Compared to 
other transitional justice experiences, ERC had one of the longest temporal periods 
in the world (Groupe de travail, 2009, p. 8).  
The royal decree establishing the ERC also engaged in a crucial terminological 
exercise. The decree defined what was meant by “Gross human rights abuses,” 
“Forced disappearance,” “Arbitrary detention,” and “victim” (USIP, 2009, Article 
5). Closely connected to these definitions and based on the signification given to 
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them, reparation, which is the corollary result of a claimant’s established 
victimhood, is also defined by the decree as, 
  
all measures taken for the victims because of the material and moral 
damage sustained by them or by their legal successors as a result of forced 
disappearance or arbitrary detention, as well as the general and collective 
measures. The reparation of damage may take different shapes and be put 
into practice through various measures such as compensation, 
readjustment, reintegration, rehabilitation, the preservation of memory and 
guarantees against the repetition of the violations. In case the victim died 
or her fate could not be determined, the reparation of the damage will be 
affected in favor of his/her heirs or legal successors. (USIP, 2009, Article 
5) 
 
It’s all too clear from the stipulations of the decree that ERC’s investigations and 
reparation work were tailored to focus on the tangible damage arbitrary detention 
and forcible disappearance inflicted on individual victims. Indeed, ERC’s priority 
was to resolve individual suffering and addressing the needs of the direct and 
indirect victims of the Years of Lead. After all, it was thanks to the mobilization of 
these victims and their families that the state was forced to undertake the ERC 
process. Moreover, the violence done to the educational system and cultural 
production platforms lacked the brutal tangibility of political disappearance and its 
consequences, which explains it not being a priority. Despite the constraints of its 
mandate, ERC was able to chart a path for a future examination of losses in 
education and culture.  
ERC was able to transcend the limitations of its founding decree’s focus on 
individual victims. Not only did ERC succeed at assessing how state violence 
sabotaged Moroccan society’s potential beyond the direct victims, but it also 
elucidated “[t]he relationship between violations and socio-economic issues,” 
which it made recommendations to redress (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 66). ERC’s 
final report contains an important analysis of the impact of “violations on the fields 
of education and culture” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). In a summary of the 
discussions during a workshop dedicated to “educational and cultural reforms” 
organized on March 8, 2005, the panelists’ comments included in this section shed 
light on the imbrication of state violence and attrition in education and culture. 
According to the participants, violations in the field of education and culture “stifled 
creativity” and led to the “beginning of the end of the individual and the citizen” 
(Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). The panelists also argued that the violations in the 
“cultural field impacted creativity, including poetry, the novel, [and] music” 
(Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). Because associations working in the fields of 
education and culture were targeted, the country’s creative potential was repressed 
(Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). Always according to ERC’s final report, the reforms 
undertaken in education “were insufficient, and the educational system remained as 
it was in the past.” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). This assessment paints a bleak 
picture of a society in which 48% of the population was illiterate (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 
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2006c, p. 72) and which missed its rendezvous with the open horizons of modernity 
in 1960s (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71).  
Delving into the contradictions of the educational system, ERC emphasized the 
unevenness between languages in Morocco. Arabic and Amazigh languages were 
disadvantaged by French’s predominance in business, administration, and higher 
education (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). This confirmed the suspicion that 
Arabization in the1960s sought to limit working classes’ access to foreign 
languages to protect the interests of the elites. Amazigh language was specifically 
presented as having been sacrificed by both the state and media. The identity-related 
ramifications of this sacrifice of Amazigh language was a symbolic rejection of the 
marginalized Morocco (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p.71), the one inhabited by the 
Amazigh speakers. In addition to a lack of linguistic justice, the report asserted that 
Morocco’s linguistic policy was designed to serve the goals of the regime, which 
produced “generations that mastered no language” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). 
ERC’s claims about languages during the Years of Lead open up a capacious space 
for inquiry into educational and cultural loss that future ethnographic work could 
quantify.  
The ERC made multiple recommendations to redress the effects of political 
violence on Morocco. In order to reconcile the Moroccan state with its people and 
prevent the repetition of the same violations in the future, ERC’s recommendations 
focused on creating strong legal and institutional safeguards for human rights. For 
instance, under the heading “constitutional protection of human rights,” Hay’at al-
inṣāf wal-muṣālaḥa (2006c) called for the constitutionalization of human rights and 
equality between genders as well as strengthening the “constitutional monitoring” 
of executive laws (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 84). These changes targeted the 
transformation of the legal, security, and human rights culture in the country 
through governance-focused reforms in these areas (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, pp. 84-
91). However, there is a mismatch between ERC’s diagnosis of the educational and 
cultural losses during the Years of Lead, and its proposed rehabilitation measures, 
which focused merely on a general protection of human rights. Except for 
recommendations about the recognition of Amazigh language and culture, the 
organization of the national archives and the revision of history curricula (Hay’at 
al-inṣāf, 2006c, pp. 92-93), ERC seems to be more invested in a forward-looking 
education and sensitization about human rights. Nonetheless, ERC placed education 
and culture at the heart of the areas in which the Moroccan state needed to reckon 
with the violence of the Years of Lead.  
 
Conclusion 
Throughout this article I have demonstrated that education and culture suffered 
from state violence during the Years of Lead. Locating the beginning of educational 
and cultural attrition in the early years of independence, I have revealed how much 
of the power struggle between the monarchy and the opposition played out to the 
detriment of education policies. Moreover, I have shown that the skepticism that 
governed the state’s attitudes vis-à-vis education also translated in the form of 
disdain and disregard for intellectuals and intellectual work. The ban of cultural 
journals deprived Moroccans of open spaces for critical engagement with new 
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ideas. Reflecting the linguistic and cultural diversity that was lost with the shutting 
of journals, I listed some of the main Arabic, Amazigh, and francophone journals 
that were closed by administrative decisions. The sheer number of these journals 
proves that Moroccan thought and societal development were impacted by these 
decisions. 
Articulating educational and cultural loss can be elusive and at times difficult 
to quantify. Evidence, however, can be found in the most unlikely places. The 
official report “50 years of Human Development in Morocco” has concluded that 
the failure of the Moroccan school has “revealed itself in its inability to transmit 
values of citizenship, openness and progress, freedom of thought and learning of 
critical thought” (Mouline & Lazrak, 2005, p. 15). The results are there for us to 
understand the impact of authoritarianism on education and intellectual production.  
Finally, this examination of the impact of the Years of Lead on education and 
culture is only a step toward a more critical investigation of cultural and educational 
losses that society incurred during the five decades of mistrust between state and 
society in Morocco.  
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Using Moroccan sources associated with the Islamist movement, this 
paper outlines the theological and political challenges facing Morocco in 
terms of violent extremism, especially those posed by certain Wahhabi and 
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Islamist Moroccan intellectuals. 
 
Keywords: violent extremism, Salafism, Wahhabism, Islamism, Morocco, 
political reform  
 
 
Introduction 
Many Moroccans believed their country to be immune to terrorist attacks after 
September 11, 2001. This belief was associated with a narrative of exceptionalism 
that held the Kingdom of Morocco to be exempt from extremism because of its 
traditionalist approach to Islam, and the relationship between the state, the 
monarchy, and Islam, as well as the prevalence of Sufi, or Islamic mystical, practice 
among vast segments of the population. However, it was precisely in this context 
that the attacks of May 16, 2003, took place in Casablanca. The country’s 
exceptional, ideational context guaranteed these small attacks an impact and 
influence far beyond their actual casualty figures, which were about 44 people, 
including about 14 attackers. For the following four years, the state played a cat-
and-mouse game against the local Al Qaeda affiliates. By April 2007 with the 
dismantling of some of the most active terrorist cells that participated in the May 
16, 2003, attacks, that conflict was resolved clearly in the favor of the state, but 
certain problems remained (Benchemsi, 2007, pp. 21-27). First, small unaffiliated 
groups and individuals continued to pose a threat. This threat was clearly displayed 
in the April 28, 2011 Argana cafe attack in Marrakesh that killed 17 people and 
injured 25 more people. Second, some Moroccans, particularly those from overseas 
and from Northern Morocco continued to join Al Qaeda and Da’esh, (the “Islamic 
state” organization), because of alienation and feelings of marginalization, and due 
to the ideological appeal of the extremists. For these reasons, the views that 
prompted the attacks continued to find currency among a minority of Moroccan 
people. The December 2018 murder by local Da’esh sympathizers of Louisa 
Vesterager Jespersen and Maren Ueland, two young Scandinavian tourists and 
hikers, caused the debates among Moroccan people at all levels surrounding 
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terrorism, religion, external influence, and the relationship with the Western world 
to be reignited. The attackers posted videos of their attacks and the state was able 
to arrest them and much of their support network. This was not surprising given that 
there are frequent arrests of terror suspects and a nearly continuous pace of cells 
being disrupted and neutralized. A recent example was the arrest of three Daesh 
sympathizers in Fez. The Director of the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation, 
Mr. Abdelhak El Khiyame, claimed that his agency apprehended 2,963 suspects and 
dismantled 341 cells between 2002 and 2016 (Igrouane, 2016).  
Like any other country facing the problem of violent extremism, the Moroccan 
state has been trying to address the root causes of the attacks. For example, it created 
a development program that tried to address some of the socioeconomic grievances 
of the poorest citizens and engaged in a well-structured security campaign against 
the terrorist movements, without returning to the excesses of human rights 
violations of the past. The conventional policy of political reform, economic 
inclusion, and law enforcement worked quite well. In some ways, it helped create 
the political condition of relative deprivation, a situation where political instability 
increases despite overall economic improvements because some people are doing 
better than others. In this context, the Arab Spring arrived in Morocco in the form 
of the February 20th movement of 2011. The state's response to that movement 
included additional democratization and the election of an Islamist Democrat as the 
Government President – a position analogous to Prime Minister, since Morocco is 
a monarchy. The government’s efforts are discussed here to provide some context 
for the reader; there are more extensive assessments of these efforts by the author 
and others elsewhere. 
This paper focuses on a neglected aspect of the Moroccan struggle against 
extremism – religious debates surrounding terrorism. While religious reforms, such 
as the creation of women religious guides, requiring college level education for 
Imams and reforming the structure of religious education, have been an integral part 
of the Moroccan program against violent extremism, earlier attempts focused on 
security did not address theological questions that fed violence against Moroccan 
people, other Muslims, and non-Muslims alike when approached from a Takfiri 
(declaring other Muslims as apostates and anathemizing them as well as 
legitimating violence against them) perspective. The threat of violence coexists with 
the rejection of the State’s approach to Islam, which were the rejection of the 
religious legitimacy of the state to gain currency, the door to more violence and 
even civil war will open. This is the theological challenge that needs to be addressed 
before Morocco can transition to a society where democracy and rule of law are 
actualized within a Muslim and conservative social context. Therefore, this paper 
addresses the origin, extent, and scope of Salafi and Wahhabi thought in a Moroccan 
context with particular emphasis on its most extreme views such as those held by 
the violent wings of Takfiri Salafis. It also addresses the State’s responses to Salafis 
and Wahhabism in both historical and current settings. Nevertheless, the first and 
primary focus of this paper is the conversation that took place among self-avowed 
Moroccan Islamists concerning the origins of violent extremism. There is a vast gap 
in the literature concerning this issue, and this paper intends to bring some of these 
debates into the attention of the larger world. 
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Preliminary Considerations 
This paper deals with the political challenge posed by non-governmental, 
particularly Wahhabi and Salafi theological positions, and focuses on the political 
and security implications of these challenges for the population and government of 
Morocco (in that order), but it does not take a position concerning the accuracy or 
“correctness” of any particular set of theological positions. Questions like “is 
Wahhabism a correct interpretation of Islam?” are outside the scope of this paper. 
There are many overlapping varieties of Wahhabism and Salafism movements, and 
most of these do not preach or practice violence. The author simply invites readers 
to place themselves in the shoes of a Salafi or Wahhabi Moroccan, who often is a 
small independent businessperson struggling to earn a living. After 2003, Moroccan 
Salafis and Wahhabis found themselves under the State’s suspicion and under a 
certain level of social isolation as well. The vast majority of them do not support or 
condone violent extremism, but they nevertheless found themselves feared by many 
in the rest of the population, including, in some cases, their own relatives.  
To complicate matters, the contributions of Salafi and Wahhabi communities 
to the Moroccan economy are significant. As stated earlier, these men and women 
are often active in small business, employing themselves and others, providing 
services and products, and engaging in new investments using their own savings. 
People living in Morocco would attest that the economic contribution of Salafi 
communities is vital, and that any program that aims to deal with their violent sub-
set must avoid damaging the majority of its members and followers who do not 
condone violence. This paper looks at these beliefs only in terms of their security 
and political implications. Other people’s rights are impacted only by the actions of 
some members of these communities, not by the beliefs, however exclusionary they 
may be, of the majorities within them. Nevertheless, given that terrorists have used 
these beliefs to justify their attacks, discussing them is legitimate within the rubric 
of political studies, because they are also political beliefs, provided that the 
action/belief distinction is kept in mind. Terrorists like Al-Mailoudi have openly 
stated that their beliefs motivated their attacks (Al-Mailoudi, Fezazi, Al-Shadali, & 
Hadous, 2003, pp. 47-48). 
 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this paper, terrorism, also referred to as violent extremism, 
is political violence committed by non-state movements or persons against civilians 
with the aim of using the resulting fear to insure political and/or social change. The 
term was used by anarchist and Marxist terrorists, including those who are self-
avowed, without shame or odium in the past. One Marxist theorist and practitioner 
of terrorism took issue with the negativity attached to the term: 
 
The accusation of “violence” or “terrorism” no longer has the negative 
meaning it used to have. It has acquired new clothing; a new color. It does 
not divide, it does not discredit; on the contrary, it represents a center of 
attraction. Today, to be “violent” or a “terrorist” is a quality that ennobles 
any honorable person, because it is an act worthy of a revolutionary 
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engaged in armed struggle against the shameful military dictatorship and 
its atrocities. (Marighella, 1969)  
 
While Marxists like Marighella subscribed to the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, 
and Mao, the violent segment of the Salafist movement has less clearly defined 
textual boundaries. Like Marxists however, they also tend to write prolifically about 
their reasons for carrying out the things they do. They often use theological 
arguments to justify their actions. So, Moroccan scholars, including Islamist and 
Salafi scholars, have attempted to distinguish between the various forms of Salafi 
and Wahhabi discourse. Implicitly, this paper uses a typology created by the late 
Moroccan Member of Parliament and religious scholar, Shaykh’Abd al-Barri Al-
Zamzami. There are certain advantages to using a typology derived from Moroccan 
political life, because it is sensitive to the local context. Due to his interest in Islamic 
mores governing sexuality, Al-Zamzami was controversial in his lifetime and 
attracted both ridicule and praise from Moroccan social liberals and Salafis alike. 
Nevertheless, his typology, while clearly designed to uphold his own version of 
Salafism, can be very useful in navigating Moroccan perspectives of their Salafi 
and Wahhabi communities. He participated in the intellectual life of the country, 
making presentations in parliament and at scholarly conferences, so his eccentricity 
should not disqualify him from inclusion in this analysis.  
Al-Zamzami blames the Gulf States for the spread of types of Salafism that he 
finds negative in Morocco. However, matters are more complex, as this paper shows 
in subsequent sections. He clearly exonerates Moroccan forms of Salafism, such as 
his own and those of ‘Allal Al-Fasi, who campaigned for an independent Morocco 
and helped found the current political system, where liberalism influences what is 
essentially an Islamic kingdom (Howe, 2005). For Salafis and other Islamists, 
controversy over what constitutes both “true” Salafism and the “correct” application 
of the thoughts of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab is unavoidable. The table below summarizes 
and gives a formal structure to Al-Zamzami’s thoughts on problematic forms 
Salafism in Morocco. It will be addressed in more detail in the section on 
theological challenges. 
In the view of this author, a social scientist cannot take a stance on these 
questions since these questions are outside the scope of social sciences and properly 
belong to Islamic Theology. Nevertheless, it is possible to look at violence, which 
is a form of political actions, so the focus here is on actions rather than on beliefs. 
Beliefs, as claimed by the terrorists themselves, only become a topic of study here 
when they are acted upon. Consequently, the object of study here is the Jihadi 
Salafism with its complete focus on violence, terrorism, and war upon all non-
believers, including other Muslims and its security implications.  
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Table 1 
Al-Zamzami’s Typology of “Incorrect” Forms of Salafism in Morocco 
 
Type Characteristics Doctrine 
Arabian 
Gulf-style 
Wahhabi 
Salafism 
NGO-level 
institutionalization, “Quranic 
houses,” and private and 
public financial support from 
the GCC states. 
Represents an extension of Gulf 
approaches to Wahhabism in a 
Moroccan context. Differs from 
traditional and historic 
Moroccan approaches to 
Wahhabism. 
Popular 
Salafism 
An emphasis on appearances 
and the superficial 
characteristics of the 
movement, for example 
being bearded and insisting 
on the headscarf. 
No textual references. It relies 
on adherence to satellite TV 
preachers.  
Jihadi 
Salafism 
A complete focus on 
violence, terrorism and war 
upon all non-believers, 
including other Muslims. 
The ideas of Osama bin Laden 
and those who inspired him, 
including Abu al-Alaa Al-
Mawdudi. 
Isolationist 
Takfiri 
Salafism 
Rejection of the rest of 
society as pagan and self-
isolating, restricting social 
and personal relations to the 
“saved” community only. 
Strict focus on Wahhabi 
foundational texts such as those 
written by Ibn Qaim Al-
Jouyaza.  
Source: Al-Zamzami, A. (2006). Salafism and Terrorism. Casablanca, Morocco: 
Al-Najah, al-Jadida, and Sunnah Publications, pp. 13-16. 
 
Yet Al-Zamzami has to be placed in a global context. “Salafi” and “Wahhabi” 
are terms that have been confused and conflated. There is ideological overlap 
between the two movements, and they are often confused, precisely because their 
extremist wings tend to overlap and function as one. As with the rest of the world, 
Moroccan Salafis represent a broader movement than the specific Wahhabi 
movement which originated in what is now known as Saudi Arabia in the 18th 
century. A Salafi is a Muslim who adheres to the path of the pious predecessors (al-
Salaf al-Salih), in contrast to those who adhere to al-Khalaf al-Falih (the productive 
successors). The term has seen multiple uses over the generations, with people as 
diverse as Melcom Khan of Iran, and Mohmmed Abduh and Abu al-‘Alaa al-
Mawdudi of Pakistan being labeled Salafis. In the Moroccan context, the ideology 
of Al-Fasi has been described as Salafi-inspired, because it postulated that Morocco 
must be a Muslim rather than a secular state. The term is consequently fluid and 
needs proper contextualization both in terms of time and place. Al-Zamzami is 
essentially saying that there are correct versions of Salafism and Wahhabism and 
these tended to be the earlier forms in Morocco; consequently, his typology allows 
us to see some of the diversity in the Moroccan Salafi and Wahhabi movements. As 
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for Wahhabism, it is a simpler term, because it refers to its founder, Mohammed 
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab an 18th century religious reformer and political activist aligned 
with the dynasty that came to rule Saudi Arabia. Like many other Salafis, he 
followed the Hanbali tradition of jurisprudence. It is his work, particularly his 
reading of Ibn Tammiya, and that of his students that forms the textual basis of what 
became Wahhabism. Wahhabism relies on asserting that the precedent of Ibn 
Tammiya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab is pious, and consequently, it is a Salafi 
movement. There are non-Wahhabi Salafists, and the two terms are not 
interchangeable, despite considerable overlap (Bin Ali & Bin Sudiman, 2016).  
 
Normative Considerations 
Given the topic, there is also no escape from normative considerations, and this 
paper is no exception. This analysis stands with violent extremism’s civilian victims 
first. It also stands with people who face ostracism for their religious views despite 
not advocating or practicing violence. To that end, this paper uses a combination of 
history, participant observation, and perspectives of Moroccan leaders as a basis for 
outlining the theological challenge in a Moroccan context. To do so, it outlines the 
overall Moroccan counter-extremism effort, details the history of Moroccan Salafi 
and Wahhabi movements in the country, and summarizes the overall Moroccan 
policy response in the religious field, particularly the theological response of the 
State. Since these items are ultimately reflected in government policies, the overall 
approach is influenced by elements of policy evaluation methods. In this case, the 
ultimate measure of success is a decline in the performance of terrorist outfits within 
the country. Finally, this paper takes what terrorists say about their motives 
seriously. Like their Marxist and Anarchist forerunners, Al Qaeda, Da’esh and their 
supporters have been vocal both in print and in public statements about their 
motives. Taking them seriously, understanding their points of reference, and 
responding to them must be part and parcel of any policy designed to reduce 
violence. 
 
Attempts at Social and Economic Reforms 
Economic improvement is a vital action for governments to take in response to 
violent extremism. Poverty creates an environment that, directly or indirectly, 
enables violent extremism to grow. On the eve of the May 16, 2003 attacks, the 
Moroccan economy languished far behind that of Southern Europe and 
unemployment was rife. The tourism sector did not have its current dynamism and 
access to and from the country was very expensive. The largest sector in terms of 
employment was and remains agriculture and most people still resided in the 
countryside when the attacks took place. While Morocco still lags behind Southern 
and Eastern Europe, the per capita gross national product on a purchasing power 
parity basis (per capita GDP/PPP) rose from 3985 USD in 2002 to 7841 USD in 
2015 (World Bank, 2011). 
These improvements owed a lot to monetary stability, wherein the Moroccan 
dirham is tied to a basket of currencies dominated by the Euro, while trading in a 
controlled market. Other factors that assisted economic growth have been 
government encouragement of manufacturing, especially of automobiles and 
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aircraft parts for export. The call center industry, specializing in providing services 
in French and Spanish, was an early success. The economy now suffers from a 
paradox of a labor shortage combined with unemployment, which is a better 
dilemma than unemployment alone. The problem is increasingly refusal of urban 
youth to participate in the workforce due to perceptions of low wages when 
compared to the same professions in Europe, and a simpler problem – the lack of 
qualified individuals. Despite the obvious and clear improvement of the overall 
economy, Morocco still needs a rather generous welfare and development policy 
because poverty remains dire and widespread. Poverty complicates the 
government’s counter-extremism efforts. The government’s National Initiative for 
Human Development (INDH in its French abbreviation), whose first phase ran over 
a five-year period until 2010, appeared after the attacks. The initiative was partially 
motivated by a desire to reduce the appeal of violent extremism, which in Morocco 
takes a religio-political form, but it was also a studied response to a rather dire 
situation. The program's first phase cost about 1.2 billion U.S. Dollars over its five-
year life. However, the Initiative struggled especially in its attempts to impact rural 
livelihoods: 
 
At the launch of the operation (2005), Morocco suffered from high levels 
of poverty (14.2%, with a further 23% ‘economically vulnerable’), 
strikingly poor income inequality, and low human development indicators. 
Over half of adults were illiterate, compared to an average of 10% for 
lower middle-income countries. Poverty was equally pronounced in both 
rural and urban areas, albeit with different characteristics. Although half 
of public expenditures were allocated to the social sectors, access and 
quality were limited, particularly for rural people because of the centrally 
driven approach, with low levels of participation, weak coordination 
amongst line ministries, and inadequate targeting. (World Bank, 2013) 
 
The growing pains of the program marked the first phase. The country had to 
confront a wide variety of social issues head on with few resources. The second 
phase saw the construction of new highways, high speed rail, and solar and wind 
power plants. The program is now in its third phase, as new facilities are being 
opened by the King under its own title and structure (Nafaa, 2017), and was referred 
to as a priority by the current Minister of Finance (Le360Live, 2017). Assessing the 
program’s impact is outside the scope of this paper. The INDH program began after 
the May 16, 2003, attacks. 
 
Political Reforms 
The early reaction to the May 16th attacks, initially included the continuation 
of the alternation policy with the elected parliament and State, wherein the monarch 
shared power with an elected prime minister elected by the majority coalition in 
parliament. By 2007, a conservative, Istiqlal Party-led, government chose a set of 
policies that many Moroccans found restrictive. By that same year, Al Qaedas 
sound defeat in Morocco had become apparent, and the more conservative political 
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forces with Moroccan society and government felt that the threat had waned. Istiqlal 
is a conservative, nationalist party that led the country to independence; its ideology 
reflects the thinking of Al-Fassi and emphasizes the Islamic nature of Morocco. 
Historically, it endorsed the Arabization of Morocco and the abandonment of 
Tamazight. Therefore, the pace of political reforms that began under the alternation 
governments in the late 1990s slowed and in some cases reversed. “Alteration” was 
a power-sharing agreement between Hasan II and the Socialist opposition. The post 
of prime minister alternated between a monarchist prime minister and the socialist 
opposition. The real or perceived decline in freedoms during 2007-2011 set the 
stage for the Arab Spring in Morocco. The Moroccan Arab Spring took the form of 
a non-violent youth protest movement named after the day it was launched on 
February 20, 2011. The movement was supported by the youth wings of nearly all 
mainstream Moroccan political parties. It had the support of well-known and well-
connected businesspeople like Karim Tazi and the late Miloud Chaabi (Mekouar, 
2016). 
In response to the February 20th Movement, the king offered reform. These 
measures included a referendum on a new constitution, more powers shifted to the 
parliament, and the replacement of the Prime Minister's office with a newly elected 
government president, a title borrowed from Spanish practice, akin to the term 
“Minister-President” used in Germany and Belgium. The ensuing elections saw the 
emergence of the Islamist-democratic Justice and Development Party (PJD) as the 
leading partner in the government coalition. The party performed well in office and 
secured re-election, but the parliamentary dynamics prevented the re-election of its 
leader ’Abdel-Ilah Benkirane as government president. While there has been noted 
progress towards democracy in Morocco, the present situation falls short of the 
reform vision outlined by the king on March 9, 2011 (Mohammed VI, 2011). In 
part, the shortcomings were due to the fear expressed by the political parties and the 
political class over issues related to Moroccan identity, including religion. The 
political debates on Moroccan religious identity necessarily included the Islamist 
Party of Justice and Development, which won the two following elections. 
 
Religious Reforms 
While the political, economic, and policy reforms can be said to reduce the 
risks of violence, the root cause of terrorism in Morocco lies in issues connected 
with certain extremist interpretations of religion first and foremost. It has been 
argued by Sa’id Al-Kahal, a leftist secular Moroccan thinker, that there is no 
economic or political reason for the violence. By pointing to the attackers’ own 
statements, Al-Kahal argues that the attackers’ reasons are primarily eschatological. 
He highlights a statement made in court to a judge by Mohamed Damir, a suspect 
connected to the May 16th attacks who viewed his actions as ones that would find 
favor on the final day by God:  
 
I would like to surround you with the knowledge that I committed 
the actions of which I am accused; I committed them and did them 
upon the knowledge of the book of God and the sunnah of his 
prophet … I am happy … because I [am] being tried for 
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commanding the good and prohibiting that which is forbidden. 
(Al-Kahal, 2008, p. 271) 
 
Damir clearly articulated the challenge to the state posed by his particular strand of 
the Salafi movement, and to its credit, the government has been trying to institute 
reforms to address the ideological challenge it faces. To start, it began reasserting 
its monopoly on the religious sphere. After the April 2007 attacks, the state shut 
down “Qu’ranic Houses” controlled by Mohammed ‘Abd al-Rahman Al-
Maghraoui. Al-Maghraoui is known for enjoining the marriage of nine-year old 
girls in a well-known fatwa he had issued online (Hemimat, 2009, pp. 103-111). 
Today, the state requires aspiring imams to possess a bachelor's degree with at least 
the equivalent of a “B” average, have knowledge of foreign languages, and undergo 
additional instruction on special topics such as Social Psychology. The Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs also reformed the curriculum on clerical seminaries and female 
religious counselors. Theses counselors, or Murshidat in the Arabic plural, were the 
first such step ever undertaken in the Islamic world (Ministry of Religious 
Foundations and Islamic Affairs, 2006).  
 
The Theological Challenge 
As Al-Zamzami (2006) argued, there are Moroccan versions of Salafism, 
which include elements of Wahhabism in their approach to the religion. While the 
state is Maliki (based on the Sunni school established by Imam Malik Ibn Anas, 
who emphasized the precedents set in Medina by the Prophet of Islam and the 
people of the city or as he called it “the work of the people of Medina”) in 
jurisprudence, Asha’ari (following the ideas of Asha’ari who emphasized the need 
for context and discussion while arguing that some things need to be accepted on 
faith) in doctrine, and Sufi (mystical and directly relational to God through mystical 
practice) in foundation, it has had a long history of interaction with the Wahhabi 
movement from its inception onwards (Ministry of Religious Foundations and 
Islamic Affairs, 2017). It is important to note that the Muslim world does not view 
its own divisions in the same manner of denominational differences within Buddhist 
and Christian traditions. Informal and less structured influence has been ongoing 
since the 18th century, when Wahhabism emerged. Wahhabism's influence in 
Morocco is so significant that a book, Wahhabism: the Founder, the Thought and 
the Movement (Belkabir, 2004) written by some of the country’s leading luminaries, 
was prepared in its defense in an attempt to de-link it from the attacks that took 
place only six weeks prior. The manuscript went to the printer the following year 
and is a valuable insight on how Wahhabism is understood by the country’s 
intellectual elite. The book attempts to defend Wahhabism as a well-meaning, if 
largely unsuccessful, reform movement. It contains a speech by the Sultan Slimane 
(1766-1822, reigning from 1792 until his death) attacking certain folk practices 
such as festivals and shrine visits. One article underscores the connection between 
Sultan Mohamed Ibn Abdullah, Moulay Slimane’s grandfather, who was a 
contemporary and a supporter of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Professor Abdelhadi 
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Boutaleb (deceased in 2009), a senior Moroccan scholar and a diplomat, recognizes 
the historical roots of the Moroccan Wahhabi movement in the book: 
 
Sultan Mohamed ibn Abdullah led an important reform movement. He 
focused his attention on the science of hadith, which is the source of the 
Salafi movement since the time of Ahmed ibn Hanbal and Ibn Tammiya. 
He introduced Morocco to the foundations of Imam Ahmed [sic Ibn 
Hanbal] and the foundations of Ibn Hanifa, which were not known in 
Morocco … He was a true Salafi, who described himself as Maliki in 
jurisprudential orientation and Hanbali in belief. He forbade the reading of 
books based on kalam [sic “dialogue” meaning philosophical debate] 
along Ash’arite lines, and enjoined stopping at beliefs taking from the 
apparent meaning of the book and the Sunnah without interpretation in the 
Salafi way. (Boutaleb, 2004, p.142) 
 
Boutaleb is recalling a very different Salafism and a very different Wahhabism that 
existed in Morocco’s past. Not only that, the peaceful life exemplified by Boutaleb 
and other academic admirers of Wahhabism stands in sharp contrast to the lifestyles 
enjoined and pursued by the terrorists. Having served as the Moroccan ambassador 
to the United States, Boutaleb’s political and personal philosophy was clearly 
realistic and pragmatic. Like other authors in the book, he appears to think that 
Wahhabism can be a progressive force. The authors go as far as to invoke the late 
Mohamed ‘Abed Al-Jabri, a professor of philosophy and Islamic thought at 
Mohammed V University and a quasi-secular thinker (deceased 2010) criticized for 
his free thought by Salafis (Al-Hababi, 2004, p. 160).  
The pragmatic and rationalistic ideas of Boutaleb concerning Wahhabism are 
not shared by Takfiri Salafists (see table on page 4) who would condemn him for 
consorting and interacting with pagans (the Americans) during his stint as 
ambassador in the United States. The Wahhabi movement has been characterized 
by excess and over-politicization, according to a leading Salafi figure, Farid Al-
Ansari (2007). An often misunderstood and underestimated theologian, Al-Ansari 
was a social activist in the Unification and Reform Movement (Tawhid wa Islah). 
This was the social movement underpinning the Moroccan Party of Justice and 
Development. One of his works directly relates to politics and his concerns about 
the Islamist movement in Morocco (Al-Ansari, 2007). Al-Ansari clearly states that 
the Moroccan Islamist movement in general has been too harsh against Maliki 
Islam, Moroccan Sufism, and the use of non-Hanbali (Hanbalism is the Sunni 
school established by Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, emphasizing the literal application of the 
Qu’ran, within which Wahhabism arose) references to the point of anathematization 
or takfir. Al-Ansari (2007) calls out the Islamist movement for creating six “idols,” 
to include, “the idolization of the Hanbali denomination in the Salafi movement.” 
Concerning this final idol, Al-Ansari hones an internal critique of his own 
movement. First, Al-Ansari argues that the attacks on Maliki Islam, under a new 
generation of Salafi and Wahhabi scholars in Morocco have alienated both the state 
and many other Moroccans. Second, he argues that their insistence on ideological 
purity has harmed their community by fomenting internal divisions. Third, he 
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argues that the movement’s attacks on Sufism have earned it the hostility of Sufi 
orders in Morocco and their suspicion. Fourth, he argued the movement emphasized 
external appearances of piety instead of a values framework. Fifth, he argued that 
the form actually advocated by the Salafi and Wahhabi movement is basically what 
is practiced in the Gulf States (which he does not mention by name), and that it is a 
form alien to the needs and historical heritage of Morocco (Al-Ansari, 2007, pp. 
141-175). In short, Al-Ansari forcefully argues that the Moroccan Wahhabi and 
Salafist movement is founded on a rejection, a nearly complete one, of Moroccan 
traditional approaches to religion. The rejection includes earlier versions of 
Salafism that were brought by Sultan Mohamed Ibn Abdullah, his grandson Sultan 
Slimane, independence leader ‘Allal Al-Fasi, as well as followers of the current 
movement in Morocco. Since the Moroccan constitution and tradition establish the 
monarch as the commander of the faithful in Morocco, and Islam as the official 
religion, the theological and political challenge posed by the more extreme and 
violent Wahhabi and Salafist Islamist movements is serious, because it leaves no 
room for compromise.  
This challenge is based on specific readings and interpretations of religious 
texts. As these can be classified, they are the closest item that can exist to a “cause” 
for violent extremism in a Moroccan context. Such causes were outlined by Abu 
Zaid Al-Maqari al-Idrissi (2010), a PJD member of parliament, a linguist, and a 
researcher in Islamic thought. In essence, he complements and elaborates upon the 
criticisms raised by Al-Ansari. He outlines five broad levels of causation for 
terrorism: these are cultural, psychological, mental, militant, and political. In terms 
of what he calls a cultural set of causes, he also identifies five important factors that 
lead people to become extremists. The first one is simply not having the tools to 
understand what the Qu’ran means. The second one is the detachment of written 
word from its context, including the Qu’ranic verses related to war. The third factor 
involves the mixing of missionary work with governance, failing to understand the 
difference between the two stages. Fourth, the confusion of what God appears to 
promise non-believers with what believers ought to do to them. The fifth factor 
involves mixing “right and wrong” in terms of interacting with other cultures, 
movements, and sects. Like Al-Kahal, Al-Zamzami and implicitly Al-Ansari, Al-
Maqari al-Idrissi places the cause of violent extremism first and foremost in 
ideology. On the psychological level, he identifies a psychology of oppression and 
despair that invites retaliation against the other; he points out that the traditional 
distinctions between individuals and their nation-states has broken down in people’s 
minds. At the mental level, he puts blame on media in general for making Islam 
appear more militant and violent than other religions, which has two effects: it feeds 
Islamophobia and simultaneously encourages violence. At the militant level, he 
argues that many people believe that military might is the proof that can show the 
correctness of the Islamic message and therefore warring against other populations 
is warranted. Finally, at the political level, he argues that there are grievances, such 
as Palestine, held by Muslims that feed extremism (Al-Maqari al-Idrissi, 2010, pp. 
62-72).  
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The Role of Education and Dialogue 
While security and law enforcement measures are important, they cannot stop 
terrorism without the help of society/government in addressing the underlying 
threats that extreme Salafi Jihadi interpretations of Islam pose to the Moroccan state 
and its citizens. As stated earlier, it is important to avoid the pitfall of putting the 
Salafi movement in Morocco into a single category. The clear majority of Salafis 
and Wahhabis do not practice or preach violence. A royal declaration, or dahir, was 
issued in 2016 calling for reforming the religious education system in Morocco to 
emphasize the values of peaceful co-existence, moderation, and tolerance with other 
cultures, civilizations, and religions. The declaration set off a debate on how to 
reform religious education, as well as debates between those advocating “Islamic” 
education against those advocating “comparative religious studies.” Nevertheless, 
the king’s declaration was responding to the need to reduce the threats posed by the 
violent Jihadi minority branches of the Salafi movement (Al-Kafi, 2016, pp. 3-6). 
The strategy used the educational system to recruit members and spread counter-
narratives (Benhamza, 2016, pp. 7-16). 
Educational changes may help reduce the threat in the future, but they can do 
little to persuade convinced terrorists that they should give up their planned 
violence. Therefore, the government also pursued arrests which led to interactions 
that inevitably took place between the accused terrorists and the various officials in 
the Moroccan legal system. Subsequent dialogue in the courts resulted in requests 
for royal pardons, implying that the convicted terrorist accepts the legitimacy of the 
Moroccan state. This was the case with several Salafi clerics who had given 
sermons to the attackers but expressed reservations and retractions in prison. A 
more formal process took place where the head of the official Moroccan ‘Ulema 
Association, Ahmed ‘Abadi, met with a group of 12 convicted terrorists that were 
guided by the May 16th leader, Khalid Hadad. The dialogue included such topics 
as the Maliki school of jurisprudence, the Command of the Faithful (the Moroccan 
king’s religious role), and issues related to dealing with non-Muslims. Based on 
recent reports, it appears that some of these prisoners are changing their minds out 
of conviction and not convenience (Abu al-Ma’ali, 2017). 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the complex and multifaceted Moroccan response to the challenge 
posed by the terrorists and their ideology has been effective. It may be useful to ask 
what other countries can do for Morocco, but there is little that outsiders can do. 
Nevertheless, there are things that are actionable for foreign states and actors in 
terms of reducing the level of threat both within Morocco and outside it. These 
actions may not be politically popular or economically cheap, but they are doable. 
These include enhanced levels of aid and investment in Morocco as well as a more 
cautious approach to Salafi movements than the one exhibited by the West in the 
Middle East and Syria. Aside from not creating violence in places like Libya and 
Syria, providing help to countries like Morocco also means accepting that these 
states are a product of a very different political and religious history. Other areas of 
cooperation would include security sector reform and educational improvement. 
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Ultimately, however, the theological challenge represented by the extremist 
segments of the Salafi movement can be met only by the ideological resources of 
the local states and governments in question and the religious establishments they 
support. The good news concerning the challenge posed by violent extremists is 
that the Islamist movement itself is taking them seriously and is taking apart their 
arguments. No less a Salafi thinker than the late Farid Al-Ansari has criticized the 
tendency to exclude, demonize, and condemn other people, and the whole 
mainstream of Islamist community is engaged in a debate concerning their origins 
and what to do about violent extremism, and that is a far cry from the denial that 
met the attacks on both May 16, 2003, and on 9/11.  
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of National Development 
Zakaria Fatih 
Abstract 
This article explores the question of national development in Morocco 
considering the institution of the makhzen. It asserts that to adequately 
assess Morocco’s national development as a post-colonial country, it is 
necessary to rely on an economic model based in politics rather than in 
theories exclusively informed by classical and neoclassical economics. 
Among the key economists called upon to investigate the validity of 
politics in discussions of national development and income inequality are 
the following: Simon Kuznets, Thomas Piketty, W. A. Lewis, and the duo 
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, all of whom continue a long 
tradition of economic sociology that had been established by George 
Simmel, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Thorstein Veblen. Acemoglu 
and Robinson offer an especially useful theoretical model to discuss 
Morocco in light of its pervasive political institution: the makhzen. 
Overall, the paper demonstrates that inadequate national institutions, such 
as the makhzen in the case of Morocco, adversely impact national 
development and increase the level of income inequality. 
 
 
Introduction 
Taking Morocco as a case study, I argue in this paper that national development 
depends on the nature of national institutions. The more democratic and inclusive 
national institutions are, the more likely the climate those institutions generate will 
spur economic growth and reduce income inequality and social disparities. 
Approaching national development from the vantage point of politics and history is 
not an unprecedented undertaking; German historicists and American 
institutionalists did just that when they advocated for an economics open to “other 
disciplines, such as law, political science and arts” (Sandelin, Trautwein, & 
Wundrak, 2014, p. 68). Added to those early historicists and institutionalists a new 
wave of economists, including but not limited to Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) 
and Piketty (2014) have argued for a politically-informed analysis to the question 
of economics and national development, considering this move an urgent 
undertaking in light of the looming threats of “arbitrary and unsustainable 
inequalities” that capitalism may “automatically generate” in the 21st century 
(Piketty, 2014, p. 1).  
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An analytical approach to the question of national development in Morocco, 
taking into account the state of national institutions and the role of politics in 
decision-making, has the potential to better assess Morocco’s national development 
than a purely economic model that depends, according to Smith (2010), on the 
magic of the “the invisible hand” to fix the irregularities of the market economy and 
curb the rate of income inequality and social disparities. The pervasive nature of the 
institution of the makhzen proves that, far from being a question of economics 
alone, national development in Morocco is also a question of politics and political 
institutions. By relying on Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) and Piketty (2014), I 
will show why non-politically informed economic models of national development 
are inadequate for post-colonial economies such as Morocco’s. Specifically, I will 
consider the “institution” of the makhzen in Morocco in light of Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s (2013) model that focuses on the creative power of inclusive 
institutions. 
 
Literature Review 
Thus, the literature review deliberately prioritizes a political economy inspired 
by the findings of social scientists and, moreover, lists a contemporary sample of 
noteworthy representatives of this brand of economics as well as their inevitable 
precursors. The allusion here is to George Simmel (2011), Émile Durkheim (2014), 
Max Weber (2019), Thorstein Veblen (Lerner, 1964), and Karl Polanyi (2001) who, 
in an attempt to refute the self-regulating nature of classical economics, espoused 
an economics open to findings from the social sciences, mainly from the fields of 
sociology, law, and politics. The affiliation to economics tasks the social scientist 
with the ethical responsibility to “inform democratic debate and focus attention on 
the right questions” as well as, argues Piketty (2014), “redefine the terms of debate, 
unmask certain preconceived or fraudulent notions, and subject all positions to 
constant critical scrutiny” (p. 3). The role of social scientific research appears in the 
case of Simmel (2011), as Lemert noted in the foreword in how he “tells the story 
of the greed of history’s dominant classes” (p. xi). According to Lemert, Simmel 
(2011) understood the capitalist system’s new power, money, and its impending 
influence on human relations, which entails not only the rise of a new nexus 
between freedom and money but also the birth of new forms of social bondage. Of 
interest here is how the social order, in the presence or absence of good institutions, 
has informed economic life throughout history, an assertion that Simmel (2011) 
illustrates with various examples from Roman law through modern times. 
Sociological input in economics is also palpable when Durkheim (2014) draws 
attention to the social origins of the division of labor that until his time had been 
viewed as an exclusively economic matter, if not even a phenomenon of the natural 
order: “There is no need to demonstrate the serious nature of this practical problem: 
whatever assessment we make of the division of labor, we all sense that it is, and 
increasingly so, one of the fundamentals of the social order” (p. 35). The affinities 
that the social order has with economics inform Weber’s (2019) distinction between 
“social rank” and “social class,” between the economic standing of individuals in 
traditional societies, in which the standing depends on social privilege, and their 
economic status in modern societies, which is not as much determined by social 
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rank or privilege; the conditions of possibility for good economics are antithetical 
to social rank:  
 
Every society based on social rank is ordered conventionally, through the 
regulation of life conduct; this therefore creates irrational conditions for 
consumption. This obstructs the free formation of markets, through 
monopolistic appropriation, and by obstructing the free disposition of 
individuals’ capacities to engage in gainful activity on their own account. 
(Weber, 2019, p. 457) 
 
Weber’s (2019) attitude reflects the risks to individual freedom he observed in 
societies of social rank as compromising social mobility and the dynamics of the 
market economy through monopolies based on privilege and the persistence of the 
natural order of things.  
The inextricable nexus of economics and social sciences had as functionality 
for Simmel (2011), Durkheim (2014), Weber (2019) as well as for Veblen (Lerner, 
1964) and Polanyi (2001) a corrective action to the fateful question of economics. 
Veblen (Lerner, 1964), for example, targets the classical economics’ view of the 
division of labor as a phenomenon of the natural order and accuses Smith (2010) of 
a “teleological bias” (p. 245). In the same vein, sociologist Fred Block not only 
underscores Polanyi’s (2001) predisposition to what may be called regulatory 
economics, he also believes in its capacity to avert the catastrophes, such as the 
great wars, brought about by classical economics:  
 
Although he wrote The Great Transformation during World War II, 
Polanyi remained optimistic about the future; he thought the cycle of 
international conflict could be broken. The key step was to overturn the 
belief that social life should be subordinated to the market mechanism. 
Once free of this “obsolete market mentality,” the path would be open to 
subordinate both national economies and the global economy to 
democratic politics. Polanyi saw Roosevelt’s New Deal as a model of these 
future possibilities. (Polanyi, 2001, p. xxxv)  
 
In the second decade of the 21st century, from where I draw the two main sources 
for this study, the nexus of economics and social sciences has gained even more 
ground even as it became gradually more focused on questions of poverty, income 
inequality, and national development respectively in Banerjee and Duflo (2011), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), and Piketty (2014).  
The ubiquity of the makhzen, as a political force in Morocco, calls for 
politically informed theories of national development, such as the ones propounded 
by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) on the one hand and Banerjee and Duflo (2011) 
as well as Piketty (2014) on the other hand. The hypotheses of these economists in 
so far as they highlight the nexus of political institutions to national development is 
especially relevant for examining non-democratic economies where the struggle 
against income inequality, and access to education, employment opportunities, and 
180   Journal of Global Initiatives 
social justice logically call for greater political participation and voice in national 
development policy debates. A meaningful discussion of the Moroccan political 
economy ought to take seriously the specter of the makhzen due to its far-reaching 
powers. In the words of political scholar Boukhars that Hissouf (2016) quotes in his 
article, “Benkirane [former Moroccan prime minister] frequently lashes out at the 
subterfuge of what he calls the ‘ghosts’ and ‘crocodiles’ of the invisible but 
powerful ‘Makhzenian’ force” (p. 50). Moreno Almeida (2013) also tries to expose 
the subterfuge, or the hideout, that veils the makhzen’s direct intervention in social, 
economic, and cultural affairs: “In other words, through this method [withdrawing 
funding for social and cultural events], the Makhzen is not directly accused of 
controlling freedom of speech or censorship” (p. 322). In the relative absence of 
focused research on the role of the makhzen in national development, I rely mostly 
on the work of Mohamed Daadaoui (2011, 2012), as well as Fatima Harrak (2018) 
and Abdallah Laroui (1999). These scholars recognize the makhzen as both an 
economic and a political force. As an institution, it is a hierarchical composite of 
religious entities and administrative agents endowed with political power. Daadaoui 
(2011) defines the makhzen as “an administrative apparatus” with “particular social 
and cultural symbols,” and “practices and rituals that have always buttressed 
functions of the state” (p. 47). He lists the three main groups that formed the 
makhzen until the 19th century. The first group, in charge of internal and external 
policy, includes “the king,” “the wazirs (viziers or ministers),” and “the hajibs 
(major domo);” the second “the chancellery” composed of “katibs (secretaries)” in 
charge of communicating “state policies and measures” taken by the first group; the 
third “treasurers and intendants” tasked with fiscal issues (Daadaoui, 2011). 
Daadaoui (2011) writes, “the establishment of modern political institutions neither 
changed nor transformed makhzenite authority. The current modern state in 
Morocco features western style institutions of government and precolonial power 
traditions” (pp. 59-60). Daadaoui (2011) makes it clear that the traditional structure 
of the makhzen still runs the country:  
 
Makhzen has maintained its traditional structures necessary for its 
legitimation. At the same time, it has reformed its institutions into a 
modern administration within a façade constitutional monarchy. … 
Politically, makhzen is the only constant force, while all other political 
forces are transient and ephemeral. (p. 67)  
 
In essence, Daadaoui (2011) suggests that institutions implemented during or after 
colonialism, such as the king, political parties, the parliament, which is now 
bicameral, the office of the prime minister, the judicial system, the appointed 
bureaucracy as well as property rights, cooperations, and organizations are all 
makhzenite in nature, i.e. they operate following the triad of functions mentioned 
above that governed Morocco prior to colonialism. In light of the ubiquity of the 
makhzen as a political and an economic force, it makes sense to apply an approach 
that takes into account the role of politics in national development.  
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Discussion 
Thomas Piketty (2014), one of the most prominent economists alive today, has 
critiqued Simon Kuznets’ (1955) highly influential and long unquestioned theory 
that postulated industrialization leads first to greater income inequality only for the 
inequality to later subside sharply at a second stage, supposedly once the 
fundamentals of industrialization have been grasped. When the second stage of 
industrialization kicks in, those who were disadvantaged will start to harvest the 
fruits of their labor and become legitimate contributors to national development and 
economic growth. Kuznets seemed to have embraced an overly optimistic theory 
that traded the Marxist “apocalyptic prediction” of a permanent “inegalitarian 
spiral” for a political economy that believes in the aphorism: “Growth is a rising 
tide that lifts all boats” (Piketty, 2014, p. 14).1 Piketty (2014) rebukes Kuznets’ 
predictions that “should theoretically reproduce itself everywhere, including 
underdeveloped countries then mired in postcolonial poverty” (p. 18). That poverty, 
still ever-present decades after the wave of the liberation movements, discredits 
Kuznets’ prognostic. His so much hoped for reproduction has never taken place in 
the post-colonial world, Morocco included, nor has Kuznets’ hypothesis ever fully 
materialized in the United States of America.2 Ben Nasr, et al. (2019) reproaches 
Kuznets’ inverted U-curve for its unsubstantiated “empirical evidence” that 
prevents assessing “a long temporal change in income inequality,” and for its 
inability to “explicitly” date “the stages” (p. 828).3 In the case of most developing 
countries, “the less privileged” and the poor, the authors argue, have no credit value 
and capital remains beyond their reach, preventing their potential in economic 
investments and active involvement in wealth production leading to a permanent 
gap in social and economic equality and greater instability (Ben Nasr et al., 2019, 
p. 828).  
The irreconcilability of non-politically informed economic theories with the 
realities of post-colonial economies indicates that national development relies more 
heavily on strong and credible political institutions than previously thought. The 
high rate of income inequality and social injustice in post-colonial industrialized 
economies is not due to being unindustrialized, or not industrialized enough, but for 
not being democratic enough. There are additional reasons that further discredit 
Kuznets’ economic arguments in the developing world. Decolonization coincided 
with the moment when industries began to depend less and less on human labor and 
soon moved after that moment to automation and robotic industrialization. 
 
1 First published in France in 2013.   
2 In Piketty’s (2014) view, what led to the sharp decrease in inequality in the United States 
points more to the 1929 global depression and to the two world wars, catastrophic events 
that disrupted income returns on capital and wealth, and not to the “‘advanced phase’ of 
industrial development” (p. 18). 
3 As of 2018, Kuznets’ specter still looms larger than life; he continues to be an influential 
figure in studies on income inequality, such as Ben Nasr et al. (2019). They open their 
article with the following sentence: “A study conducted by Kuznets (1955) is continuously 
referenced by most of the research evaluating the possible relationship between economic 
growth and income inequality and/vice versa” (Ben Nasr et al., 2019, p. 827).   
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Industrialization of agriculture, for example, has displaced vast segments of rural 
populations without governments making adequate investment in or provision of 
quality education needed to train people for jobs in a modern industrialized 
economy. This failure leads some observers to believe that withholding quality 
education represents a calculated political decision to stem the potential of the 
working class as a subversive popular force to political absolutism.4 The issue of 
global inequality and underdevelopment does not stem from the growth rate of 
industrialization, or the performance of any other sector of the economy, be it 
tourism, agriculture, fisheries, or mining that have witnessed unprecedented growth 
in Morocco thanks to modernization, foreign direct investments, and reforms. 
Rather, the real problem of national development lies in the nature of the political 
institutions that regulate and profit from those sectors and the impact of the political 
decision-making process on availability and access to education, training, and job 
opportunities. 
As both Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue, “Traditionally economics has 
ignored politics, but understanding politics is crucial for explaining world 
inequality. As the economists Abba Lerner noted in the 1970s, ‘[e]conomics has 
gained the title Queen of the Social Sciences by choosing solved political problems 
as its domain’” (p. 68). The inclusion of politics in economics is gaining 
momentum, as we have already seen with Piketty (2014), who rails against 
economics’ “childish passion for mathematics” and its refusal, in the name of 
“scientificity,” to collaborate with social sciences, especially with politics, history, 
and sociology: “we must obviously take a pragmatic approach and avail ourselves 
of the methods of historians, sociologists, and political scientists as well as 
economists” (p. 42). In Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), the interest in politics 
indicates the desire to see a politically-informed economics, whereas, in Piketty 
(2014), the point in placing economic data at the disposition of policy makers, 
historians, and politicians nurtures the hope to see a socially-informed and 
culturally-conscious economics.5  
Between Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) on the one hand, and Piketty (2014) 
on the other, but both proponents of politically-inspired economics, the agreement 
on the necessity of the integration of politics in economics is offset by the 
disagreement about the share allocated to culture, history, sociology, and other 
social sciences in national development. If Piketty calls for full collaboration with 
the social sciences, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) restrict the collaboration to the 
 
4 For more discussion on the nexus of national development and the fear of 
industrialization, see the section: “Fear of Industry” in Daron Acemoglu and James A. 
Robinson (2012), Why Nation Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New 
York, NY: Crown Business. pp. 222-231. 
5 Piketty’s (2014) dream job, he writes, “was to teach at the École des Hautes Études en 
Sciences Sociales,” because the school gives the best example of an institution of higher 
education in which historians, such as Lucien Febvre and Fernand Braudel, rub shoulders 
with an anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and a sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, among 
others. Besides enabling cross-disciplinary interaction, this intellectual environment 
enables its residents to constantly check each other’s work and hypotheses (p. 41).    
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institutional side of politics, rejecting geography and culture as well as “ignorance” 
for being unreliable criteria in discussions of world inequality (pp. 45-69). For 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), the deciding factor in the failure of poor nations 
fighting underdevelopment and the continued economic success of prosperous 
nations reside in politics, mainly in political institutions.  
While the belated credit to politics does not vindicate Marxist ideology in its 
call to erect a proletarian-based system on the ashes of bourgeois capitalism, the 
growing interest in politics in theories about income inequality and economic 
growth re-centers the issue of national development by awarding to politics a large 
margin in the discussion. For Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) a nation’s prosperity 
and progress depend on inclusive institutions; the more inclusive institutions are the 
more prosperous a nation is and, by contrast, the more extractive or non-inclusive 
those institutions are, the less prosperity a nation generates. The symmetry of 
political and economic institutions becomes the sole criterion in determining the 
cause of affluence and, conversely, in the case of asymmetrical institutions the 
reason for a nation’s poverty.  
Acemoglu’s own successful story in the West as a Turkish-Armenian 
immigrant in England first and then a prominent academic in one of the most 
prestigious institutions of higher education in the United States, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, best illustrates how inclusive political and economic 
systems can lift people out of poverty. This is what inclusive political and economic 
systems do; by embracing all members in society, they transform the individual into 
an ethical force in the service of knowledge and beneficial production, creating 
prosperity and wellbeing.  
 
The Makhzen and National Development 
No one contests the impressive strides Morocco has made in the economic 
sector nor does anyone disagree that those valuable gains have disproportionately 
enriched and increased the economic and political power of the makhzen. This 
Machiavellian power structure balances state violence or hard power with privilege 
or soft power by relying on patrimonial practices rooted in the ancient cultures and 
traditions of Morocco. Some of those practices were institutionalized within the 
makhzen during the reign of Ahmad al-Mansour, AKA al-Mansour al-Dahbi of the 
Saadi Dynasty, who “initiated the elaboration of a centralized system of governance 
for Morocco, which came to be known as the Makhzen” (Harrak, 2018, p. 283). For 
Daadaoui (2011), the birth of the makhzen happened in stages; it designated first 
the “whole government,” which included “the army and the administration” when 
Morocco seceded from the Abbasid dynasty in Baghdad in the 12th century and, 
second, in the 16th century when it referred to an institution in charge of collecting 
and transferring taxes to the treasury: “Thus, throughout its development, makhzen 
has shifted from its literal meaning as the government’s treasury to a sociopolitical 
interpretation as a ‘reservoir of power’” (p. 42).6  
 
6 Unlike Harrak (2018) and Daadaoui (2011), Laroui (1999) attaches the birth of the “new 
makhzen,” which the Europeans noticed ahead of the protectorate, to the reign of Moroccan 
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The universal reach of the makhzen is both a blessing and a curse. Morocco 
owes its stability to the power the makhzen wields in politics, in public affairs, in 
foreign policy, in diplomacy, in trade and economic matters as well as in the social 
and the cultural life of the citizen. The state is practically everywhere, a pervasive 
presence that also leads to political atrophy and institutional stagnation. As an 
imaginary and eternal state symbol, the makhzen also secures national 
cohesiveness, but the cohesion comes at the expense of cultural emancipation and 
social mobility. The makhzen, which has so far spared the country the turmoil 
observed in its regional neighborhood, can best be described using one of Weber’s 
(2019) types of legitimate domination. Under the three “pure types of authority,” 
Weber (2019) conditions the legitimacy of “traditional authority” to “the sanctity 
of age-old rules and powers. The masters are designated according to traditional 
rules and are obeyed because of their traditional status (Eigenwürde)” (p. 226). 
“Obedience” in such a system, adds Weber (2019), is paid to “the person who 
occupies a position of authority by tradition or who has been chosen for it by the 
traditional master” (p. 227). In Morocco today, the citizen, as a subject of the 
monarch, owes obedience not only to the governor, one of the king’s administrative 
appointees, but also to caids, sheikhs, and moqaddems who, by comparison to the 
position of governor, find their origin not in French colonialism but in the 
makhzenite power hierarchy.  
The political structure of the makhzen in the aftermath of colonialism blends 
positions of power that French colonialism institutionalized, such as “civil officials 
of the modern state” (Daadaoui, 2012, p. 56) and traditional administrative positions 
and practices that the Moroccan state revived, such as “the office of grievances,” or 
“majlis (court),” as well as the “bay’a,” or allegiance, an annual ceremony that 
“reinforces the linkage between the king and his subjects” (Daadaoui, 2012, pp. 60-
61). Daadaoui (2012) argues that the makhzen commands a composite of powerful 
political structures that, to borrow an old adage, is nothing more than old wine in 
new bottles: 
 
The institutional reorganization of makhzen after independence was an 
attempt to renew local institutions and local community traditions under 
the aegis of a new modern state. In fact, the state structure appears modern, 
but its nucleus is comprised of renewed traditional modes of government. 
Institutional mechanisms for political manipulation are facilitated by the 
existence of a primordial system that sets the monarch above the political 
system. (Daadaoui, 2011, p.67)  
 
Daadaoui implies that the survival of the makhzen depends on outdated political 
practices that are antagonistic to democratic governance. His arguments explain in 
part the impossible cohabitation of the old institutions of the makhzen and the 
modern institutions of a democratic state.  
 
Sultan Mohammed III who is credited with modernizing it decades after the death of his 
grandfather, Sultan Ismail (p. 90).  
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The ubiquity of the makhzen’s power and influence is reason to call for a 
strategy of national development that factors the impact of national institutions in 
economic and social indicators and, not as it is usually the case, especially in NGOs’ 
reports, of national development as isolated findings about a particular social 
criterion or economic scale. In other words, inasmuch as it is necessary to look at 
the makhzen as the political body in charge of the success or failure of the national 
economy and social policy, it is equally indispensable to assess national 
development, especially in the post-colonial world, on the basis of the transparency, 
representativeness, and accountability of such national institutions. Furthermore, 
the means of production, in this case, are not detached from the political structure 
or, to use Fanon’s (2004) words about the colonial world: “[i]n the colonies the 
economic infrastructure is also a superstructure” (p. 5). The makhzen has the dual 
function of collecting taxes and doing politics; it is as much involved in economic 
production as it is in the stipulation of a political economy that serves the interests 
of the class(es) it represents.  
The makhzen and its extractive institutions have a direct impact on regional 
development and social disparities, which could be accounted for by the use of the 
“dual economy” paradigm, or Lewis’ (1954) model. Lewis (1954) ties 
underdevelopment to structural variations between the modern sector of the 
economy, which Lewis calls “the capitalist sector,” and the traditional sector of the 
economy, which he calls “the sector of subsistence” (p. 6). The contrast leads to an 
economy moving at two speeds and evolving inadequately to be able to resolve 
social disparities and bring about sustained human flow from the sector of 
subsistence toward the capitalist sector. Even though Lewis’ (1954) model was 
formulated decades ago, it offers a description of the social and economic 
discrepancies observed in Morocco. Although there has been a modest movement 
from the sector of subsistence to the capitalist sector in Morocco, the deplorable 
state of public education and the scarcity of capital allocated to poor individuals and 
small businesses willing to embrace the spirit of the new economy are major 
obstacles to real improvement. The makhzen may also perceive a gathering threat 
to its interest in the expansion of the capitalist sector for reasons Lewis (1954) lists 
below:  
 
The fact that the wage level in the capitalist sector depends upon earnings 
in the subsistence sector is sometimes of immense political importance, 
since its effect is that capitalists have a direct interest in holding down the 
productivity of the subsistence workers. Thus, the owners of plantations 
have no interest in seeing knowledge of new techniques or new seeds 
conveyed to the peasants, and if they are influential in the government, 
they will not be found using their influence to expand the facilities for 
agricultural extension. (p. 6) 
 
Take the example of public education in today’s Morocco, an area with the potential 
to spur successful migration from “the sector of subsistence” to “the capitalist 
sector.” Public schools at all levels have been marred in a myriad of problems 
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concerning the quality of instruction to the degree that a rising number of Moroccan 
families prefer to send their children to private schools.7 In 2017, the percentage of 
children in private schools stood at 14%, or 1 million students, still a low percentage 
because only the wealthy could afford to pay tuition, transportation, and school 
supplies.8 Moreover, the state continues to welcome the move from public to private 
schools because the relocation relieves some of the financial burden on its treasury 
by dumping on private institutions some of the costs of building new schools, hiring 
new personnel, and making available other logistics. The catastrophic results of 
lowering the standards of public education explain the persistence of structural 
disequilibria and the rising rate of inequality, since the majority of those able to 
afford private education for their children are the very same people already in the 
capitalist sector, those who understand the value of offering their children an 
adequate education and can already afford to do so. The Legatum Prosperity Index 
(2018) on education shows Morocco with a ranking at 117 among 149 countries, 
134 on social capital, and 130 on personal freedom. The fact that 14% of Moroccan 
students are able to attend private schools means that only a tiny fraction can dream 
of social upward mobility and that education is one of the strongest cards in the 
hands of the makhzen, as an extractive institution, to control the flow from the 
subsistence sector to the capitalist sector. 9  
The binary oppositions between “extractive and inclusive economic 
institutions” on the one hand and “extractive and inclusive political institutions” on 
the other hand hold the most plausible explanation to what is taking place in 
Morocco. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) define “inclusive political institutions” 
as “sufficiently centralized and pluralistic” and “extractive political institutions” as 
a power monopoly “in the hands of a narrow elite” (p. 81). They maintain that 
“economic inclusive institutions” establish the foundations for an equal distribution 
of wealth and resources. In addition, they emphasize that “inclusive political 
institutions” lead to “inclusive economic institutions” in that the state becomes the 
“enforcer of law and order” to protect “public services and regulate economic 
activity” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 80). It intervenes to fight fraud and 
illegal and dubious economic dealings so as to guarantee, among other things, an 
equal playing field for everyone. By contrast, “extractive political institutions” 
usher in “extractive economic institutions.” In such cases, political institutions are 
designed in a way to serve the interest of the powerful. While one could argue in 
favor of “inclusive economic institutions” in Morocco, the inclusion does not touch 
 
7 In a press conference, the spokesman for the Moroccan government blames the current 
educational system for creating a “jobless generation.” He stated that school dropouts stand 
at 270,000 a year. See the following link from Morocco World News, accessed on May 7, 
2019: https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/05/272521/official-morocco-education-
system-produces-jobless-generation/ 
8 These statistics appear in this article: “Année scolaire 2017-2018: 1 élève sur 7 est 
scolarisé dans le privé,” accessed on May 14, 2019: 
https://www.medias24.com/MAROC/Quoi-de-neuf/184572-Education-nationale-les-
principaux-chiffres-de-l-annee-scolaire-2017-2018.html  
9 See previous note on the percentage of students attending private institutions.  
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all the geographic regions nor are economic opportunities available to all the 
citizens. 
Many media pundits have described Morocco as a country that runs on two 
speeds. The launching of Morocco’s high-speed train created a polemic concerning 
the social and economic disparities between the haves and the have nots, or 
Morocco moving at two speeds (Rboub, 2017). The unbearable economic and social 
disparities between the haves and the have-nots are occasionally met with state 
violence to stem the tide of popular revolt, as in the recent Hirak movement in the 
Rif for which its leader, Nasser Zefzafi, is now serving a 20-year prison sentence. 
According to The New York Times, the court charged him and his acolytes with 
“undermining public order and threatening national unity” (Reuters, 2018). 
Zefzafi’s case illustrates the unsustainability of the coexistence of “extractive 
economic institutions” that the makhzen symbolizes and its spurious “inclusive 
political institutions.” The daily eight-month long protests he organized had social 
grievances and economic discontent as their dominant themes; although he 
denounced state surveillance, he never complained of the inability to organize 
protests and hold rallies. In fact, he offered the state the alibi to arrest him when he 
interrupted the Friday religious sermon, which was his biggest mistake. In a sense, 
Zefzafi did take advantage of the availability of “inclusive political institutions” to 
rally public support in the Rif and the rest of Morocco, but that effort failed to 
contest the “extractive economic institutions.”  
Zefzafi’s example shows that spurious “inclusive political institutions” can 
coexist with “extractive economic institutions.” The coexistence becomes possible 
when “extractive economic institutions” give the impression of “inclusive 
economic institutions,” or alternatively, when “extractive political institutions” pass 
for “inclusive political institutions.” However, the limitations of spurious inclusive 
institutions, whether economic or political, appear when the system is in crisis 
mode, i.e., when individuals or social groups challenge those institutions, either 
through a momentum of economic grievances or by protesting their social 
condition. In the name of “undermining public order and threatening national 
unity,” which is a common allegation in Morocco to muzzle dissidents, as in 
Zefzafi’s case, the makhzen intervenes in the process of “creative destruction” that 
the protesters may have unleashed.10 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) rightly point 
out that, “[f]ear of creative destruction is often at the root of the opposition to 
inclusive economic and political institutions” (p. 84). The Hirak movement exposed 
the paradox of the Moroccan state as promoter of democracy and the rule of law, 
i.e., as a state that appears to embrace and live by “political inclusive institutions” 
while also holding on to the extractive institutions of the makhzen. 
The fear of “creative destruction” in the case of Morocco presents itself in terms 
of a class struggle. If the power of the makhzen is threatened, it is not only the 
 
10 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) explain Joseph Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” as 
the replacement of “the old with the new. New sectors attract resources away from old 
ones. New firms take business away from established ones. New technologies make 
existing skills and machines obsolete” (p. 84). 
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economic interests of a social group that are at risk; it is the privilege of the class 
that this social group represents that will be at stake. There is no justice, let alone 
compassion, in dealing with dissidence when the stakes are understood in absolute 
terms of winners and losers, of haves and have-nots. In such cases, the fear may be 
worse than the reality. At the same time, the fear of “creative destruction” has not 
prevented the state from promoting progressive political policies and selling an 
image of the country as politically stable and culturally tolerant; it will continue to 
do so as long as it earns dividends from running a simulacrum of a system of 
inclusive institutions. Lacking substantive change, the problem will grow. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the present article relies on select theories of political economy, 
mainly those of Piketty (2014) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) to show that 
national development and income inequality depend on national institutions. The 
more inclusive institutions are, the more democratic and prosperous a nation is. If 
Morocco’s ultimate dream has been since independence in 1956 to make it to the 
club of democratic and prosperous nations, and if that dream has been elusive thus 
far, the answer to the failure of democracy along with the states’ structural programs 
to shore up chronic poverty, unemployment, and income inequality lies in politics. 
While the economic growth rate of industrialization per anum has enabled the 
country to be more competitive on a global scale, its political institutions are 
impeding any progress towards the country’s espoused economic and political 
aspirations. The secret to successful national development is not to succumb to the 
irrational fears of privileged elites but to invest in the dreams of hard-working 
everyday citizens, to provide the necessary educational support and legal 
protections that allow the citizenry to fully participate in both the economic and 
political life of the country. 
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Abstract 
This essay explores the vast potential for participatory and sustainable 
human development in Morocco. Though Morocco is a country with many 
diverse resources, it remains burdened by severe levels of poverty and 
illiteracy, and now growing social discord. There have recently been 
increased public calls for participatory development programs designed 
and implemented by and for local people. The essay identifies six existing 
Moroccan Frameworks intended to initiate decentralized human 
development programs, and critically examines their efficacy. Ultimately, 
the purpose of the article is to suggest a new model to implement these 
Frameworks with maximum impact. The six Frameworks deal with 
municipal development plans, a sub-national funding agency, 
decentralization, environmental protection and agriculture, women’s 
rights, and youth engagement. Each of these Frameworks present positive 
ideals which are not fully being capitalized on currently because they lack 
sufficient resources and momentum individually. By integrating the six 
Frameworks to function in tandem, Morocco could achieve its goal of 
initiating widespread decentralized, sustainable development programs 
that truly impact local communities in positive ways. 
 
 
Introduction 
This article provides an overview and analysis of Morocco’s national policy 
initiatives as related to critical issues of local development. In recent years, while 
Morocco has put in place the right frameworks for mobilizing rural communities to 
advance the nation’s sustainable development goals, it falls woefully short when it 
comes to implementation. What is sorely needed is an action plan for 
implementation that provides community training and evaluation processes for 
assessing progress. As someone who has been engaged in rural development in 
Morocco for the past 26 years, this policy analysis assesses Morocco’s sustainable 
development goals highlighting the different frameworks that exist, an analysis of 
how these frameworks can work together and complement each other, and 
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recommendations for how to engage and empower local communities to 
successfully interact with and implement them.  
Since 2000, the author leads a Moroccan-U.S. civil organization that assists 
local communities in their identification and management of priority development 
projects—in the sectors of agriculture, education, health, and women’s and youth 
empowerment—and achieved initiatives located in the 12 regions of Morocco. The 
community-driven data gathering, assessments, consensus-building, and overall 
project experiences engaging with most ministries and administrative tiers have 
afforded the author realistic local and national contextual perspectives, which is 
drawn from in this essay, in combination with literature on these subjects. 
The utilization in the essay of the terms participatory development, sustainable 
development, and human development is deliberate, as it is also in their embedding 
in Moroccan national policies. Participatory development refers to community 
beneficiaries of development being in control of all phases of the project cycle, from 
design to evaluation. The process of local people planning projects together and 
sharing information itself creates positive outcomes; however, the participatory 
approach or “method” (King Mohammed VI, 2008) as commonly referenced in 
Moroccan codifying documents) seeks the fulfillment of the participants initiatives 
and the measurable change they create (Green & Haines, 2002, p. 14), such as in 
regards to employment, clean water, and girls’ participation in education. 
Sustainable development focuses on the characteristics that enable project 
outcomes to endure, which evaluations over the decades since World War II and 
from all parts of the world show people’s participation to be most causal.1 After all, 
sustainable project designs incorporate the full range of factors that bear on matters 
of development, such as cultural, economic, environmental, financial, historic, 
political, and technical dimensions. Indeed, the more inclusive and participatory 
during the project development experience, the more the opportunity is given that 
the full range of factors or points of view will be injected into the project design 
and decision-making processes. This operational definition, which can also be 
found in Moroccan formative programs, such as the National Initiative for Human 
Development discussed below (Kingdom of Morocco, 2016), suggests that the 
concept of sustainable development has evolved to become more multifaceted since 
its coining in a United Nations report in 1987, when it heavily (or even exclusively 
(Holdgate, 1996) emphasized natural resource management as its determining 
factor. 
Finally, human development, also based on pragmatic principles made 
functional and evaluative by the United Nations (HDRO Outreach, 2019), refers to 
 
1 A 1990 study of 52 USAID projects across different sectors showed a positive correlation 
between participation of beneficiaries and project success—almost as strong as between 
availability of funding and success (see Bhatnagar & Williams, 1992, p. 10). The World 
Bank’s evaluation of 121 rural water projects around the world showed that one of the 
strongest correlations with success was local participation and capabilities—and that it was 
more significant than technical solutions and capital expended (see Uphoff, Esman, & 
Krishna, 1998, p. 36). An analysis of five case studies of development projects in Thailand 
suggests that people’s participation is the most critical determinant in attaining 
sustainability (see Gonzalez, 1988, p. 42). 
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the conditional opportunities to create the change we seek in our lives. Its focus is 
on strengthening personal and group-related capacities (such as in participatory 
decision-making, project management, and supporting organizational growth) in 
order that effected communities analyze social and natural conditions and design 
and create projects that enhance their livelihoods, education, health, and 
empowerment. Morocco’s goal is to utilize participatory approaches to achieve 
projects that are sustainable and that measurably enhance the standard of living, 
knowledge, longevity, and engagement in society.  
Morocco is a nation of immense promise in terms of its human development 
potential (The World Bank, 2019). The country's naturally bountiful landscape, if 
combined with dynamic social development frameworks, could transform Morocco 
into a bottom-up haven of community-managed projects and facilitate change in 
Africa and the Islamic World. On the other hand, should Morocco not sufficiently 
achieve publicly acceptable levels of development, which is currently the case 
particularly in rural areas and with marginalized groups, other nations in the region 
may feel deterred from committing itself as Morocco has done to charters of 
decentralization, women’s freedoms, and participatory community action, for 
example. In other words, Morocco’s successful local people’s development 
movements are for the profound benefit of its own sustainable future, and due to its 
geographic and historic position it is also for the sake of serving as a guiding model 
well beyond its borders.  
  
An Action Plan to Implement Morocco’s  
Frameworks for Sustainable Development 
The following six national policy and programmatic frameworks form the 
pillars of people’s development in Morocco. The questions this article addresses 
are: how can the six frameworks better fulfill their individual purposes? And, how 
can the frameworks work or relate with each other to create sustainable and 
participatory human development that is managed by the local community 
beneficiaries, with the support of decentralized administrations and partnerships?   
These frameworks, which are established national policies and laws that cover 
the entire country, aim to initiate human development that is participatory, 
decentralized, and sustainable. People-driven initiatives that the frameworks could 
enable are, for example, programs through which women define and achieve what 
they want within communities, while learning laws that advance and protect their 
status in the family and society. The frameworks could help youth overcome the 
risks of an exceedingly difficult life, such as their condition of being more likely to 
be unemployed the more they are educated (USAID, 2018a). The Moroccan 
development approach also provides a basis for innovative (and organic) agriculture 
to grow while aiding rural civil associations to plan and create new projects that 
meet local needs.  
It is not the insufficiency of the principles and guidelines of these frameworks 
that accounts for the hardships that afflict the Moroccan people, especially those in 
rural areas. There is generally inadequate coordination among ministries to achieve 
the synergies of these national initiatives, and a lack of popular understanding and 
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the needed skills in order to translate them into reality. Central to fulfilling this 
development model is the transfer of knowledge focused on how to organize 
community meetings where people together determine the projects they seriously 
need and build the multi-sectoral and multi-tiered partnerships to achieve 
implementation. 
The six government-constructed Moroccan frameworks that set out to guide 
community and national growth are:  
 
1) The Municipal Charter, amended in 2010, requires the creation of multi-
year community development plans that are formed by people’s 
participation (Secretary General of the Government, 2019); 
 
2) The National Initiative for Human Development, which was launched 
in 2005 to provide access to sub nationally-managed funding for 
multidimensional development projects in rural and urban communities 
(INDH, 2019);  
 
3) The Decentralization Roadmap, first unveiled in 2008, and the Charter 
ratified in 2018, synthesize three pathways to empower regions, provinces, 
and municipalities in development and self-determination: delegation, de-
concentration, and devolution (Ministry of Interior, 2019); 
 
4) The Green Morocco Plan, written in 2008, recognizes that essential 
financial grants and technical contributions are needed along the entire 
agricultural value-chain—from nurseries to processing—to overcome the 
systemic poverty that afflicts most rural households (Maroc Vert, 2019); 
 
5) Morocco’s Family Code, or Moudawana based on the Maliki School of 
Sunni Islam, was reformed in 2004 to promote equality and joint 
responsibility between men and women (United Nations, 2004); and 
 
6) Youth leadership programs created by the ministries of National 
Education and Vocational Training; Higher Education and Scientific 
Research; among others, to increase youth employment and involve young 
people in decision-making in civil society and the public sphere (The 
World Bank Group, 2019).  
 
There are other important and forward-thinking national developmental 
approaches. Stated briefly, these additional frameworks include: a) Morocco’s 
commitment to the Maghreb Union bloc and African unity, with regionalism 
representing a transitional phase to global competitiveness (Soludo, 2003, p. 273) 
and a strategy to deal with regional challenges, such as pollution and illegal 
immigration (Duina, 2006, p. 20); b) the formalization of laws and reforms in 2002 
and 2018, respectively, to promote the growth of civil organizations and 
cooperatives; c) renewable energy actions (which, however, should be realigned to 
be more household-driven) (Hanger-Kopp, Komendatova, & Zejli, 2016); d) culture 
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preservation while incorporating human development benefits, such as the example 
of Moroccan Muslim-Jewish collaboration for building organic fruit tree nurseries 
for family farmers and schools (Ben-Meir, 2018); and e) a multidimensional trade 
strategy that attempts to balance global free trade with protections from hegemonic 
powers enabled by integrated regional markets and rewarding domestic markets 
(Delener , 1999, p. 1). Nonetheless, the six frameworks listed above lay out 
exemplary guidelines and potential community empowerment basis, according to 
this author, that are critically needed for these and other national programs and 
policies to be implemented productively, inclusively, and equitably. 
Sadly, essential human development outcomes are not being realized in 
Morocco as hoped and needed. I have found after observation and engagement with 
Moroccan development from positions in civil society, government, and academia 
that there is an abysmal pace of rural sustainable development. There are few 
examples in which government agencies and officials have successfully applied 
participatory development methods, even though these methods are codified in 
national charters and policies. This is largely not the fault of the personnel and 
officials, but the result of their lack of training to facilitate inclusive community 
planning. 
The participatory approach has developed and expanded to comprise hundreds 
of “families” or methods of carrying out group dialogue on community needs and 
data-gathering to identify and meet project development goals (Kumar, 2002, p. 
16). To enable an inclusive planning process to take place the approach applies 
visual—and therefore generally accessible—diagramming and planning centered 
around projects addressing high-priority goals (Lyons, Smuts, & Stephens, 1999, p. 
10). Typical methods of analysis include mapping, where local communities 
analyze household wellbeing, risks, and community assets and gaps. Using visually-
based methodology, community members improve their ability to determine and 
evaluate solutions to problems, create and present action plans, link available funds 
with priorities, manage projects, and advocate successful local initiatives for greater 
scale. 
There is a severe lack of development progress in rural areas, where 75% of all 
impoverished Moroccan people reside; they experience close to five times the 
national poverty rate (Noury, 2007). The social discontent from chronic poverty has 
boiled over into disruption and localized demonstrations, mostly in the north. 
Considering the overall ineffectiveness of Moroccan development programs—no 
matter how progressive their founding visions—there is reason to be seriously 
concerned that growing civic dissatisfaction will continue to outpace the rate of 
fulfillment.  
The urban-rural stratification remains alarming and is growing in Morocco 
(The World Bank and the Morocco High Commission for Planning, 2017), even as 
both groups generally experience economic hardship. Rural communities have great 
agricultural and human development possibilities in regards to the range of potential 
organic and endemic food product, niche artisanal crafts, and available markets; yet 
in recent years, there has been a 15% rise in households that consider themselves 
poor (The World Bank and the Morocco High Commission for Planning, 2017). 
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They lack basic essential human development projects such as water for irrigation 
and clean drinking water; rural women’s and children’s education; completing the 
agricultural value-chain, from tree and plant nurseries to processing and 
commercialization of product; and people’s empowerment to implement their own 
initiatives. 
The problem is that Morocco’s programs for national growth and development 
through people’s participation are not being orchestrated in tandem. As will be 
explained, and as recently acknowledged by the Moroccan government (Purgeon, 
2018), integrating these programs would enable their mutual reinforcement to 
promote accelerated growth and success of development initiatives. In response to 
the public calls by King Mohammed VI that the nation reconsider its development 
model, this essay takes the position and explains with case evidence that it is the 
implementation process of the nation’s development model that requires the major 
reevaluation and overhaul, not the guiding principles or vision of the model itself 
(Koundouno, 2018). 
This article recommends a new action plan to advance Morocco’s sustainable 
development—emphasizing disadvantaged people and regions and resting on 
participatory democratic methods and decentralization. The challenge that Morocco 
faces, however, to achieve its vision is seriously daunting, especially when we 
consider that even as there is supporting evidence of the efficacy of participation on 
a small scale, there is insufficient evidence around the globe of its effectiveness as 
a strategy for broad-based and long-term social change (Cleaver, 2001, p. 36). Thus, 
the successful unfolding of Morocco’s bold development approach, guided by its 
frameworks, bears existential consequences for itself, its position on the larger 
African and Middle Eastern stage, and potential transfer to other nations of the 
world by exemplifying a decentralized participatory development course. 
To Morocco’s lasting credit, key laws, policies, and programs already exist—
for instance, the Moroccan Constitution itself—to promote development projects 
that reflect locally shared priorities and have democratic decision-making and 
governing arrangements. The lack of rural development is predominantly due to the 
poor implementation of the existing frameworks, the continued pervasive poverty, 
and widespread gender biases—not lack of opportunities. Morocco has declared 
positions on sustainable development that could result in successful, scaled 
community movements, engaging and improving life within the society, but only if 
applied correctly.  
As will be discussed in section six, the outstanding potential of Morocco’s 
agricultural economy—with strategic local community investments in 
implementing farm-to-fork initiatives—is that it can become the financial engine to 
create projects in education, health, new businesses, and capacity-building in 
management and technical areas, to implement the change that local communities 
and their associations determine. The organization and process necessary to achieve 
sustainable, revenue-generating enterprises is supported by Moroccan laws, and 
prototypes of community initiatives have proven successful. Fortunately, social 
conditions and economic opportunities—coupled with a sense of necessity, if not 
urgency, to fulfill—are such that a significantly more accomplished Moroccan 
model could potentially be at hand in the not-too-distant future. 
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Morocco’s Municipal Charter 
The first framework, Morocco’s Municipal Charter, requires locally elected 
representatives to create one-, three-, and five-year development plans derived from 
people’s participation in the determination of local projects. This could be a major 
chance for sustainable development to take hold as people’s participation and 
financing are the key factors of project sustainability (Chambers, 1993, pp. 11-13). 
However, in Morocco there is a constant challenge: elected members to municipal 
councils, who are given the responsibility to carry out the community plans, are 
typically not trained in facilitating participatory project methods. Representatives 
(and other community members) would highly benefit from applied learning 
workshops organized by government, civil society, universities, and socially 
responsible businesses to effectively fulfill the development-related articles of the 
Municipal Charter. 
Catalyzing widespread and inclusive development projects means first 
implementing experiential training programs for university students, 
schoolteachers, technicians, civil society members, elected officials, and local 
people, for example, to be active agents of participatory development. Through 
hands-on training, the aforementioned municipal development plans can reflect the 
actual will of the people in regard to the projects and future they most want. The 
participatory community planning approach has been applied with success in a wide 
variety of situations. The projects cited below all successfully emerged from group 
assessments of their own needs. In rural areas, improvements have taken place in 
farming systems (Chambers 1993, p. 957), food production (Ruddell, 2002, p. 186), 
natural resource management (Campbell, 2001, p. 382), cooperatives (Sargent, 
1986, p. 109), land use (Forester, 1989, p. 103), pest control management (Uphoff, 
Esman, & Krishna, 1998, p. 70), sanitation (Vernooy, Qui, & Xu, 2003, p. 99), and 
protected area management (Warford, 1989, p. 19). Similarly, in the field of 
business and public services, improvements have been noted in business 
management and production, infrastructural projects, poverty alleviation and 
economic development, technological developments including software, 
architectural planning, community control of policing and schools, the creation and 
delivery of services, and waste management (Ben-Meir, 2009, pp. 235-237). 
With regard to health care, improvements are visible in terms of access and 
empowerment for the disabled (Jason, Suarez-Balcazar, Keys, Taylor, & Davis, , 
2004, p. 4), disease control (health education) (De Koning & Martin, 1996, pp. 1-
2), sexual and reproductive health (Kumar, 2002, p. 49), public health, and nutrition 
(Hampshire, Hills, & Iqbal, 2005, p. 340). In pedagogy, this methodology has been 
shown to assist formal and informal education (Jason et al., 2004, p. 4), experiential 
learning and communication (Campbell, 2001, p. 382), adult education (Kumar, 
2002, p. 29) and—on college campuses—in increasing student involvement in 
academic decisions (Wengert, 1976, p. 27) university-community partnerships 
(Van der Eb et al., 2004, pp. 224-225), gender and youth development (Pancer & 
Krasnor, 2002, p. 62), and in overcoming racial prejudice and other forms of 
discrimination (Wengert, 1976, p. 27). Participatory planning methodology 
improves disaster management, including crisis situations such as war and drought 
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(Kumar, 2002, p. 49), as well as their amelioration and peace-building (Rodríguez, 
2000, pp. 147-148), management of displaced people (Brand, 2001, p. 962), 
emergency relief in a conflict situation (Symes & Jasser, 2000, p. 149), and the 
work of welfare organizations (Thomas-Slayter, 1995, p. 9). Finally, it is cited as a 
crucial factor in improved organizational development (Kumar, 2002, p. 29); 
building civil society (Symes & Jasser, 2000, p. 149); human resources 
management (Taylor, 2001, p. 122); project and program evaluations (Campbell, 
2001, p. 382); management practices (Cornwall & Pratt, 2003, p. 4); and policy 
development, reform, and advocacy (Kumar, 2002, p. 29).  
Much of Morocco’s development success depends upon dispersing skills to 
create and assist inclusive community planning meetings as well as implementing 
the projects that become designed by the people, who are the project beneficiaries 
and managers. The Municipal Charter—directing the administrative tier closest to 
the people—establishes an avenue for the success of participatory development. 
People-driven projects instituted in the Municipal Charter, are necessary for 
sustainable development and actualization of the other frameworks that compose 
the Moroccan model. Without local representatives understanding how to 
implement people’s participation in development and without the local people 
aware of this vital right, plans are typically drafted in a top-down manner with 
impossible or unrealistic levels of uniformity. It has come to the point that the 
statutory requirement to create community plans through genuine participatory 
processes now often appears merely rhetorically. In my experiences over recent 
years, on multiple occasions governors have voiced concerns upon their reflection 
of the quality of the plans they receive; municipal council members discuss their 
desire to fulfill the participatory planning requirement while being without the 
information and material capacities to do so; and municipalities resorting to outside 
expertise to conduct the needed local assessments are able to access a limited 
number of people due to time and trust level constraints—discouraging the 
continued momentum that is needed to achieve project implementation and 
sustainability. Skills-building workshops in facilitating local consensus as well as 
gender- and youth-based dialogue to understand the different needs among the 
different demographic groups are absolutely critical if these dimensions of the 
Municipal Charter are to be effectively delivered.  
I have met municipal council members in the Beni Mellal, Marrakech, 
Mohammedia, and Taroudant provinces who cite their Charter’s statutes and state 
they are without instruction on how to procedurally accomplish development plans 
generated from the people. It would be helpful if actual participatory planning 
methods were included at the annex in the published Charter that all council 
members receive at the approximately 1,500 municipalities. Considering the lack 
of guidelines on how municipalities might proceed, it is not a surprise that I have 
also met governors of provinces who faced the impossible likelihood of receiving 
identical development plans from more than a dozen municipal councils. The plans 
contained the exact projects defined by hundreds of villages at the same precise 
level of priority, having been copied from one another. Effectively training council 
members and others in real community settings can be the primary remedy against 
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this awful loss of opportunity and result in plans for projects that accurately reflect 
the people’s ideas. 
 
The National Initiative for Human Development 
The second framework, Morocco’s National Initiative for Human 
Development (NIHD), is a national fund for infrastructure projects, capacity-
building, social and cultural revitalization, and job-generating activities on the sub-
national level. Its budget through 2023 was approved in September 2018 at $1.9 
billion (North Africa Post, 2018). 
In theory, the NIHD should primarily help to actualize development projects 
designed under the Municipal Charter. Indeed, the NIHD and the Municipal Charter 
can only be successful if they work in tandem. The NIHD is meant to help fund the 
participatory development plans embodied in the Charter and finance the projects 
that local people expressed they most need during participatory planning processes 
(such as during the fulfillment of the Communal Charter requiring such actions) and 
want to implement, helping to ensure their sustainability. If this were the case, and 
if the NIHD’s budget were doubled through 2023, then it is my assertion—based 
on budgetary analyses and project evaluations at municipal levels—that Morocco 
could potentially fulfill its development model and vision through local community-
driven development movements that incorporate multisectoral partnerships at all 
administrative tiers, rather than remaining ranked 123 among nations on the Human 
Development Index following an enormity of expenditure, intentions, and effort 
(United Nations Development Programme, 2018). 
If the Municipal Charter does not result in projects properly defined over the 
course of community-wide meetings (inclusive to the general public (Mikkelsen, 
2005, p. 72), disadvantaged groups (Kapoor, 2002, p. 104), professionals (Swantz, 
1982, pp. 114-115), and the vulnerable (Kumar, 2002, p. 51), which is unfortunately 
often the case due to inadequate participatory training and finance, then it can be 
expected that the NIHD will not have adequate local projects to fund and that the 
aggregate of results fall short of national goals, as is already happening. 
There are many other practical NIHD reforms to increase its development 
impact. First, the provincial administrations of NIHD should accept development 
proposals all year round. As of now, the shifting periods during the year when they 
receive proposals mean that opportunities open and close, and most local 
associations and cooperatives remain unaware.  
Second, the NIHD should be maximally flexible to fund the range of projects 
communities determine most important to them (whether in health, education, 
construction, etc.). The NIHD’s criteria regarding project types they consider 
supporting also often changes, such as their across the board prohibition in recent 
years of local community construction projects, while rural community priorities 
have remained consistent, such as building of preschools, drinking water towers and 
irrigation canals, and work centers for local cooperatives and associations.  
Third, the NIHD should double the amount of the funding ceiling for local 
projects to $60,000 to enable construction of irrigation systems, agricultural 
processing facilities, and other vital infrastructure, as well as reduce the requirement 
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that recipients contribute toward the financial amount requested to 10% from the 
current 30%. The requirement to co-invest is understandable because it seeks to 
encourage buy-in and a deeper level of commitment by the beneficiaries. However, 
the 30% level has become a prohibitive barrier for many people to access the 
program, as was expressed by community representatives in the Oujda, Beni Mellal, 
Marrakech, and other regions.2 In-kind giving on the part of community applicants, 
such as labor and land, should be acceptable by the NIHD in place of the financial 
contribution. Furthermore, there also appears to be a many month lag between when 
beneficiaries manage to pay their financial contribution and when NIHD finally 
disburses the total grant. In Morocco, it is customary for financial transactions 
related to goods and services to be immediate upon delivery, just as people’s needs 
are immediate. The NIHD ought not be an exception to this norm.  
Finally, and most critically, the NIHD should co-create project proposals 
among its staff with the prospective local beneficiaries. Rural areas’ illiteracy rate 
is nearly double that in urban places at over 40%, and rural women’s illiteracy is 
close to double that of men (Hemidach, 2015). Drafting the required project 
proposals and documents is impossible for people and communities who could most 
utilize NIHD. Credit Agricole, Morocco’s leading bank that finances professionals 
in agriculture and the agri-food sector, and USAID in northern Iraq are starting to 
gain experiences in co-creating project proposals with community representatives 
and beneficiaries,3 lessons from which might be helpful if NIHD adopted this 
approach. Incorporating these measures and aligning the NIHD and the Municipal 
Charter regarding participatory planning and development could create a sharp rise 
in the implementation of new local development projects that are consistent with 
the necessities of sustainability. 
 
Moroccan Decentralization 
The “roadmap” of Moroccan decentralization—derived from a series of public 
statements of the King of Morocco since 2008—aims to utilize ongoing national 
level engagement (devolution) along with sub-national partnerships (de-
concentration), to help implement community projects (delegation). In other words, 
the Moroccan pathway aims to rally national resources and partnerships for local 
development. In principle, this is good for sustainability. However, appropriate and 
lasting construction of decentralized systems must happen in tandem with the 
implementation of community planning, projects, and partnership-building between 
the public, private, and civil sectors (Friedmann & Klauss et. al., 1984, pp. 189-
194). These relationships and joint development actions are what decentralized 
systems are actually made of, and this requires sustained community initiatives on 
a widespread basis. Therefore, without the Municipal Charter and the NIHD 
working together, adequate decentralized arrangements of public administrations 
will neither be effectively formed nor adequately enduring. 
 
2 Yossef Ben-Meir, based on meetings with community representatives in the regions of 
Oujda, Marrakech, Beni Mellal, and others during 2018-19. 
3 Ali Benmokhtar (Credit Agricole, Marrakech) and Timothy Lavelle (USAID, 
Washington, DC), based on meetings with Yossef Ben-Meir in 2018.  
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Morocco’s decentralization has been referred to as “regionalization,” meaning 
that its emphasis is on the devolution of power to its 12 regions (Pignon & 
Braconnier, 2017). Nevertheless, regional public administrative centers in Morocco 
remain too distant from the dispersed communities of their jurisdictions. This 
causes considerable delays of basic authorizations needed to carry development 
initiatives forward. Even provincialization, which is the breakdown of regions into 
their provinces, resembles an unnecessary limitation on reasonable actions for 
sustainable change and growth. 
In Morocco overall, decentralization has not significantly taken hold, which 
only further suppresses new local development. The national level still generally 
decides the parameters, terms, cases, and situations for sub-regional actions, as I 
have observed generally across all ministries that engage in sustainable human 
development as part of their mission. For example, local education directors defer 
decisions about opening beds in a middle school dormitory, During the fall of 2018, 
the King of Morocco tasked the government to submit a draft Decentralization 
Charter, which has now been developed and would ideally bind national and 
regional government agencies to specific functions for the administration of human 
services (ElJechtimi, 2018). The human development course of the nation depends 
upon clear articulation and implementation among the relationships between public, 
civil, and private institutions.  
Without hardly a mention of the municipal level, the Decentralization Charter 
will likely fall short of enabling the system of sub-national management of 
development to fulfill its promise for Moroccan local communities. The elements 
of the Municipal Charter, particularly the community creation of participatory 
development plans, should clearly be referenced in the Decentralization Charter, as 
well as the central elements of the Decentralization Roadmap being de-
concentration (intersectoral subnational partnerships) and delegation (community 
management). Devolution (ongoing national level engagement) is already well 
codified in the Decentralization Charter, whose function appears to be that of 
establishing parameters for the national and regional levels to interface, without 
establishing the necessary roles of the provinces and municipalities with the 
nation’s decentralization system. 
Decentralization advances autonomy of societies to determine their own 
development path (Parfitt, 2004, pp. 538-539). Brazilian economist Theotonio Dos 
Santos stated that for developing nations to no longer be dependent on foreign trade 
and be able to build a locally controlled economy, they must restructure internally 
and direct their development efforts and resources toward the interior, which 
decentralization can help to do (Dos Santos, 1978, pp. 57-80). For Dos Santos 
(1978), internal conditions determine the potential effects of the international 
situation (pp. 57-80). Therefore, he suggests that underdeveloped economies 
develop their own productive autonomy. Decentralization by its very nature 
promotes the growth of alternative centers in what were previously areas of the 
periphery. A certain amount of autonomy from political, administration, and 
economic national centers and from global dynamics is thus created (Rolly, 2001, 
p. 55). Decentralization then becomes a potential means of conflict resolution by 
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providing autonomy to sub-regions, which can have a stabilizing effect (Hulbe, 
1980, p. 56).  
Here again, informational workshop sessions on decentralized organization and 
its bottom-up formation are necessary with national, regional, and local leaders. 
Conducting workshops that help demonstrate overlapping parallels between 
localized control over social affairs and Islamic religious concepts would also be 
helpful and is sorely needed today. For some national leaders, particularly Islamists, 
this could heighten decentralization’s appeal by placing it in this cultural-traditional 
context, where it can be naturally integrated. For example, some writers on Islamic 
political philosophy describe the notions of shura, ummah, baya, and tawhidi as 
involving dimensions of local governance, social justice, leadership, and personal 
empowerment (Said, Abu-Nimer, & Sharify-Funk, 2006, pp. 159-162). By 
developing understanding as to how Islamic precepts relate to characteristics of 
participatory decentralization, supportive coalitions can be expanded by having 
more shared frames of references for furthering sustainable development. By further 
developing this understanding as to how specifically Islamic ideas exist in 
participatory and decentralized pathways, development advocates are able to 
expand the community of the people and groups with whom there may be regularly 
dialogue and partnership, with more closely aligned and relatable frames of 
references.  
There are concerns that the process of decentralization in pursuing 
development may lead to destabilizing political outcomes (Rolly, 2001, p. 56). With 
regards to Morocco, the emphasis on participatory approaches by local communities 
to create these projects centers around their livelihoods and meeting their immediate 
human needs. Having directly or indirectly helped bring about local meetings and 
projects in all its 12 regions, I have observed no basis for concerns that stem beyond 
these developmental factors involving the unrealized plethora of socioeconomic 
and environmental opportunities of the people. Communities are focused on 
meeting their needs; creating and furthering their associations and cooperatives 
toward their goals; and somehow addressing what can seem stifling difficulties for 
progress. There has certainly been ample opportunity to redress the needless 
poverty, and there still is if only Moroccan leadership were to fulfill the model of 
decentralized participatory development to which it is committed.  
However, human service ministries’ consistent deference to Rabat remains as 
fixed as ever. Reflecting upon dozens of meetings regarding community 
development projects in an array of sectors since 2008 when the Decentralization 
Roadmap was launched, my experience begs the question: What compels regional 
directors of public agencies that oversee the different human service deliveries over 
vast areas to still refer to central administrations for their approval of modest-sized 
initiatives and partnership agreements? Is it that they actually do not understand 
their full authority or that it has not been specifically enough defined, or is it that 
the pattern of centralized behavior is so deeply entrenched that regional managers 
are not as of yet comfortable or confident to execute the power that they have? Even 
as these possible explanations are ultimately conjecture within an ongoing 
decentralization process, it may be a combination of these and other factors that 
keep decentralization an intention rather than a reality. 
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Understandably, executing decentralization, particularly at an accelerated pace, 
can be a delicate balance. The local level is stratified socio-economically, 
environmentally, and in regards to gender just as it is on the societal level and 
globally (Brohman et al., 1996, p. 235). Advancing decentralization quickly can be 
fraught with unhelpful consequences, such as entrenching further the locally 
affluent and political classes (Heller, 2000, p. 139). However, genuine 
implementation of frameworks one and two could create the initial participatory 
and sustainability conditions that would enable Morocco to eventually opt for an 
emerging form of decentralized development management to the municipal level. 
In order for this to unfold, local communities and their associations require greater 
guidance, support and practice in managing projects (that incorporate multi-sectoral 
partnerships) through their different phases, and to also directly experience their 
development benefits. 
  
Moroccan Agriculture and Rural Development 
The fourth framework, which is constituted by Morocco’s agricultural 
development programs to promote product cultivation, processing, and 
commercializing, are not making a sufficient difference for the majority of farming 
families who cultivate five hectares or less of land and who experience intractable 
poverty (Maroc Vert, 2019). The social unrest in northern Morocco is a direct 
reflection of the ongoing rural poverty and a fallout in the application of the 
country’s agricultural, human development, and participatory frameworks. Rural 
poverty—despite immense local and national potential—is the “Achilles’ heel” of 
Morocco’s stability and, ultimately, national prosperity. 
Local people are left deeply frustrated with the anemic progress made over the 
past three decades in implementing rural development projects they prioritize—a 
period that has seen rural poverty increase most dramatically in the 1990s (Levy, 
2005) and is currently three times higher than urban poverty (Ghanem, 2015). I 
would suggest that the rural poverty conditions in Morocco are increasingly 
impossible to justify. Even with viable projects aplenty, donors and financiers 
complain of a lack of viable business and development proposals. But how could 
that be when, for example, farming communities know exactly the irrigation 
infrastructure that is needed to uplift all village households? Local people 
consistently prioritize this, yet even when the local beneficiaries would gladly 
contribute their labor in-kind, there has been no construction. Irrigation 
infrastructure projects are prohibitively expensive, especially in mountain areas, 
and hardly any other project will more greatly improve agricultural production, food 
security, and income.  
Rural development conditions are very problematic; there are the near complete 
losses of local fruit tree varieties of fig, apple, pear, grape, clementine, carob, date, 
and others that are endemic to the northern region, and other varieties elsewhere in 
Morocco. These local crop varieties are encouraged in Morocco’s “Green” plan for 
agriculture. The crops offer a genetic resource for small farmers that enhances food 
security in the face of water scarcity and climate change. However, agrobiodiversity 
remains seriously undermined because of a few high-yielding varieties that cause 
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genetic erosion; in addition, there is the backing of government programs that 
currently deem agriculture for export of greater national importance (Ouarghidi, 
2018). 
This is occurring in Morocco at a time when billions of trees and plants are 
needed (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Rural Development and Waters and 
Forests, 2013). Farming families are also compelled by the market and population 
to transition away from growing the traditional staples of barley and corn. 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture, these staples are grown on 70% of 
agricultural land, yet account for only 10-15% of agricultural revenue (King 
Mohammed VI, 2008). Government tree nurseries have been closing over the years 
when they should be at maximum production capacities based on the enormous 
public demand for trees. One simple policy shift would make a profound difference 
for tens of thousands of farming families—fig and potentially walnut trees 
(depending on water availability) should be allowed to be planted at high elevations 
on public domain lands, just as carob is allowed on public domain lands in lower 
lying ones.  
One of the intolerable consequences of rural poverty is the horrendous drop in 
participation in education of rural girls, particularly between primary to secondary 
schools, which is three times higher than urban girls and 15% higher than rural boys 
(Benyakhlef, 2017). In addition to gender role expectations, such as domestic work, 
marrying early, and fear of ostracization, other contributing factors of lower female 
participation are insufficient dormitories, affordable transportation, and adequate 
decentralization (Auletto, 2017). Many rural families must choose between sending 
their daughters to fetch drinking water miles away or sending them to school. 
Available safe drinking water improves girls’ education outcomes more than boys 
(Khandkur, Lavy, & Filmer, 1994). 
Agricultural programs understandably put pressure on the entire upstream 
value chain, from nurseries to markets, of raw and processed product. Enormous 
value is lost by Moroccan family farmers due to tree and seed dependency, 
irrigation inefficiency limiting the size of arable lands, ineffectual or nonexistent 
cooperatives, and by selling their raw product through traditional local market 
channels. These conditions characterize the experience of the vast majority of 
farming families, who are without the production capacity, partnerships, and means 
to add value and reach a consistent standard and quality of product necessary to 
enter more rewarding markets. These stifling barriers ensure that up to five times 
the average household income is lost as compared to if a viable cultivation, 
production, and management system were in place, based on my conservative 
calculation. Thus, rural people’s potential savings, income, and revenue for 
reinvestment—their basis for growth—only serve to improve livelihoods elsewhere 
while they themselves reap no benefit. 
Agricultural finance programs have to make choices as to where they can 
catalyze the greatest possible developmental difference with their limited resources. 
In this regard, project priority solutions are widely shared and are in irrigation: 
water canals, basins, towers, pipes, pumps, infrastructure—all of which can 
conserve water by 50% or more and create the opportunity to expand agricultural 
cultivation. Meeting the equally-widespread need for clean drinking water could be 
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appropriately incorporated into the technical scheme. Only approximately 60% of 
rural Moroccans have access to clean drinking water. Though this has increased 
from 14% in 1995, access to house connections and good water sources has 
improved only slightly (Benargane, , 2017). Clean drinking water projects remain 
a top priority expressed by rural communities. Too often, there seems to be a 
disconnect, as in this case, between the national human development figures that 
show marked improvements, and the reality of rural communities that have been 
left behind. 
The obvious counter-response to the recommendation regarding irrigation is 
that there are already government programs to subsidize some of these activities for 
farmers (pressure drip systems, for example). However, those programs need to be 
brought to the farmers where they are, and the needed partnerships and local 
institutional growth are aided by facilitating farmers’ strategic planning, outreach, 
and experiential learning. Programs should fund nurseries on public land lent to 
community associations to reduce risk and cost to farmers, similar to what the 
Moroccan High Commission of Waters and Forests, public schools, universities, 
and others have done with the High Atlas Foundation (HAF), the U.S.-Moroccan 
nonprofit organization I founded and help lead that works to strengthen cooperative 
capacity-building in management and technical areas, organic, food safety, and 
other certifications, and revolving lines of credit in order for cooperatives to acquire 
certified product for its processing and sale. The results of these combined actions, 
as HAF has observed in rural cases in Morocco, will be a surge in cultivation and 
market-ready product, along with improved local organization, reinvestment in 
human development, and decentralized partnerships that conduct decision-making 
considerate of such multiple factors. The HAF model can be adopted and adapted 
by other community-based organizations. 
For example, the Moroccan Jewish community is also participating in the 
national agricultural development effort by providing land in-kind to cooperatives 
and associations (with HAF guidance and support) in order for rural communities 
to build their needed tree nurseries, and most recently in the Province of Ourzazate 
with government funding to help build the irrigation infrastructure and assist inter-
cultural collaboration. The 300 or so agricultural extension centers and the 54 
training schools in Morocco under the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Rural 
Development, Water and Forest should be fitted for endemic and organic fruit tree 
and medicinal plant nurseries. In this way, these locations will be natural extension 
technical skills transference sites for the surrounding areas, essential in order for 
Moroccan communities to generate the one billion agro-forestry trees the nation 
requires (Ben-Meir, 2015). Their students and staff should be the future trainers 
who are themselves trained experientially in facilitating participatory planning and 
development projects with local communities. 
But how do we get there? Again, the first framework of the Municipal Charter, 
forming community development plans driven by the intended beneficiaries, 
women and men of all ages, is key for sustainable agricultural project identification 
and implementation. Facilitation of project development is helpful and needed; in 
this regard, establishing centers of participatory planning to assist with dialogue, 
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meeting space, and coordination will be vital. Provincial governors and other local 
leaders who understand the important contribution such centers can make should 
exercise greater authority to assign underutilized public or civil building 
infrastructure for this participatory development purpose.  
 
Moudawana and Women’s Empowerment 
The fifth framework, Moudawana—Morocco’s family code—represents a 
major opportunity for equality and prosperity for women. Like the deficiencies in 
positive outcomes from the other frameworks relative to opportunity, the ground-
level application of Moudawana’s articles—which are of a rights-based approach 
to sustainable development—have not broadly translated into positive change for 
the vast majority of rural women. In an action-research study conducted by the High 
Atlas Foundation, 94% of 194 participating women in the rural Al Haouz province 
said that they had never heard of Moudawana. The purpose of the study was to assist 
the High Atlas Foundation in the delivery of workshops that involve 1) recognizing 
and exercising rights, 2) growing capacities for participatory cooperative 
development, and 3) building the knowledge and facilitative skills of citizens in 
empowerment processes.  
The lead researcher, Gal Kramarski (2018), stated in her yet unpublished 
results, “All groups mentioned illiteracy as a core obstacle that holds them back 
from knowing their rights” (p. 15). The distances between communities and their 
closest middle and high schools create practical (infrastructural) and cultural 
barriers for participation in education by rural girls. Without cell phone coverage 
and independence, one person expressed the sentiment: “No one cares about us, we 
are neglected here; how could we know our rights?” Kramarski (2018) observed, 
“Many women indicated that they are dependent on their relatives; their lack of 
financial and social freedom prevents their access to rights” (pp. 17-18).  
The observations from the fore mentioned study, and the ongoing 
empowerment program it launched, point to a multidimensional course to advance 
the status and opportunities of Moroccan women. First, 10 urban women from 
universities in Marrakesh who were part of the above study, and all of whom had 
awareness about Moudawana as an issue of political and civil struggle recognize 
the opportunity to strengthen the capacities of both rural and university women in 
Morocco by facilitating women’s workshops that teach integrated self-discovery, 
Moudawana rights, and cooperative development programs. Such exchanges have 
many reciprocal advantages. 
Second, in order to expand empowerment experiences and development, it 
would be helpful to have the theoretical and methodological perspectives of 
Western and Islamic feminisms analyzed together for similarities and differences. 
Their integration could create enhanced approaches and outcomes toward greater 
participation, potentially benefiting both societies (or civilizations).  
Third, self-discovery, human rights-based, and confidence-building strategies 
can then also achieve greater financial independence for women through 
cooperatives, further human development, management and technical capacities, 
and social networks. Just as participatory planning needs to result in measurable 
improvements in people’s lives to be successful, so too should the women’s 
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empowerment processes result in more sustainable development. For example, Gal 
Kamarski’s (2018a) published report indicates that the initial self-discovery 
workshops, utilizing participatory democratic procedures, helped women to identify 
economic solutions for development. A group of 35 Moroccan women in the 
Marrakesh region addressed illiteracy by hiring a female university student and 
starting a literacy program in their village, and 65% of participants have joined 
parent associations and are actively involved in efforts to improve local schools for 
their children’s benefit.  
Finally, education alone is not enough to increase women’s employment, as 
evidenced by the fact that in Morocco, women already comprise 47% of the 
population holding a tertiary degree of some kind, and yet the vast majority remain 
marginalized from the workforce (“Ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment,” 
World Bank World Development Indicators Database, 2010). Education programs 
must be combined with empowerment workshops to give women the confidence 
they need to overcome patriarchal notions preventing them from entering the 
workforce. Women, as community leaders, also must be involved in identifying and 
implementing development projects. Only with women’s close involvement will 
such projects truly be successful at the local community level and beyond.  
 
Youth, Activism, and Development 
The sixth framework—the advancement of youth enterprises and their civil and 
political participation in decision-making—is full of opportunities and challenges 
in Morocco. There are many avenues to engage youth in community-based 
volunteerism and internship experiences for human development. It comes down to 
investment, leadership, and implementation management. University-based action 
research and service learning, youth centers, and schools show every day how they 
can be the catalysts for people’s projects and social change, while forging students’ 
best possible futures through formative skill-building. However, lack of funding 
makes it hard to maintain these programs, which actually form the basis to redress 
the 40% urban youth unemployment and extenuate innovative social development 
(Reddy, 2017). In the long term, these programs, which are not very expensive, pay 
for themselves, especially when considering the hope and sense of purpose these 
experiences give young people and the development results that youth subsequently 
create in their communities.  
Capacity-building programs for groups of young people—such as in education 
and youth center settings, with urban students assisting local communities, and 
children protection centers—should couple two streams of mutually reinforcing 
actions. First, the application of participatory methods among the youth training 
participants, so that they themselves analyze and strategize to achieve their self-
defined needs. Simultaneously, they learn the participatory approach. Second, as 
they learn planning methods from their own use of them, the students apply the 
techniques with neighboring communities to affect change beyond their own 
schools, centers, or neighborhoods. In this way, student and community projects are 
identified and implemented as skills in participatory planning and project 
management are built among the youth participants. Learning-by-doing is cost 
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effective, but it requires management and integrated programs involving participant 
reflection, writing, collaborative learning, and critical thinking.  
 
Conclusion—Morocco: Setting the Table for Sustainable Prosperity 
The Moroccan frameworks for development enumerate what is needed to 
catalyze sustainable development of marginalized areas and groups, and a few 
instructive cases have proven capable of bringing ideas to full implementation with 
replicable and enduring results. These successful cases underscore the importance 
of participatory approaches for defining and implementing sustainable initiatives. 
They encourage decentralization in order to enable local communities and civil and 
public agencies to make decisions and allocate resources for people’s projects. The 
frameworks target rural communities, women, and youth in recognition of their 
disadvantaged situations, and their role as key drivers of transformational change.  
Taken together, these frameworks provide the needed comprehensive pathways 
for the people of Morocco to achieve the future they want, providing a course and 
means to help reach their human development goals. The Municipal Charter could 
provide the plans for project development and sustainability that the National 
Initiative for Human Development could then get behind and help accomplish. 
Decentralized arrangements are subsequently built and enhanced through 
community project implementation that involves multi-sectoral partnership. 
Moroccan agriculture and agroforestry, with its income-generating and 
environmental-enhancing potential can and should be the engine for self-reliant 
financing of the people’s projects, especially in rural areas that need it the most. 
Agriculture projects also become identified and determined through the process of 
implementing the mandates of the Municipal Charter potentially providing jobs for 
university trained project facilitators. The Moudawana embodies a rights-based 
approach and recognizes the centrality of sustainable development as a product of 
human rights. Thus, it not only secures and protects the just and rightful status of 
women and girls but also enables a vital pathway toward independence in regard to 
economic decision-making and empowerment. For youth, increased programs to 
promote experiential learning, the creation of capacity-building community 
projects, and the building of employable skills improve both urban and rural 
livelihoods.  
To highlight and reiterate, implementation priorities must include:  
 
1. Provide community development training/workshops; 
2. Create Centers for Participatory Rural Project training, planning, and 
implementation; 
3. Empower greater decentralized local control in identifying and 
implementing development projects; 
4. Provide more irrigation infrastructure; 
5. Provide greater support for agroforestry, especially for indigenous 
plants that strengthen biodiversity; 
6. Involve and empower women to take active roles in development 
project planning and implementation; and 
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7. Involve and empower youth especially through schools and self-study 
experiential learning programs to take active roles in development 
project planning and implementation. 
 
Sustainable development depends on people’s participation. The first steps to 
improving community development in Morocco have been taken and rest within the 
existing frameworks themselves. Communities now need to learn and apply these 
frameworks in their daily lives by gathering, assessing, implementing, and doing. I 
have found that all that is needed is to give men and women of all ages the chance 
to come together through community workshops. If successful, implementing these 
frameworks will ultimately deliver projects that they and their families have hoped 
for too long. Thus, empowered rural communities will transform Morocco into a 
model for sustainable development. 
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Abstract 
This article focuses on Laila Marrakchi’s film Rock the Casbah (2013), 
which reflects the exchange between global and local cultural and 
sociopolitical ideologies of a new Morocco. The film highlights the 
contradictions of globalization as it occurs through disjuncture. Arjun 
Appadurai’s theory of the world in motion and “a world of flows” provides 
a relevant framework for this analysis. The article uses Appadurai’s notion 
of “disjuncture” as a theoretical framework to discuss the dynamics and 
interrelationships involved in the protagonist’s movement between 
Western mediascapes as a filmstar and her Moroccan family’s local 
context. Appadurai’s conceptualization of globalization is crucial for 
understanding the inherent disjuncture between the homogeneity of media 
representations and the local heterogeneity of Morocco. One aspect of the 
film represents the reality of a changing, glocalized Morocco. Another 
engages with Western media tropes in order to reveal the false 
representations of reality that are often depicted in Western films. The 
film’s panoptic vision reveals the power structures present in both the local 
and global contexts, inspiring the viewer to imagine new identities and to 
be more aware of glocal possibilities. 
 
 
Moroccan women filmmakers such as Laila Marrakchi construct a particular 
model of Moroccan cinema emerging from a global perspective.1 Such a 
perspective is enhanced by their connection to Europe and the United States, their 
multinational production, as well as by the significant attention their films have 
drawn at international festivals. Most contemporary Moroccan women filmmakers 
enjoy international funding and have international connections, as this is the only 
way they can produce their films. What they also share is professional 
 
1 In his essay “The Limiting Imagination of National Cinema,” Andrew Higson (2000) 
examines if Benedict Anderson’s theory of the nation is relevant for investigating national 
cinemas. Higson argues that an understanding of national cinema needs to take into account 
more transnational aspects of cinematic production, since the communities imagined by 
cinematic techniques tend to be transnational. 
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marginalization and a common project of solidifying a woman’s gaze and claiming 
subjectivity, as they struggle against the sexist ideologies that control their filmic 
productions both at home and abroad. Despite the relative circulation of their films, 
Moroccan women filmmakers remain marginalized because of the hegemony of 
Hollywood constructions of spectatorship and distributions of film, which is true 
for practically all filmmakers outside Hollywood.2 The circulation of their films in 
the digital age has been mainly aided by different media and platforms such as 
Amazon and Netflix (Caillé, 2016, p. 72). The category “Moroccan women’s 
cinema,” however, is very broad and does not communicate important factors such 
as generational issues and other differences in contexts and locations. For example, 
Valérie Orlando has noted the difference between Moroccan filmmakers living at 
home and those in the diaspora. She argues that, “Young audiences have 
emphatically supported international MRE [Marocain résident à l’étranger] 
productions because they associate them with what they think is most important: 
connection, not only to their own country, but to the outside world” (Orlando, 2011, 
p. 39).  
This article focuses on Marrakchi’s film Rock the Casbah (2013), which 
highlights the changes in Moroccan society and culture that have happened since 
the 1990s shaped by the sociocultural, economic, and political forces of 
globalization. Being part of the diaspora, Marrakchi enjoys a unique vantage point 
as a commentator from both inside and outside Morocco. My use of the term 
“diasporic” in describing Marrakchi is framed by cultural theorist Stuart Hall who 
defines diasporic cultural producers as those who adopt in their work a “diaspora 
aesthetic” and “diaspora identities” “which are constantly producing and 
reproducing themselves anew through transformation and difference” (Hall, 
1995/2006, p. 438). In this sense, the term diaspora refers not necessarily to 
Marrakchi’s physical movement from a place, but also to the unconventional ways 
in which she represents the reality of a new Morocco which is often perceived by 
conservatives as “unconventional.” 
Marrakchi also fits the framework of cinéma-monde, a concept that has been 
used to describe emerging transnational francophone cinema from former French 
colonies. Florence Martin has argued that the “translocal” and global funding of 
cinéma-monde constitutes “a de-orbiting from” France, “since we are no longer 
dealing with postcolonial films … with France as the main pull, but rather with a 
reconfiguration of transnational teams for a local/translocal/transnational 
collaboration of people, and movements of ideas and languages that are de-centered, 
 
2 With regards to Moroccan women’s cinematic production, I would like to suggest that we 
can read their films drawing on certain feminists of color’s frameworks pertaining to class, 
race, and ethnicity. This intersectional approach will allow us to consider racial, gendered, 
and cultural hegemony in film criticism. Despite these filmmakers’ relative wide 
circulation, only few scholars study their films, with the exception of Francophone scholars 
such as Valerie Orlando, Suzanne Gauch, and Florence Martin, among others, who only 
work on non-Hollywood films. My views echo those of bell hooks who notes that film 
theory has erased the cultural productions of women of color when she points out that 
“Feminist theory rooted in an historical psychoanalytic framework that privileges sexual 
difference actively suppresses recognition of race” (hooks, 1992/2003, p. 214). 
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de-orbited, free” (Martin, 2016, p. 473). Thus, it would be safe to label Marrakchi 
as a cinéma-monde cineaste whose film Rock the Casbah draws in global and local 
parameters. It uses the international languages of cinéma-monde, which permeate 
films from former French colonies, including Morocco, all while decentering 
hegemonic languages and narratives. Brian Edwards has argued that since the 
1980s, Moroccan cinema has adopted American models against the French model 
because the American model has proven to be freer and far from domination 
(Edwards, 2007, p. 292). Marrakchi appropriates the tools of American cinematic 
styles not only to free herself from French domination but also to counteract 
Hollywood’s misrepresentations and false images. Rock the Casbah begins with the 
tunes of the 1940s Hollywood musical “On the Road to Morocco,” thus squarely 
setting the referential mood of the film. While, at first glance, it contains many 
familiar elements of Hollywood movies, including an upbeat Hollywood-style 
narrative, a closer reading readily reveals serious elements of critique. The film 
mixes melodrama, which is marked by sensational themes and suspense, with 
humor. It also employs a fantastical ghost played by Omar Sharif who offers 
commentary on the actions of his family in the style of a Greek Chorus. The use of 
Arabic, French, and English in the film has significant implications. The 
relationship between the use of French and the influence France held in Morocco is 
called into question. Moroccan characters are not only bilingual, but also understand 
English. Their use of French is a consequence of French colonialism, but their 
understanding of English is more related to polycentric multiculturalism and a 
decentering of France. The film then can be interpreted as being informed by Ella 
Shohat and Robert Stam’s (1994) theory of polycentric multiculturalism which “is 
about dispersing power” (p. 48), thus de-centering authority and foregrounding 
multilingual and global spaces. 
Marrakshi’s film is reminiscent of other films about globalization such as 
Alejandro Iñárritu’s diasporic Babel (2007), which displays an array of languages 
but no dominant language, thus contributing to lack of communication across 
borders. Both Rock the Casbah and Babel highlight global connections combined 
with disconnection and exclusion. 
 
The Plot and Sub-plots 
Well-financed, Rock the Casbah is polished, demonstrating impressive and rich 
color designs. The setting is the beautiful estate of Sophia’s father Moulay Al 
Hassan, a well-off businessman in Tangier who benefited from economic 
globalization. Yet, the beautiful façade hides a world of violence, incest, and severe 
punishments. The film interweaves two different narrative strands that take place in 
two different parts of the world (the United States and Morocco) in a way that 
highlights global connectivity. The film consists of a main plot and two sub-plots. 
The main plot centers on Sophia’s immigration from Morocco to the United States 
to become a Hollywood movie star, at the price of being typecast as a terrorist. 
Sophia is a diasporic migrant who, as an actress, only plays roles involving violence 
and immobility. Her privileges in Morocco, however, are a result of her father’s 
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wealth, which has made it possible for her to immigrate to the United States and 
initiate a career in Hollywood. 
The first sub-plot revolves around the dead father who has a large presence on 
the screen, often commenting on his funeral and interacting with Sophia’s son, 
Johnson, who he has not met prior to his death. Moulay Al Hassan introduces 
himself to the audience as a businessman who has just passed away. His death 
prompts the gathering of his family members to honor the three-day mourning 
period. The audience hears Moulay Al Hassan observe, “The old man on the table, 
the body, is me. I died yesterday of a heart attack … There was no announcer to 
prepare me for it. … But fortunately, as our saying goes: The dead rule the living.” 
Hearing the dead patriarch talk about what he is seeing, the filmmaker is making 
him omnipresent and a charismatic presence through his commanding gaze. His 
wife is worried that he will reappear and reproach her for mismanaging the funeral. 
His daughter Kenza refuses a cigarette for fear he is watching. In Foucault’s 
(1977/2012) words, the father is a “panopticon,” a symbol of the disciplinary power 
of surveillance (p. 196). The dead father is an observer who can oversee everything 
and everyone; each person is seen by him but they, themselves, are limited in what 
they see. What the film reveals from outlining the history of Moulay Al Hassan’s 
surveillance and punishment is a shift from a bodily spectacle, where the dead body 
is seen by all family members, to the dead man as all-seeing and all-knowing, even 
after his death. Moulay El Hassan’s “gaze is alert everywhere,” which renders his 
family “a segmented, immobile, frozen space” (Foucault, 1977/2012, p. 195). 
Through the lens of the panopticon, different layers of narratives unfold in the film.  
In the second sub-plot, the film’s rich estate makes clear the gap between 
Morocco’s poor subalterns and the global elite who have benefited from flows in 
globalized neoliberalism. To further dramatize such divisions, the film tells the 
story of Zakaria, the son of the family servant, who falls in love with Leila, the 
daughter of Moulay Al Hassan, who embodies the wealth and privilege that Zakaria 
has been denied. The details of their love story provide the context of the spectacles 
and dramas that later unfold in the film. Their love relationship ends in tragedy as 
Leila commits suicide when banished to London by her father and forced to have 
an abortion. The tragic side of the relationship between the two lovers is tied in the 
film to the new relationship that almost developed between Zakaria and Sophia. At 
the end, the film provides a vision of a new world beyond the gap between wealth 
and poverty when Zakaria learns that he is Moulay Al Hassan’s biological son and 
thus set to inherit half of his father’s fortune. Thus, we see at the funeral how the 
camera now captures a different image of the dual worlds, as Zakaria and his mother 
pose for a family picture with the rest of Moulay Al Hassan’s family members. 
Although far from perfect, world order is also restored in another happy ending 
when Sophia reconciles with her American husband. 
Rock the Casbah echoes Marrakchi’s earlier film Marock (2005), which also 
focuses on the vast gap between the world of wealth and privilege and the world 
below. It portrays an unconventional relationship between a Jewish boy and a 
Muslim girl. Both films, through stunning scenes and diverse perspectives, make 
manifest the complex movement of global capital, products, peoples, and ideas. 
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Critical responses to Marrakchi’s films 
Critics of Marrakchi have focused mainly on the global aspect of her films, as 
well as the impact of globalization on gender roles, without taking into account her 
subtle critiques of globalization. Brian Edwards discusses the cultural choices in her 
film Marock (2005). For Edwards, the circulation of American cultural products in 
Marrakchi’s film Marock promotes a Hollywood-like product that becomes the 
dominant narrative. Edwards describes Marock as a Hollywood teen romance that 
“exhibits the circulation of an American look, which is doubled by the film’s 
interest … in American commodities” (Edwards, 2016, p. 165). However, such 
reading overlooks the complexities that characterize the process of globalization. 
American culture has permeated Morocco via Western media, but its consumption, 
as Stuart Hall (1997) notes, is “a process of profound unevenness” (p. 33), which 
can generate a sort of defensive assertion of local cultural identities. The 
consumption of American cultural products is not necessarily to be equated with 
the Americanization of local culture. In this regard, Edwards questions “the ways 
in which American cultural products circulate through the world and what the 
meaning of their transnational circulation portends for U.S. hegemony (both 
political and cultural)” (Edwards, 2016, p. 22). 
My reading of Rock the Casbah draws from cultural studies more than film 
studies, particularly critical globalization theory. Through this lens, the film 
highlights the contradictions of globalization as it occurs through disjuncture. Arjun 
Appadurai’s (1996) theory of the world in motion and “a world of flows” (p. 4) 
provides a relevant framework for my analysis. Appadurai argues that globalization 
involves five scapes or disjuncture that occur in global contexts which are usually 
more manifest in the developing world than in the West. These are ethnoscapes, by 
which he refers to the mobility of people; mediascapes, by which he refers to the 
global flows of images produced by a variety of media such as film and television; 
technoscapes, by which he means the dissemination of technology across borders; 
financescapes, which refer to the global flows of finance, and ideoscapes by which 
he means the global flow of ideologies such as freedom and human rights 
(Appadurai, 1996, p. 35). The relation between these scapes is marked by 
disjuncture, separation, and dislocation rather than unity. I will use Appadurai’s 
notion of “disjuncture” as a theoretical framework to discuss the dynamics and 
interrelationships involved in Sophia’s movement between Western mediascapes as 
a filmstar and her Moroccan family’s local context. Appadurai’s conceptualization 
of globalization is crucial for understanding the inherent disjuncture between the 
homogeneity of media and the local heterogeneity of Morocco. 
 
The “Glocal” in Rock the Casbah 
The term “glocal,” which is related to Appadurai’s notion of disjuncture, 
represents the tension between the local and the global in Marrakchi’s film, thus 
providing a new space for a new identity that is neither limited by local values nor 
by the stereotypes perpetuated by Western media. The term glocal was first used by 
sociologist Ronald Robertson when he stated during a 1997 conference that 
glocalization "means the simultaneity—the co-presence—of both universalizing 
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and particularizing tendencies” (“Glocalization,” n.d.). An Encyclopedia 
Britannica entry further explains glocalization as constituting “a challenge to 
simplistic conceptions of globalization processes as linear expansions of territorial 
scales. Glocalization indicates that the growing importance of continental and 
global levels is occurring together with the increasing salience of local and regional 
levels" (“Glocalization,” n.d.).  
Marrakchi is eager to depict images that are constructed from a local point of 
view despite her global connections to France and the United States (she is married 
to an American film director and she resides in France). In one interview, she is 
quick to affirm her strong connection to Morocco when the interviewer remarks that 
some Moroccans view her as an outsider: “I feel I’m deeply Moroccan and anchored 
in my roots. I also feel very Parisian. For a long time I worried about this, thinking, 
‘I’m a crossbreed. …. What’s annoying is that some Westerners expect me to be an 
Arab filmmaker and to focus on what is miserable, to have the same approach as 
the media’s … I’ve tried to show something else, from the inside” (Koral, online 
interview). Hers is an identity in motion that breaks borders because of her on-going 
in-depth contact with Morocco despite her diasporic status. Marrakchi’s reference 
to the Eurocentric and imperialist perspective of Western media and its 
misrepresentations of Arabs shows that she is aware of the politics of post-
colonialism, a view certainly also evident in her protagonist’s career as an actress 
in Hollywood playing terrorists. While she critiques media representations that are 
biased and Eurocentric, she particularly challenges the racism and sexism that are 
present in Hollywood. One could also say that Sophia is Marrakchi’s alter ego. The 
film highlights their connections through their participation in Hollywood 
filmmaking and their marriages to American filmmakers. 
 
Disjuncture between Global Media and Local Meanings 
Rock the Casbah reflects the exchange between the global and the local cultural 
and sociopolitical ideologies of a new Morocco. One aspect of Marrakchi’s film 
represents the reality of a changing, glocalized Morocco. Relatedly, another 
engages with Western media tropes in order to reveal to Moroccans the false 
representations of reality that are often depicted in Western films. Sophia’s 
participation in Western media places her at the dis/juncture of the global and the 
local, between the United States and her Moroccan family. The film highlights the 
ruptures that she experiences as she navigates authoritarian structures both within 
Hollywood and Morocco. The positive aspects of Hollywood’s global and 
international aspirations foster imagined communities, and this is initially an 
attractive position for women like Sophia who are in pursuit of freedom and self-
fulfillment. However, type casted, the only roles she is given to play in American 
films are those of terrorists. She might have opted to act in some other roles if they 
were available, but she was assigned only stereotypical depictions. Her American 
lifestyle and her insistence to a travel agent at the beginning of the film that she is 
a Hollywood film star make it clear that she is proud of being a successful actress. 
Yet, American ethnic and cultural stereotyping in her roles is obvious: all Arabs are 
potential terrorists whose religion and values place them in opposition to American 
beliefs. In the aftermath of 9/11, Western media has perpetuated images of Muslim 
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men as terrorists and oppressors of women (Abu-Lughod, 2006, p. 7). In creating a 
female terrorist heroine, Marrakchi mocks a Hollywood that has continuously 
exaggerated a hegemonic masculinity, and a subordinate, submissive femininity. 
The film critiques Hollywood’s stance with respect to typecasting Arabs in roles 
full of racist clichés, as either villains or caricatures.3 
By exposing the stereotypes of Western filmmaking, Marrakchi’s film 
deconstructs the industry’s ideological messages and false representations. Sophia’s 
Moroccan family is in shock as they watch one of the scenes in which she is strapped 
to a suicide bomb and about to pull the trigger, shouting “Allahu Akbar.” This 
particular scene also shocked Moroccan audiences, who watched Rock the Casbah 
following the Casablanca and Marrakech bombings that occurred in 2003 and 2011. 
The film criticizes the way American media associates Islam with terrorism and 
portrays Muslims as suicide bombers, and how such misrepresentations affect the 
feelings of Moroccan audiences and generates their strong reactions. Marrakchi 
regards Hollywood’s representations as a disjuncture between what is represented 
on the screen on the one hand and the reality in the local Muslim context on the 
other hand. Reminiscent of Canada’s hit television series Little Mosque on the 
Prairie, and through the technique of film within a film, Marrakchi shows how 
global media images of Muslims are recreated and influence the very local context 
where Sophia’s family is situated, as her Moroccan family now view Sophia with 
suspicion and ridicule. She is subjected to mockery when her sister Miriam whispers 
to her mom that Sophia “never does anything like normal people.” Sophia’s 
experience with her family exemplifies the cultural disjuncture that occurs when 
global actors (pun intended) attempt to relocate themselves in local contexts.  
 
Anxious Border Crossings as Acts of Transgression 
Sophia’s mere return to Morocco provokes fear and anxiety. She is not 
enjoying free circulation even though she is “cosmopolitan.” She has to come to 
terms with two ideologies, in Appadurai’s framework, that represent two axes of 
power. The first ideoscape represents Western media (also a mediascape) which 
assumes a homogenous stereotype of Muslim women as terrorists. The second 
ideoscape is Moroccan patriarchy, which assumes that good women are submissive. 
Here, Marrakchi uses her international film to deal with internal issues that 
Moroccans do not want to discuss in public. Control of Moroccan women occurs 
not only overtly through controlling fathers but also covertly through mechanisms 
of normalization whereby women come to internalize power in abiding by norms 
 
3 Jack Shaheen is the most outspoken critic of Hollywood’s stereotypes of Arabs. He states 
that, “the time is long overdue for Hollywood to end its undeclared war on Arabs, and to 
cease misrepresenting and maligning them” (Shaheen, 2012, p. 34). Tania Kamal Al Din’s 
1999 documentary Hollywood Harems also examines Hollywood movies since the 1900s 
that have perpetuated stereotypes about Arabs. She looks particularly at the image of the 
oversexualized and exotic Arab female beauty who is rescued from the harem by a white 
male hero, thus adding to the corpus of race and gendered images that constitute fantasies 
about the orient and contribute to the homogenization of Arabs. This study is pertinent in 
light of continued racial profiling of Middle Easterners in the aftermath of 9/11. 
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and understanding themselves by way of these norms. Power is inscribed in 
women’s bodies through their very actions and commitments to norms that render 
them, in the words of Foucault, “legible and docile” (Foucault, 1977/2012, pp. 187-
188). According to Foucault (1977/2012), disciplinary power in the modern era is 
not public but rather “exercised through its invisibility” (pp. 187-188). 
Entering Morocco, Sophia experiences that the border is a site of policing that 
exercises control of women. The border is a gendered site where women are not 
viewed as independent agents but only on the basis of their relationship to a man 
who is either a father, a brother, or a husband. Their act of crossing without a man 
is deemed a transgression (Macklin, 2009, p. 276). The disjuncture resulting from 
Sophia’s movement results in a display of power by the border agent, who ignores 
her greeting, flirtatiously asks her to remove her glasses, and reprimands her for not 
carrying her Moroccan national identity card: “Even though you have a U.S. 
passport, you are still Moroccan.” The agent also ridicules her son’s name 
“Johnson,” and makes a snide remark that her son cannot be Moroccan because his 
father is American. The agent’s comments on her perceived cultural transgressions 
are interrupted by a stranger who asks him to “spare her,” because her father is the 
boss of a famous company. Such scenes demonstrate what Moroccan feminist 
Fatima Mernissi (1987) means when she states that in Moroccan culture some men 
have the right to police women in public space (p. 82). 
The viewer also senses such anxiety in the scenes in which Sophia interacts 
with her family. Brian Edwards argues that globalization triggers local anxieties 
(Edwards, 2007, p. 296). Globalization is often perceived as a threat when it comes 
to identity and uniqueness. This explains the schizophrenic and anxious 
consciousness represented in the film, where some Moroccans still want to claim “a 
pure culture.” In one scene, Sophia’s grandmother reproaches her for not teaching 
her son Arabic and decries that “marrying a foreigner produces little bastards.” The 
disjuncture between the local and the global is evident here since the grandmother 
is open to American cultural products when she eats a hamburger from McDonald’s, 
but objects to Sophia’s marriage to an American. The circulation of American 
cultural products is at variance, as Appadurai would affirm, with the rejection of 
others (ethnoscapes). The film presents the viewer with a mixed marriage between 
Sophia and her American husband Johnson but, despite the tone of hope that the 
film sets for acceptance, conservative ideologies put a strain on their relationship. 
Sophia’s uncle instructs her son to eat couscous with his hands the Moroccan way 
and accuses Sophia of being ashamed of her Arabic roots, alleging that she did not 
bring her American husband for fear “he would be scared off by her Arab family.” 
Her sisters Miriam and Kenza also chastise her for trying too hard to assimilate to 
U.S. culture. Sophia bonds with Zakaria to escape her family’s dramas, not yet 
realizing that he is her half-brother. Marrakchi forces the viewer to think about such 
disjuncture and their implications for a new Morocco. Hence the film demonstrates 
tensions between local traditions and the global manifestation of different cultural 
norms and meanings. Disjunctures become most acute when people’s values are 
met with a counternarrative. 
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Glocal Disjuncture 
The film portrays contradictory images of gendered and social values in 
contemporary Morocco. It also highlights the image of the “modern” woman as a 
global subject represented by Sophia who feels at home in the United States and 
speaks only English to her son. Initially, American culture presented a viable 
alternative to a local culture which Sophia views as too exclusive in its adherence 
to authenticity and purity. The United States offers her opportunities for freedom 
and self-realization that do not exist yet in her Moroccan family. The United States 
is also portrayed as a model of cultural hybridity and progressive notions with 
respect to immigration and citizenship, as the film coincides with the presidency of 
Barack Obama. Sophia’s sister Miriam is represented as a modern woman, who 
flirts openly with her doctor and expresses her sexual desire in a free, nonchalant 
way. Miriam’s attitude shows a disjuncture between the images perpetuated by 
Western media and the local realities of Moroccan women. There is also a 
disjuncture between the manner in which Moroccan women like Sophia and her 
sisters are conducting themselves in Moroccan society and the local norms 
regarding gender relationships. In this regard, when confronted by her sister Kenza 
about her entanglement with the doctor even though she is a married woman, 
Miriam acts as if there is nothing wrong with her behavior. Such attitude is in 
conflict with local norms regarding male-female relationships and interactions. 
Miriam might have been exposed to the idea of open relationships from Hollywood 
movies, which can be accessed easily in Morocco through local cable networks. 
The film also shows the disjuncture between global and local values as 
manifested in the changes of aesthetic values. Miriam’s plastic surgery to augment 
her breasts shows the interplay of both patriarchy and consumer capitalism in the 
construction of the “modern” woman in Morocco. Global forces have influenced 
women in their new interest in body images and sexuality. Through Miriam’s 
obsession with finding the perfect body, Marrakchi suggests that Moroccan men’s 
preferences and global market forces dictate what Moroccan women should look 
like, forcing them into conformity and self-inflicted violence. While Miriam defines 
herself through her body, her older sister Kenza has constructed her identity in terms 
of her job as a schoolteacher and a stable marriage. In one scene, she is portrayed 
performing the Muslim prayer. As shown in the film, the different experiences of 
Sophia and her sisters indicate that globalization in Morocco has created 
heterogeneous and contradictory situations for women. 
The film contrasts the roles of women in the global north with their roles in the 
local context. Gaining insight into the role of women in her family results in 
Sophia’s own self-perception of positive change for herself in the United States, 
and a feeling of superiority with regards to women in Morocco. She scolds Kenza 
for marrying her cousin and becoming a schoolteacher just to please her father. She 
also mocks Miriam’s plastic surgeries, challenging her to be a critical thinker 
instead of following latest fashions and trends: “If they all wore the veil, would 
you?” When her mother advises her against getting a divorce, Sophie exclaims, “So 
I accept everything like you? Like all the women here?” The film seems to be 
critical of the way Sophia has internalized Western media’s biased portrayals of 
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Moroccan women ignoring their lived diversity. Such patronizing attitude clearly 
originates from Western media’s stereotypes and objectification of Moroccan 
women as lacking agency. Lila Abu-Lughod has written about the disjuncture 
between Muslim women’s experiences and public attitudes in her book Do Muslim 
Women Need Saving (2013). She points out how “popular rhetoric is put to political 
use” (Abu-Lughod, 2013, p. 8) in the United States, where mediascapes serve also 
as the ideoscapes of the state, which continues to target Muslims through its 
discriminatory policies. 
In fact, Western media’s rigid representations of Moroccan women have 
misconstrued Moroccan women’s reality. The film shows that much has changed 
in Moroccan culture since the 1990s. Morocco now has a new generation of 
Moroccan women with new ideas and more freedom. On the day of their father’s 
funeral, the sisters do not seem to be constrained by traditional expectations of 
female behavior. They put scarves around their necks instead of wearing white veils 
as dictated by Moroccan custom. Amidst Koranic chants by the Talba, Miriam 
complains about the scars from her plastic surgery that have not healed, while 
Kenza lights a cigarette, expressing relief that her father who policed her is now 
dead. The sisters also drink American beer a few days after the funeral. The 
surveillance in Foucault’s use of panopticon is repressive and reactionary, as if 
people who are watched are being punished by being watched. The deceased father 
in the film acts as a mischievous and positive force that actually brings the family 
together in the end. While in Foucault’s conceptualization of the panopticon being 
watched is repressive, in the film it is liberating. 
The attitude of the daughters towards their deceased father in the film borders 
on being disrespectful. This is acted out by Sophia through monologues with the 
corpse. Instead of crying over his death, she reads him her sister’s suicide note. 
From Sophia’s perspective, he is to blame for the incestuous relationship Leila 
unknowingly had with her brother Zakaria, and for her eventual suicide. As the men 
taking care of the body prepare to put the corpse in the refrigerator to keep it cool, 
Sophia remarks, “Like a side of lamb. It’s what he deserves.” Sophia’s uncle 
questions her sense of respect and wonders whether “she left it in America.” To 
Sophia, her father’s double standards and hypocrisy invite such disrespect. While 
manifesting local Moroccan values outwardly through his clothes, Moulay Al 
Hassan demonstrated global values through his French speech, a sexual relationship 
with his maid, and his access to Western pornographic magazines. His children are 
unaware of the disjuncture between his reality and what he projected to the outside 
world. In this way, the film is critical of both local Moroccan values and Western 
media. 
 
Global Imaginations 
Appadurai has argued that while globalization is characterized by disjuncture 
“one positive force that encourages an emancipatory politics of globalization is 
the role of the imagination in social life” (Appadurai, 2001, p. 6). The imagination 
is the power through which “collective patterns of dissent emerge,” since it 
“works across national lines to produce locality as a spatial fact and as a 
sensibility … without either the predatory mobility of unregulated capital or the 
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predatory stability of many states” (Appadurai, 2001, p. 6). It is such “patterns of 
dissent” that Marrakchi might have meant during a YouTube interview when she 
refers to the power of Moroccan women’s transgressions in Rock the Casbah. In 
the interview, Marrakchi discusses the intersection between global and local 
customs and pressures in her film. She notes that Rock the Casbah offers an 
insider’s perspective on the sociopolitical reality of Moroccan society and the 
position of its women. Women’s transgressions during the three days of mourning 
following the death of the patriarchal father uncover hidden taboos and the 
hypocrisy of a schizophrenic society. Their transgressions also herald an interior 
revolution that is symbolic of another Arab spring in the making. The film does 
hint at the Arab revolutions as the title resonates with Robin Wright’s book Rock 
the Casbah (2011), where the author discusses the positive dynamics of change 
that are taking place in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab Spring due to 
social media and the power it has on people’s imaginations. Suzanne Gauch has 
astutely noted that the monumental ousting of Tunisian leader Azedine Ben Ali in 
2011 triggered “a newly excited, mobile curiosity” (Gauch, 2016, p. 1). What 
clearly emerges from Marrakchi’s film is how Moroccan women are key agents 
able to navigate the complexities of the current glocal condition and imagine a 
better future. 
In conclusion, the film highlights its characters’ interaction with global forces 
through Western media, where they undergo a disjuncture between their local 
context and global norms, between their lived reality and their imagined 
experiences. Marrakchi uses her film to critique global media, as she tries to 
counter the ideoscapes and mediascapes represented by the power structures of 
American media. In this sense, she has used globalization to critique hegemonic 
narratives which contribute to unease at the local level. The disjuncture stemming 
from globalization have forced characters to reimagine their local identities. The 
film suggests that an imagined glocalization has given women new identities, 
critically aware of both global and local forces and problems. Rock the Casbah is 
critical of how women have been marginalized in Morocco through legal and 
verbal violence, as evident in the scenes that hint at unequal inheritance laws. It 
thus challenges Moroccans to take into consideration women’s rights in 
reimagining the nation.  
The film also departs from the rhetoric of Western anti-imperialism and from 
the anti-Americanism that was prevalent in earlier films of the 1980s such as 
Farida Benlyazid’s Door to the Sky (1988). While the film, at times, idealizes 
what is American, it also shows that Sophia has lost all sense of self, being 
remade in an “American” image, as she strives to be something she is not. While 
Sophia’s mobility has endowed her with an analytical eye in Morocco that might 
have allowed her to effect some change, in the United States, her assigned 
Hollywood role as a terrorist is indicative of her liminality and marginality. By not 
making a more explicit statement against racism in the United States, the film 
highlights the powerlessness of racialized immigrants.  
Sophia is unable to emancipate herself because she is forced to choose 
between two competing ideologies. She either has to be a self-hating stereotype in 
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America or a “modern” woman in a schizophrenic Morocco. The film suggests 
that the transnational is not truly possible because racialized people are unable to 
change the West, thus demonstrating that becoming “modern” is not enough for 
women to escape patriarchy. Sophia was ready to leave her husband and entertain 
a romance with Zakaria until she found out he is her half-brother. When her 
husband returns from the United States at the end, she assumes her passive role as 
mother and wife. The film’s panoptic vision reveals the power structures present 
in both the local and global contexts, inspiring the viewer to imagine new 
identities and to be more aware of glocal possibilities. 
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